|
Архитектура Аудит Военная наука Иностранные языки Медицина Металлургия Метрология Образование Политология Производство Психология Стандартизация Технологии |
|
|
Архитектура Аудит Военная наука Иностранные языки Медицина Металлургия Метрология Образование Политология Производство Психология Стандартизация Технологии |
A near miss ( потенциально опасное происшествие ) is a hazardous event which does NOT result in accident / injury but a situation has arisen where an accident or an incident could have happened.Стр 1 из 25Следующая ⇒
Part 1. NEAR MISS REPORTS A near miss ( потенциально опасное происшествие ) is a hazardous event which does NOT result in accident / injury but a situation has arisen where an accident or an incident could have happened. Some examples of near misses which occur during day-to-day activities: − A seaman is found aloft (на высоте) not wearing a safety harness (страховочный пояс), − Acid is spilled while filling up emergency batteries, − A cargo net breaks while taking on stores but there is no damage, − Emergency action is required to avoid collision. Near misses should be reported to a Senior Officer or the Master who will complete a near miss report to send to the office. · Near miss reports should be completed in full so that a complete picture of the incident can be built up. · Near miss reports do not need to be signed. · Once received by the office a near miss will be analysed and compared to other near misses. In this way, trends can be identified and changes put in place to improve safety onboard. · Near miss reports should be filed onboard so that action can be followed up and they can be accessed by external examiners / auditors. CASE STUDY Case study - 1. Pilot Ladder Insecure Weather: SW winds, 26 knots cloudy with showers. The pilot vessel came alongside the departing ship from Fremantle Port inner harbour. The procedure is to check that the Pilot ladder is correctly rigged as per the guidelines set by the International Maritime Pilots Association, before the Pilot disembarks. The testing of the ladder involves placing weight on the ladder and pulling on the manropes. When the manropes were tested it became apparent that one of them had not been correctly secured. The pilot then proceeded to instruct and assist the crew to correctly rig both manropes. The pilot proceeded to disembark with no problems. This near miss is a reminder of the dangers that the pilot is exposed to when transferring between pilot launch and ships at sea. Had the Pilot crew not correctly followed procedure and had the pilot not noticed, it is certainly possible that the pilot may have fallen.
Answer the questions.
1. Weather: SW winds, 26 knts cloudy with showers. What is the force of the wind in this case according to the Beaufort scale? 2. According to what organisations should the Pilot ladder be rigged correctly? 3. How should the Pilot ladder be tested properly? 5. Can you explain the expression “placing weight on the ladder”, and “pulling on the manropes”. Describe the process. 6.What is “near miss” ? Why is it so important to report near misses to the company? 7. Who is responsible for securing the Pilot ladder on board the ship?
Decide if the following statements are True or False. Correct the wrong ones. 1. The reminder of the dangers that the pilot is exposed to is called dangerous avoidance of the accident.__________ 2. The pilot vessel was underway alongside the departing ship from inland harbour Fremantle Port.__________ 3. Prior the Pilot disembarks, the officer must be sure that the pilot ladder is secured correctly. ____________ 4. When the manropes were tested it became clear that the pilot ladder had been rigged properly. ______________ 5. The Pilot crew had not correctly followed the procedure and the pilot had not noticed that the ladder was unsecured. _____________ Give synonyms to the given words. You may use more than one. 1. Departure _____________________________________________________________________ 2. Harbour ______________________________________________________________________ 3. Guidelines ____________________________________________________________________ 4. Apparent _____________________________________________________________________ 5. Pilot launch ___________________________________________________________________ 6. Danger ______________________________________________________________________ 7. To rig_________________________________________________________________________
Read a near miss report (see a sample in annex). Complete a near miss report covering the following items. 1. Description of the situation; 2. Possible cause of situation (root cause) and possible consequences; 3. Which preventive measures have been taken; 4. Master's decision (plan for further handling of above incident) Supplementary Notes Chart notes "A Precautionary Area exists around the light buoy. Large commercial ships inbound and outbound will board and disembark pilots within this area and will be severely limited in their ability to manoeuvre. All vessels are advised to exercise extreme caution when navigating within this area." ALRS Volume 6(5) NP 286, states, "The Pilot Boarding and Cruising Area is close seaward of the Light Buoy. Large deep-draught vessels are requested to stay at least 1 nautical mile eastward of the Light Buoy for pilot boarding because of the strength and proximity of the Gulf Stream current." Answer the questions. 1. What was the rank of the narrator of the Panamax box ship? 2. What were technical particulars of both vessels? 3. Why was the inbound vessel drifting offshore? 4. What was the pilot station dispatcher's advice for the inbound vessel? 5. In what position was the inbound vessel seen exactly? 6. How was the fairway buoy passed by the Panamax box ship? 7. Why was the pilot very concerned? 8. What did he ask the inbound vessel to do? 9. Why was a port-to-port passage unacceptable? 10. What cautionary warnings did this special situation demand? 11. How did the Master of Panamax box ship act to avoid a collision between two vessels? 12. How did the inbound vessel enter the marked channel? 13. What did the pilot ask the Master and Officer of the watch about? Case study - 4. Confession Own vessel was on a course of 090 x 12 knots, off the coast of Oman. We were due to make an alteration of course to 075 in 10 minutes time. It was a clear dark night. A container vessel on parallel course at a speed of 21 knots was overtaking us on the port quarter, giving a CPA of 0.2 miles in 20 minutes. I was observing this vessel for the previous 20 minutes and she did not seem to have any intention to keep clear. I was concerned with the small CPA and gave her five flashes on the ALDIS lamp. There was no response. I was also concerned of the alteration that I was due to make to port according to the passage plan. When the vessel was about 2 miles behind us, I made the mistake of altering course to port to make the alteration as per the passage plan. The previous CPA of 0.2 miles now became 0.1 mile in 10 minutes. I now started giving more rapid flashes to the overtaking vessel, which were about as fast as my heartbeat! Suddenly, the container vessel altered her course to starboard and headed for a collision course! I put the wheel hard-over to starboard but realised that it was a point of no return - any action on MY part now could not prevent a collision unless the other vessel altered to port. I reached for the VHF and said "container