Национальный исследовательский Нижегородский государственный

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Национальный исследовательский Нижегородский государственный

университет им. Н.И. Лобачевского

А.А. Корнилов, Д.Т. Сухиашвили

ПРОЦЕСС ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ

ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ

РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГРУЗИЯ:

КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ

Учебно-методическое пособие (практикум)

Нижний Новгород

2018

УДК 327(07)

ББК Ф4(075)

П 84

П 84 Процесс формирования внешней политики Республики Грузия: концептуальные аспекты. Учебно-методическое пособие (практикум). – Нижний Новгород: Нижегородский госуниверситет, 2018. - 94 с.

Составители: Корнилов А.А., Сухиашвили Д.Т.

Рецензент: доктор политических наук, профессор С.И. Грачев

Учебно-методическое пособие предлагает студентам для чтения и анализа оригинальные документы внешней политики Республики Грузия – активного и важного актора международно-политических процессов в регионах постсоветского пространства, главным образом в регионе Закавказья.

Публикуемые Концепция национальной безопасности, национальная военная стратегия 2014 г., а также Коммуникационная стратегия Министерства обороны Грузии 2007г. оказывают непосредственное воздействие на различные аспекты процесса формирования внешнеполитического курса Республики Грузия. Исполнение названных документов влияет на развитие международных отношений в регионе Закавказья и за его пределами, придает специфику очень сложным отношениям Грузии с Российской Федерацией. Авторы также публикуют Закон по борьбе с терроризмом, Бухарестское Заявление стран НАТО 2008 года и американо-грузинскую Хартию 2009 г. о стратегическом партнерстве.

Учебно-методическое пособие (практикум) предназначено для студентов Института международных отношений и мировой истории ННГУ, обучающихся по направлению «Зарубежное регионоведение», в качестве пособия в рамках курса «Процесс формирования внешней политики ведущих государств» (магистерская программа «Исследования регионов Азии и Африки»), «Процесс формирования внешней политики и дипломатия» (бакалавриат) и «Внешняя политика стран Закавказья» (бакалавриат).

УДК 327(07)

ББК Ф4(075)

университет им. Н.И. Лобачевского, 2018

Содержание

Введение ………………………………………………………………………..…………………... 4

Документ 1. National Security Concept of Georgia................................................................... 6-29

Документ 2. National Military Strategy, 2014 …………………………………. …………… 30-38

Документ 3. Communication Strategy, 2017-2020 …..…………….………………………… 39-49

Документ 4. Закон Грузии по борьбе с терроризмом 2007 г ………………..…….……… 50-61

Документ 5. Заявление по итогам встречи в верхах в Бухаресте обнародовано главами государств и правительств, участвовавшими в заседании Североатлантического совета в Бухаресте 3 апреля 2008 г. …………………….…………………………………….…….. 62-81

Документ 6. United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, 2009 ………...…..82-86

Заключение..……………………………………………………………………………...……...... 87

Литература ………………………………………………………………..……………...……....... 88

Введение

Республика Грузия (РГ) занимает выгодное географическое положение в регионе Закавказья (Южного Кавказа) и своими границами выходит к странам Среднего Востока, а на севере граничит с Российской Федерацией. Наряду с этим исторически сложилось, что Грузия оказалась прямо вовлеченной в региональные конфликты – грузино-абхазский и грузино-юго-осетинский. На положение РГ прямое, прежде всего, экономическое воздействие оказывает и неурегулированный Нагорно-Карабахский конфликт. Поскольку регион Южного Кавказа стал ареной острой конкуренции глобальных и региональных держав за доступ к источникам сырья и транспортным коридорам, Тбилиси был вынужден взаимодействовать не только с северным соседом – Россией –, но и со странами НАТО и ЕС. Турецкая Республика стремится к реализации через Грузию своих внешнеполитических интересов. На регион Закавказья выходит своими интересами и такое явление как международный терроризм.

Все эти и прочие немаловажные факторы повлияли на специфический «почерк» процесса формирования внешней политики в Тбилиси. Грузия как суверенное государство выработала целый ряд концептуальных документов в сфере национальной безопасности и внешней политики, которыми обязаны руководствоваться ключевые исполнительные ведомства.

