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Архитектура Аудит Военная наука Иностранные языки Медицина Металлургия Метрология Образование Политология Производство Психология Стандартизация Технологии |
and harmonization of international relations⇐ ПредыдущаяСтр 25 из 25
Due to a number of objective historical, economic and political reasons, Russia plays a key role in organizing the processes of Eurasian integration. Public opinion surveys conducted by the Integration Barometer[247] indicate an invariably persisting view of Russia as a unifying center for the population of all CIS countries. They expect from Russia an innovative breakthrough, some signals for the implementation of systemic changes that will take into account the national interests of the states participating in the processes of Eurasian integration. While in the socio-cultural and economic spheres there is an evident substantial differentiation of views and attitudes about the preferred vectors of attraction, in the political (especially military-political) sphere there is a comparative unity of opinions. Practically in all the republics of the post-Soviet space, the majority of residents are oriented toward Russia in matters of political friendship and mutual military assistance. It was also put on the first place in the frequency of mentioning as a " friend country" by respondents from nine CIS countries[248]. Public perception of Russia as the nucleus of attraction on the Eurasian continent was formed not only because of its vast territory and resource potential. Eurasianism refers Russia to a special ethnographic formation located between Europe and Asia, and represents an ideological, political, historical and cultural concept[249]. The earliest sources of Eurasianist ideas are attributed to the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries, where the Russian people is defined as the defender of Orthodoxy and the heir of Byzantine culture. One of such sources referred to by the Eurasianists are the " Epistles of the Elder Philotheus, " the hegumen of the Pskov Yelizarov Monastery. The formation of geopolitical views of Eurasianists was directly influenced by the works of A. Khomyakov, I. Kireevsky, S. Aksakov, where Eurasianism was developed in Russian historiosophical thought of the 19th century. The origin of Eurasianism as an ideological concept is considered to be the book by N.S. Trubetskoy Europe and Mankind, published in Sofia in 1920. This " cultural-historiosophic" movement was created among the Russian intelligentsia who emigrated to Europe after 1917. Along with N.S. Trubetskoy, its prominent representatives were geographer P.N. Savitsky and historian G.V. Vernadsky[250]. One of the points of Eurasianism was the " concept of the multilinearity of the world historical process, " which made the " originality and unique identity of culture" its inalienable characteristic feature and denied the exclusivity and absoluteness of European culture. The very concept of " Eurasia" was interpreted by the movement participants from several positions. Firstly, as purely geographical. They considered it quite natural to divide the West and the East into Europe (Western Europe), Asia (south and east of Asia: India, China, Eastern Siberia) and Eurasia (continental flat part of Europe and Asia). Secondly, from an ethnic point of view, a special " Turanian psychological type" was formed in Eurasia, " Russians are neither Europeans nor Asians, but Eurasians." Thirdly, in terms of pure economy Eurasian Russia is a continental country, and the ties that need to be developed are not the same as in the global ocean economy, but intracontinental ones. We should acknowledge the prophetic vision of N.S. Trubetskoy, who in 1927 foresaw the collapse of the communist empire and a new unification of peoples on this territory as equals, based on an understanding of the community of their historical destiny[251]. Later on, L. Gumilyov played a special part in the establishment of the theory of modern Eurasianism. In his pre-death interview in 1992, already after the collapse of the USSR, he said, " Let me tell you a secret: If Russia will be saved, then only as a Eurasian power, and only through Eurasianism" [252]. This formula, which can be regarded as a guide to action, has been consonant with the ideas of modern experts who recognize that the welfare of the states of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia depends not on provision of individual preferences in cooperation with the West or the East, but on creation of the Eurasian transcontinental corridor from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. In the Old World, Russia is the only country located " from sea to sea, " through which communication can run between the three world regions of economic and technological development in Western Europe, East Asia and North America. The unique place of Russia and its attractiveness in Eurasia is determined by several features highlighted by the well-known Russian intellectual A.I. Podberezkin[253]: Russia is not just a country, it is a country-civilization. · There are no more such countries in the world, with the exception of China, India and Japan, neither in sociocultural, nor in historical aspect. Therefore, national and state identity will inevitably remain despite the influence of globalization, or attempts by cosmopolitans to " liberalize" it and change its traditional character; · Russia occupies a unique place in terms of geography, being the center of Eurasia and connecting its eastern, western and southern borderlands; · Russia occupies an exclusive place in the world by reserves of mineral and biological resources, as well as by the territory of its adjoining marine areas; · Russia unites on its open and non-discriminatory cultural and spiritual basis all the major world religions and denominations with the decisive role of Orthodoxy, creating an amazing, unique spiritual space that opposes agnosticism and modern secularism; Russia is a unique information, communication and transportation hub of global importance, the role of which is rapidly increasing. In 2000, the decision to create the EurAsEC fully corresponded to the concept of multi-speed and multi-level integration that had already ripened by that time. The Baltic republics fell away from the post-Soviet space, to be swallowed up by the EU following the former Eastern European CMEA countries. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have self-isolated from integration, building their policies on the basis of gas and oil exports. Uzbekistan, the leadership of which relied on relatively autarkic development, took a neutral position. The dynamics of perception by the Russian leadership of the Eurasian integration processes, from imitation to real promotion, immediately received support from interested states, including Ukraine. The latter confirmed its participation in the formation of the Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the integration impulse in the early aughties was largely emasculated and negated by ultra-liberals in the Russian government, who considered any forms of integration in the post-Soviet space as economically inefficient and rudimentary. The idea of reuniting the economic potentials of the CIS states on a market basis and giving concrete substance to the integration initiatives of Vladimir Putin was met by their latent opposition within the country, and open one beyond its borders. The suggested false idea about incompatibility of the simultaneous creation of the Customs Union and the SES and the accession of their potential member states to the WTO, prioritizing the latter, blocked the integration process for several years. The officials responsible for integration either sabotaged the process, or dragged leaders of states into deliberately unrealistic initiatives to discredit the idea of integration. The global crisis distracted to a certain extent the attention of geopolitical opponents and their ideological followers within Russia from the integration activities in the post-Soviet space. They proceeded from the premise that the Russian leadership's adherence to the dogma of the WTO priority blocked them for a long time. Only after the resolution adopted by heads of government of the three member states of the already formed Customs Union on June 9, 2009, to terminate separate negotiations on accession to the WTO and create a single delegation for the talks in Brussels on the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia to this organization on a unified basis, Washington realized the earnestness of these intentions. The EU ambassador in Moscow, Marc Franco, was even recalled from Russia because he underestimated the determination of the Russian authorities to set the integration of the post-Soviet space in motion. Attempts to stop the process of Eurasian integration were taken after this as well. Attitude to the Eurasian economic integration has uncovered many of Russia's longstanding domestic problems. On the one hand, criticism becomes more severe in the Russian society in respect of ultra-liberal ideology, manifested in the blind fulfillment of the recommendations issued by Western experts, and in respect of models for building socio-economic life, with serious negative implications virtually in all spheres of life. On the other hand, the processes of globalization and world competition make it impossible even for such a huge country as Russia to act alone, forcing to seek allies in a multipolar world[254]. In this connection, the policy of the country's leadership to actualize the potential of the EEU with the participation of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan is quite understandable. At this stage, the focus is on maximizing the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labor[255]. As Vladimir Putin rightly pointed out, "... regional integration – the entire world is following down this path – is the most effective way to maximize the use of domestic growth resources and enhance competitiveness on global markets. And, of course, as we have already mentioned on many occasions, together we are stronger, and it's easier for us to deal with global challenges" [256]. Based on these considerations, the Eurasian Union is being built as a community of equal partners. Equality and mutual trust are prerequisites for the rapid advancement of the alliance. This is fundamentally important for the former USSR republics. It is critical to remember that " Eurasia is not synonymous with Russia" [257]. Despite the obvious dominant role of Russia as the largest economy in the region, the Eurasian project – at least, from a political point of view – cannot be a " Russian-centric" phenomenon, as experts believe[258]. However, the political side of Eurasian integration does not belittle its economic component. Partners expect Russia's go-aheadedness in proposing beneficial joint projects[259]. Russia is undoubtedly the ideological, economic and administrative leader of the Eurasian integration process. The latter has been successfully developing when the Russian leadership gave priority to this process. When the head of the Russian state used to stop paying due attention to this process, it was suspended. Russia's key role in Eurasian integration is determined historically and objectively by its undeniable economic and political dominance. Russia accounts for 87.6% of the economic potential, 78.4% of the population and 83.9% of the territory of the Eurasian Economic Union. This creates both advantages and certain difficulties in shaping of the Eurasian economic integration structures. In the most difficult period of the Eurasian integration, when the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia was being created in 2009-2011, the leading role of the Russian Federation was formally enshrined in the rules of procedure for the decision-making of integration structures. The share of votes of each state conformed to its share in budget financing. In