ship on my port quarter - I am altering to starboard - please alter YOUR course to PORT". Miraculously this had the desired effect and she altered just in time to port passing us at a CPA of less than 0.1 mile. After the incident, as our nerves calmed down, we analyzed the near miss and the following factors seemed contributory to me. I would welcome comments from others if they see other factors: As per rule 13, the overtaking vessel had the duty to keep clear, even after we made our alteration to port. As per rule "Action to avoid collision" though, we should have altered to starboard on seeing the overtaking vessel not taking action. The decision to make the normal course alteration to port (as per the passage plan) was a bad one and should have been delayed. Having been on container ships for 5 years, I know for a fact that container ships "get tired" of altering for vessels they are overtaking and find a CPA of 0.1 to 0.3 miles in open seas quiet sufficient. I am simply stating facts as they are and not trying to justify anything. It also seemed that the watch on the container ship had not seen us and they were only alerted at the second set of quick flashes. Then panic must have set in there and, seeing our port side light and masthead light, the OOW must have decided to alter to starboard. It is doubtful if her ARPA would have shown the vector correctly at such close range, especially if she was not tracking us earlier. It appears that the OOW must have put the wheel hard-over and then possibly checked other bridge equipment. Of course, the entire near-miss could have been avoided if the overtaking vessel had just altered well in time and given us a berth of say 1 mile, but then, we don't live in a perfect world! Under most circumstances, a close quarter situation with another vessel is far more risky than missing the way point by a few cables. If a slight adjustment to the way point on a coastal passage is more risky than having a collision, there must be something drastically wrong with the Passage Plan. Similarly, is it wise to put a position on the chart or make an entry in the log book when there are other vessels or hazards in close proximity? Make sure that there is no risk of collision or grounding before carrying out these secondary tasks. Answer the questions. 1. What was the officer of own vessel due to make? 2. What course was a container vessel steering? 3. What was the author concerned with? 4. What vessel headed for a collision course? 5. How did the author reach the vessel steering a collision course? 6. Which rules were violated and could become a cause of calamity?
2. Explain the following terms. 1. Near miss______________________________________________________________________
2. To take (the wrong) things for granted__________________________________________ 3. To give a CPA____________________________________________________________ 4. ALDIS lamp________________________________________________________________ 5. ARPA________________________________________________________________________ Correct the mistakes. 1. Own vessel was due to make an alteration of course to 0550 in 15 minutes time. ________________________________________________________________________________ 2.Own vessel on parallel course at a speed of 21 knots was overtaking cellular container ship on the port quarter, giving a CPA of 0.2 miles in 20 minutes. ____________________________________ 3. The container ship was asked to alter her couse to starboard. _____________________________ 4. The OOW must have decided to alter to starboard when he saw starboard and masthead lights of the own vessel. __________________________________________________________________ 5. A close quarter situation with another vessel is not so dangerous as missing the way point by a few cables. ________________________________________________________________
Give the analysis of the situation mentioned in the text above and draw a sketch of ships’ movement. Explain what could cause a calamity (бедствие) and evaluate a huge role of human factor in the failure to perform the bridge duties. Answer the questions. 1. What vessel was proceeding on manoeuvering speed towards One fathom Bank? 2. What vessel in ballast was ahead of her? 3. What actions did the post-panamax container vessel have to take in order to avoid collision? 4. Why did the Master of the TEU container give the order to alter her course to port? 5. What was the only action taken by the container vessel? 6. What made the OOW assume that the container vessel was a tanker? 7. What factors led to a near miss?
Answer the questions. 1. Where did the incident happen? 2. What vessel was on a voyage from U.S. Gulf to the Mediterranean? 3. What object was noticed on the vessel's port bow? 4. Did the tugboat display lights indicating her ability to manoeuvre? 5. What does the expression “to make it red to red” mean? 6. What did the general cargo vessel have to do to avoid collision during his first near miss? 7. Were the weather conditions favourable for the voyage of the general cargo vessel when the second near miss situation happened? 8. What vessel was approaching the general cargo vessel? 9. Why did the general cargo vessel have to alter her course sharply to port? 10. How did the man on the tanker explain why he had turned to port? 11. What does ARPA stand for? 12. What does CPA stand for?
Preventative actions Careful judgment is to be made on the deployment of safe access. Where there is the possibility of a sea or swell that could allow the launch to make contact with the platform, a conventional pilot ladder or combination accommodation ladder is used.
Match the synonyms.
Answer the questions. 1. When and where did the near miss incident take place? 2. What did the manufacturer’s representative ask the 4th engineer to do? 3. What happened on opening the cover bolts? 4. How do you understand the expression “to have a narrow escape”? 5. What were the main causes of the incident? 6. What preventive actions must be taken to avoid such incidents in future?
Lessons Learned 1. Duty officer to be always alert on bridge. 2. Vessel to be in constant state of readiness for any emergencies. Realistic training should be carried out during routine drills. 3. Vessel should not be complacent and always keep a sharp lookout on passing traffic and vessels anchored near own vessel. 4.Good listening watch to be kept on VHF and, in case of any doubt about intentions of another vessel, seek clarifications after positively identifying her and inform VTS/port control. 5. In congested anchorages, always have some staff on deck with walkie-talkies, in order to mobilise resources promptly. Answer the questions. 1. What was customary for the ship when she anchored in a crowded anchorage in a major port? 2. What vessel was noticed proceeding ahead at high speed? 3. What was the reason for the first vessel to call anchor stations immediately? 4. What was the inbound vessel doing while the first vessel was testing her engine and continued to heave in our anchor cable? 5. At what distance did the engine of the vessel “A” become operational? 6. Who informed the port and all vessels in vicinity that the situation was under control? 7. Where did the inbound vessel anchor? 8. What did the first vessel do when the inbound vessel anchored safely? 9. What should a vessel do on passing traffic and vessels anchored near own vessel? 10. What should the vessel have in congested anchorages?
