Dissatisfaction with Current Role

US Role in the World

General International Engagement

A very strong majority supports US engagement in the world and rejects the idea that the US should take a more isolationist stance. However strong and growing majorities show dissatisfaction with key aspects of the current US role in the world and see it as destabilizing. A majority supports US military bases on the soil of traditional US allies, though support for US military presence in the Middle East has become quite soft.

A strong and consistent majority supports the view that the US should be actively engaged internationally. This is particularly true in polls taken since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but was also true throughout the 1990s when there was a common perception that the American public was going through a phase of wanting the US to withdraw from the world in the wake of the Cold War.

Perhaps the most significant evidence is derived from poll questions that have been asked in the exact same form over many years. For example, various polling organizations have for several decades now posed the question, "Do you think the US should take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs?" During the Cold War Americans rather consistently, by a two to one margin, embraced the position that the US should "take an active part." Even in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, a solid majority held this attitude (with an upward spike around the time of the Gulf War). The most recent findings show that while the percentage has come down from its historical high after September 11th, it is still at one of its highest points over the last decade.

Active Part – Stay Out
Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?

Organization	Date	N	Active Part	Stay Out	DonЎЇt know
Chicago Council	7/9/06	1227	69	28	3
GMF/TNS	6/17/05	1000	72	20	8
Chicago Council	7/12/04	1195	67	30	4
GMF/EOS Gallup	6/26/04	1000	79	14	7
GMF/TNS	6/25/03	1001	77	15	8
Chicago Council	6/30/02	3200	71	25	4
PIPA	11/04/01	602	81	14	5
Gallup	06/13/99	1022	61	34	5
Gallup	05/02/99	1014	69	28	3
CCFR	11/10/98	1507	61	28	11
PIPA	9/14/96	1214	66	28	6
PIPA	06/27/96	1227	60	35	6

As a general rule, when poll respondents are presented a statement that is effectively an argument and asked whether they agree or disagree, there is a tendency to agree. Nonetheless, a majority consistently rejects trend line questions that pose arguments in favor of US disengagement from the world. Over the last decade, a large majority has rejected the argument that "Since the US is the most powerful nation in the world, we should go our own way in international matters not worrying too much about whether other countries agree with us or not." Most recently, in a December 2006 Pew poll, a large majority of 68% disagreed, slightly lower than the 73% who held this view when in an October 2006 WPO/KN poll. This is less widespread disagreement than in the March 2004 PIPA poll, which found overwhelming opposition to the statement (79% disagreed, 20% agreed). In a March 2003 Newsweek poll -- even as the US was preparing to invade Iraq despite its failure to obtain substantial international support -- 62% rejected this argument and just 33% agreed with it. These results are consistent with findings for the previous decade. [1]

In another trend line question repeated as recently as December 2006 by Pew, a majority (53%) still disagreed with the statement Ў°the US should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own," holding steady from April 2006 when nearly the same number disagreed. However, while Pew found in March 2003 that only 33% agreed with the argument, 42% agreed with it in October 2005 and December 2006. This increase in those who favor the argument may be representative of public fatigue in dealing with the war with Iraq after three years.[2]

It should be noted that in December 2006-the same month that Pew most recently asked this question, a CBS News poll showed that 52% agreed with the statement that the US should mind its own business (42% disagreed). Given that this is the only time that a majority has ever agreed with this statement, as well as the fact that another organization found quite different finding in the same month, suggests that this finding should be given limited credence.[2a]

Statements in favor of engagement, on the other hand, receive overwhelming support. Similar to the above-mentioned statements, Pew has presented the argument "It's best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs," which has elicited overwhelming agreement--most recently 90% in August 2003. There has been no significant change on this question with the end of the Cold War and after the September 11th attacks, except that there has been an increase in the percentage saying that they agree with this position "completely" (50% in 2003 and 45% in 1999).[3]

A strong majority feels the US should take a leading role trying to stop genocide. In an October 1999 Harris Interactive poll, 70% agreed with the statement that Ў°The United States should play a leading role in developing new and better ways to prevent and react to international problems like Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and East Timor.Ў±[4]

When Beldon and Russonello (February 2000) asked respondents to rate a number of possible reasons for the US Ў°to be active in world affairs,Ў± a reason that was highly rated—mean of 8.34 on a 0 to 10 scale—was: Ў°It is a matter of pride to me as an American that the US be a respected leader.Ў± [5] Other reasons that were rated were:

Our national security depends on our being involved. Mean = 7.73
I want a stable world in which I can travel and appreciate other cultures. Mean = 7.99
We have to protect our economic interests. Mean = 8.24 [6]

Americans overwhelmingly support the idea that the US should play a strong leadership role in the world. Asked in the June 2006 GMF poll, "How desirable is it that the U.S. exert strong leadership in world affairs?" 84% said it is desirable (43% very desirable) with only 14% saying that it undesirable, nearly the same levels of support found by GMF in May 2005 and in the June 2002 Chicago Council poll. PIPA found 85% saying that such leadership was desirable in response to the same question (April 1998).[7]

As discussed below, support for US leadership does not mean that Americans want the US to play the role of world hegemon. Most Americans reject the idea of the US playing the leading role [See US Role: Rejection of Hegemonic Role] and strongly support the US playing a shared leadership role, not be the single global leader. [See US Role: Multilateral Cooperation and International Institutions]

Americans generally see the US as playing a highly influential role and continuing to do so in the future. In July 2006 the Chicago Council asked respondents to rate US influence in the world on a scale of 0 to 10 and found 56% rating it either a 9 (21%) or a 10 (35%), with no other country even approaching this level. When asked in July 2006 to rate US influence in 10 years on the same scale, 48% gave it either a 9 (18%) or a 10 (30%), showing that a large percentage do not believe US influence in the world will change significantly during that time frame.

However, this bullishness on US influence is down a bit. In 2002 the Chicago Council found 55% rating US influence a 10--20 points higher than 2006. Also in 2002 the Chicago Council found 86% that predicted that the US would play an even greater role in the next ten years.[7a]

On the whole, few Americans see US influence in the world as declining, while many more see it increasing. Asked in July 2004 whether the US played a more or less Ў°important and powerful role as a world leader today compared to ten years ago,Ў± 45% said it played a more important role, with 31% saying it played just as important a role, and 20% said a less important role. In the same poll, nearly the same number (41%) thought it played a more important role Ў°as it did in the past,Ў± while 35% saw it playing just as important a role and just 18% said a less important role (Pew Research).[7b]

Contrary to the idea that Americans do not like to see their elected representatives devote time to international problems when there are problems at home, the majority feels they should spend a substantial portion of their time on world affairs. In a June/September 1996 PIPA poll the median respondent felt that the President should devote 30% of his time to international issues, while a Congressional representative should devote 28%.[8]

Poll questions that do elicit a seemingly isolationist response are those that ask respondents to prioritize international and domestic problems-- domestic problems are almost always assigned a higher priority. Numerous polls have asked respondents to agree or disagree with a statement that asserts the relative importance of domestic problems and invariably gets high levels of agreement. Sixty-nine percent agree that Ў°We should not think so much in international terms, but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up strength and prosperity here at homeЎ± (Pew Research, December 2006), a preference consistent with findings from recent years. In an August 2003 Pew poll, an even higher 76% agreed that Ў°We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate at problems here at home.Ў± In a January 2000 Beldon and Russonello poll, 76% agreed that Ў°The US should spend less of its resources on international issues because we have so many problems to solve here at home.Ў± Seventy-eight percent agreed that Ў°The U.S. should address problems at home first, rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countriesЎ± (Kaiser/Washington Post, June 2002). Eighty-four percent agree that Ў°Taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countriesЎ± (PIPA, November 2000). In July 2004, an AP-Ipsos poll asked whether the US has a responsibility to fight HIV and AIDS abroad or whether it should focus on the problem at home: 63% said to focus on the problem at home. Similarly the Kaiser Foundation in March 2004 found 62% agreed more that the Ў°US should address problems at home first rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries.Ў± [9]

However these findings should not be taken at face value. Though respondents place a higher priority on dealing with problems at home when asked whether they think the US should also address problems abroad they consistently say that the US should. In the Kaiser Foundation poll just mentioned 53% even said that the US should increase its spending on fighting HIV/AIDS to in developing countries.[9a]

Another example is a January 2006 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner poll which presented competing (though not mutually exclusive) arguments. A majority of 57% chose Ў°we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home,Ў± and 37% chose Ў°it is best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs.Ў± However as discussed above, by a two-to-one margin or more Americans consistently favor playing an active role in world affairs.[10]

US Global Military Presence

Americans show strong support for the US maintaining a global military presence. When asked about the Ў°long term military bases the US has overseas,Ў± in the 2006 Chicago Council poll about two-thirds said the US should either maintain the number it has now (53%) or increase the number (15%). Twenty-seven percent wanted fewer bases abroad. This shows a very slight increase over the findings from June 2004, when support for having fewer bases was stronger (31%) and weaker for having more bases (11%). In the period immediately after the September 11th attacks, support for military bases overseas was understandably more robust. In the June 2002 CCFR poll only 14% called for the US to have fewer long-term military bases overseas, while 57% said the US should have about as many as now, and 25% said the US should have more bases.[14]

In 2002, 2004, and 2006, the Chicago Council also presented a long list of locations for the US to have such bases. While support was higher in 2002, in 2004 and 2006 substantial majorities favored having US bases on the soil of major allies. These included Germany (57% in 2006 and 2004, 69% in 2002), Japan (57% in 2006, 52% in 2004, and 63% in 2002), and South Korea (62% in 2006 and 2004, and 67% in 2002). Asked specifically in June 2002 about the US having 100,000 troops in Western Europe, just 33% said this was too many, while 53% said it was about right, and 8% said it was too few. This showed increased support relative to an October 1996 poll that asked the same question (43% too many, 47% about right, 3% too few). In the 2002 Chicago Council poll, support for keeping 44,000 troops in Japan was more mixed, with 43% saying this was too many, 45% about right and 5% too few.

Only a slight majority of 54% also supported US bases in Guantanamo Bay. This was down from 58% in 2004 and 70% in 2002: presumably a negative reaction to reports of treatment of prisoners there.[14a]

AmericansЎЇ attitudes about bases in the Middle East are complex and seem to be going through some kind of change particularly when thinking about the future. A majority thinks that at present the US should have bases: asked in December 2006 (WPO/KN) whether they favored or opposed Ў°the US having bases in the Middle East,Ў± 60% said they were in favor (37% opposed). The same poll found a slight majority (53%) saying that long-term US military bases in the Middle East that have been in place Ў°for decadesЎ± have had a positive effect on stability in the region, while 41% see it as having a negative effect.[14b]

Asked about specific bases a slight majority or plurality tends to favor them—but this support is soft and has declined significantly since 2002. The Chicago Council in July 2006 found the highest level of support for bases in Saudi Arabia with 53% in favor—down from 65% in 2002. Similarly 52% favored bases in Afghanistan (up from 47% in 2004, but down from 57% in 2002). Pluralities were supportive in Turkey (46%: down from 58% in 2002), and Pakistan (43%: up from 39% in 2004, but down from 52% in 2002).