После августовской войны 2008 года на Южном Кавказе концептуальные документы РГ приобрели все более прозападный характер. Документы и эксперты, которые комментируют эти внешнеполитические идеи, ориентируют международные отношения РГ, в первую очередь, на страны Запада, то есть, государства НАТО и Европейского Союза. Напротив, роль Российской Федерации в документах, а также во внешнеполитическом дискурсе, обозначается главным образом и, к сожалению, как деструктивная. Такое отношение связано с позицией, которую заняла Россия в отношении самопровозглашенных еще в 1990-е годы республик Абхазия и Южная Осетия. РФ официально признала независимость и суверенитет Абхазии и Южной Осетии, в то время как Грузия считает территории этих образований своими внутренними регионами.

Предлагаемый студентам свод оригинальных документов содержит самые важные тексты положений и принципов политики РГ в области безопасности и внешней политики. К таковым относятся: Стратегия национальной безопасности, Национальная военная стратегия, Коммуникационная стратегия Министерства обороны РГ, Закон по борьбе с терроризмом, Бухарестское заявление стран НАТО 2008 года и Хартия США-Грузии о стратегическом партнерстве. Предложенная структура пособия позволяет студентам не только составить представление о стратегии политики Грузии, но также уметь анализировать документы внешнеполитического и военного характера, сравнивать факты повседневной политики и концептуальных документов, делать выводы о том, в какой степени концепции влияют на вектор грузинской внешней и оборонной политики, а, значит, и на положение России в регионе Закавказья. Авторы пособия ожидают, что чтение и анализ документов вызовут со стороны студентов искренний интерес и всесторонние дискуссии, что, в свою очередь, будет способствовать повышению уровня аналитической подготовки регионоведов ННГУ.

Авторы пособия полагают, что в процессе изучения внешней политики Грузии крайне важно иметь представление о базовых понятиях и терминах, об интересах, ценностях и принципах внешнеполитического курса. Большое значение имеет также знание студентом основных направлений международной политики Республики Грузия на глобальном (Европа, США, Россия, КНР) и региональном уровнях (Южный Кавказ, Ближний и Средний Восток, Черноморский бассейн).

Для успешного выполнения задач изучения ПФВП Грузии авторы рекомендуют использовать и применять такие формы обсуждения документов, как: аналитические игры, работа групп междисциплинарного анализа, «мозговые штурмы», составление терминологических словарей и использование методики «бортового журнала». Столь же полезными в процессе изучения окажутся классические приемы анализа оригинальных документов, о которых не следует забывать, а именно: внешняя и внутренняя критика источника. Авторы считают, что существенным дополнением в процессе обретения знаний по ПФВП Грузии стало бы обращение к нарративным материалам, прежде всего, СМИ Республики Грузия, так же как и внимательное прочтение экспертно-аналитических разработок авторитетных специалистов по вопросам стратегии и основным направлениям международных отношений изучаемой страны.

Документ 1.

Документ 2.

NATIONAL M ILITARY STRATEGY

I NTRODUCTION

This document represents an update of the Military Strategy published in 2005. “National Military Strategy” of Georgia (NMS) reflects new realities facing the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) as well as existing tendencies within a sphere of defence defined by the strategic defence planning documents.

The National Military Strategy is a key military-political document of the country. Based on the “National Security Concept” and the “Threat Assessment Document”, it addresses the national security environment, national interests and major priorities for security policy. It also identifies strategic military objectives, missions and capabilities of the GAF.

The changed nature of the security environment that followed the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 posed the necessity to revise existing strategic documents. For this purpose the National Security Review process was initiated under coordination of the National Security Council leading to update of the “National Security Concept”, “Threat Assessment Document for 2007-2009” and the “Strategic Defence Review” (2007). Elaboration of the “National Military Strategy” is also a part of this process. Considering military objectives, missions and capabilities defined in the NMS, the Strategic Defence Review sets out priority development directions for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the GAF conformably to new needs that result from an altered security environment.

Legally, the National Military Strategy draws upon the Constitution of Georgia, international treaties and agreements, domestic laws and reflects values, obligations and norms acknowledged by Georgian legislation.

The NMS is approved by the Government of Georgia. Elaboration/ revision of the NMS is an obligation established by the Georgian Legislation. The document is being revised upon necessity in case of substantial security environment change and/ or in accordance to security sector policy, priorities or tendencies, to set out new development directions of the GAF.

NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

The security environment of Georgia is complex and dynamic. Numerous challenges still face the country first and foremost conditioned by the occupation Georgia`s territory and the risk of re-igniting a conflict. This continuous to threaten security of both Georgia and region and hinders country`s stable development. Therefore, the main national and security policy objective of Georgia is to end this occupation and allow the peaceful restoration of its territorial integrity. Achieving this objective is further supported by the steps undertaken in consolidation of democratic reforms and the continuation of the Western path of development.