Lesson learnt 1. Appropriate PPE must be worn before commencing any task. This includes flotation aids, lifeline or fall-arrestor and thermal wear, if appropriate; 2. Aluminium welding requires special equipment, materials and skills, without which such repairs can pose a serious safety hazard. Answer the questions. 1. What is the difference between pilot combination ladder and accommodation ladder? 2. Why did the seaman fall over board? 3. What preparations did the seamen fail to do before the commencement of the operation? 4. What equipment is usually used for recovering a person from water? 5. What is PPE?
Odd-one-out. 1. embark board get release 2. escape secure rescue save 3. fall drop throw pick up 4. recover rehab restore demolish 5. admit conceal confess avow Answer the questions. 1.Where was the own vessel proceeding? 2.What vessel did she suddenly observe? 3.What was the tanker doing? 4.Was the own vessel in doubt as to the intentions of the tanker? 5.Are vessels allowed to cross narrow channels or fairways? On what condition shall a vessel not cross a narrow channel or fairway? 6.Was there a risk of collision between the tanker and the own vessel? 7.What did the outbound vessel request about? 8.Did the own vessel agree to do so? 9.What actions were unilaterally made by the own vessel? 10.Did the tanker do likewise? 11.What did the own vessel do when the distance between the vessels was about 1.5 miles? 12.Why did the own vessel have to leave fairway? 13.At what distance did the vessels pass safely? 14. What's rule 9 about? Which vessel violated the rule?
Answer the questions. 1.Where was own vessel proceeding? 2.What did the vessel send to the VTS? 3.Why was the speed of the vessel reduced? 4. How was the vessel steered? 5.What vessel was observed by the own vessel approaching the port? 6. How was this vessel proceeding? 7. How was this vessel identified? 8. Did the own vessel receive any answer? 9. What actions were unilaterally made by the own vessel? 10. Why did the own vessel alter her course to port? 11. How did the rogue vessel pass in relation to the own vessel? 12.What didn’t the rougue vessel pay attention to while making her manouevre? 13.Who was noticed on board of the rogue vessel? 14. What did the own vessel ask VTS about? 15.What violations were made by the rogue vessel under Rule 10? Answer the questions. 1. How can you determine the risk of collision by bearing? What Rule of Colregs stands for Risk of Collision? 2. What signals were taken by stand-on vessel in present situation? What Rule of Colregs stands for this? 3. What device is used for giving light signals? 4. What actions should be taken by give-way vessel in this situation under Rule 15? 5. What actions must be taken by stand-on vessel under Rule 17? 6. How could the responsibilities of the vessels change in present situation in restricted visibility? 7. In your opinion, why didn’t stand-on vessel turn port side at first? Was it easier?
Part 2 CARGO RELATED INCIDENTS CASE STUDY Answer the questions. 1. What cargo was tween-decker ship chartered for a voyage from West Africa? 2. How were the logs transported to the vessel in these regions? 3. What are specific features for transporting wood products? 4. How did the gang of stevedores commence loading the vessel? 5. Why didn’t the master receive all the information on the quantity and types of logs to be shipped? 6. Can a supercargo, crew, managers, shippers, stevedores be blamed of negligence? Why? 7. Why did the ship’s managers and crew lack knowledge about nuances of timber loading in West Africa? 8. What was wrong with the stowage factors accepted by the ship’s crew? 9. What aspects affect stowage factor in most timber loading operation? 10. What did the revised stability calculation show? 11. What was the reason for commercial pressure on the owners and vessel? 12. What scheme was worked out to solve the problem?
Lesson learnt 1. Shore cargo weights must always be treated with caution. Accurate draught surveys and evidence of draught and stability calculations must be preserved by the vessel; 2. Charterers/terminals must be issued a written note of protest immediately once under-declared cargo weights is suspected; 3. The vessel's officers must fully familiarize themselves with the cargo types before arriving at the load port(s). Shore management must actively communicate to the vessel, expert advice obtained from industry sources, P&I club etc. 4. With timber cargoes, a careful investigation must be made in the early stages of loading to establish the “surcharge” or excess weight of cargo, especially if the logs are floated down-river; 5. Container terminals must be queried about the accuracy of manifested weights of loaded containers. Nevertheless, the ship's officers must work out displacement calculations frequently to monitor the “missing” cargo weight; 6. Such excess weights may impose unsafe stresses on the tanktops, tween decks and hatch covers; 7. On modern container vessels, if the excess weight on hatch covers is not accounted for, the deck cargo lashing configuration as determined by the on-board software may prove to be insufficient. Answer the questions. 1. What type of vessel was loading at the final load port before commencing a trans-ocean voyage? 2. What were the conditions of sailing in the exit channel? 3. How many containers did pre-arrival loading information list? 4. What was the fault of the terminal’s computer system? 5. What did the chief officer realize during the latter part of loading period? 6. What problem did the vessel face after loading manifested boxes? 7. What measures were taken to avoid grounding? 8. Who should be involved in treatment of shore cargo? 9. When must charterers/ terminals be issued a written note of protest and why? 10. What are the nuances of timber loading operations? 11. How can displacement calculations help to solve stability problems? 12. What is the function of auto-heeling tanks to maintain stability? Answer the questions. 1. What changes concerning containers carriage were recently added to the SOLAS Convention? 2. What happened to 6 containers on route? 3. Where had the missing containers been located? 4. How was the stowage plan created? 5. What resulted in the vessel being stacked incorrectly? 6. What was the total weight of the stack in question? 7. What weight is allowed by the Cargo Securing Manual?