When asked about bases in Iraq in the context of this series support is mixed—though it is difficult to interpret since bases are of course necessary for the US to conduct its current operations. In July 2006 49% favored having bases in Iraq, while 43% were opposed, showing a slight shift in preference from 2004 when 42% favored having bases there and 50% were opposed.[14c]

At present Americans have serious doubts about the value of US military presence in the region. Asked in a BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA December 2006 poll whether the US military presence in the Middle East is a Ў°stabilizing forceЎ± or Ў°provokes more conflict than it prevents,Ў± a majority (53%) said that it provokes more conflict. Only 33% saw it as a stabilizing force.[14d]

Looking to the future Americans are opposed to the US maintaining bases in Iraq on an indefinite basis. In a November 2006 WPO/KN poll, 68% were opposed to having Ў°permanent military bases in Iraq.Ў± [14e]

Americans also show responsiveness to the preferences of the people in the region. Asked in a December 2004 Opinion Research Corporation poll if they would support a Ў°major military presence in the Arabian peninsulaЎ­even if such a presence near Islamic holy sites may been seen as provocative to Muslims;Ў± support was quite soft-- 44% against 39% who would be opposed. When asked in the 2004 Chicago Council poll if Ў°a majority of people in the Middle East want the US to remove its military presence there, do you think the US should or should not remove its military presence?Ў± a strong majority of 59% said the US should (should not: 37%). And asked by WPO/KN in November 2006 how the US should respond if the Iraqi government were to be opposed to the US having permanent bases there 85% said the US should comply with this preference.[15]

This responsiveness to local opinion appears in regard to US presence in East Asia as well. When asked Ў°if most people in East Asia want the US to reduce its military presence there,Ў± a majority of 55% said that the US should comply (38% should not)

 

Rejection of Hegemonic Role

A large majority is opposed to the way it perceives the US playing the role of hegemon or dominant world leader. Americans express surprisingly modest concern for preserving the US role as the sole superpower.

As discussed above, while the majority clearly rejects the idea that the US should withdraw from the world, and supports the US playing a leadership role, there is nonetheless criticism of the current perceived US role. This may well be related to widespread feelings that the US is playing the role of the hegemonic or dominant world leader more than it should be.

Only a small minority supports the idea that the US should take the preeminent leadership role in the world. Gallup has frequently asked about "the role the US should play in trying to solve international problems." In February 2007, only 15% said the US should take "the leading role," while 58% said the US should "take a major role but not the leading role." Another 25% said the US should take a "minor role" (21%) or "no role" (4%). There was a slight bump up in support for the US playing the leading role after September 11, rising to 26% in February 2002, compared to just 16% in February 2001. However, a majority (52%) continued to endorse only a major role in 2002, similar to the 57% who held this view in early 2001.[1]

A majority feels that the US is playing the role of 'world policeman' too much. In the July 2006 Chicago Council poll, 76% agreed that "the US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be." This is nearly the same as the 80% who held this view in the 2004 Chicago Council poll, and significantly up from 65% in the 2002 Chicago Council poll and 68% in a June 2000 PIPA poll. [2]

Majorities reject the idea that the US has an obligation to play such a role. Asked, "Do you think that the United States has the responsibility to play the role of 'world policeman,' that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur?" only 22% said yes while 75% said no in the July 2006 Chicago Council poll. This is consistent with findings from 2004 and even more emphatic than in 2002 when the Chicago Council found 34% saying yes and 62% saying no. [3] Polls also find the public rejecting the idea that the US has the "ability" to be world policeman: in a February 2003 Time/CNN poll, 56% said it does not.[4]

This rejection of a world policeman role for the US has been in place for some time. Even at the height of the Gulf War in March 1991, when respondents were asked whether "the US should be playing the role of world policeman," 75% said "no," with just 21% saying "yes" (Time/CNN). While the "world policeman" idea fared a little better on later repeats of this question, it was always rejected by healthy majorities (60% no, February 1992; 57% no, January 1993; Los Angeles Times). In a June 1995 ATIF poll, when asked who should be "the policeman of the world," only 19% said United States, while 76% said the United Nations.[5] Rejection of the world policeman role is sustained by a belief that other countries have grown overly dependent on the US for their defense. When asked by PIPA in November 1995, "Do you feel that countries that receive protection from US military capabilities are doing enough to protect themselves, or do you feel that they rely too much on the US?" an overwhelming 89% said that these countries "rely too much on the US." [6]

Furthermore, in PIPA's June 1996 poll, 80% rejected the view that "as the sole remaining superpower...the US [should] spend a larger percentage of its...GNP on defense than its allies," in favor of the notion that "all of the industrialized countries should spend about the same percentage." [7]

However if poll questions only offer the two options of the US taking the leading role or refraining from doing so, Americans' support for international engagement is strong enough to prompt many to endorse the leading role-and this number appears to be rising. From May 1999 through April 2003 Gallup and CBS News asked, "Do you think the United States should or should not take the leading role among all other countries in the world in trying to solve international conflicts?" The percentage endorsing the US playing a leading role has risen from 38% in May 1999, to 41% in May 2000, to 45% in September 2002, and for the first time to a plurality of 48% in April 2003, the month after US forces invaded Iraq. In October 2004 Gallup, for CNN/USA Today asked whether the US should "take the leading role among all other countries in the world in trying to solve international problems" and a slight majority-53% said that it should, with 45% saying it should not. Similarly when asked to choose between the US taking a leading role in world affairs or staying out of the affairs of other countries, Americans give a divided response. Forty-seven percent said the US should take a leading role, while 45% said it should "stay out of the affairs of other countries" in the September 2006 Public Agenda poll. In all these cases the questions do not really offer the options that elicit a clear majority response.[8]

This desire for the US to not play a domineering role was also reflected in a Beldon and Russonello poll in January 2000. It posed an interesting pair of questions, in which the first one asked: "Which of these best describes the role you think the US currently has in the world?...Bully, teacher, good neighbor, banker, relief worker, policeman." The most popular response was "policeman" at 30%, followed by good neighbor (21%), banker (17%), teacher (13%), bully (9%), and relief worker (8%). When asked what role they would like to see the US play, the big favorite was "good neighbor" at 53%, with "teacher" at 36% and all other options in the single digits-- including policeman at 5%.[9]

A very strong majority favors a US role in the world that puts a greater emphasis on US participation in multilateral efforts to deal with international problems and on a cooperative approach wherein the US is quite attentive to the views of other countries not just US interests. Very strong majorities favor the US working through international institutions (especially the United Nations) and support making international institutions more powerful. Strong majorities favor international law and strengthening international judicial institutions. Americans support US participation in collective security structures and are reluctant to use military force except as part of multilateral efforts. A large majority favors the US using multilateral approaches for dealing with terrorism, addressing international environmental issues, and giving aid for economic development.

So if the majority feels that the US is too domineering and hegemonic, but does not want the US to withdraw from the world, what does it want? The answer is actually fairly clear: Americans strongly support the US putting greater emphasis on actively participating in multilateral efforts to solve international problems.

In a July 2006 Chicago Council poll, respondents were presented three options for America's role in the world. Only 10% embraced the idea that "as the sole remaining superpower, the US should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems." But just 12% chose the option that "the US should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems." However, an overwhelming 75% endorsed the view that "the US should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries," This was nearly the same level of support as in June 2004 and a larger majority than when the Chicago Council asked the same question in June 2002. In October 2006 WPO asked the same question, but with a different preface: "I would like you to imagine that you heard three Congressional candidates make the following statements." Seventy-two percent said the candidate proposing that the US do its share together with other countries would be most likely to get their support.[1]

As mentioned above, Gallup has repeatedly asked whether the US "in trying to solve international problems" should take "the leading role...a major role but not the leading role...a minor role, or take no role at all" Most recently (February 2007), a 58% majority wanted the US to take a major role, but only 15 percent said the US should take "the leading role". However, support for the US having a considerable role far outweighs the preference for the US having a smaller role: just 21% felt the US should have a "minor role" while only 4% said it should have "no role at all." This majority favoring the US taking a major role has been present since the question was first asked in February 2001, and has been growing since 2005.

Similarly over the past several years, Pew has asked respondents what kind of leadership role they would like to see the US play in the world. In October 2005, a strong majority of 74% said that the US should play "a shared leadership role," while just 12% felt that the US should be "the single world leader." These numbers have remained largely consistent, with the largest majority of 79% believing that the US should have a shared leadership role coming in October 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks. At that time, only 3% embraced the isolationist position that the US "shouldn't play any leadership role," growing a bit in in recent years, to 9% in July 2004 and 10% in October 2005.

In all years, those who opted for a shared leadership role were also asked if they wanted the US to be the most active, or about as active as other leading nations. In October 2005 47% of the total sample preferred the US be "about as active" while 25% said it should be the most active of the leading nations." When Pew asked this question in previous years, it elicited similar responses, reaching the greatest preference for the US to be "the most active" in October 2001 (33%) and June 2003 (30%).[2]

Americans show strong support for working in conjunction with allies. The GMF Transatlantic Trends poll from June 2006 showed 91% agreeing (65% strongly) that Ў°when our country acts on national security issues, it is critical that we do so with our closest allies.Ў± The Los Angeles Times asked respondents to choose between two statements: "The United States has a responsibility to fight violations of international law and aggression around the world, even without the cooperation of its allies;" and "the United States should work only in a coordinated effort with its allies to fight violations of international law and aggression around the world." In January 2006, 63% said the US should work only with its allies, up slightly from September 13-14, 2001, when 59% took this position.

Large majorities say that the US should take into account the interests of other countries. Most recently, in September 2006 90% said it was very (49%) or somewhat (41%) important to US foreign policy to "[take] into account the views and interests of other countries" (Public Agenda). In Pew's December 2006 poll, 82% agreed that, "In deciding on its foreign policies, the U.S. should take into account the views of its major allies." This was the same as levels found by Newsweek in March 2003. In June 2002, the Chicago Council found 61% saying that, "In general, in responding to international crises...the United States should...not take action alone, if it does not have the support of its allies." [3]

Further, when the US considers whether to join an international agreement, a majority is likely to take into account what most other countries have chosen to do. In November 2006 WPO asked, "If a large majority of countries in the world have signed an agreement on how to address a major global issue and the United States is considering whether to sign, how much should the United States take into account the fact that a majority of countries have signed the agreement? Sixty-eight percent said either "a lot" (31%) or some (37%); only 27% said "just a little" (16%) or "not at all" (11%).