Georgia pursues a friendly neighbourhood policy with great attention paid to making a substantial contribution to strengthen regional and international peace and stability. Georgia is the largest contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission among non-NATO and partner countries.

Additionally, integration into NATO and the European Union is one of the key priorities of country`s foreign and security policy. In support of this political objective, the GAF will continue bilateral and multilateral cooperation and participation in international multinational exercises and operations.

Based on the “National Security Concept” and the “Threat Assessment Document for 2013-2016”, the NMS recognises following major risks and threats:

 Occupation of Georgian Territory – the occupation of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and represents a major source of destabilisation. The absence of international peacekeeping forces on the occupied territory and its militarization increases the risks of provocations and military aggression.

 Regional I nstability – the instability in the Caucasus has a negative impact on the security of the region. The possible spill-over of those conflicts to Georgia and potential humanitarian crisis poses a threat not only to the conflict parties, but Georgia as well.

 T r ansnational T h r e ats – Globalisation facilitates the growth of influence and scope in international crime. International terrorism and transnational organized crime pose a threat to the global security and safety of individual countries. The continued occupation of Georgian territory creates a favourable environment for international terrorism and transnational organized crime. There is also a risk of using occupied territory for such illegal activities as; smuggling, human and drug trafficking, illicit trade of arms and weapons of mass destruction.

 Cyber Threats – cyber threats are one of the major challenges to the modern world. The cyber attacks against Georgia during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 highlighted the need to increase the quality of cyber defence.

 Natural and M a nmade Disasters – Georgia is located in a seismically active area, with frequent landslides, floods and other natural disasters the aftermath of which causes severe impacts on the welfare of the population. There is also a threat of manmade disasters, which can cause catastrophic harm to the country as well.

DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE

Georgia has an Armed Forces for the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as for the honouring its international obligations. The MoD is responsible for the development of the GAF military capabilities necessary to accomplish its assigned missions.

The aim of deterrence is to avoid possible military aggression through developing combat-effective Armed Forces that are adequately manned, equipped and trained. Effective deterrence measures shall make a potential adversary consider an attack unfeasible or not worth the cost or the advantage that could be gained. Credible deterrence also requires an effective reserve and mobilization system as well as Government`s ability to mobilize national resources in times of crisis and/ or war. Deterrence also implies use of diplomacy to avoid conflict and prevent possible escalation.

Should deterrence fail the Georgian Military Forces (including GAF), supported with relevant state and civilian institutions, shall be used to counter an adversary`s aggression. Defeating an adversary implies preventing its Armed Forces from accomplishing its strategic objectives.

4.1. Enhancement of Defence Capabilities

Effective deterrence and defence require a high level of Armed Forces readiness, development of a rapid crisis response capability and effective force mobilization. Based on the analysis of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, changes have also been made in the command structure of the GAF.

Effective execution of defence operations requires allocating forces based on a territorial principle; improving mobility, emphasizing centralized planning and decentralized execution, enhancing commander flexibility as well as making more effective use of available resources. In order to improve defence capabilities particular emphasis shall be placed on a provision of GAF with required personnel, armament, military equipment and ammunition.

4.1.1. F o r c e Readiness

The existence of properly trained units is a necessary precondition for enhancing defence capabilities and attaining a high level of force readiness. It supports rapid, effective and adequate response to threats. Units with a high level of readiness must be capable of conducting full spectrum combat operations. The development of such forces depends on further professionalization of the GAF, improvement of operational planning and training processes using tailored GAF doctrine compatible with NATO and Partner Nations.

 Command and Control – Further development of stationary and mobile GAF command and control systems is important to maintain unity and continuity of military operations. Particular importance should be attributed to centralized planning and decentralized execution, institutionalizing standard operating procedures, modernizing communication and information systems, as well as improving GAF operational planning procedures during crisis/ war.

 Bu ilding I nstitutional Capacity – Considering the existing security environment of Georgia there is a constant need to enhance GAF capabilities by modernizing and professionalizing the Armed Forces, developing and sustaining effective defence planning and management systems and continuously improving force capabilities. Such actions will enhance Georgia`s defence capabilities and strengthen the country`s security.

Further implementation of an effective personnel management system supports continual improvement of a professional civilian and military work force and reduces risk of personnel separation. One of main priorities of the MoD is improving professional development programs as well as implementing a comprehensive set of programs that provide complete life cycle management of personnel from recruitment to separation.