Answer the questions. 1. What was the vessel’s course and what was she carrying? 2. What was wrong with the loading operation? What was the potential risk? 3. Why didn’t Chief Officer request the stevedores to reload the vessel? 4. What happened when the vessel entered the North Atlantic? 5. What measures were taken by the crew to secure the cargo? 6. What should have been done to avoid major heeling? 7. What were the consequences of the severe weather impact?
Decipher the abbreviations. 1. SW course____________________________________________________________________ 2. ENE winds____________________________________________________________________ 3. ESE wind______________________________________________________________________ 4. AB___________________________________________________________________________ 5. GM___________________________________________________________________________
PART 3 VESSEL RELATED INCIDENTS Such incidents will involve significant sums of money and are likely to involve Hull and Machinery Underwriters as well as P&I Liability Insurers. Whilst the potential incidents will each be dealt with separately, clearly there will be a very good chance that a number of other incidents flow directly from the initial casualty. For example, in the case of a collision, it may well be that there are people injured, maybe a fire, a spill of fuel oil from a damaged bunker tank, cargo damage and maybe a subsequent salvage operation. Since incidents within this general category tend to involve significant sums of money and other potential loss it is very likely that surveyors and lawyers will be instructed to investigate and collect evidence. Vessel-related incidents include collision; contacts and damage to property; non-contact damage; grounding; stranding; foundering; hull and machinery – damage or failure of ship and/or its own equipment; fire and explosion.
1. Collision: Striking or being Struck by another Vessel regardless of whether Underway, Anchored or Moored In the lead up to a collision taking place there is very likely going to be a series of incidents and increasingly intense activity developing on the bridge of both ships. It will be necessary to try and reconstruct what exactly happened on the bridge of each ship, who did what and when – it will also be necessary to try and find an answer to the more difficult question of why? Clearly, if the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions (COLREGS) were being followed then collisions simply should not occur.
CASE STUDY Answer the questions. 1. What was the course and speed of a laden deep-draught VLCC? 2. What was the passage plan? 3. Why did the VLCC alter her course? 4. What types of ships collided while on this course? 5. What was the reason of the collision? 6. What ship was responsible for this collision and why? 7. Was there any influence of sub-surface current? If there was, how did it affect the collision? 8. What were the consiquences of the collision for all vessels involved? 9. What are the root causes of the incident? Answer the questions. 1.What is the type of the own vessel? 2.Where was she moving to her designated berth from? 3.Where was the tug made fast? 4.How was the own ship to berth? 5.At what speed did own vessel head towards her berth? 6.What did the master and the pilot do when approaching the berth? 7.What unit was manoeuvring control transferred to? 8.What did the chief officer report? 9.At what speed was own vessel still moving? 10.What did captain realise? 11.What actions were made to avoid the contact with the other vessel? 12.What damage did both vessels sustain?
Explain the following terms 1. An area of high traffic density_____________________________________________________ 2. To plot________________________________________________________________________ 3. To stay clear of_________________________________________________________________ 4. Warning signals________________________________________________________________ One ship causes damage to another without coming into physical contact, e.g. one ship travelling along the course of a river or canal, perhaps at excessive speed, where the wash being produced causes another ship which may be moored ro a riverside berth to range along the berth and, as a consequence suffer damage. (the wash – кильватерная струя) CASE STUDY Answer the questions. 1. What was the position of the small chemical tanker? 2. What was the course of the container vessel? 3. What were the weather conditions? 4. Why did the pilot order the engine to be slowed to half ahead? 5. Did the container vessel proceed at a safe speed? 6. What were the actions of the pilot? 7. What did the 3rd mate see on the tanker? 8. What was the reason for an arrest order against the ship? 9. What was the subject of the claim? 10. What were the consequences of the container’s passage? 11. Was the lawyer’s claim justified? What did he accuse the vessel of?
2. Explain the following terms. 1. To surge along the berth ______________________________________________________ 2. Ebbing tide________________________________________________________________ 3. To be hanging loose_________________________________________________________ 4. Mooring line_______________________________________________________________ 5. Excessive speed____________________________________________________________ 6. The wake of the vessel_______________________________________________________
Case study -1. Grounding A 12,500 gt general cargo ship was proceeding fully loaded through the Aegean Sea toward the Suez Canal. Full sea speed was 15 knots. A passage plan had been prepared and approved, the master’s standing orders had been read and signed by all deck officers and the master had written up his night order book on the evening in question which had also been signed by the third officer and the second officer. In his night orders the master had reminded his navigating officers to: “Maintain the courses and follow the passage plan and to call him if in doubt or if required”. During the midnight to 0400 hrs watch the vessel was to pass between two groups of islands with a channel some 8 miles wide. At about 0200 hrs the second officer – who was the officer of the watch and who was accompanied by a look out – became aware of a significant number of lights on the starboard bow. His radar was detecting a number of small echoes at a distance of 7 miles. By 0210 hrs the lights were starting to become clearer and the second officer determined that they were small sailing vessels and appeared to be crossing very slowly from starboard to port. He thought they were probably a flotilla of yachts or maybe a yacht race sailing between the two islands. At 0215 hrs the second officer altered course 30 degrees to starboard which put all of the sailing vessels on his port bow. He continued to monitor the sailing vessels and was satisfied that they were passing clear. At 0235 hrs he was just about to start bring the vessel back around to her original course line when he heard the echo sounder alarm. On checking the echo sounder it was showing ten metres below the keel and reducing. The ship started to vibrate and shudder. He immediately put the lookout onto hand steering and ordered hard to port at the same time putting the engines on dead slow and then stop. At this time the vessel was felt to be bumping along the bottom. The master arrived on the bridge, having been awakened by the vibrations — he noticed that the speed according to the GPS was zero. The vessel had run aground on an off-lying shoal. General Emergency stations were called and the chief officer led a party to sound around the tanks and bilges on deck and the chief engineer to check the engine room. It was confirmed that the hull appeared to be intact. Upon investigation it transpired that the second officer had put a position on the navigation chart at 0200 hrs but had neither put a position on the chart nor consulted the chart during the period he was altering course to pass the sailing vessels – up to the grounding shortly after 0235 hrs. He confirmed that he was monitoring his distance off the island on his starboard side using the radar and didn’t intend getting any closer than 1V2 miles. However, he had not appreciated or rather he had forgotten about the off-lying shoal area. Indeed it was the same second officer who had prepared the passage plan and had actually highlighted the shoal area in order to draw the attention of the officer of the watch to its existence. A salvage tug and lightering barges were engaged. A little over 2000 tons of cargo were offloaded onto barges before the ship refloated and was safely pulled clear of the shoal area. Following an inspection it was confirmed that there was no serious damage to the ships hull, propeller, rudder or machinery. The salvage / general average expenses to lighten and refloat the vessel came to US$2,000,000 of which cargo interests’ contribution was to be US$1,200,000. Cargo interests refused to make their contribution alleging that there had been a breach of the contract of carriage by the ship owner / carrier. Specifically cargo interests alleged that the ship was not seaworthy and the carrier had failed to exercise due diligence at the commencement of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy in that they did not have an adequate safety management system in place in respect of the navigation of the vessel and that the master and second officer were both negligent and incompetent.