On the other hand, Americans do think that sometimes the US must act on its interests irrespective of the views of other nations. In the September 2006 Public Agenda poll 79% said it was important to do "what we think is best for our own interests even if other nations oppose us." [3a]

When a dichotomy is posed between taking into account the views of others against simply acting on US interests, a preference for the cooperative approach prevails, though by varying margins. Asked by NBC/Wall Street Journal whether US government leaders "should generally try to consult and work with leaders of other countries before acting" when it comes to foreign policy, or "do what they think is best without worrying about other countries' interests," 73% chose the former. Asked twice in 2003 by Newsweek, overwhelming majorities (78% in March and September) supported working "with major allies and through international organizations" to achieve foreign policy goals, as opposed to extremely small numbers who favored the US "acting mainly on our own." In July 2004, Pew asked how the US should determine its foreign policy, and found a plurality (49%) saying it should "strongly take into account the interests of its allies" as compared to 37% saying it "should be based mostly on the national interests of the US." In December 2004, a Pew poll found 53% agreeing that "In foreign policy, the U.S. (United States) should take into account the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises with them" as opposed to 37% agreeing that "In foreign policy, the U.S. should follow its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree." [3b]

Finally, as discussed elsewhere Americans are generally quite reluctant to take military action without multilateral approval and/or allied participation except in a small range of circumstances.

International Institutions

Americans also show strong support for the US working through international institutions. When presented, in October 2006, two statements on methods for dealing with international problems like terrorism and the environment, 69% agreed that to address such problems "it will be increasingly necessary for the US to work through international institutions," while only 23% agreed with the one that argued that it is better for the US to act on its own because "international institutions are slow and bureaucratic, and often used as places for other countries to criticize and block the US," (WPO/PIPA). This majority has grown steadily since October 1999, when 56% agreed with the former statement.[6]

Americans also show a readiness for the US to abide by the decisions of international institutions, even when they go against the US. When the Chicago Council asked in June 2006, "If another country files a complaint with the World Trade Organization and it rules against the U.S., as a general rule, should the U.S. (United States) comply with that decision or not?" 73% said that the US should comply. (The Chicago Council asked this question in June 2004 and June 2002, and WPO/PIPA in January 2004 and October 1999, with support for compliance increasing steadily.) [7]

Americans are particularly supportive of working through the United Nations. Numerous polls show overwhelming majorities supporting the existence of the UN and US participation in it. [See United Nations: General Attitudes Towards the UN]

The UN plays a very central role in Americans' thinking about the legitimacy of its using military force. In the event that it is necessary for the US to use military force, whenever possible, a strong majority prefers to act through the UN. A plurality even prefers acting through the UN over acting through NATO. Except when it comes to acting in self-defense, Americans are quite resistant to using military force without UN approval. [See United Nations: The United Nations and the Use of Military Force]

Americans show strong support for strengthening international institutions-something that could create greater pressures and constraints on US action. For example in June 2002, the Chicago Council asked about the option of strengthening a number of international institutions. Though the question mentioned that some people "say that this would only create bigger, unwieldy bureaucracies," majorities favored strengthening the World Health Organization (80%), the United Nations (77%), the World Trade Organization (63%), and the World Court (56%).[8]

When Americans are asked about enforcement mechanisms for international treaties that would apply to all signatory countries, this can get a positive majority, while vague questions about general compliance may not. For example, an August 2004 National Opinion Research Center survey found no clear response to such controversial statements as "International organizations are taking away too much power from the American government." Only 34% agreed with the statement, while 31% disagreed and 30% neither agreed nor disagreed. Similarly, when given the statement, "In general, America should follow the decisions of international organizations to which it belongs, even if the government does not agree with them," respondents were nearly evenly divided among agreement, disagreement, or indifference.[8a] However, when NORC asked about the ability of international organizations to enforce compliance with their rulings on certain issues like environmental pollution, a clear majority (60%) agreed that "international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions" for certain problems, like environmental pollution, while just 17% disagreed. Giving a concrete circumstance where an international body might override national government generates more support than blanket US government compliance with international organizations' rulings.[8b]

Numerous polls have found that Americans would like the UN to be stronger. Only a small minority are concerned that a stronger UN might compromise US sovereignty. Even some proposals for giving the UN the power to tax receive majority support. [See United Nations: General Attitudes Towards the UN]

A strong majority is even ready to support international intervention in the internal affairs of countries, especially when atrocities are being committed or civilians are suffering as a result of war. [See Globalization: International Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States]

Collective Security

A cornerstone of American support for the multilateral use of force is the principle of collective security. In November 1995, PIPA presented the following question:

The UN was established on the principle of collective security, which says that when a UN member is attacked by another country, UN members should help defend the attacked nation. Some say the US should contribute its military forces to such UN efforts, because then potential aggressors will know that aggression will not succeed. Others say the US should not contribute troops to such efforts, because American troops may be put at risk in operations that are not directly related to US interests. Do you think the US should or should not contribute troops to UN efforts to help defend UN members if they are attacked?

Sixty-nine percent said that the US should contribute troops to such UN efforts, while 23% said the US should not.[15]

Americans continue to support US participation in the collective security structure of NATO. In the June 2004 Chicago Council poll, only 20% wanted to either decrease the US commitment to NATO (14%) or withdraw from it (6%). However, 72% favored either keeping the commitment the same (58%) or increasing it (14%). As of June 2006, 61 percent said that NATO is still essential (GMF).[16]

Support for NATO expansion also reflects the support the general principle of collective security and cooperative multilateral approaches. In the February-April 1998 PIPA poll that found 61% in support of expanding NATO, the most popular argument in support of doing so (rated as convincing by 80%) was that "It is better to include Eastern European countries rather than to exclude them, because peace is more likely if we all communicate and work together." The second strongest pro argument was based on a core principle of collective security--76% found convincing the argument that "it is important for potential aggressors to know that they cannot get away with conquering countries."[17]

While the public's support for following through on bilateral commitments to use military force to protect countries from aggression is quite soft, support for doing so as part of a multilateral effort is quite strong. The Chicago Council poll found that when respondents were asked about defending countries against aggression without mention of the UN, support was quite low for protecting Saudi Arabia from Iraq, for protecting South Korea from North Korea, and for protecting Israel from Arab forces. But when asked about participating in a UN operation to protect these countries, support was much higher. This greater readiness to contribute to multilateral effort and also for the US to be constrained from using military force without UN approval is discussed in-depth elsewhere. [See United Nations: The United Nations and the Use of Military Force]

Americans also favor sizing US defense capabilities to the assumption that the US will fulfill its commitments to protect other countries in a multilateral fashion. In a February 2005 PIPA/Knowledge Networks poll, offered three options, just 17% wanted the US to "spend enough so that it can protect itself and other countries on its own," while just 11% wanted the US to "only spend enough to protect itself but not to protect other countries." A strong majority of 69% wanted the US to "only spend enough to protect itself and to join in efforts to protect countries together with allies or through the UN." [18]

In general, for the US to take the kind of multilateral approach to the use of military force that Americans say they want, it would be necessary to put more reliance on the other members of a cooperative multilateral system. There is evidence that Americans are ready to do so. In a November 1995 PIPA poll respondents were presented with some of the complexities of relying on allies to carry part of the responsibility for protecting shared interests. They were asked:

Right now the US has a world-wide military presence which protects its interests, such as oil in the Persian Gulf region. US allies who share these interests, like the Europeans and Japan, also benefit from this US military presence. Some people feel that these allies should contribute more military forces to protect these interests so that the US can reduce its burden. Others do not like this idea because, they say, we cannot be fully confident that allies will effectively protect shared interests. Do you favor or oppose the idea of allies taking over some of these responsibilities so that the US can reduce its presence abroad?

An overwhelming 79% favored having the allies take over some of these responsibilities, with only 19% opposed.[19]

To test this attitude with a concrete case, respondents were asked to consider the possibility of having the Persian Gulf policed by "a multinational naval patrol with ships from different countries as well as the US." The complexities of this idea were also introduced with the comment, "Most likely this would reduce the burden on the US but also mean having shared command with other countries." Nevertheless, 72% said they would favor such a multinational naval patrol over the US doing the patrolling on its own.[20]

Respondents also showed strong support for putting more emphasis on acting multilaterally to maintain US commitments to protect other countries. When presented four different options for dealing with US commitments to protect other countries only 7% wanted to "withdraw" US commitments, while only 5% wanted to maintain its commitments by acting "primarily on its own." An overwhelming majority favored more multilateral approaches. The largest number, 49%, favored the US maintaining its commitments but "whenever possible" acting "together with allies or through the UN." Thirty-eight percent wanted to see the US "change its commitments to protect countries so that it is only committed to protecting them together with allies or through the UN." [21]

Dealing with Terrorism

A very large majority favors the US dealing with the problem of terrorism in a multilateral fashion. When an October 2006 poll by WPO asked "What do you think is the more important lesson of September 11th",72% answered that "the US needs to work more closely with other countries to fight terrorism," while 24% said that "the US needs to act on its own more to fight terrorism." This is up from 61% favoring a multilateral approach in the June 2002 Chicago Council poll.

In the October 2006 WPO/KN poll 94% thought it was important "for the war on terrorism to be seen by the world as an effort of many countries working together, not just a US effort" (73% very important-up from 67% in September 2003). A September 2003 Ipsos-Reid poll also showed 70% felt that "the war on terrorism should be a cooperative effort involving many countries that agree on goals and war plans," as opposed to only 27% who identified more with "the war on terrorism is something the US should conduct according to its own plan and goals, regardless of what other countries think."