In order to enhance the professionalism of the GAF, emphasis shall be placed on improving career management, implementing merit based promotion, expanding professional education programs, providing competitive salaries and improving the transparency of selection and assignment processes.

Implementing these programs demonstrates taking care of civilian and military personnel of the Ministry and contributes to improving the morale within the defence system. Emphasis will also be placed on improving social conditions and providing quality medical service for Ministry personnel, their families and veterans.

Improvement of GAF capabilities requires further development of the military training and education system in preparation of the Armed Forces capable of participating in full spectrum combat operations. Special attention shall be placed on the National Defence Academy officers` and non-commissioned officers` (NCOs) professional development programs and participation in military education and training programs offered by leading educational institutions of partner states. This shall ensure progressive development of the GAF chain of command and enhancement of the officer and NCO`s professional corps. This process requires the development of GAF tailored military doctrine and an effective lessons learned program. Effective collective and individual training also requires further development of modern simulation and training technologies.

 Combat Capabilities – Effective and credible combat capabilities are required to successfully accomplish the defence objective of the GAF. The components of the GAF, whose core is composed by light infantry, infantry and mechanized units, must be properly organized, manned, equipped, trained and motivated. They should also be supported by appropriate combat support and combat service support capabilities.

 Combat S upport Capabilities – The development of GAF combat potential requires improvement of combat support capabilities. In this regard attention shall be paid to development of self-propelled artillery by enhancing fire control system and obtaining of target acquisition and location finding systems. Combat support improvements are also needed to acquire modern engineer systems necessary to improve GAF mobility and counter-mobility measures as well as to develop Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence capabilities. Modern air defence and anti-armour systems are also needed to neutralize any adversary’s superiority. It of vital importance to develop air surveillance and air control capabilities by modernizing infrastructure and armaments. Successful implementation of military operations also requires a functional intelligence system that ensures timely collection of intelligence data, proper analysis and immediate dissemination to rapidly respond to an escalating crisis, strengthen state security and provide decision-makers with relevant information. For this reason, it is crucial to improve intelligence gathering, enhance analytical capabilities and expand interagency data exchange mechanisms.

 Combat S ervice Su pport Capabilities – A flexible logistic system is essential to support combat efficient Armed Forces. Force sustainment ensures GAF flexibility in the planning, coordinating and execution of military operations by providing transport, supply and medical capabilities as well as warehouse and depot sustainment support. Emphasis is also needed on developing a modern logistic information management system, modernizing military infrastructure, improving deployed sustainment for units participating in international operations as well as developing “Host-Nation Support” capabilities.

 Special Operations - Development and strengthening Special Operation Force capabilities is critical. Special attention shall be paid to the acquisition of modern equipment and institutionalizing rigorous training programs.

 Reserve and M obilization S ystem – It is important to develop a reserve and mobilization system considering existing threats, available forces and limited resources available to ensure the country`s defence. This system shall ensure defence resiliency and assist in deterring possible aggression. The establishment of an effective reserve system as an important component of national defence and demonstrates to any potential adversary that the cost of aggression against Georgia will not be worth the anticipated results. Emphasis will be placed on developing an affordable GAF reserve and mobilization system that provides properly armed and trained personnel having compatible command and control system with the active force and capable of performing missions defined through a unified operational planning process.

 I nformation and Cyber Security – Ensuring the functionality and security of communication and information systems is crucial to the command and control of the GAF. Modern, protected communications support secure, continuous connectivity and coordinated military action. Protection of information security requires the establishment of cyber and communication security systems capable of preventing or mitigating harmful results inflicted by the adversary and restoring operability of all elements in the shortest time possible. The Ministry shall ensure its information security through cooperation with relevant Government agencies.

CONCLUDING S UMMARY

According to the NMS the main goal of the GAF is to deter a potential adversary and should the need arise defend the country. A modern, well-trained and equipped Armed Forces is the cornerstone of preserving country`s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Georgia shall continue the efforts to improve capabilities of its Armed Forces to successfully accomplish assigned military missions and meeting international obligations.

The MoD places special emphasis on maintaining and improving combat readiness of the GAF. In this regard, it is important to deepen cooperation with NATO and EU, participate in multinational operations and exercises and remain engaged in bilateral military cooperation with NATO and Partner Nations.

Additionally, the MoD shall ensure the readiness of the GAF to provide timely assistance to civil authorities in cases of manmade or national disaster. The MoD shall ensure the rapid mobilization of relevant resources and offer support to mitigate the harm caused by such emergencies.