Answer the questions. 1. What was the course of the general cargo ship? 2. What was her speed? 3. Was the passage plan prepared? 4. Who was the Master’s night order book signed by? 5. What was the Master’s order to his navigating officers? 6. What happened at midnight? 7. What did the second officer see? 8. What was the action of the second officer when he saw a flotilla of yachts? 9. What did he do when he heard the echo sounder alarm? 10. Where was the Master when the vessel ran aground? 11. What was the second officer’s mistake? 12. What were the bridgeteam’s actions to divert the vessel from the shoal?
1. Read the text and find a word or phrase which means the following . 2. _________is a procedure to develop a complete description of a vessel's voyage from start to finish. 3. _________a direction or route taken or to be taken. 4. _________as slow as possible without losing steerageway. 5. _________remaining sound, entire, or uninjured; not impaired in any way. 6. _________in a fit condition or ready for a sea voyage
Answer the questions . 1. What did the Master and Officers state in giving evidence to an investigation of grounding? 1. Why did the Master abort the approach to the Pilot Station? 2. What discussion took place between the ship and the Marine Manager? 3. When did the vessel again commence the approach to a port? 4. What was the vessel experiencing after passing the Fairway buoy? 5. Why did the vessel come into contact with the seabed? 6. What critical point was overlooked in the findings of the investigation? Hull and Machinery – Answer the questions. 1. Where was the Sandetti NE buoy seen at 0648 hours? 2. What did the helmsman do which had no effect on the vessel’s set? 3. What incident occurred? 4. What kind of damage did the gearbox sustain? 5. What was wrong with the propeller? 6. What kind of agreement did the tug request for her service? 7. How did the tug help the vessel? 8. Who made an examination of the damage to the M.E. gear box? 9. Was it possible to discharge the vessel’s cargo? 10. Why was the vessel towed to Antwerp? 11. Who attended the vessel after she had been dry-docked? 12. What salvage settlement did the parties agree to?
Fire. Explosion Answer the questions. 1. Where did the fire break out? 2. Why did the Chief engineer’s clothing ignite? 3. How did the crew members extinguish the fire? 4. Why did the fire reflash and rage out of control? 5. Who reported that the fire had been extinguished? 6. How was the crew rescued?
Choose the correct variant. 1. There were …. exits from the engine room a) several b) less than two c) no 2. The crew …. a) closed the engine room’s doors to prevent fresh air to enter the interior b) opened the doors to evacuate the engine room c) opened the doors to the vessel’s superstructure to de-smoke the engine room 3. The chief engineer ….. a) died because of numerous burns b) suffered minor injuries c) suffered serious injuries 4. The fire was caused by …. a) smoking in prohibited area b) oil waste left unwatched c) oil ignited on a pump and sprayed onto the ME’s exhaust manifold 5. Once the fire area has been closed and the CO 2 released…. a) it is advisable to open it only 12 hours after activating the gas installation b) it is strictly prohibited to open it until SAR resources render the assistance c) it is advisable not to open it until you are absolutely certain that all the heat has been removed. Lessons learn Bagged or bulk copra should only be stowed inside holds or compartments that are fitted with fixed firefighting systems. Open deck stowage should be avoided as it poses a serious fire hazard. Answer the questions. 1. What was the biggest mistake in the stowage of bagged copra? 2. Is it correct to give deck stowage to dry cargo which can be easily wetted? 3. What consequences may such stowage lead to in adverse weather? 4. What put the master and the crew in grave danger? 5. Why do you think was it better to use foam to extinguish bagged copra fire? 6. Will it be reasonable and justified to take legal action against Port Authorities who endangered the crew by forcing them to cast off from the berth? Choose the correct answer. 1. Bagged copra must be loaded : a)on deck b) into holds c)in tanks d) in reservoirs 2. Copra is liable to produce heat when: a)wetted b) stowed c)in contact with metal surface d) heated and exposed to air 3. The worried harbour authorities forced the barge to: a)make fast alongside b) cast off c)exhibit NUC shapes d) stay adrift 4. The harbour authorities' act was careless because: a)the barge didn't complete loading b) the cargo was improperly stowed c)the master and the crew were endangered d) another ships were waiting for vacant berth 5. Dry cargo such as copra may be loaded during adverse weather if : a)the LOI is issued b) it is covered with tarpaulins c)the Bill of Lading states that d) the shipper agrees Lessons learned -Both vessels were proceeding at full speed at the time of collision, yet one of the safest of time-proven tactics is to slow down when unsure of the developing situation or of the intentions of the opposite party. -Keep the bridge clear of chit chat and business unrelated to navigating the ship when in high risk areas, high traffic areas or at all other times when maximum concentration is needed. -Course alterations should be as bold as possible so as to make your intentions known to the other vessels. -When two ships in your vicinity collide and explode, do your best to stay safe but also render what assistance you can to the fellow mariners involved. Do not sail away as if nothing had happened. Answer the questions. 1. What area were ships A, B and C in? 2. What were the intentions of Ship B? 3. How many crewmen were on the bridge of Ship B? 4. What was the 2nd officer of Ship B doing on the bridge? 5. Why was the OOW of Ship A surprised? 6. Why did the Ship A’s OOW express concern on VHF? 7. What incorrect assumption did the Ship B’s CO make? 8. What other ship did the bridge team on Ship B identify as Ship A? 9. What disaster occurred on Ship A as a result of the collision? 10. What kind of accident occurred on Ship B as a result of the collision?