(It should be noted that if a question sets up a dichotomy between US interests and the interests of allies, the public has no majority view. In August 2003 Pew asked whether the US should "determine its policy [on] the war on terrorism...based mostly on the national interests of the US, or should it strongly take into account the interests of its allies?" This wording is confusing because it implies that the interests of the US and its allies are inherently opposed-begging the question of why they are allied with each other. Forty-eight percent picked national interests, 35% picked allies' interests, and 9% percent volunteered "both").[22]

Americans not only prefer a multilateral approach to addressing terrorism-they also perceive that a unilateral approach can be counterproductive. A December 2004 Opinion Research Corporation poll found 71% agreed (44% strongly) with the statement that "When the United States acts alone against terrorism, it makes itself a bigger target than when it cooperates with other nations in a coordinated crackdown on terrorism." [22a]

The support for the multilateral approach is evident in questions that offer different approaches to take against international terrorism. The Chicago Council found in 2004 that 88% supported "working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to make sure UN members enforce them," and 82% wanted to see the "trial of suspected terrorists in an International Criminal Court." Likewise, in September 2003 79% wanted to make "setting up an international system to cut off funding for terrorism" a higher priority, and 76% said the same about "setting up a UN database of terrorists to which all countries would contribute" (PIPA, September 2003).[22b]

These attitudes were very strong in late 2001, only a few months after the September 11 attacks. Overwhelming majorities favored seeking UN Security Council approval for military action against terrorism. In a September 19-24, 2001 Harris poll, 84% said that it was important (54% very, 30% somewhat) to "get the support of the United Nations--including a vote of the Security Council--supporting our response to the attacks, even if this means exercising more restraint than we'd like." [22c]

Contrary to US policy at the time, a very strong majority favored including other countries' forces in the military action in Afghanistan. In the November 1-4, 2001 PIPA poll, only 24% thought it would be better to not get more countries involved and then have to make joint decisions with them; 73% said "it would be better if more countries would join with us, because then it would be an international effort, not just an American one." In a September 14-18, 2001 Associated Press poll, an extraordinary 90% said that the United Nations should "play a major role in pulling countries together to fight against terrorism." [22d] Overwhelming majorities supported the UN Security Council being able to require UN members to allow a UN-sponsored police force to enter countries and conduct investigations (70%), to freeze the assets of suspected terrorist groups (86%), to provide intelligence on them (88%), to arrest them (87%), and if the member country refuses to do so, to send in an international military force to capture suspected terrorists (82%) (PIPA, November 2001).[22e]

A large majority of Americans feel that US foreign policy should at times serve altruistic purposes independent of US national interests. Americans also feel that US foreign policy should be oriented to the global interest not just the national interest and are highly responsive to arguments that serving the global interest ultimately serves the national interest. Americans show substantial concern for global conditions in a wide range of areas.

Altruism

It is often assumed that most Americans feel US foreign policy should be tied closely to the national interest, narrowly defined, and are opposed to the idea of making sacrifices based on altruistic purposes. Polling data reveal quite a different picture. In numerous cases Americans show support for altruism in US foreign policy independent of any impact it might have on US interests.

In January 2000 Beldon and Russonello asked respondents to rate a list of reasons "for the US to be active in world affairs" on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 meaning "it is not at all an important reason" and 10 meaning "it is an extremely important reason to you personally." Altruistic reasons scored quite well.[1]

Generosity is part of Americans' national self-image. Asked in a September 2006 Public Agenda poll whether "people in other countries see the United States as generous towards other countries," two-thirds (66%) said they do, while just 29% said they do not. [2]

Giving Aid: Numerous poll results show that large majorities find convincing the argument that the US has a moral responsibility to provide aid to the needy. For example, in December 2001 Greenberg et al. presented a number of arguments in support of foreign aid. Seventy percent found convincing the argument, "The United States is the only remaining superpower and the world's wealthiest nation. We have a moral responsibility to help those who need it the most. America has always stood for justice, freedom, and opportunity for all people--a responsibility that has only grown since September 11th." [3] Other examples abound.[4]

A September 2006 Public Agenda poll asked "How important to our foreign policy should each of the following be?" and then gave a list of foreign policy activities. Altruistic functions received some of the highest ratings including "helping other countries when they are struck by natural disasters like the tsunami in Indonesia" (97% saying that it is important), "assisting countries with developing clean water supplies" (95%), and "helping people in poor countries to get an education" (89%).[5]

Americans have roundly rejected the argument, made by some legislators, that the US should only give aid when it also serves the US national interest. Asked to choose between two statements in a November 2000 PIPA poll, just 34% chose the statement "We should only send aid to parts of the world where the US has security interests," while 63% chose the statement "When hunger is a major problem in some part of the world, we should send aid whether or not the US has a security interest in that region."[6] When PIPA, in 1995, posed the argument in favor of the principle of limiting aid to security-related countries by itself, the percentage rejecting it was even higher-77%.[7]

Although Africa is a region that Americans tend to see as relatively less significant to US national interests, support for giving aid to Africa is markedly higher than it is for any other region.[see Africa: Aid to Africa]

Altruistic concern also prompts Americans to give poor countries preferential trade treatment. Americans have shown concern that poor countries do not get a net benefit from international trade.[see Globalization: Trading With Poor Countries]

Military Intervention: A majority of Americans also show a readiness to intervene militarily abroad for altruistic purposes, even if it is not directly tied to the national interest.

For example, in September 1999 Mark Penn asked:

Which is closer to your view of the proper role of the US in the world?...The US sometimes needs to get involved in regional conflicts that do not directly threaten US interests, because we are often the only country able to maintain world peace and prevent humanitarian disasters such as Kosovo and East Timor, OR The US should only act to protect our own national interests because it is not our responsibility to keep peace around the world. 40%.[8]

Fifty-six percent chose the humanitarian response and 40% chose the counterargument.

Numerous polls show a majority feels that the US has a moral obligation to intervene in the event of genocide. Most recently, a July 2005 Pew poll found that 69% agreed that "the US and other Western powers have a moral obligation to use military force if necessary, to prevent one group of people from committing genocide against another," nearly the same level found when the question was asked in March 2001.[9]

In PIPA's April 1995 poll, 66% agreed that "When innocent civilians are suffering or being killed, and a UN peace operation is organized to try to address the problem, in most cases the US should be willing to contribute some troops, whether or not it serves the national interest." [9a]

Pew in 1999, with three different samples, posed a question about the moral obligation to use military force to stop genocide in different regions. Majorities said that the US does have such an obligation to intervene in Europe (60%), Asia (58%), and Africa (58%). It is interesting that number affirming the responsibility to intervene in Europe (arguably more tied to US national interests), was not significantly higher than it was for Asia or Africa.[10]

Numerous polls have found majority support for the idea that the US had a moral obligation to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo.[11] Even a strongly stated argument rejecting intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo on the basis of its marginal relevance to US national interests and playing on the concern for fatalities did not garner majority agreement. In an April 1998 PIPA poll only 35% agreed with the argument: "Bosnia is far from the US, and we have no real interests there. Therefore, it would be wrong to risk the lives of American troops in a NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia" (62% disagreed). This was virtually unchanged since 1994 when 37% agreed and 61% disagreed in a question using a UN peacekeeping operation. In a July 1994 PIPA poll that applied this argument against sending troops to Rwanda, the same low number, 37%, found this argument convincing, while 62% found it unconvincing.[12]

When a December 1995 CBS/New York Times poll presented four different reasons to send US troops to Bosnia, the one found to be a good reason by the largest number (64%) was based on "stopping more people from being killed in this war." Various PIPA polls on sending US troops to Bosnia also found strong support for moral arguments.[13]

Interestingly, support for using military force for such altruistic purposes can be as high or even higher than for purposes more directly related to traditional national interest concerns. In the Chicago Council July 2006 and June 2004 polls, respondents were given a list of possible purposes for using military of force. Altruistic reasons, such as "to deal with humanitarian crises" were endorsed by 66% in 2006 (72% in 2004). This was higher than some more self-interested purposes, such as "to ensure the oil supply," which was favored by 45% in 2006 (in 2004: 54%). Americans responded similarly in the Chicago Council's 2002 study.[14]

Serving Global Interests

Americans believe that US foreign policymakers should not only think about what is best for the US national interest but should think in terms of what is best for the global interest.

Respondents in the October 2006 WPO/KN poll were asked to choose between two principles for how the US should use its power. Only 16% endorsed the view that "the United States should use its power to make the world be the way that best serves US interests and values." Seventy-nine percent opted for the view that "the US should coordinate its power together with other countries according to shared ideas of what is best for the world as a whole." PIPA found similar responses in 2004.[15]

In the same October 2006 poll, 75% said that "sometimes the US should be willing to make some sacrifices if this will help the world as a whole," while only 22 percent say the United States should not make such sacrifices. In July 1994 84% favored making such sacrifices. [16]

Even just shortly after September 11, when Americans might have been particularly prone to think in terms of America's own interests, a majority showed a continued readiness to think in more collective terms. Asked "How should the US determine its policy with regard to the war on terrorism?" just 30% said it should "be based mostly on the national interests of the US," while 59% said it should "strongly take into account the interests of its allies" (Pew, October 2001).[17][see Multilateral Cooperation and International Institutions]

Support for US international engagement is dampened and obscured by widespread feelings that the US is doing more than its fair share in efforts to address international problems relative to other countries, and spending too much on international programs relative to domestic programs. However, in many cases this attitude seems to rest on substantial overestimations of the levels of US contributions relative to other countries and international spending as a portion of the federal budget. Asked to set their own preferred levels for foreign aid, most Americans usually set them higher than the actual levels.

While an abundance of data suggests that the majority of Americans is supportive of international engagement, there is also some data that suggest the contrary. First, as discussed above [see US Role: Rejection of Hegemonic Role], a strong majority of Americans rejects the role of dominant world leader for the US. Closely related is the view that the US is doing more than its fair share internationally.

Most recently, a September 2006 Public Agenda poll offered two statements about how the US should approach helping other countries. A majority (57%) agreed with the statement "With all the problems we have, we're already doing more than our share to help less fortunate countries." Only 37% chose the statement with the more altruistic viewpoint, saying "our country is so well-off that we really should be doing more to help countries that are less fortunate."[1]

This perception of the US doing more than its "share" internationally has persisted in American public opinion for some time. For example, in a June 2000 PIPA poll respondents were asked, "In recent efforts to solve world problems, as compared to other countries, do you think the US has generally done more than its fair share, its fair share, or less than it's fair share?" Seventy-one percent said that the US has generally done more than its fair share, 24% said it has done its fair share and only 3% said it has done less.[2]

A February-April 1998 PIPA poll also found widespread feeling that the US does more than its fair share relative to European countries. Eighty-one percent said the US does more than its fair share in maintaining peace in the world and 78% felt that way about maintaining peace in Europe. Sixty-seven percent said Europe was doing less than its fair share in the NATO operation in Bosnia. [3]

Polls have found 60% feeling the US pays more than it fair share for "UN activities"(June 1995, Times Mirror); 50% feeling the US is paying more than its fair share for UN dues (June 1996, PIPA); and 60% saying the US contributes more than its fair share of troops to UN peacekeeping (April 1995, PIPA).[4]

But these judgments of unfairness seem to rest on major misperceptions, as respondents dramatically overestimate the US share of international efforts, and when asked what the appropriate share for the US would be, often propose a proportion that is as much or greater than the amount the US is in fact contributing.