Источник: Министерство обороны Грузии // https: //mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/NMS-ENG.pdf

Контрольные вопросы:

1. Дайте определение Национальной военной стратегии Грузии.

2. Охарактеризуйте принципы военной политики Республики Грузия.

3. Дайте толкование терминам «Deterrence and Defence» применительно к оборонной политике РГ.

4. Какие международные задачи решает Грузия в рамках сотрудничества с НАТО?

5. Какие действия Вооруженных сил Грузии относятся к сфере «Information and Cyber Security»?

Документ 3.

COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

2017-2020

Introduction

This communication strategy (Strategy) is designed to outline the key communications objectives, target audiences and desired communications effects of the Ministry of Defence of Georgia (MOD) and Georgian Armed Forces (GAF). The Strategy considers the Ministry’s role and policies, current security challenges in the region, the modern information environment, key target audiences, and public atitudes.

The Georgian MOD/GAF operates in a complex and unpredictable security environment. The Russian Federation continues occupation of Georgian territories – the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region (former South Ossetia Autonomous District) and thus remains the main security challenge for Georgia. After the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions by Russia and continuation of the so-called “creeping occupation” affect Georgia’s sovereignty and violate the norms of international law. In the absence of international control, signing so-called “agreements on incorporation” between Russia and de facto governments, as well as Russia’s growing militarization in the occupied regions, offer clear signs of continuous provocations and a resumption of military aggression.

Apart from the threat of renewed Russian military aggression, violation of the sovereignty of neighboring countries using the methods of hybrid warfare remains the top security challenge for Georgia. Annexation of Crimea and events in Eastern Ukraine, the cyber-attacks conducted by Russia, and strengthening of information warfare have significantly increased security challenges on a global scale. In this context, dealing with Russian “soft power” has become the main task for Georgia, along with considering the specifics of future hybrid warfare and adaptation to it.

The actions of Russian “soft power” are aimed at weakening state institutions, discrediting Euro-Atlantic integration and strengthening pro-Russian and anti-Western forces. The number of pro-Russian non-governmental organizations and media outlets opposing Euro-Atlantic integration is significantly growing in the information space. Their goal is to discredit state institutions, among them the Ministry of Defence, which is one of the most important institutions aimed at defending the sovereignty of the country and its Euro-Atlantic integration.

Information Environment

To the Ministry of Defence, the existing information environment encompasses opportunities for strengthening communication, as well as important challenges. The structure of information dissemination mechanisms, socio-political attitudes, and issues related to perceptions of the Ministry all influence the information environment.

According to the International Republican Institute (IRI), the population generally favors television as a source for news, though use of the internet and social media are rising. According to the World Statistics Online Resources, the number of internet users reached nearly 2.5 million as of 2016 in Georgia, while the number of Facebook users increased to 2 million. The functionality of social media, such as information exchange and the creation of space for discussion, enable an increasing impact on the formation of public opinion day by day. Development of this function is also encouraged by a free environment. In Freedom House’s Internet Freedom Index, Georgia was named among free countries in 2016.

Increased access to information and greater information diversity, and more public engagement in socio-political processes, ensure enhanced communication with different target audiences, despite the growth of risks of misinformation and dissemination of unverified information.

Diversity in radio and print media outlets ensure the increasing awareness of the population. The regional media outlets provide information to ethnic minorities in the Azeri, Armenian and Russian languages.

There are no free media in the occupied territories, and Russian TV and Radio are the main sources of information.

According to the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the majority of the population of Georgia still supports Euro-Atlantic integration and considers Russia as the main threat (NDI 2012-2016). During this period, two-thirds of the population supported Georgia’s accession to the NATO Alliance, which shows that the enthusiasm of the Georgian population expressed during the plebiscite in 2008 remains broadly unchanged.

Intensifying Russian “soft power” policies have caused the consolidation of the pro-Russian electorate. According to research by NDI conducted in recent years, the maximum number of supporters of the Eurasian Union is about 31%. Within this indicator, those considering Russia as the best guarantor of the country’s security – who should be considered as a strong pro-Russian electorate - total 13 %. It should be noted that ethnic minorities dominate in this percentage.

According to IRI surveys in 2012-2016, GAF enjoy a high level of public trust (86%), taking second place after Georgian Orthodox Church.

According to assessments by Georgian non-governmental organizations, the MoD stands out for its high level of transparency and access to information. Based on Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) research (conducted 1-15 May 2016), the Ministry’s indicator in terms of proactive publication of public information is 69%.