Part 4 PEOPLE RELATED INCIDENTS Ship operators owe a duty to ensure the safety of persons on board the vessel. This duty extends beyond the physical limits of the vessel to areas where the safety of persons off the vessel is affected by the vessel’s operation and tasks carried out by the crew, e.g.mooring operations, discharge with ship’s crane and similar situations. As regards the people whose safety is to be ensured, this is not limited to crew members, but extends to passengers, shore personnel and even unathorised persons on board such as stowaways. This type of incidents include personal injuries to crew, passengers, third parties; illness of crew, passengers, third parties; employment – Labour disputes and disciplinary procedures (trade disputes on board the vessel, ITF – International Transport Workers Federation – disputes; strikes by shore personnel), disciplinary procedures, drug smuggling; stowaways; refugees; piracy. People related incidents represent a significant slice of the total claims, by number and by value, which are handled by P&I Clubs, accounting for 40% of all claims.
CASE STUDY Answer the questions. 1. What are the mooring parties involved in the procedure? 2. What orders were diven by the Master and the 2nd officer? 3. What mooring procedure is normal? Was it violated by the AB? 4. Why couldn’t an OS see the AB? 5. Can the 2nd officer’s orders cause the mooring accident? 6. Why was the AB hit by the mooring line? 7. Do you agree with the Master’s conclusion on accidents’s causes? 8. Did the team have the situational awareness?
Answer the questions. 1. When did the pilot disembark? 2. What were the weather conditions? 3. Did the bosun perform the job without any assistance? 4. Where did the bosun place the pilot ladder? 5. What did the assisting crew have to do to avert the disaster? 6. Did the crew manage to fulfill the bosun’s order? 7. How did the bosun appear in water? 8. What means were used in search and rescue operation? 9. Why did the mechanism fail? 10. What was the recommended length of the accommodation ladder?
Lessons learnt: - Even if the paperwork is done, the permits to enter tanks were completed, always ensure the required safety measures are actually in place before starting the work. Proper lighting and a barrier around the open maintenance hatch would have prevented the fatality. - We tend to get with on the work without first analyzing the workspace for possible hazards. Before starting a task ask yourself, “What needs to be done here to make the workspace safe?” - The ordinary seaman was apparently aware of the open and unsecured maintenance hatch when he entered the tank, but he didn’t know where in the tank the hatch was located; he had never been inside a cargo tank before. Familiarization with the space and the hazard would have helped him to avoid the accident. - Hand-held lights are no substitute for cluster lighting arrangements. Always work in a properly illuminated space.
Answer the questions. 1. Where was the tanker moored? 2. What was discovered during the preliminary inspection? 3. What were the instructions issued to the crew? 4. Who participated in the recovery of the maintenance hatch cover? 5. Had they entered this tank before? 6. Who went into the lower tank dome? 7. What were the actions of the AB after he had got an overview using his torch? 8. Under what conditions did the bosun and the AB have to carry out their job? 9. Where did the bosun discover the OS? 10. What could have prevented the fatality?
Lessons learned 1. Never work aloft without a work permit and without taking the proper precautions to prevent falling. 2. If you are in doubt about safety insist on stopping the work and re-evaluate. Get a second opinion from your superiors. 3. Use your equipment properly. Ensure that ladders are properly secured against tipping and the weight evenly distributed on the supporting legs.
Answer the questions. 1. How can you evaluate the external factors which could affect the accident? 2. What was the job of the crew member? 3. Why wasn’t work permit issued for this job? 4. Did the crew member complete his task? 5. Why did he decide to do another job? 6. What assistance did he need? Why? 7. Was the ladder out of order? 8. In your opinion, was a safety line a must for the crew member when working aloft? 9. Why did the crew member fall down? 10. What preventive measures should be taken to avoid the accident?
Lessons Learned 1. Pilot ladders can be awkward and cumbersome to rig/unrig in restricted deck areas. 2. Sufficient manpower must be present for rigging and recovery. 3. A tool-box discussion must be held by the crew before each operation so that every person is aware of the exact procedure and actions of others. 4. As far as possible, pilot transfer arrangements must be decided in advance and last-minute changes avoided. 5. Pilots and bridge teams must avoid putting undue pressure on crew members carrying out a critical operation and hassled crew must resist the temptation to hurry through a task. 6. Naval architects must ensure that their designs incorporate safe and workable pilot ladder stowage, handling and rigging arrangements. 7. Where practicable owners/managers must consider retro-fitting pilot ladder stowing reels or at the very least, provide a suitable deck trolley for the safe and efficient handling and stowage of conventional pilot ladders. This will not only avoid the hazards outlined above, but also preserve the pilot ladder from abuse, damage and soiling. Answer the questions 1. What are specific features of a general cargo-cum-log carrier's structure? 2. Why did the crew hand-carry a coiled pilot ladder? 3. What should be done to rig the ladder? 4. What did a change of plan result in? 5. What remedial and preventive measures must be taken by crew to avoid accidents?
