And how Europe should respond

 

The Economist                                                                                                             6 October 2018                   

    Europe has caught China’s eye. Chinese investments there have soared, to nearly? 36bn ($40bn) in 2016 - almost double the previous years’ total. Chinese FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) fell in 2017, but the share spent in Europe rose from a fifth to a quarter. For the most part, this money is welcome. Europe’s trading relationship with China has made both sides richer.

    However, China is also using its financial muscle to buy political influence. The Czech president, Milos Zeman, wants his country to be China’s “unsinkableaircraft-carrier” in Europe. Last year Greece stopped the European Union from criticising China’s human-rights record at a UN forum. Hungary and Greece prevented the EU from backing a court ruling against China’s expansiveterritorial claims in the South China Sea. Faced with such behaviour, it is only prudent for Europeans to be nervous.

    And not only Europeans. The terms on which the emerging undemocratic superpower invests in the outside world are of interest to all countries - particularly if other things, such as foreign policy, may be affected. Americans, increasinglyconsumed by fears that China poses a commercial and military threat, should be mindful of competition for the loyalties of its oldest ally. For everyone’s sake, it matters that Europeans gauge their welcome to China wisely. Just now, they do not.

 

    A sense ofperspective

    Many of China’s plans in Europe are just what you would expect of a rising economy. Some investments are private, profit-seeking and harmless. Acquiring technology by buying innovative firms, including in Germany’s Mittelstand, is reasonable, too, so long as deals are scrutinised for national security risks. There are also things that China, unlike Russia, does not want, such as to undermine the EU or sow chaos by furtively supporting populist, xenophobic parties. It would rather Europe remained stable and open for business. On issues such as climate change and trade, China has acted more responsibly than the Trump administration, seeking to uphold global accords rather than chuck grenades at them.

    Some Europeans suggest that China is a useful counterweight to an unpredictable Uncle Sam. That is misguided. Europe has far more in common with America than China, however much Europeans may dislike the occupant of the White House. Moreover, China has used the EU’s need for unanimity in many of its decisions to pick off one or two member states in order to block statements or actions of which it disapproves— as with human rights.

    Other Europeans seize on such examples to jump to the opposite conclusion. They fear that Chinese lucre will one day undermine Europe’s military alliance with the United States. Fortunately, that is a long way off, as the French and British navies have shown by joining America and Japan to challenge China in the South China Sea. Until China itself becomes a democracy, of which there is no sign, Europe will surely remain closer to its traditional allies.

    Europe thus needs to take a path that avoids the extremes of naivety and hostility. It should avoid mimicking Chinese protectionism. It might sound “fair” to subject Chinese firms in Europe to the restrictions European firms face in China, but it would be a mistake. The permeability of European societies and economies to ideas and influences is strength.

    But such openness also makes them vulnerable. Hence, governments should vet investments case by case. Montenegro should not have allowed its debts to China to become so perilously vast. Hungary and Poland should have looked harder at certain Chinese infrastructure projects that offer poor value for money or were never properly completed.

    Europeans could do more to substantiate their talk of “reciprocity”, or the mantra that the EU and China should treat each other as each wishes to be treated. They could, for example, introduce new instruments to make it clearer who is buying stakes in firms and thus whether they are doing so fairly. They should also increase funding for impartial China research. Transparency should be demanded from political parties, universities, think-tanks and lobbyists. Sometimes Chinese cash buys unsubtle happy talk. More often, it leads to self-censorship and punch-pulling from even prestigious academies.

    And Europe should aim to speak as one. None of its states alone can face down China but, acting together, they could do so for decades to come. The EU could, for example, use qualified- majority voting (QMV) rather than unanimous votes on some subjects sensitive to China, such as human rights. This would not work for everything - most EU nations would balk at giving Brussels a veto over how they deploy their military forces. But QMV would make it harder for China to paralyse the EU by picking off one small member at a time. The EU could also co-ordinate investment-screening processes by member states. And it could take better care of those southern and eastern countries particularly vulnerable to China’s influence and provide alternative sources of investment for the projects they deem important. A little more intra-European solidarity would go a long way.

 

    What money can’t buy

    America has a role to play, too. Ideally the Trump administration would stop treating Europeans as free-riders on American power who deserve a good kicking. On trade, especially, the EU is a powerful potential ally in getting China toabide by global norms. America should also work more closely with European governments to set up common standards of transparency, graft-busting and the prevention of influence-peddling - which would make it harder forChina to impose its own rules on small countries. At a time when standards for IT and artificial intelligence risk splitting into a Chinese camp and an American one, Europe can help find a middle path.

    As China rises, the benefits for the world of an independent, open and free Europe will only increase. Conversely, a Europe weakened and divided by the world’s most powerful authoritarian regime would exacerbate problems far beyond the EU’s borders. Europe must not let that happen.

