| Vessel A was on a southbound course and vessel B was northbound. It was shortly after dusk, a light breeze, calm seas and visibility of around 8 nautical miles. The vessels were transiting an area of high traffic density with many merchant and fishing vessels. There were a number of small fishing vessels in the area, some moving, and others stationary. Vessel A had a group of small fishing vessels on its starboard bow. To stay clear of the fishing vessels, the officer, on watch by himself at the time, decided to keep the vessels to starboard and altered course to port three times over a 20 minute period, while maintaining a speed of 25 knots. The fishing vessels had bright lights, making it difficult to see any traffic behind them. The master on vessel A was doing administrative jobs and visited the bridge a couple of times during the watch. The officer on vessel A tried to plot the multiple fishing vessels, but lost the targets or they moved on the radar. The officer on vessel B was on watch with a designated lookout. The vessel maintained a speed of 12 knots. Vessel B saw vessel A at 5 miles, or 8 minutes before the collision and could see vessel A’s red light on her port bow. The echo trails of both vessels were parallel. He did not realize that there was a danger of collision. Five minutes before the collision, vessel B observed that vessel A was showing a green light. The officer on vessel B gave the order to stop the engine and go hard to starboard. The officer did not plot vessel A. Just before the collision vessel A made another alteration to port. Neither of the vessels sounded any warning signals. The officer on vessel A did not see vessel B until a couple of seconds before the collision and maintained full speed the entire time. The officer on vessel A did not consider slowing down, even when traffic started to become dense. The officer was not fully aware of the situation, as the northbound vessel was not identified behind the cluster of smaller vessels. | WHAT?  Collision in congested waters  1WHY? Vessel A was maintaining 25 knots in congested waters. There was no dedicated lookout, which is requirement as per the company’s SMS and also under STCW regulations. 2 WHY? The chief officer showed an acceptance to take risks and over confidence in his own ability. The master visited the bridge but did not raise concern about the lack of a designated lookout. 3 WHY? Vessel A’s chief officer had not complete situational awareness. The master showed a lack of enforcing policies and following company procedures as the manning on the bridge was insufficient. 4 WHY? Lack of onboard safety culture. 5 WHY? The company had not been able to establish safety culture onboard that followed the company’s own procedures. Consequences: this collision led to the total loss of vessel B which was almost split in half by vessel A. Vessel B broke in half a couple of days later and sank. There was no loss of life, or injuries, on either of the vessels . |