One of the areas with the greatest misperception of US contributions lies in foreign aid. The most recent OECD estimate for US overseas development assistance as percent of national income for 2006 is projected to be at 0.17%, the lowest of all countries. In 2005 it was at 0.22% GNI, above only Portugal and Greece, and at 0.17% GNI in 2004, above only Italy (for more information see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/5/38354517.pdf and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/41/35842562.pdf). However, Americans have historically overestimated foreign aid as a portion of the US budget by nearly more than 100 times the actual amount. As recently as June 2005, Gallup International asked Americans "what share of national incomes the United States actually gives in foreign aid to help development/poverty alleviation in other countries," with only 9% correctly estimating the amount at "higher than .1-.2 of a percentage point." 18% believed it to range from 5 to more than 25%, while another 11% thought it to range between 1-2%. Ironically, when asked to say what percentage of gross national income the US should give in foreign aid, a plurality (44%) preferred to give at least 1% and in general significantly more (see footnote for more detailed results). [5]

Eighty-one percent have also believed, mistakenly, that the US gives more aid as a percentage of GDP than the other industrialized countries give (PIPA, January 1995).[6]

In the February-April 1998 PIPA poll respondents were asked to estimate the ratio of US spending as compared to European spending in a number of areas and then to propose the appropriate amount. While Americans were quite accurate at estimating the ratio of US and European defense spending and development aid, they greatly overestimated the US share of troops in Bosnia and UN dues, and they proposed a US share that was as much or more than the actual share.

When asked what percentage of all the troops in Bosnia at the time were American, the mean estimate was 53% when in fact the US was contributing about 25%. When asked about contributing US troops to the extended NATO mission in Bosnia with the following question, "If our European allies and some other countries would provide 75% of the troops for this extended mission, should the US be willing or should the US not be willing to contribute 25%?", an overwhelming 78% of respondents said the US should be willing, while only 18% said it should not.[7]

Asked about the US share of combined US-EU contributions to the United Nations, the median estimate was 50%, far higher than the 40% actually given.[8]

When asked to estimate what percentage the US gives of all US-EU aid to help poor countries develop their economies, the median response was similar to the actual ratio -- the US does give 60% (mean estimate: 58%). The suggested appropriate share was 40%.[9]

However, in a similar question about the US share "of all the aid given by wealthy countries to poor countries to help them develop their economies," the public also overestimated US contributions yet suggested a proportion higher than that actually given. Americans estimated that the US gave 37% of all development aid from rich countries and proposed a more reasonable percentage would be 26% (November 2000). In fact, according to recent OECD figures, the US gives just 12% of the total amount of official development assistance.[10]

When Americans are given correct information about the actual levels of US contributions relative to other countries, criticism falls off sharply. For example, after hearing in June 1996 that, in fact, the US contributes 25% of UN dues because the US economy is 25% of the world economy, 56% found it fair, while just 37% found it unfair.[11]

The belief that the US is contributing more than its fair share can also obscure support for US engagement in unpredictable ways. For example, despite fairly strong support for the general principle of contributing US troops to peacekeeping operations, in 1996 most polls have showed the public divided on contributing troops to the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. In a January 1996 Pew poll respondents were asked whether they "approve or disapprove of President Clinton's decision to send 20,000 US troops to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force," without stating that other countries would be supplying the majority of the troops. Forty-eight percent said they approved, while 49% said they disapproved. The same question was repeated with half the sample in the June 1996 PIPA poll and produced a similar result -- 51% approve, 44% disapprove. However in the PIPA poll the other half sample was asked the question in another way. They were asked to specify what percentage of the troops they would like to see the US contributing, with "none" being a clearly stated option. In this context, 68% said the US should contribute some troops, while only 30% said that the US should contribute none. Thus, it appears that some respondents in the standard 'approve-disapprove' question refrain from expressing their support for the operation because they disapprove of the level of US participation they assume, while not necessarily opposing participation in the operation per se. This interpretation is confirmed by the finding that the median respondent estimated that the US was contributing 40% of the troops for the operation, while among those who favored contributing some troops the median preferred level was 25%.[12]

Large majorities believe that the US is viewed negatively by people in other countries and see this as derived primarily from the current US foreign policy not American values. Most see goodwill towards the United States as important for US national security. Most Americans believe that people around the world are growing more afraid that the US will use force against them and that this diminishes US national security and increases the likelihood that countries will pursue WMDs.

Large majorities in the US perceive that the United States is viewed negatively by the rest of the world. The September 2006 Public Agenda poll asked, "How do you think the rest of the world sees the United States?" Sixty four percent answered that the world views the United States either somewhat (32%) or very negatively (32%). Only 24% said they believe the US is viewed positively while 8% said that views were "neutral or mixed." The same poll found that 73% worried somewhat (39%) or a lot (34%) that "The US may be losing the trust and friendship of people in other countries." Just 26% said they did not worry about this happening.[1]

This negativity is largely attributed to the Bush foreign policy. Asked in a WPO/KN October 2006 poll whether the way the Bush administration has been conducting US foreign policy, on balance, has increased or decreased "goodwill toward the US", 78% said it had decreased goodwill and just 18% said it had increased.[2]

Americans tend to believe that dislike of the US stems from its policies rather than an inherent dislike of American values. Asked in the October 2006 WPO/KN poll if negative attitudes toward the United States in the Middle East were based mostly on their "dislike of American values" or "dislike of American policies in the Middle East," more than 62% said that dislike of American policies in the region were largely responsible. Only one-third (34%) said that it was dislike of American values.[3]

Negative views of the US concern Americans. A September 2006 Public Agenda survey found 87% saying it that it was important to US national security that "the rest of the world sees the United States positively." A WPO/KN October 2006 poll showed nine out of 10 (87%) saying it is very (47%) or somewhat (40%) important "for people in other countries to feel goodwill toward the United States." [4]

Even when given counter-arguments against viewing goodwill as an important factor, a very large majority continues to affirm its value as a tool for US security, rather than something that would inhibit pursuit of US goals. The November 2006 WPO/KN poll presented respondents with two arguments: 1) "Goodwill toward the US is important in order to obtain cooperation in dealing with important threats to US security, and because...hostility towards the US can lead people to actively work against the US." 2) "Goodwill is not really critical for the US because it is so much stronger than all other countries. Trying to be popular can tie the US's hands and distract the US from pursuing its security." A very large majority-80 percent-rejected the view that the United States was so strong it did not need to be concerned about maintaining other countries' goodwill. Only 17 percent saw goodwill as not critical for US security.[5]

Americans believe that people around the world increasingly view the US as a military threat. The November 2006 WPO/KN poll found that 63% assumed that over the last few years countries around the world have grown more afraid that the United States will use force against them.[6]

A majority views this growing fear of US military power as negative for US security, even when presented the argument, sometimes made in policy circles, that fearing American military power will make other countries more responsive to US preferences. Respondents were asked whether "as a general rule, if leaders of some countries grow more afraid that the US will use military force against them," on balance, this tends to be good for US security because such leaders are "more likely to refrain from doing things the US does not want them to do", or bad for US security "because it makes them seek out new means of protecting themselves from the US, such as acquiring weapons of mass destruction." By a two-to-one margin (63% to 33%), a majority thought that rising fear of US force was bad for US security (WPO/KN November 2006).[7]

When asked, in a later question, Ў°if leaders of some countries grow more afraid that the US will use military force against them, this tends to increase or decrease the likelihood that countries will try to acquire weapons of mass destruction,Ў± a very large 80 percent said it increased the likelihood foreign governments would pursue WMD.[8]

Consistent with this majority perception that other countries have become more afraid of the United States, three out of five also think the world sees the United States as both a strong leader and a bully. While two-thirds (66%) in a September 2006 Public Agenda poll agreed that other countries see the United States "as a strong leader," 63% also said they believe that people in other countries see the United States as a bully.[9]

Americans have complex attitudes about the idea of promoting democracy. A majority thinks that promoting democracy should be a goal of US foreign policy. However there is a reluctance to make democracy promotion a central theme in US foreign policy and an opposition to using military force or the threat of military force to that end. At the same time Americans do feel a moral obligation to promote democracy and there is substantial support for cooperative methods for promoting democracy and for working through the United Nations. A modest majority favors promoting democracy in friendly authoritarian countries even if it may lead to unfriendly governments; large majorities do favor putting diplomatic and public pressure on governments to respect human rights.

In general, a majority thinks that promoting democracy should be a goal of US foreign policy, but not a top priority. For several decades the Chicago Council has asked how important the goal of "helping to being a democratic form of government to other nations" should be for US foreign policy. A large majority-between 70 and 80%--have consistently said that it is important. Most recently in July 2006 74% said it was important. However the number saying that it is "very important" has never been more than one in three and most recently was only 17%.[1]

Others have found similar results. A February 2005 Gallup poll using a similar scale found 70% saying that "building democracy in other nations" is an important foreign policy goal, with only 31% saying it is very important.[2] Pew has asked how high a priority "promoting democracy in other nations" should be for the US among possible long-range foreign policy goals. In October 2005 78% said that it should have some priority, but only 24% said that it should have top priority. This has changed little since July 2004.[3] A September 2006 Public Agenda poll asked how important "actively creating democracies in other countries" should be to foreign policy, and found 69% saying it should be important, with just 24% saying it should be very important.[4]

Other foreign policy goals are given a higher priority. In the case of the Chicago Council and Pew polls mentioned above, promoting democracy is relatively low on the list of priorities compared to other goals. When asked to compare promoting democracy with protecting US security as a primary goal of US foreign policy, promoting democracy is given a back seat. The February 2007 Third Way survey asked two questions on this issue. Asked whether the main purpose of American foreign policy should be "protecting the security of the US and our allies," "promoting freedom and democracy," or "advancing our economic interest," two-thirds (66%) chose protecting security. Only 21% opted for promoting freedom and democracy, while just 9% chose economic interests.[5] Posing the question a different way yielded nearly the same results. Given two statements, 68% said they agreed more that the "main goal of US foreign policy should be to protect American security, whether it spreads our ideals or not," as opposed to the 27% who said the main goal "should be to spread our ideals, including freedom and democracy."[6]

Americans appear to want to take a fairly pragmatic approach to promoting democracy, not making it a fixed rule that the US will always promote democracy in every situation. Offered two positions in the September 2005 PIPA-Chicago Council poll, only 38% said that "As a rule, US foreign policy should encourage countries to be democratic." Fifty-four percent preferred the position that "As a rule, US foreign policy should pursue US interests, which sometimes means promoting democracy and sometimes means supporting non-democratic governments."[7]

Americans appear to have resisted the Bush administration's proposal to make promotion of democracy a central role for the US as expressed in the 2005 State of the Union address. Shortly after the address a February 2005 AP/Ipsos poll found that 53% said it "should not be in the role of the United States to promote the establishment of democratic governments in other countries," while just 45% said it should.[8]