The narrative that the West poses a threat to the Orthodox Church, Georgian identity and traditions, is getting stronger on the web. Anti-Western and nihilistic narratives are gaining momentum, thus increasing the probability of affecting the armed forces, as an integral part of society.

The current information environment poses a serious threat to Georgia’s national security and its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. In this regard, it’s important to inform the population about NATO-Georgia cooperation and Georgia’s progress towards integration and membership, which will counter malicious Russian narratives.

Within this information environment, strategic communications will help set the agenda for communications for the Ministry, in order to advance MOD core policies by achieving the desired effects with key target audiences.

Strategic communications is defined as shaping the information environment in support of national and organizational interests. Therefore, it is fundamental for strategic communications to identify target audiences and tailor messages appropriately.

MoD Vision

The MoD aims to support building a united, democratic, independent, secure and powerful state where every citizen holds an honorable role and place. As threats to our country are growing, the Ministry aims to develop a more effective defence institution and to establish an optimal force structure that is capable of responding to existing challenges, supporting Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and meeting NATO interoperability requirements.

To achieve this goal, the Ministry is taking into account the best practices of partner countries and has introduced the principle of “Total Defence.” Implementation of this approach requires rational allocation of resources, establishment of civil defence systems, development of relevant infrastructure, creation of effective reserves and a mobilization system, and defining and synchronizing tasks within a context of cross-government cooperation.

Narrative

The primary objective of Georgia’s national security policy is to use all available lawful and peaceful means to ensure the sovereignty of the country, restore territorial integrity and protect its internationally recognized borders.

Accession to European and Euro-Atlantic structures is one of Georgia’s top foreign and security policy priorities. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, the allies agreed that Georgia would become a NATO member. Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will ensure the peaceful and sustainable development of Georgia, as well as the region.

Accession to European and Euro-Atlantic structures will also contribute to strengthening Georgia’s resilience and defence capabilities, creating a secure environment for rapid economic development of the country, strengthening democratic institutions, and protecting rule of law and human rights.

Moreover, Georgia is the only NATO “aspirant country” that, alongside other practical pre-accession tools, also has the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). Successful implementation of the package aims to enhance Georgia’s defence capabilities and to help Georgia advance in its preparations towards membership of the Alliance, which offers an effective defence force for the challenges that the country faces.

Georgia - as a creditable member of the international community - is being transformed from a security consumer to a security provider state. Georgia, as a stable and reliable partner, contributes to global stability and security by participating in NATO, EU and UN-led international missions. Furthermore, from 2015 one of Georgia’s infantry company participates in the NATO Response Force (NRF)1. Georgia’s positive contribution to Euro-Atlantic security architecture not only enriches the military experience of the GAF, but also increases Georgia’s importance in the process of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. The GAF now enjoys higher level of interoperability with NATO than ever before.

Russian military aggression against Georgia in August 2008, the occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, Russian recognition of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, and continuation of the so-called “creeping occupation”, violate the norms of international law and negatively influence the security environment of Georgia and the whole region.

Apart from the threat of renewed Russian military aggression, violation of the sovereignty of the neighboring countries and use of methods of hybrid warfare remain the top security challenges for Georgia, as can be seen by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and events in Eastern Ukraine.

Responding to traditional threats and new challenges requires high readiness, and flexible, well-trained armed forces, which will be able to effectively protect the country’s territories and population, and support the government’s in time of crisis.

For this purpose, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces (by making effective use of available resources) tries to: develop its combat readiness; improve command and control systems; properly equip the armed forces; create mobilization and reserve systems; improve military education and training systems; and effectively use all existing formats and tools with NATO, while enhancing interoperability with NATO forces.

Communication Themes

Current reforms in the Ministry of Defence:

ü Strategic Direction and Management;

ü Force Optimization;

ü Force Readiness;

ü Institutional Development;

ü Multilateral and Bilateral Engagement;

ü Improvements in military education and training;

ü Qualitative improvement of mandatory military service;

ü Establishment of new reserve and mobilization systems;

ü Strengthening of cross-governmental coordination in the face of modern security challenges;

ü Strengthening of crisis communications capability across government;

ü Georgian Armed Forces as an example of civil integration and unity;

ü Social programs for the military and their families;

ü Programs for wounded military servicemen;

ü Enhancing transparency and public engagement in decision making processes;

ü NATO-Georgia cooperation, progress towards integration and membership; implementing the 15 initiatives of the Substantial NATO Georgia Package;

ü Enhancing interoperability with NATO;

ü Managing expectations related to Georgia’s integration into NATO;

ü GAF’s participation in NATO, EU and UN-led international missions;

ü Security challenges: hybrid warfare, cyber security, terrorism.