the first supranational body, the Commission of the Customs Union, Russia's share in the budget was 57%, with the same number of votes when making decisions, the share of Belarus and Kazakhstan was 21.5% each respectively. With the transition to establishment of the EEU and the transformation of the Commission of the Customs Union into the Eurasian Economic Commission, absolute equality of all parties in the decision-making was established, while Russia's share in financing the budget reached 88% in accordance with its share in the distribution of revenues from the receipt of import duties. This decision entails contradictory consequences. On the one hand, Russia's formal equalization with other member states of the EEU might result in a more complicated decision-making and a slower pace of Eurasian integration. Due to the equalization of all member states in the number of votes and in representation in the management bodies, giving each of them the right to put a veto on resolutions of the supranational body, the complexity of making common decisions has increased drastically. As a result, the formation of a single economic space started dragging out, and its completion was postponed from 2017 to 2024. The parallel expansion of the supranational bureaucracy resulted in a multiple increase in the staff number and cost of the supranational body operation. Thus, the average cost per decision of the Eurasian Economic Commission increased more than 20-fold compared to its preceding Commission of the Customs Union. On the other hand, vesting the parties with absolute institutional and legal equality in the integration management body is aimed at removal of any grounds for distrust of the national elites of the integrated states, and at elimination of the wary attitude towards the EEU from its prospective new members. In the long term, subject to controllability of the supra-national bureaucracy and its responsibility for the implementation of integration processes, this approach seems justified. Objectively, Russia is the basis of the Eurasian integration, and a weakening of its formal positions could be made up for by strengthening the ideological component of this process, shared by all its participants. To do this, we need to rise above the purely economic component that currently defines the meaning of this process, expanding its understanding with formation of a new integrity, and turning to the philosophical origins of Eurasianism. Speaking about Eurasian integration, usually we mean its economic component, although the leader of Russia Vladimir Putin noted that " We suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region" [260]. The very title of his article, "...a project for Eurasia...", goes far beyond the purely economic understanding of the Eurasian integration idea. Vladimir Putin spoke out time and again about the prospect of forming a common continental area of cooperation from Lisbon to Vladivostok on the basis of free trade relations and mutually beneficial cooperation. The Russian leader envisages Eurasian integration much broader than just the creation of the EEU, including in it not only the SCO that unites the latter with China and India, but the Greater Europe as well[261]. Vladimir Putin developed this idea at the meeting of the Russia-EU Council, but he also pointed to a predictable reaction of the European partners, who unlike the Russian part are not ready for such formulation of the issue[262]. The policy of Eurasian integration lacks ideology[263]. Vladimir Putin said at the Valdai Forum, " I am not only thinking about analyzing Russian historical, cultural, and governance experiences. First and foremost, I am thinking of general debates, conversations about the future, strategies, and values, about the values underpinning our country’s development, how global processes will affect our national identity, what kind of twenty-first-century world we want to see, and what Russia, our country, can contribute to this world together with its partners" [264]. The Eurasian idea and Eurasian policy are not just geopolitics in its traditional sense as domination in the region, they are also a struggle for a national value system that has in fact become an integral part of the struggle for sovereignty and protection of national interests in Eurasia. In transition to the new global economic paradigm, the limits of liberal globalization become revealed. New independent centers of the world economy, being formed in spite of American domination – China, ASEAN, India, and the EEU – have their own cultural and civilizational characteristics, differing in their values, history, culture, spirituality and other national and regional specific features. Today, it is already obvious that for all the significance of the globalization of interpenetration, none of these centers of power will abandon its singularity along with cultural and ideological identity. Moreover, they will only strengthen and promote them, seeking to reinforce their competitive advantages in relation to other centers of power. Russia faces an obvious choice, either to become a powerful ideological and civilizational center (which was characteristic of its entire history of the last millennium), as well as an economic and social one, or integrate into some other global center of power after losing its own identity. The choice in favor of self-sufficiency and self-reliance based on an understanding of its cultural and historical purpose requires restoration of a relatively high weight of Russia and the EEU in the world economy, trade, scientific and technical cooperation. It is necessary to develop, adopt and implement a set of measures, taking into account the still limited Russian resources and its capabilities in Eurasia. To achieve this, the above strategy for the outstripping development of the Russian economy should be implemented. Extensive Eurasian integration including Europe, China, India, and the Middle East could become a powerful stabilizing anti-war