In general questions that pose the option of the US, by itself, establishing democracy in other nations elicit relatively weak support. The German Marshall Fund asked in June 2006 whether "it should be the role of the United States to help establish democracy in other countries": just 45% said that it should while 48% felt it should not. This is slightly less supportive than the previous year, when GMF found 51% believing the US should have this role.[9]

Americans do not support using military force for promoting democracy. Asked simply in the September 2005 PIPA-Chicago Council poll whether they favored or opposed using military force to overthrow a dictator, only 35% were in favor while 55% were opposed. Only 27% said that "using military force to overthrow a dictator" "does more good than harm," while a 58% majority says this "does more harm than good."[10] The June 2006 GMF poll also found a majority 56% rejecting "sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes" as a method to help democracy (only 34% would support it).[10a]

Americans overwhelming accept the premise that democracy cannot be successfully instituted by force. Eight-three percent in a February 2007 Third Way poll agreed with the statement "The US cannot impose democracy by force on another country." Just 15% disagreed.[11]

Interestingly, promoting democracy through the threat of force is even more emphatically rejected. In the PIPA-Chicago Council September 2005 poll, a majority of 66% said that "warning a government that the US might intervene military if it does not carry out democratic reforms" does more harm than good, compared to 58% who said that "using military force to overthrow a dictator" does more harm than good. When asked to think about making such threats against to specific countries support is even lower: 73-76% rejected doing so for each country named (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Russia, China, and Burma, also called Myanmar).[12]

Americans also show a reluctance to apply pressure on countries to become more democratic. In the September 2005 PIPA-Chicago Council poll only 44% favored "withholding development aid from a government that is not democratic and is not moving toward becoming more democratic."[12a]

Polling conducted within the past few years clearly indicates a lack of majority support for placing greater pressure on countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, to become more democratic. Asked in the September 2005 PIPA-Chicago Council poll specifically about putting "greater pressure on countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to become more democratic," 51% said the US should not do this, while 39% said that it should. The Chicago Council has asked this question a number of times since November 2003, no more than 41% have supported this policy, while majorities of 51-57% have been opposed. [13]

Consistent with the uneasiness about getting involved in the internal affairs of a country the June 2006 GMF poll found a plurality of 44% rejecting "supporting political dissidents" (39% would support it).[14]

Response to Arguments

Americans have complex and subtle responses to questions that implicitly and explicitly present arguments about democracy promotions.

Americans have a wary response to arguments in favor of democracy promotion based on American exceptionalism. The February 2007 Third Way poll offered two arguments. Only 36% chose "American is an exceptional nation with superior political institutions and ideals and a unique destiny to shape the world" while 58% agreed that "It is a dangerous illusion to believe America is superior to other nations; we should not be attempting to reshape other nations in light of our values."[15]

When the normative principle of non-intervention in a country's internal affairs is elicited, support for democracy promotion is especially low and has been drifting even lower in recent years-perhaps in response to the frustrations of Iraq. CBS/NYT have asked "Should the United States try to change a dictatorship to a democracy where it can, or should the United States stay out of other countries' affairs?" Most recently in March 2007 only 15% favored intervention, while 69% said the US should stay out. Opposition to intervention has grown since April 2003 when 48% took this position.[16]

Pragmatic arguments that it is not feasible to promote democracy from the outside are quite effective. In a September 2006 Public Agenda poll, nearly two-thirds (64%) felt that democracy is "something that countries only come to on their own when they're ready for it" as opposed to the 31% who agreed that "The US can help other countries become democracies."[17]

Americans are wary of sweeping visions that portray the movement toward democracy is inexorable and desired by all people. A clear majority (64%) disagreed with the statement that "eventually, nearly all countries will become democracies," while just 28% agrees (PIPA-Chicago Council September 2005).[18] In the same poll, while 78% said that democracy is the best form of government only 50% said that it is the best for all countries while 43% disagreed. Given two statements in a February 2007 Third Way poll, only 40% agreed that "People all over the world share the desire to live in freedom and govern themselves democratically," while a majority of respondents (55%) agreed that "People in some countries want freedom and democracy more than people in other countries."[19]

Despite the efforts of the Bush administration, Americans are not widely convinced that expanding the number of democracies will have wide ranging positive effects. Americans have doubts on whether democracy makes the world safer. The PIPA-Chicago Council poll presented a number of these arguments. Presented two statements only 26% chose the one that said "When there are more democracies the world is a safer place." Instead 68% chose the statement that "Democracy may make life better within a country, but it does not make the world a safer place."[20]

The case that democracy undermines support for terrorism did a bit better but was not persuasive to a majority. Forty-five percent concurred that, "democracies better serve the needs of their people and thus people in democracies are less frustrated and less likely to support terrorist groups." Overall 46% opted instead for the view that "people support terrorist groups because of their ideological convictions, and having a democratic government is not going to change that."[21]

The popular view among political scientists that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other does not have a wide public following. A plurality (49%) said democracies are just as likely to go to war with each other as are other types of government, compared to 46% who said democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than other types of government.[22]

The one claim that did get modest majority support (52%) was that democracies are more stable and less likely to experience civil war than non-democracies. [23]

Americans also remain unconvinced that increasingly democratic countries will become more accepting of US policies. Only 42% said that they believe that the likelihood of agreement with US policies increases when countries become more democratic (PIPA-Chicago Council September 2005).[24]

At the same time Americans do express some sense of moral obligation to promote democracy. When asked in a November 2003 Gallup poll, 56% believed that the United States has Ў°a responsibility to help other countries rid themselves of dictators and become democracies.Ў± Thirty-eight percent held the opposite view.[25]

Furthermore, when placed in this moral context nearly half respond positively to an argument that calls for the readiness to use military force. A February 2007 Third Way poll offered the statement Ў°The US has a moral obligation to help free other peoples from tyranny and to help create new democracies, even if that means using military force.Ў± Forty-eight percent agreed with the statement (17% strongly, 31% somewhat), while 50 percent disagreed (22% strongly, 28% somewhat).[26]

Pressing for Human Rights

In contrast to more divided attitudes about pressuring countries to be more democratic, large majorities favor putting diplomatic pressure on governments to respect human rights, speaking out against human rights abuses, and encouraging other countries to do the same.

A significant majority favored pressuring governments to respect human rights as a method to encourage greater democracy. The September 2005 PIPA-Chicago Council poll asked specifically about seven nations--Burma (also called Myanmar), China, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia--a majority--66% to 71%--in each case favored putting diplomatic pressure on the government to respect human rights, speaking out against the country's human rights abuses and encouraging other countries to do the same. Of five different methods that were listed as possible ways to encourage democracy, including pressure on human rights, warning of military intervention, and economic sanctions, the most favored method was pressure on human rights. [35]

Americans also appear to be ready to accept significant political costs as part of pressing for human rights. In another question in the PIPA-Chicago Council September 2005 poll on human rights, nearly three-fourths of respondents favored investigating possible human rights abuses even if it meant that the United States would lose the ability to utilize a foreign military base as a result. Asked whether the United States should have called for an international investigation of a protest in Uzbekistan in which the government shot and killed several hundred Uzbeks and as a consequence Uzbekistan ordered the U.S. to close its airbase and leave, 72% said the United States did the right thing.[36]

 

 

Published on: Mar 26, 2004

Most recently Nabudere has edited Globalisation and the African Post-colonial state (AAAPS, Harare, 2000) and is author of Africa in the New Millennium: Towards a post-traditional renaissance (forthcoming-Africa World Press).

Introduction

It is clear that power relations in the global system have been severely tested since the events of September 11, 2001, so much so that it has become fashionable these days for people to argue that the world has irrevocably changed with those events. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11th, 2001 were calculated moves to test the standing and political and economic positions of the world's sole superpower. They were aimed at delivering a blow that could carry several messages around the world at once. Indeed, it is clear that this fateful event was a manifestation of the contradictions of the modern world system since its foundation some five hundred years ago, and the messages the attacks were calculated to transmit were intended to convey to all and sundry those contradictions.

The first of these messages was the expression of anger by those disaffected social and political forces, that felt mistreated, marginalized, and oppressed by U.S. global power relations. The second was to demonstrate to the U.S. that those global power relations were vulnerable and could be attacked at the very heart of the system any time. Thirdly, the attacks gave signal to other disaffected groups opposed to U.S. dominance of the world that it was possible to weaken this power in such a way that their grievances could be addressed through the overthrow of that system. Fourthly, by attacking these two pillars of U.S. economic and military power, al Qaeda wanted to demonstrate that the U.S. was not as powerful as it thought and that its economic power and military power could be broken down by well organized, and well manned attacks.

These messages had other side interpretations. To U.S. neo-conservative forces as well as to some in the right-wing liberal political establishment, these attacks signaled an attempt by fundamentalist political Islam to overthrow Western civilization at the core and, in this respect, the attacks were interpreted as not just constituting a threat to the U.S. as a country but to the whole Christian, western civilization project. This was in fact what president Bush dubbed an "attack on civilization" in his condemnation of the strikes. This interpretation had the effect of influencing the way the world looked at the attack and the U.S. response to it. While not necessarily accepting this interpretation, it forced all foreign governments, with the exception of the very few, to side with the U.S. ideologically on the issue. Thus in addition to the overwhelming humanistic outpouring of sympathy for the victims, it enabled the Bush administration to arm-twist all governments and individuals throughout the world to side with its response on the grounds that the attacks were not on the U.S. as such but on "civilization" in general. It forced these governments to side with the U.S. government, faced with its accompanying threat that: "Either you are with us, or you are against us."

At the same time, the attacks had other interpretations. The generalization of the consequences of the attack also put emergent "anti-globalization" activists on the spot since any attempt by them to express sympathy with the attackers by asking that the causes of the attacks be examined and addressed was interpreted as being "unpatriotic" expression of sympathy with "the enemy." For this reason, the attacks had the effect of dampening the activities of the global solidarity movement, at least for some time, since its strong showing at the Seattle WTO demonstrations in 1999. This interpretation was also used to crack down on the democratic and civil rights of U.S. citizens and to reinforce authoritarian regimes throughout the world. Thus, the event and the reactions surrounding it were turned from a political discourse into a moral-religious event in which "the enemy" was equated with evil and barbarism, while the victim was equated with virtue and civilization.

Nevertheless, these interpretations have begun to have an opposite effect in that the widening of the net in "the war against terrorism" with the attack against Iraq has caused many countries to pose questions that were not posed earlier. Questions are being asked whether the tragic events of September 11 are not being misinterpreted to advance a narrow political agenda of some cliques within the U.S. political establishment. Something like a return to a political discourse is beginning to emerge with a call being made to address the real causes that led to the September 11th attacks against the headquarters of the "Free World" and for the United Nations to resume its responsibilities for international peace and security. President Bush's threats against the United Nations to act according to his will "or become irrelevant" are being taken as rantings of a president whose unilateralism has gone wild. The war against Iraq has again undermined the hope of a return to a multilateral world.