 

 

 

US leaving INF will put nuclear non-proliferation at risk & may lead to ‘complete chaos’ – Moscow

21 Oct, 2018

    If the US ditches the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), it could collapse the entire nuclear non-proliferation system, and bring nuclear war even closer, Russian officials warn. By ending the INF, Washington risks creating a domino effect which could endanger other landmark deals like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and collapse the existing non-proliferation mechanism as we know it, senior lawmaker Konstantin Kosachev said on Sunday.

    The current iteration of the START treaty, which limits the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, is due toexpire in 2021. Kosachev, who chairs the Parliament’s Upper HouseForeign Affairs Committee, warned that such an outcomepits mankind against “complete chaos in terms of nuclear weapons.” “Now the US Western allies face a choice: either embarking on the same path, possibly leading to new war, or siding withcommon sense, at least for the sake of their self-preservation instinct."

    His remarks came after US President Donald Trump announced his intentions to “terminate” the INF, citing allegedviolations of the deal by Russia and China.

    Moscow has repeatedly denied undermining the treaty, pointing out that Trump has failed to produce any evidence of violations. Moreover, Russian officials insist that the deployment of US-made Mk 41 ground-based universal launching systems in Europe actually violates the agreement since the launchers are capable of firing mid-range cruise missiles.

    Leonid Slutsky, who leads the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament’s lower chamber, argued that Trump’s words are akin toplacing “a huge mine under the whole disarmament process on the planet.”

    The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 by then-President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The deal effectively bans the parties from having and developing short- and mid-range missiles of all types. According to the provisions, the US was obliged to destroy Pershing I and II ballistic missiles and BGM-109G Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles. Moscow, meanwhile, pledged to remove the SS-20 and several other types of missiles from its nuclear arsenal.

    By scrapping the historic accord, Washington is trying to fulfill its “dream of a unipolar world, ” a source within the Russian Foreign Ministry said. “This decision fits into the US policy of ditching the international agreements which impose equal obligations on it and its partners, and render the ‘exceptionalism’ concept vulnerable.”

    Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov denounced Trump’s threats as “blackmail” and said that Washington wants to dismantle the INF because it views the deal as a “problem” on its course for “total domination” in the military sphere.

    The issue of nuclear arms treaties is too vital for national and global security to rush into hastily-made “emotional”decisions, the official explained. Russia is expecting to hear more on the US’ plans from Trump’s top security adviser, John Bolton, who is set to hold talks in Moscow tomorrow.

    President Trump has been open about unilaterally pulling the US out of various international agreements if he deems them to be damaging to national interests. Earlier this year, Washington withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme. All other signatories to the landmark agreement, including Russia, China, and the EU, decided to stick to the deal, while blasting Trump for leaving.

US ultimate goal is to strip Russia of its nukes

24 Oct, 2018

       The US single strategic objective, in terms of Russian nuclear triad, is to strip it of its arsenal. This is what shapes all of the White House's foreign policy while any talk about nuclear arms reduction is just cover for that.

       Last week, US President Donald Trump announced plans to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Since signing the document in 1987, the USSR/Russia had to get rid of several highly promising pieces of military hardware, such as intermediate-range two-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile, known as Pioner, with the associated mobile launchers and the Oka mobile ballistic missile system. It's worth noting that these systems had outstanding operational capabilities, and their combat potential was a great concern to the US.

       Under Boris Yeltsin, Russia almost lost its strategic air force and heavy multiple-warhead ballistic missiles. In comparison, what the US had to give up looks like a bare minimum.

       So, let's not be under any illusion that negotiations with the US on limiting or reducing any types of nuclear weapons could actually lead to strengthening global peace and security or building mutual trust. Their one and only goal is to disarm Russia completely and finish it off.

       Looming US withdrawal from the INF Treaty could theoretically lead to the US deploying its intermediate-range missiles in the Baltic States and Ukraine.
Up until 1987, US ground-launched cruise missiles BGM-109G Gryphon were based at Greenham Common and Molesworth (Britain), Wueschheim (Germany), Comiso (Italy) and Florennes (Belgium) – a total of 309 missiles across Europe. About 100 intermediate-range Pershing II ballistic missiles were placed near Schwä bisch Gmü nd, Neu-Ulm, and Neckarsulm in West Germany.

       And now similar weapons could be deployed several hundred kilometers to the east, almost at the current western border of Russia.

       Today, the deployment of US intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-based cruise missiles, for instance, around Kharkov, Chernigov or Mariupol in Ukraine, sounds like a nightmare.

       Unfortunately, we have good reason to believe that the current Ukrainian regime won't put any political obstacles in the way of this. Moreover, Kiev would undoubtedly respond to Washington's plans to deploy missiles on Ukraine's eastern borders with genuine enthusiasm. Similar levels of excitement could be expected from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, should the US decide to deploy missiles on their respective territories.

