Door-in-the-face (rejection-then-retreat)

The door-in-the-face (DITF) tactic involves a requester first asking for a large favor (which is refused) and then for a smaller favor, which is typically granted at a rate higher than just asking for the small favor to begin with. For example, Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler, and Darby (1975) asked passersby on a university campus to volunteer two hours a week for a minimum of two years working with juvenile delinquents. When the passerby rejected this request, the solicitors followed-up with the real request – to work 2 hours with juvenile delinquents. The results showed three times as much compliance with the request to work 2 hours when preceded by the large request as opposed to a control that merely made the smaller request. The DITF has created a vast literature with multiple meta-analytic reviews. The explanation most consistent with this literature is one based on the norm of reciprocity – when the requester retreats from the large request, it obligates the target to also make a concession (in this case, acquiesce to the smaller request) or feel the pangs of unrequited indebtedness. In addition, the unattractive first request serves as a comparison point to make the second request appear more

attractive via contrast effects (Miller, 1974; see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004 for a discussion of the cogency of other possible explanations). One limiting condition of the DITF tactic is that the first request cannot be extreme and outside the bounds of a legitimate request (Schwarzwald, Raz, & Zvibel, 1979).

 

The that’s-not-all technique

 Another tactic that employs the norm of reciprocity is the “that’s-not-all-technique.” This effective tactic (and staple of TV infomercials) consists of offering a product at a high price, not allowing the customer to respond for a few seconds, and then offering a better deal by adding another product or lowering the price. The sweetening of the deal invokes a feeling of indebtedness that increases compliance. For example, Burger (1986) sponsored a bake sale offering unpriced cupcakes. 

When a passerby asked about the price of the cupcakes, he or she was told the price was 75 cents and then, after a pause, that they would also get some cookies. In the control treatment, passersby were merely told that the cupcake and cookies were 75 cents. Burger found nearly double the sale of cupcakes using the that’s-not-all technique (see also Burger, Reed, DeCesare, Rauner, & Rozolios, 1999). The that’s-not-all technique bears similarity to the DITF tactic in that both (a) involve an initial less attractive requested followed by a more attractive second request, (b) invoke the processes of norm of reciprocity and contrast, and (c) the effectiveness of both tactics is reduced if the initial offer is large and lacks legitimacy. The two tactics differ in two important ways: (a) in DITF the initial offer is rejected whereas no response is elicited in that’s-not-all tactic and (b) in DITF the initial offer is made less sour whereas in that’s-not-all tactic the initial offer is made sweeter.

 

Commitment trap

Commitment is defined as the binding of an individual to a behavior or course of action. In other words, the person becomes identified with a certain behavior; commitments are strongest when that behavior is visible, irreversible, and perceived to be freely chosen (Salancik, 1977). Breaking this binding produces a negative tension of not living up to one’s promises and a concern that one will look

inconsistent and untrustworthy (e.g., a need to save face). As such, securing a commitment increases the likelihood that the target will comply and perform that behavior. A commitment can be secured through a number of devices including a public verbal commitment (Wang & Katzev, 1990), investment in a course of action, (Brockner & Rubin, 1985), sunk costs, self-selection of goals, and the pretense that a commitment has been made (e.g., presumptive close in sales). Commitment can lead to disastrous results when negative setbacks result in escalating commitment to a failing course of action (Shaw, 1976).

Foot-in-the-door

 In the foot-in-the-door tactic (FITD), a target is first asked to do a small request (which most people readily perform) and then is asked to comply with a related and larger request (that was the goal of influence all along). For example, Freedman and Fraser (1966) asked suburbanites to put a big, ugly sign stating “Drive Carefully” in their yard. Less than 17% of the homeowners did so. However, 76%

of the homeowners agreed to place the sign in their yards, if two weeks earlier they had agreed to post in their homes a small, unobtrusive 3-inch sign urging safe driving. Burger (1999) has conducted a thoughtful analysis of over 55 published research reports on the FITD and concludes that it has the potential to invoke a number of psychological processes that may increase (self-perceptions that one is the type of person to perform an action, commitment, and desire for consistency) or decrease (reactance, norm of reciprocity, and other social pressures) the magnitude of compliance. 

 

Low-balling

A common sales tactic is low-balling or throwing the low-ball. In this tactic, the target first makes a commitment to perform a course of action (say, purchase a car for $20,000) and then this action is switched for a more costly behavior (opps, the car really costs $20, 859). The target is more likely

to perform this costlier task as a result of the earlier commitment. For example, Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller (1978) found that securing students’ agreement to sign up for a psychology experiment before telling them that the experiment was at 7 am (a high cost behavior for most students) resulted in more compliance compared to asking them to sign up for a 7 am experiment. Burger and Petty (1981) have replicated the low-balling effect and argue that it is based on commitment, not necessarily to the task, but to the requester. Low-balling bears a similarity to the FITD in that both involve a commitment to an initial request or requester followed by a less attractive second request. In addition, the effectiveness of both tactics is reduced if there is no commitment to the first task (Burger, 1999; Burger & Cornelius, 2003). Low-balling differs from FITD in that the first request is the actual target behavior (only later made less attractive by adding costs) whereas in FITD the first request may be related to the second request but it is not the target behavior.

 

Bait-and-switch

Joule, Gouilloux, and Weber (1989) demonstrated a tactic they called “the lure” that is similar to what is called bait-and-switch in sales. In their experiment, subjects volunteered to participate in an exciting study on film clips. This experiment was then cancelled and subjects were asked to switch to a boring experiment involving word memorization. These subjects were three times more to continue with the boring experiment relative to a control treatment. Bait and switch is based on commitment processes. It differs from low-balling in that the bait or lure is not available in bait-and-switch as opposed to

merely made less desirable in low-balling.

 

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