In may ways, therefore, these events, and particularly the unilateral action of launching the war against Iraq with the support of Britain and the so-called "alliance of the willing," have confirmed a predictable hegemonic trend in U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War 2. This trend has afflicted all great hegemonic powers in history. Nevertheless the role of the U.S. in international relations since the end of that war has confirmed the traditional realist and hegemonic stability theories, which have argued that for the stability of institutions of global international public good to prevail, there must be a hegemonic power that is able to enforce certain rules of behavior in international relations, because the hegemon in that case can afford the short-run costs of achieving the long-run gains, which also happens to be in its national interests. These theories have been challenged by institutional stability theorists, who have argued that the model of institutionalized hegemony, which explains the functioning of multilateral arrangements based on the cooperation of a number of core countries to overcome "market failures," is preferable to the hegemonic power model [Keohane, 1980].

Still in Search of Oil

So in order to understand the September 11th events without conjuring up conspiracy theories, it is important to note that the issue of the change of the Taliban government in Afghanistan was uppermost in the minds of certain business and political interests in the U.S. at the material time. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Region of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives on February 12, 1998, John J. Maresca, the UNOCAL vice-president for international relations, argued that there was need for multiple pipeline routes for Central Asian oil and gas resources, as well as the need for the U.S. to support international and regional efforts aimed at achieving balanced and lasting political settlements to the conflicts in the region, "including Afghanistan." He also pointed out that there was need for U.S. "structured assistance" to encourage economic reforms and the development of appropriate investment climates in the region. Therefore, in his view, one major problem, which had as yet to be resolved, was how to get the region's vast energy resources to the markets where they are needed.

At this time, there was a consortium of 11 foreign oil companies, including four American companies, Unocal, Amoco, Exxon and Pennzoil, which were involved in the exploration in the region. This consortium conceived of two possible routes, one line angling north and crossing the north Caucasus to Novorossiysk; the other route across Georgia to a shipping terminal on the Black Sea, which could be extended west and south across Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. But even if both pipelines were built, they would not have had enough total capacity to transport all the oil expected to flow from the region in the future. Nor could they have had the capability to move it to the right markets.

The second option was to build a pipeline south from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. One obvious route south would cross Iran, but this was foreclosed for American companies because of U.S. sanctions legislation against Iran. In Maresca's view, the only other possible route was across Afghanistan, which had of course its own unique challenges. The country had been involved in bitter warfare for almost two decades, and is still divided by civil war. He emphasized: "From the outset, we have made it clear that construction of the pipeline we have proposed across Afghanistan could not begin until a recognized government is in place that has the confidence of governments, lenders, and our company"[Emphasis added].

These developments indicate that the whole situation around September 11th can now be seen to have been part of a wider geo-strategic process of U.S. economic and political interests. While not conjuring up conspiracy theories, one can surmise that there was more to the incidents than meets the eye. It is reported that senior U.S. officials in mid-July 2001 told Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, that military action was planned to be taken against the Taliban by mid-October, 2001. Bush declared war against Afghanistan, though the Taliban did not order the attack on the U.S. It was alleged by the U.S. government that Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national residing in Afghanistan, ordered the attack. The U.S. action against Afghanistan resulted in the ouster of the Taliban regime and a change of government. Was this a calculated move or was it a genuine war against terrorism? Within a few months of the ouster of the Taliban regime, the U.S. government under President Bush quietly announced on January 31, 2002 that it would support the construction of the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline. Then on February 2, 2002 the Irish Times announced that President Musharraf of Pakistan (now popularly known as Busharraf) and the new Afghan leader, Mohamed Karzai, had "announced an agreement to build the proposed gas pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan." Although September 11th might have been an event that took place independently of the wishes of the U.S. oil interests in the area, the issues connected with the event were clearly interlinked [Onyango-Obbo: 2002:8].

Africa in the `New World Order'

The events of September 11th have had a spectacular impact on the African continent. Although terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania signaled a new development for these countries in terms of their security, which U.S. presence posed, the issue was nevertheless seen as a distant threat. In the new situation and due to pressures from the U.S. government, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in October 2001 quickly adopted a Declaration Against Terrorism, which had different connotations from the earlier initiatives by the African States themselves. At the same time, efforts were exerted to propose a Treaty on Terrorism in terms of the new definitions emanating from the U.S. Before September 11th, the OAU had in July 1999 adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which in article 1 condemned "all forms of terrorism" and appealed to member states to review their national legislation to establish criminal offences against those engaged in such acts. The Convention had gone a step further to define terrorism and to distinguish it from the legitimate use of violent struggle by individuals and groups. The Convention pointed out that political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives could not be used as justifiable defense for terrorism. Nevertheless, in article 3 (1) it declared:

Notwithstanding the provisions of article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as acts of terrorism.

It can be seen here that the African states had made some attempt to be objective on what constituted terrorism. But the events of September 11th seem to have pulled the clock backwards. Soon after the attacks on the U.S., the U.S. National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, reminded the African States that:

One of the most important and tangible contributions that Africa can make now is to make clear to the world that this war is one in which we are all united. Ў­ We need African nations, particularly those with large Muslim populations, to speak out at every opportunity to make clear Ў­ that this is not a war of civilizations. Ў­ Africa's history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war. Ў­ Africa is uniquely positioned to contribute, especially diplomatically through your nations' memberships in African and Arab and international organizations and fora, to the sense that this is not a war of civilizations. This is a war of civilizations against those who would be uncivilized in their approach towards us [Emphasis added].

Following this appeal, the OAU Central Organ in November 2001 issued a CommuniquЁ¦ on terrorism in which the organization "stressed that terrorism is a universal phenomenon that is not associated with any particular religion, culture or race." It added that terrorism "constitutes a serious violation of human rights, in particular, the rights to physical integrity, life, freedom and security." The CommuniquЁ¦ also added that terrorism "poses a threat to the stability and security of States; and impedes their socio-economic development." The CommuniquЁ¦ further stressed that terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances and consequently, it "should be combated in all its forms and manifestations, including those in which states are involved directly or indirectly, without regard to its origin, causes, and objectives."

This CommuniquЁ¦ demonstrated sensitivity to the problem of terrorism because of the multiethnic, multireligious, multiracial, and multicultural composition of the continental organization. It specifically excluded the religious connotations that terrorism was having in the U.S. It included, to some extent, state-sponsored terrorism as part of the evils to be combated, "without regard to its origins, causes or objectives." But in another sense, many states now began to respond to the dictates of the Bush administration in their understanding of the problem in order to curry favor with the U.S. Some African States initiated legislation directed at their internal opposition in terms of the new U.S. definitions of terrorism. Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Uganda were the first ones to do so.

Uganda, in particular, emphasized the fact that it had been fighting terrorism even before the U.S. began to do so consistently. It rushed legislation though parliament, which was aimed at the legitimate opposition as well as groups fighting the government by way of "armed struggle." These groups fighting the government "in the bush" were listed and sent to the U.S. and the UNO to be included among terrorist organizations. The Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), fighting in different parts of Uganda, were now listed internationally as terrorist organizations. At the same time, a law against terrorism was also rushed through parliament, which the opposition regarded as being targeted against them. Soon, it listed its opponents as "terrorists" to be treated as criminals in any part of the world.

These negative developments indicated the real impact on world affairs initiated by the U.S. response to terrorism. The statement by Condoleezza Rice demonstrated the concerns of the U.S. government as to the role Africa could play in the "war." But it missed the very important point that Africa was largely a Christian and Muslim continent, where these two civilizations met and intermingled with African traditional religions and civilizations. This combination has created a more racially, religiously, and culturally tolerant continent. Indeed, it is said that the American officials in Guinea were extremely impressed by the fact that on the very day of the attack against the U.S., the entire Cabinet of the government of Guinea, which is an all Muslim country, went in one body to the U.S. Embassy in Conakry to deliver their condolences to the American people. This single incident demonstrated that African Islam was important to the U.S. in moderating Islamic radicals on the continent.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the attack on the U.S. on September 11th 2001 was directed at U.S. strategic interests, which it has developed since the end of WW2. The analysis here has shown that this policy has been developed against the interests of Third World peoples, whose resources are subjected to U.S. control and exploitation. The U.S. believes that as a leader of the "Free World" it has the responsibility to ensure global peace and security and to do this, it needs to develop the resources in the entire world on a "free trade" basis. But, as we have seen, this has been achieved through manipulation and the use and threat of use of force against its weaker opponents in the Third World. The U.S. claims that its actions are motivated by the interest of the whole world, although it also at the same time claims to be defending "civilization," which is a coded-word for western civilization and western interests.

Therefore while it calls on the whole world not to permit the al Qaeda to turn the present war against terrorism into a war of civilizations, it actually creates conditions that could ultimately turn such a conflict into a generalized conflict between civilizations on a global scale. The only answer to this conflict therefore lies in insisting that all problems between countries, cultures, and civilizations be resolved through dialogue and negotiations, which recognizes the interests of all as equally important. We have to use organs of global dialogue such as the United Nations, Global Summits and Conferences through which agreements can be reached and implemented. It is for this reason that the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for a dialogue between civilizations as a task of this century, if indeed the century is to be a peaceful one.

For the U.S. therefore to emphasize that the war against terrorism is not a civilisational one, while at the same time calling on the African states to agree that it is "a war of civilizations against those who would be uncivilized in their approach towards us" is to take Africa for granted and to try to use Africans against other peoples who may have genuine grievances against the U.S. It should be remembered that up to this point, the U.S. government still regards Africans and their descendants in the United States as being less than human beings and still treats them as uncivilized beings. Why? Because, alongside the other western powers and some of the Arab world, they refuse to consider demands for reparations for the exploitation and sufferings of those Africans who were enslaved by them and exploited as sub-humans in the building of the wealth which they now enjoy. Africa must push for the need to have dialogue on all these issues. The U.S. cannot have its cake and eat it. She cannot expect Africans to defend their civilization while at the same time refusing to compensate them for acts of inhuman behavior against them.

Global security of the 21st century requires that security of one country becomes the security of another and security in this new understanding must be understood in its broadened sense to mean human security for all. As the Social Science Research Council has come to recognize, security concerns should no longer be seen in the context of the geopolitics of the Cold War period. The field of security considerations has changed greatly since the early 1980s with the increasing realization that threats to security of individuals, communities and states around the world originate from a variety of sources other than the military dimension of great power competition and rivalry, which characterized the period of the Cold War. Such `small events' as localized wars, small arms proliferation, ethnic conflicts, environmental degradation, international crimes, and human rights abuses are all now being recognized as being central to the understanding of security at local, national, regional, and global levels.