       Should this happen, the flight time of an intermediate-range ballistic missile to Russian Armed Forces' crucially important facilities in the European part of the country would be tens of seconds. Russia's top administration would have virtually no time to even consider a retaliatory strike. In addition, the process will render the entire early-warning system based on the Voronezh radar installations ineffective.

       Neither would the situation be improved in any substantial way through the use of satellites launched as part of the Unified Space System (EKS) of the Russian Armed Forces.

       The purpose of the satellites is to detect ballistic missiles launched by a potential enemy, then calculate their trajectories and determine the impact point of each warhead. There will be practically no time left to perform all these operations and inform the military and political leadership.

       In addition, the deployment of military units, equipped with intermediate-range missiles, near the western borders of Russia significantly raises the probability of a disarming strike with the use of conventional weapons, which fits very well with the so-called Prompt Global Strike initiative developed by the US.

       In other words, should the US leave the INF Treaty, the resulting situation would be much worse – in terms of potential military and political consequences – compared to the one the Soviet Union faced in the mid-1980s.

       Among other things, it is believed that the collapse of the INF Treaty will undermine any further discussions on the topic of strategic offensive arms, making it unlikely that the New START treaty would be extended beyond 2021, when it expires.

       However, there are varying opinions with regard to that possibility. Notably, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said it was too early to say whether the statements by President Trump about the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty would affect the future of the New START Treaty.

       Finally, a significant part of both Russian and US expert communities believe that America's withdrawal from the INF Treaty would signal the start of an uncontrolled and completely unrestricted nuclear arms race.

       On the surface, it may look like that is the case – however, some of the issues can be approached from a slightly different angle. There has been a great deal of exaggerationwhen it comes to the significance of the agreements signed by Russia and the US in the area of strategic arms reduction and control in the past.

       At one time, for example, it was believed that the 1972 ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of global strategic stability, and the US withdrawal from it would lead to disastrous consequences. It has been over 16 years since they did withdraw from it, back in June 2002. Still no sign of Armageddon.

       Likewise, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the termination of the INF Treaty would somehow bring about the end of the world. Besides, even if intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles are deployed along Russia's western border, in case of a nuclear conflict Moscow would still be able to launch a retaliatory attack, which would happen even if the government and the military are completely crippled and paralyzed.

       This will be done by the modern iteration of the Perimeter system (also known as the Dead Hand). In any case, the US and its European allies would suffer a guaranteed level of unacceptable damage, should they attack first. Thus, this whole debate over catastrophic consequences for Russia that may follow the deployment of intermediate-range missiles on its borders if a nuclear war eruptsboils down to two key things.

       But first, it is necessary to keep in mind that nuclear missile exchange would inevitably lead to the nuclear winter, meaning a true Armageddon for humanity. For instance, even a nuclear conflict without intermediate-range missiles would send the global temperature level to -40 °C, while adding the intermediate-range missiles factor would mean even a more drastic cooldown reaching as low as -41°C. That is, there is no big difference whether such missiles would be used or not during a potential nuclear war – either way it would mean a catastrophe of a truly global scale.

       Recent statements delivered by Donald Trump has given rise to a wave of speculationregarding Russia's possible response. To begin with, it is clear that Moscow will not be plunging into another nuclear race as it was in the 1950s or 1960s. First, Russia doesn't have enough resources. Second, there is simply no need for it – and that is the real reason. Russia is not going to build up its missile arsenals.

       However, if the US indeed leaves the INF, Moscow's hands will be untied and it could revamp its 9К720 Iskander-M missile complex to use long-range cruise missiles. Also, we cannot rule out that Russia would decide to go back to designing a new light ballistic missile such as Kurier or improving combat capabilities of the RS-26 Rubezh.

       As for Donald Trump's expectations to see China joining the negotiations on a new treaty, it seems that no-one has told him that India, Pakistan and Iran also possess such missiles. And it is highly likely that China will not be interested in talking about any kind of INF Treaty. First, intermediate-range missiles are at the core of Beijing's nuclear capabilities. Second, China will never let go of its DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles with the operational range of 1450km (900 miles).

       In case of a conflict between China and the US, these very DF-21Ds would not let US carrier battle groups come closer than 1400-1500 km without the risk of being hit. It would neutralize the threat of US jets carrying successful strikes against coastal infrastructure and targets located further ashore. Currently, China is working on further improvements to combat capabilities of the DF-21. Its operational range is expected to reach between 3000 to 5000km. That said, China will not be giving up on its crucial future weapon so easily.

       As for a new treaty, it should be negotiated between all countries which now possess (and can possibly possess) such missiles – the US, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and China. However, it is quite likely that won't happen in any immediate future because of the many conflicting political interests of the countries. At the very best, it seems to be possible to launch consultations and outline the positions of countries that now have intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

 

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