Answer the questions 1. What was the cause of the chief officer's death? 2. What substance did the tanks contain? 3. What kind of operations was to be carried out before calling at the loading port? 4. Who was to be in charge of monitoring the tank cleaning? 5. Why is it necessary to provide accurate keeping of checklists and other documentation? What can inaccuracies lead to? 6. What procedures were to be done before entering an enclosed space? 2. Decide whether these statements are true (T) or false (F). Correct the wrong ones. 1. The C/O died because of falling down the ladder during the tank cleaning procedure._________ 2. The rest of vapours in tanks had the property of depriving oxygen from air._________________ 3. As the C/O was a wathckeeper he didn't have to conduct pre-loading inspection of the empty tanks.______________ 4. No Enclosed space drills should be provided before tank inspection._______________________ 5. Appropriate signage at tank entrances should be provided to infrom the personnel that tanks may be deficient in oxygen._________ Case study - 7. Stowaways A 6,600 GT purpose built heavy lift ship carried a full project cargo from Northern Europe to a West African port.The cargo was to be utilized as part of an inland oil and gas drilling and exploration project. A return cargo was to be loaded at the same terminal consisting of damaged or otherwise discarded items of oil drilling equipment, some containerized, which was being returned to the European headquarters for repair or disposal. The ship had a Ship Security Plan in place. Gangway security was established but the gunwale of the ship was on the same level as the quayside such that people from ashore could step across the gap and didn’t use the gangway.The crew of nine, including master, used their best to control access but eventually conceded defeat. On completionof loading the master solicited the help of the terminal managers and stevedore foremen to help him and the crew to conduct a thorough stowaway search. During a search which lasted two hours they found seven stowaways who were subsequently removed ashore. The ship sailed and after dropping the pilot the master dropped anchor and had the crew conduct a second stowaway search. No more stowaways were found and the vessel commenced her voyage back to Northern Europe. However, one day later banging and shouting was heard from number two cargo hold and two young men / boys announced their presence. They did not have any identification documents on them and none was found subsequently. They did not speak a language which was understood by the master or any of the other officers and crew.The stowaways were uncooperative although they were not violent. The master sought instructions from the ship operator and it was decided to continue towards the discharge port and try to repatriate the stowaways from Northern Europe. On arrival at the discharge port the vessel was boarded by port State Control Inspectors who cited various alleged violations under the ISPS Code and delayed the entry of the ship for six days whilst they searched the ship and conducted a full scale security investigation. Armed security guards were placed on board through discharge to stand guard over the stowaways until the ship sailed. The ship owners were presented with a bill for US$10,000 in respect of this 'security service'. The local immigration authorities refused to consider the possibility of repatriation through their country. The true identity of the stowaways, and even confirmation of their nationality, could not be established and, consequently, no country visited by the ship would assist with attempts to repatriate them. The ship continued to face serious problems with alleged violations of security and ISPS Code wherever she went causing delays and consequential losses.
1. Answer the questions. 1. What was the type of vessel the incident took place on? 2. What cargo was to be delivered to a West African point? 3. What cargo was to be carried in return? 4. What measures were taken to prevent the stowaways’ access on board the vessel? 5. What was done on completion of loading? 6. When and where were the stowaways discovered? 7. What decision did the master take concerning the stowaways? 8. What happened at the port of discharge? 9. What problems did the ship face afterwards?
2. Decide whether these statements are true (T) or false (F). Correct the wrong ones. 1. The cargo was to be repaired as part of an inland oil and gas drilling and exploration project._____________________ 2. People from ashore could step across the gap only with the help of the gangway.__________ 3. The crew succeeded with their Ship Security Plan._______ 4. On completion of loading the master soughtfor the aid of the terminal managers._________ 5. The stowaways were helpful but not aggressive_____________ 6. It was decided to continue towards the discharge port and try to send the stowaways back home._______ 7. The stowaways were successfully repatriated to their native country.________________
Part 5 Answer the questions. 1. What type of bunker was loaded in the tanks? 2. Who was in charge of the bunkering? 3. Was there any communication with the barge? 4. Did the situation seem risky and why? 5. Do you think that suspension of the bunker operation would have been the right decision? Why? 6. Did the 4th engineer succed in stopping the bunkering? 7. Why should extra measures be taken? 8. Did everyone on board the vessel follow their duties? If they didn’t, identify the errors. 9. What are the human errors made by the crewmembers?
Lessons learnt These incidents show how, even a minor spill of paint, have to be met with an immediate and comprehensive response. Before the vessel arrives at any port, Masters must ensure that the SMPEP is completed and up to date (including local P&I) and for the US, the QI information is required. This also helps create a good sense of ‘preparedness’ when being inspected by any shore agency. Crew members taking or landing stores should be made aware how apparently harmless substances can be viewed by shore authorities and agents as a potential pollution incident and consequently treated with extra care. All lifts are to be prepared carefully to ensure nothing falls out. This includes lifts prepared by shore personnel. If a pallet is not properly stowed then you are to refuse to lift it until it is rectified. Pallets should be lifted within a cargo net. SWL of gear used must never be exceeded. Once a pollution incident has occurred, it is vital that the relevant parties are informed as soon as possible and a complete log is kept of these contacts. Where possible a photo log of the incident would be very useful to complement the records. Answer the questions. 1.What kind of cargo did one of vessels take from the dock at Corpus Christie? 2. Where was the paint stacked? 3. How many cans fell from one of the lifts into the dock ? 4. What was the reason for the paint to spread over the surface of the water? 5. What kind of operation did the agent initiate? 6. What relevant parties were informed by the terminal about the pollution incident? 7. How did the Master act in this situation? 8. Why did the ship’ s superintendent call a qualified Individual for the vessel? 9. How did the vessel’s crew manage to recover the majority of the paint? 10. What actions did the QI take over coordination of the clean-up operation? 11. When were cargo operations been suspended? 12. Why was a diver hired in this area? 13. Why were no charges brought against the vessel? 14. What does this pollution incident show?