The U.S., just like all countries of the world, must adjust to this new reality and address all these different concerns of security in order to create conditions for security for all. It has now to be realized and accepted by all of us on this planet that security for 'us' must mean security for `them' as well, otherwise there cannot be security for all. That must be the lesson we should learn from the events of September 11th 2001. In short, September 11th requires us to embrace and enhance a holistic security consciousness that should inform global security policy based onUbuntu.

 

US Role in the World

General International Engagement

A very strong majority supports US engagement in the world and rejects the idea that the US should take a more isolationist stance. However strong and growing majorities show dissatisfaction with key aspects of the current US role in the world and see it as destabilizing. A majority supports US military bases on the soil of traditional US allies, though support for US military presence in the Middle East has become quite soft.

A strong and consistent majority supports the view that the US should be actively engaged internationally. This is particularly true in polls taken since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but was also true throughout the 1990s when there was a common perception that the American public was going through a phase of wanting the US to withdraw from the world in the wake of the Cold War.

Perhaps the most significant evidence is derived from poll questions that have been asked in the exact same form over many years. For example, various polling organizations have for several decades now posed the question, "Do you think the US should take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs?" During the Cold War Americans rather consistently, by a two to one margin, embraced the position that the US should "take an active part." Even in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, a solid majority held this attitude (with an upward spike around the time of the Gulf War). The most recent findings show that while the percentage has come down from its historical high after September 11th, it is still at one of its highest points over the last decade.

Active Part – Stay Out
Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?

Organization	Date	N	Active Part	Stay Out	DonЎЇt know
Chicago Council	7/9/06	1227	69	28	3
GMF/TNS	6/17/05	1000	72	20	8
Chicago Council	7/12/04	1195	67	30	4
GMF/EOS Gallup	6/26/04	1000	79	14	7
GMF/TNS	6/25/03	1001	77	15	8
Chicago Council	6/30/02	3200	71	25	4
PIPA	11/04/01	602	81	14	5
Gallup	06/13/99	1022	61	34	5
Gallup	05/02/99	1014	69	28	3
CCFR	11/10/98	1507	61	28	11
PIPA	9/14/96	1214	66	28	6
PIPA	06/27/96	1227	60	35	6

As a general rule, when poll respondents are presented a statement that is effectively an argument and asked whether they agree or disagree, there is a tendency to agree. Nonetheless, a majority consistently rejects trend line questions that pose arguments in favor of US disengagement from the world. Over the last decade, a large majority has rejected the argument that "Since the US is the most powerful nation in the world, we should go our own way in international matters not worrying too much about whether other countries agree with us or not." Most recently, in a December 2006 Pew poll, a large majority of 68% disagreed, slightly lower than the 73% who held this view when in an October 2006 WPO/KN poll. This is less widespread disagreement than in the March 2004 PIPA poll, which found overwhelming opposition to the statement (79% disagreed, 20% agreed). In a March 2003 Newsweek poll -- even as the US was preparing to invade Iraq despite its failure to obtain substantial international support -- 62% rejected this argument and just 33% agreed with it. These results are consistent with findings for the previous decade. [1]

In another trend line question repeated as recently as December 2006 by Pew, a majority (53%) still disagreed with the statement Ў°the US should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own," holding steady from April 2006 when nearly the same number disagreed. However, while Pew found in March 2003 that only 33% agreed with the argument, 42% agreed with it in October 2005 and December 2006. This increase in those who favor the argument may be representative of public fatigue in dealing with the war with Iraq after three years.[2]

It should be noted that in December 2006-the same month that Pew most recently asked this question, a CBS News poll showed that 52% agreed with the statement that the US should mind its own business (42% disagreed). Given that this is the only time that a majority has ever agreed with this statement, as well as the fact that another organization found quite different finding in the same month, suggests that this finding should be given limited credence.[2a]

Statements in favor of engagement, on the other hand, receive overwhelming support. Similar to the above-mentioned statements, Pew has presented the argument "It's best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs," which has elicited overwhelming agreement--most recently 90% in August 2003. There has been no significant change on this question with the end of the Cold War and after the September 11th attacks, except that there has been an increase in the percentage saying that they agree with this position "completely" (50% in 2003 and 45% in 1999).[3]

A strong majority feels the US should take a leading role trying to stop genocide. In an October 1999 Harris Interactive poll, 70% agreed with the statement that Ў°The United States should play a leading role in developing new and better ways to prevent and react to international problems like Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and East Timor.Ў±[4]

When Beldon and Russonello (February 2000) asked respondents to rate a number of possible reasons for the US Ў°to be active in world affairs,Ў± a reason that was highly rated—mean of 8.34 on a 0 to 10 scale—was: Ў°It is a matter of pride to me as an American that the US be a respected leader.Ў± [5] Other reasons that were rated were:

Our national security depends on our being involved. Mean = 7.73
I want a stable world in which I can travel and appreciate other cultures. Mean = 7.99
We have to protect our economic interests. Mean = 8.24 [6]

Americans overwhelmingly support the idea that the US should play a strong leadership role in the world. Asked in the June 2006 GMF poll, "How desirable is it that the U.S. exert strong leadership in world affairs?" 84% said it is desirable (43% very desirable) with only 14% saying that it undesirable, nearly the same levels of support found by GMF in May 2005 and in the June 2002 Chicago Council poll. PIPA found 85% saying that such leadership was desirable in response to the same question (April 1998).[7]

As discussed below, support for US leadership does not mean that Americans want the US to play the role of world hegemon. Most Americans reject the idea of the US playing the leading role [See US Role: Rejection of Hegemonic Role] and strongly support the US playing a shared leadership role, not be the single global leader. [See US Role: Multilateral Cooperation and International Institutions]

Americans generally see the US as playing a highly influential role and continuing to do so in the future. In July 2006 the Chicago Council asked respondents to rate US influence in the world on a scale of 0 to 10 and found 56% rating it either a 9 (21%) or a 10 (35%), with no other country even approaching this level. When asked in July 2006 to rate US influence in 10 years on the same scale, 48% gave it either a 9 (18%) or a 10 (30%), showing that a large percentage do not believe US influence in the world will change significantly during that time frame.

However, this bullishness on US influence is down a bit. In 2002 the Chicago Council found 55% rating US influence a 10--20 points higher than 2006. Also in 2002 the Chicago Council found 86% that predicted that the US would play an even greater role in the next ten years.[7a]

On the whole, few Americans see US influence in the world as declining, while many more see it increasing. Asked in July 2004 whether the US played a more or less Ў°important and powerful role as a world leader today compared to ten years ago,Ў± 45% said it played a more important role, with 31% saying it played just as important a role, and 20% said a less important role. In the same poll, nearly the same number (41%) thought it played a more important role Ў°as it did in the past,Ў± while 35% saw it playing just as important a role and just 18% said a less important role (Pew Research).[7b]

Contrary to the idea that Americans do not like to see their elected representatives devote time to international problems when there are problems at home, the majority feels they should spend a substantial portion of their time on world affairs. In a June/September 1996 PIPA poll the median respondent felt that the President should devote 30% of his time to international issues, while a Congressional representative should devote 28%.[8]

Poll questions that do elicit a seemingly isolationist response are those that ask respondents to prioritize international and domestic problems-- domestic problems are almost always assigned a higher priority. Numerous polls have asked respondents to agree or disagree with a statement that asserts the relative importance of domestic problems and invariably gets high levels of agreement. Sixty-nine percent agree that Ў°We should not think so much in international terms, but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up strength and prosperity here at homeЎ± (Pew Research, December 2006), a preference consistent with findings from recent years. In an August 2003 Pew poll, an even higher 76% agreed that Ў°We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate at problems here at home.Ў± In a January 2000 Beldon and Russonello poll, 76% agreed that Ў°The US should spend less of its resources on international issues because we have so many problems to solve here at home.Ў± Seventy-eight percent agreed that Ў°The U.S. should address problems at home first, rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countriesЎ± (Kaiser/Washington Post, June 2002). Eighty-four percent agree that Ў°Taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countriesЎ± (PIPA, November 2000). In July 2004, an AP-Ipsos poll asked whether the US has a responsibility to fight HIV and AIDS abroad or whether it should focus on the problem at home: 63% said to focus on the problem at home. Similarly the Kaiser Foundation in March 2004 found 62% agreed more that the Ў°US should address problems at home first rather than spending more money to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries.Ў± [9]

However these findings should not be taken at face value. Though respondents place a higher priority on dealing with problems at home when asked whether they think the US should also address problems abroad they consistently say that the US should. In the Kaiser Foundation poll just mentioned 53% even said that the US should increase its spending on fighting HIV/AIDS to in developing countries.[9a]

Another example is a January 2006 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner poll which presented competing (though not mutually exclusive) arguments. A majority of 57% chose Ў°we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home,Ў± and 37% chose Ў°it is best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs.Ў± However as discussed above, by a two-to-one margin or more Americans consistently favor playing an active role in world affairs.[10]

Dissatisfaction with Current Role

Americans demonstrate growing disapproval of the US role in the world and believe that current US policy is contributing to a greater instability that could post a threat to the United States.

In recent years, Americans have shown increasing dissatisfaction with the role the United States is playing in world affairs. In January 2007, Gallup found 56% saying they were dissatisfied with Ў°the role the US plays in world affairsЎ± (27% very dissatisfied), up from the 51% who held that view the previous year. As of an October 2006 WPO/KN poll, 68% also said they were dissatisfied with Ў°the position of the United States in the world today," up significantly from a slight majority (51%) that held this view in Gallup's February 2005 poll, and a dramatic reversal from the large majorities that said they were satisfied with the US position in the world in Gallup's April 2003 (67%) and May 2000 (65%) polls. A September 2006 Public Agenda poll found 83 percent who said they worry somewhat (48%) or a lot (35%) about Ў°the way things are going for the United States in world affairs.Ў± [11]

Overwhelming majorities perceive the world becoming more dangerous and a large majority attributes this at least in apart to the Bush foreign policy. The September 2006 Public Agenda poll asked, Ў°thinking about current US relations with the rest of the world, would you say that the world is becoming safer or more dangerous for the US and the American people?Ў± with 79% saying they believe the world is becoming more dangerous (43% much more dangerous). An October 2006 WPO/KN poll showed 60% believed that as a result of the Bush policy the likelihood of terrorist attacks had increased, while only 37% believed it had decreased.[12]

Americans do not feel that superior strength insulates the United States from the negative effects of the insecurity in other parts of the world. In a November 2006 WPO/KN poll 87% said that Ў°insecurity in other parts of the worldЎ± impacted US security a great deal (39%) or some (48%); only 13% with the counterargument that Ў°the US is so strong that such conditions in other parts of the world have little real impact on US securityЎ± and said the US was impacted just a little (9%) or hardly at all (4%).[13]

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