Communications Channels

Print media

The newspaper “Geo Army” and other printed media can ensure delivery of more specific and detailed information to the public, international community and decision makers. Articles in Georgian newspapers on key security themes should be encouraged.

For the purpose of informing target audiences and distribution of messages, the production of so-called “visibility material” (for example, pens, flyers, brochures, posters, stickers etc.), to be distributed during events and campaigns, is proposed.

Civil Society

The Ministry pays great importance to civil society’s engagement in ongoing processes and in implementation of defence and security policies. Creation of cooperation platforms (conferences, round tables, information meetings) will encourage civil society representatives to actively engage in implementation of defence reforms, increase transparency of defence and security systems, and support the country’s foreign and security policy priorities.

R ecommendations and Risks

The MOD Communications Strategy has been developed in this form for the first time. It would therefore be reasonable to study the effectiveness of MOD communication objectives and themes based on monitoring and analysis, and to take into consideration that study’s results for improvements when developing future iterations of this strategy. Communication objectives and themes should be revised in accordance with changes in defence priorities and directions. This document is designed for peacetime and non-crisis situations. It is intended to develop a crisis communication handbook and to determine the role of strategic communication in crisis and war situations.

It is intended that the communication strategy will be revised annually, based on analyses of the dynamic informational and strategic environment.

Источник: Министерство обороны Грузии // https: //mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/2018/PDF/strategia_eng_2018.pdf

Контрольные вопросы:

1. В чем состоит внешнеполитическое значение Коммуникационной стратегии Министерства обороны Грузии 2017-2020 гг.?

2. Что такое «принцип тотальной обороны»?

3. Перечислите ключевые задачи Министерства обороны Грузии в области коммуникаций.

4. Какие каналы коммуникационного воздействия военное ведомство считает наиболее важными?

5. Назовите приоритетные направления Коммуникационной стратегии.

Документ 4.

Закон Грузии

О борьбе с терроризмом

Глава I. Общие положения

Настоящий Закон определяет формы организации и правовые основы борьбы с терроризмом в Грузии, а также порядок координации органов власти в сфере борьбы с терроризмом, основания участия в борьбе с терроризмом общественных объединений, организаций, должностных лиц и граждан, их права, обязанности и гарантии социальной защиты.

Статья 1. Разъяснение терминов

Термины, использованные в Законе, имеют следующие значения:

а) терроризм – насилие или угроза его применения в отношении физических или юридических лиц, уничтожение, повреждение или угроза уничтожения, повреждения зданий, сооружений, транспортных средств, коммуникаций и других материальных объектов с применением оружия, взрывчатых материалов, ядерных, химических, биологических либо иных, опасных для жизни и здоровья людей веществ, или с похищением людей либо их захватом в заложники в целях понуждения властей или какого-либо органа власти либо международной организации к осуществлению определенных деяний или воздержанию от осуществления определенных деяний для удовлетворения противоправных интересов террористов;

б) террористический акт - взрыв, поджог, нападение на человека, применение оружия или иные деяния, создающие опасность смерти человека, причинения значительного имущественного вреда либо наступления иных тяжких последствий, совершенные в террористических целях, либо угроза совершения террористического акта; (27.11.2013 N1640)

б1) террористические цели – устрашение населения или принуждение органов власти, органов власти иностранных государств или международных организаций совершить или не совершать те или иные действия, либо дестабилизация или уничтожение фундаментальных политических, конституционных, экономических или социальных структур страны/иностранных государств/международных организаций; (27.11.2013 N1640)

в) террористическая деятельность – деятельность, ответственность за которую определена главой ХХХVIII Уголовного кодекса Грузии;

г) международный терроризм – террористическая деятельность, осуществленная:

г.а) террористами, террористическими группами или террористическими организациями на территории иностранного государства (государств) либо причинившая вред иностранному государству (государствам);

г.б) гражданами одного государства в отношении граждан другого государства;

г.в) в случае, когда как террорист, так и жертва терроризма являются гражданами одного и того же государства либо разных государств, но террористический акт совершен за пределами территорий этих государств;

д) террорист – лицо, участвующее в террористической деятельности;

е) террористическая группа – объединение двух или более лиц в целях осуществления террористической деятельности (террористического акта);