2. Decide whether the statements are true (T) or false ( F). Correct the wrong ones. 1. During cargo operations at Corpus Christi, one of the vessels took a three month supply of paint stores by means of the vessel’s derrick._________ 2. The paint was stacked on steel pallets in 25-liter cans.________ 3. While the crew were recovering the drums from the water using a line with a hook on the end, one drum burst open and sank.________ 4. The agent then initiated deploying a clean-up operation with Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control Association independently of the vessel._______ 5. The Master advised the ship’s Superintendent who in turn called a pilot for the vessel.________ 6. The vessel’s crew commenced their own clean-up using absorbed pads and booms and recovered the majority of the paint.________ 7. After 2 hours , the alternate team had not been deployed so the QI reverted to the original clean-up organisation ( CCAOSCA) to complete the operation using a boat with 2 people.___________ 8. Cargo operations had been suspended by the vessel when the paint was realised but were resumed after the clean-up had been completed after 21 hours._________ 9. While the diver was recovering the can, more paint was released._______ 10. The USCG was satisfied by the vessel’s response to the spill and no charges were brought against the vessel.________
Answer the questions. 1. What was the region of the ULCC’s navigation? 2. What were the local requirements? 3. How was the deballasting operation carried out? 4. Were there any appropriate conditions for the deballasting operations? 5. What was the reason of the deballasting termination? 6. What was the result of the inspection carried out in the port of the US Gulf? 7. What are the risks with the cargo lines on the aged vessels? 8. Is such situation possible on modern tankers? 9. What was the penalty for this incident? 10. Were there any additional charges to penalty expenses?
Case study - 4. Garbage Fines totaling $97,500 were handed down today in the Sydney Magistrates Court against the owners of a Hong Kong registered chemical tanker for garbage pollution in waters off New South Wales. A member of the public found a large plastic bag bearing an Australian Quarantine Inspection Service seal floating in Hastings River in January 2003. It was one of four bags used by AQIS officers to seal meat products found aboard the chemical tanker during an inspection in December 2002. Each bag was sealed with a numbered plastic tie, which was used by officers from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, assisted by AQIS, to identify the vessel. The owners pleaded guilty to the offences under the Commonwealth Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Polution from Ships) Act 1983. The maximum fine for these offences is $110,000 for the shipowner and $22,000 for the ship’s master.
1. Answer the questions. 1. What was the amount of fines handed down in the Sydney Magistrates Court? 2. Where was the chemical tanker registered? 3. What was the reason of fines? 4. What was the region where the garbage pollution happened? 5. What was found in Hastings River? 6. When was the finding discovered? 7. What was in the large plastic box? 8. What organization used such plastic bags? 9. Was that plastic bag sealed? 10. When did the inspection take place? 11. Due to what was the vessel identified? 12. According to what regulation were the owners pleaded guilty? 13. What was the maximum fine for such case? 14. Was the ship's master fined? 15. What was the amount of ship's master fine?
Description: during discharging cargo North West Shelf Condensate cargo operations was suspended 04.07.2008 at 16.18 LT Due IG Plant was not able to maintain IG positive pressure in cargo tanks. Vessel has to stop discharging to avoid vacumisation in cargo tanks. Cargo operation resumed 04.07.08 at 16.48 LT. –---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Possible cause of incident/situation and possible consequences: As a result vessel was on the verge of rejection and not acceptance by Japanese terminal in case of longer delay –---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Which preventive measures have been taken (or proposal for preventive measure): Cleaned and re-adjusted hand-regulating F.O. valve (MAXON). Cleaned and re-adjusted back-pressure regulating valve (SAFAG). Date: 23.07.08 Place: at sea Name: C/E ______________________ –---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Master's decision/ plan for further handling of above accident: As per attached C/E______________ technical descriptions
Date: 23.07.08 Place: at sea Master's signature__________________________ –--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Company's decision/ plan for further handling of above accident: Date:______________ Place:_______________________ – --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Follow up control: Remarks:
Preventive measures have been taken in accordance with the above:
Date:_______________ Place_________________________
FLEET CIRCULAR AA) Summary of Near Misses reported in June 2016
[1] Открытая форма договора спасания: договор, в котором не указывается размер вознаграждения за спасение на море или этот размер указывается только приблизительно. Наиболее популярная проформа – Ллойдовская, принятая в Великобритании в 2000 году. Part 1. NEAR MISS REPORTS A near miss ( потенциально опасное происшествие ) is a hazardous event which does NOT result in accident / injury but a situation has arisen where an accident or an incident could have happened. Some examples of near misses which occur during day-to-day activities: − A seaman is found aloft (на высоте) not wearing a safety harness (страховочный пояс), − Acid is spilled while filling up emergency batteries, − A cargo net breaks while taking on stores but there is no damage, − Emergency action is required to avoid collision. Near misses should be reported to a Senior Officer or the Master who will complete a near miss report to send to the office. · Near miss reports should be completed in full so that a complete picture of the incident can be built up. · Near miss reports do not need to be signed. · Once received by the office a near miss will be analysed and compared to other near misses. In this way, trends can be identified and changes put in place to improve safety onboard. · Near miss reports should be filed onboard so that action can be followed up and they can be accessed by external examiners / auditors. CASE STUDY |
Последнее изменение этой страницы: 2019-03-21; Просмотров: 348; Нарушение авторского права страницы
