| The master had a briefing with the pilot before proceeding to the allocated quay. Present on the bridge was the master, chief officer and pilot. Suddenly the vessel lost all power. The engines came back on before any incident occurred, but the bow thruster did not. The vessel was approaching the quay to berth starboard side alongside. It was winter and there was some ice floating by the berth, which was about 25-30 cm thick. There was no wind and visibility was good. One tug was assisting at the bow with a 30m-long wire hawser attached. It was dawn and the berth was unlit. An orange light suppose to be lit by the port but was never switched on. A gantry crane was positioned in the middle of the quay. The pilot’s intention was to berth behind it. He had the conn and the master was monitoring. Because of the ice, the pilot decided to approach with a little more speed than usual and a larger angle than normal, which was about 40°. The tug was pulling the vessel towards the quay. The vessel had a speed of about 3 knots. The pilot was not monitoring the speed because there were no instruments on the bridge wing. He trusted his own experience. The master said he was concerned that the speed was too fast. The pilot did not communicate in English with the tug and the master had difficulties understanding what was happening. When the vessel was about 25 m from the berth, the port anchor was dropped and the helm ordered hard to port. A minute later full astern was ordered by the pilot but the CPP (controlled pitch propeller) responded very slowly. The pilot stated that he had no opportunity of watching the rudder indicator or the engine’s revs and the vessel kept moving ahead, with a tendency to starboard. The pilot advised the master to work the engine full astern and told the tug to position itself on the portside and to pull firmly to port. The master ordered the rudder to mid-ship and once again voiced his concern about the excess speed. It was too late and the vessel made contact with the gantry crane. After the accident the vessel was boarded by Port State Control (PSC) inspectors, who issued a number of non-conformities. These were cleared during an internal audit by the company in the given time span. The master stated that he didn’t fully understand the pilot’s commands to the tug or thought them to be wrong. He also believed the cause of the accident was the ice situation and that the pilot wanted to approach the quay faster and at a steeper angle to move the ice away, which he was not happy about. The tug was also ordered to pull the bow to port too late. The master did not relieve the pilot. The pilot stated that he believed the causes of the accident were the low water table at the given draft, the quay being unprepared, the ice unbroken, the crane in the middle and circumstances resulting in the ship’s bow drifting to starboard. Even having these concerns he still proceeded. The company’s internal conclusion was the lack of communication between the pilot and the tug and that the master should have relieved the pilot at an early stage. Regarding the power failure, the machinery was tested by both PSC inspectors and class inspectors and was found to be working satisfactorily. The chief officer who was on the bridge did not inform the master and pilot about the speed and other critical information. The master did voice his concern about the speed but did not act on it and was assertive enough towards the pilot. The master had difficulty understanding the pilot as he was communicating in Polish with the tugboat. The pilot should have explained the orders he was giving to the tug in English and if not the master should have requested this. It is essential that all bridge team members have clearly defined roles. This could be addressed with defined bridge team roles and closed loop communication. | WHAT? Contact with Gantry Crane  1 WHY? The assisting tug was positioned wrongly and the pilot used excessive speed and angle 2 WHY? The pilot berthed without having full control of the situation or communicating his intentions to the master   3 WHY? There was no proper pilot brief which addressed the risks of the berthing operation 4 WHY? The master was not assertive and did not request the pilot to explain his actions 5 WHY? Poor MRM (Maritime Resourse Management) as there is a clear communication breakdown, as well as the company’s arrival and pilotage procedures were ntot extensive enough Consequences: the vessel needed extensive repairs, which could only be carried out in a dry dock. Fortunately there was no extensive damage to the gantry crane. There were further losses of earnings for both the port and vessel because of the required repairs. |
