Case study - 1: Wetting of Logs (Cargo Damage)

       A tween-decker cargo ship was chartered for a voyage from West Africa to load a mixture of logs in the lower holds, packaged sawn timber and plywood in the tween decks and several containers of coffee and cocoa beans on the hatch covers. As is common in these regions, the logs were floated down-river in the form of large rafts. These were marshalled by small tugs and secured to the vessel while anchored in estuaries and coastal lagoons. A gang of stevedores commenced loading the vessel, skillfully standing atop the floating logs and slinging them in ones or twos, depending on the size of the logs and capacity of the ship's cargo gear. They, along with winchmen, signalmen and tallymen worked in 12-hour shifts and the tugs ferry them to and from land twice daily.

       The master received very scant information on the quantity and types of logs to be shipped, partly due to nonexistent or unreliable communications with the forestry plantations in the interior, inland hauliers, stockyards up-river and shippers. A historic table of stowage factors for common species was handed to the vessel. The stevedores could not communicate in English and ship's crew could not understand their rudimentary French and local dialect. The charterer's port captain stationed himself ashore after the initial visit at the first loading port. As it later turned out, the ship's managers and crew lacked detailed knowledge about this trade while the charterer's super-cargo wrongly assumed that the ship's crew was fully conversant with the nuances of timber loading in West Africa and offered no advice to the vessel.

       The ship's crew accepted the stowage factors as stated in the list, not realising that the data was only for “dry timber” and accordingly prepared a rudimentary stowage plan and stability condition. They were unaware of the fact that in most timber loading operations, a “surcharge” or extra weight will affect the stowage factor, often caused by water absorption when logs are floated down-river, inaccuracies in the measurement of each log and deliberate under-declaration of weights by shippers. Such surcharge can sometimes be 35 per cent in excess of manifested cargo weight. Cargo was worked day and night and the tallymen handed a daily summary of cargo loaded figures at 0800 every morning. This process was repeated at two anchorage ports.

       The holds were duly filled with logs and the vessel berthed at a wharf to load the sawn timber and plywood in the tween decks and the containers on the hatch cover. It was at this late stage that the master noted excess deadweight from daily draught surveys. A revised stability calculation showed that after loading the containers on the hatch covers, the vessel would fail to meet SOLAS minimum stability criteria. When the master refused to load these containers, a lot of commercial pressure was put on the owners and vessel, and finally, a scheme was worked out whereby all double-bottom (DB) tanks were pressed up with sea water ballast. Despite this, the vessel had insufficient stability and two empty DB fuel tanks were also filled with sea water to ensure the vessel met IMO stability criteria without being overloaded. At the discharge port, a slop barge was hired and the contaminated ballast from the fuel tanks was duly disposed ashore.

Answer the questions.

1. What cargo was tween-decker ship chartered for a voyage from West Africa?

2. How were the logs transported to the vessel in these regions?

3. What are specific features for transporting wood products?

4. How did the gang of stevedores commence loading the vessel?

5. Why didn’t the master receive all the information on the quantity and types of logs to be shipped?

6. Can a supercargo, crew, managers, shippers, stevedores be blamed of negligence? Why?

7. Why did the ship’s managers and crew lack knowledge about nuances of timber loading in West Africa?

8. What was wrong with the stowage factors accepted by the ship’s crew?

9. What aspects affect stowage factor in most timber loading operation?

10. What did the revised stability calculation show?

11. What was the reason for commercial pressure on the owners and vessel?

12. What scheme was worked out to solve the problem?

 

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