ж) террористическая организация – организация (независимо от ее формы), созданная в целях осуществления террористической деятельности. Организация признается террористической организацией, если это – организованное объединение более чем двух лиц в определенный период времени. Организованным объединением считается объединение, не являющееся случайно созданным для немедленного совершения преступления, и в котором необязательно наличие формального распределения ролей между членами объединения, непрерывного характера членства или сформировавшейся развитой структуры; (27.11.2013 N1640)

з) заложник – физическое лицо, захваченное в целях понуждения властей, общественных организаций, государственно-политических должностных лиц или других лиц совершить какое-либо действие или воздержаться от совершения какого-либо действия как условия освобождения захваченного лица;

и) борьба с терроризмом – деятельность, направленная на выявление, предупреждение, пресечение террористической дятельности и сведение к минимуму возможных ее последствий;

к) контртеррористическая операция – комплекс специальных мероприятий, направленных на предупреждение и пресечение преступных действий террористического характера, обеспечение безопасности людей, обезвреживание террористов и сведение к минимуму возможных последствий террористического акта или(и) иного преступления, совершенного в террористических целях;

л) зона безопасности – зона активного и массированного действия субъектов борьбы с терроризмом;

м) зона проведения контртеррористических операций – отдельные участки местности или акватории, транспортные средства, здания, сооружения, учреждения и прилегающее к ним сухопутное, морское и воздушное пространство, в пределах которого проводится указанная операция;

н) режим в зоне проведения контртеррористической операции - чрезвычайное положение, которое устанавливается временно, в течение периода проведения контртеррористической операции и которое предусматривает предоставление субъекту борьбы с терроризмом определенных законом специальных полномочий, необходимых для освобождения заложников, обеспечения безопасности жизни и здоровья людей, нормального функционирования органов государственной власти и местного самоуправления, учреждений, предприятий и организаций.

Статья 2. Правовые основания борьбы с терроризмом

Правовую основу борьбы с терроризмом в Грузии составляют: международные договоры и соглашения Грузии, законы Грузии, в том числе -настоящий Закон, и другие нормативные акты.

Статья 3. Основные принципы борьбы с терроризмом

Основными принципами борьбы с терроризмом в Грузии являются:

а) законность;

б) защита и уважение прав и свобод физических и юридических лиц;

в) приоритетность обеспечения безопасности жизни и здоровья человека при борьбе с терроризмом;

г) приоритетность осуществления превентивных мероприятий;

д) комплексное использование правовых, политических, социально-экономических, пропагандистских, информационных и иных возможностей;

е) ведение переговоров с террористами в целях предотвращения возможных последствий преступления террористического характера;

ж) единоначалие в руководстве силами и средствами, задействованными в контртеррористической операции;

з) недопустимость разглашения сведений о тактике и технических средствах проведения контртеррористической операции, а также о составе участников указанной операции;

и) неотвратимость наказания за террористическую деятельность.

Глава IV.

Глава V.

Заявление

Preamble

The United States of America and Georgia:

1. Affirm the importance of our relationship as friends and strategic partners. We intend to deepen our partnership to the benefit of both nations and expand our cooperation across a broad spectrum of mutual priorities.

2. Emphasize that this cooperation between our two democracies is based on shared values and common interests. These include expanding democracy and economic freedom, protecting security and territorial integrity, strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the right of dignified, secure and voluntary return of all internally displaced persons and refugees, supporting innovation and technological advances, and bolstering Eurasian energy security.

3. Stress our mutual desire to strengthen our relationship across the economic, energy, diplomatic, scientific, cultural and security fields.

Национальный исследовательский Нижегородский государственный

университет им. Н.И. Лобачевского

А.А. Корнилов, Д.Т. Сухиашвили

ПРОЦЕСС ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ

ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ

РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГРУЗИЯ:

КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ

Учебно-методическое пособие (практикум)

Нижний Новгород

2018

УДК 327(07)

ББК Ф4(075)

П 84

Составители: Корнилов А.А., Сухиашвили Д.Т.

Рецензент: доктор политических наук, профессор С.И. Грачев

УДК 327(07)

ББК Ф4(075)

университет им. Н.И. Лобачевского, 2018

Содержание

Введение ………………………………………………………………………..…………………... 4

Документ 1. National Security Concept of Georgia................................................................... 6-29

Документ 2. National Military Strategy, 2014 …………………………………. …………… 30-38

Документ 3. Communication Strategy, 2017-2020 …..…………….………………………… 39-49

Введение

Документ 1.

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Следующая ⇒

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