factor conducive to overcoming the global economic crisis and creating new development opportunities. The thinking and most responsible part of the world community has realized that in order to avoid a new wave of self-destructive confrontation and to ensure sustainable development, a transition to a new world view model is necessary, based on the mutual respect for sovereignty, fair global regulation and mutually beneficial cooperation. Russia has a unique historical opportunity to regain the role of a global unifying center, around which a fundamentally different balance of forces will start emerging, with a new architecture of global monetary, financial, trade and economic relations based on justice, harmony and cooperation for the good of the peoples of the whole Eurasia[265]. As already mentioned above, the degradation of economic potentials of the post-Soviet states entailed shrinkage of their mutual trade, which narrowed the possibilities for integration. To expand this bottleneck, the consolidation of markets is not enough – of special importance is the development of cooperation between enterprises of different countries, for which a common development strategy is necessary. The main part of the synergistic effect of the Single Economic Space (SES) is achieved exactly due to supplementing the common market with the unified policy of development. The consolidation of markets provides only a third of the 15% GDP growth expected in the 20-year perspective as a result of successful Eurasian integration, according to calculations based on the model of integrated cross-sectoral balances of the Customs Union member states[266]. Although in the first year of full-scale Customs Union activity almost 1.5-fold growth of mutual trade was achieved, the further economic effect of integration will be determined by the results of the formation of a common development policy. It should be developed taking into account the global patterns of modern economic dynamics, determined by the change of technological paradigms and the global crisis caused by this process. This should be a policy of outstripping development based on the concentration of the EEU resources in key areas of the new technological paradigm[267]. The main burden of developing and implementing the overall EEU development strategy falls on Russia. In this connection, the Belarusian five-year development plans should be taken into account, along with the Kazakhstan program of industrialization and the corresponding development plans in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. For all the uniqueness of the Eurasian integration process, the international experience of integration cooperation, which is rich and diverse enough, should also be applied[268]. According to the WTO, in the world today there are about 200 regional groupings with different levels of development of integration ties in the sphere of economy. The most effective acknowledged integration projects are the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Mercado Comú n del Sur (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations (ACN). At the same time, all regional groupings are at different stages of convergence of economic systems, using different regulation mechanisms and algorithms. The EEU is not the largest integration formation, but, based on the achieved departure position, it has every chance to develop into a much more powerful regional grouping. However, the political willpower and favorable economic prerequisites alone are not enough. Russia, which carries the main burden of responsibility for the progress of integration processes, and its partners need to determine their strategic priorities as soon as possible, enshrining them in agreed development strategies and policies. The policy of modernization and development of the Russian economy should be based on an assessment of the global economic development prospects and an identification of national competitive advantages, the activation of which could ensure a steady and rapid growth of production on the wave of economic growth that is currently emerging. The way out of the global economic crisis is connected with the " storm" of innovations that pave the way for the emergence of new technologies. As it was shown above, it is during similar periods of global technological shifts that a " window of opportunities" arises for the lagging countries to get ahead and work an " economic miracle." For this, a sufficiently powerful initiating impetus is needed, which would allow to concentrate the available resources on the promising directions of the formation of the new technological order. As international experience shows, the accomplishment of such breakthroughs implies an increase in the rate of accumulation up to 40% of GDP with a concentration of investment in the breakthrough areas of global economic growth. A key role in this is played by a drastic increase in innovation activity. In the modern economy, scientific-technological progress accounts for up to 90% of the cumulative contribution of all GDP growth factors. Given the critical value and high uncertainty of the results of scientific research, the state assumes the functions of an intellectual and information center for regulation and strategic planning of economic development, maintaining an appropriate scientific and technological environment that would include an advanced base of fundamental knowledge and pilot research, applied R& D institutes, a system for promoting the mastering and propagation of new technologies. Russia should focus on the adoption of outstripping development plans based on promising sectors of the new technological paradigm. Such sectors should have a cooperative relationship with the industry of the EEU partners. The feature of the basic technologies of the new technological paradigm is their high integration, which requires a comprehensive policy of their development providing for simultaneous creation of clusters of technologically coupled industries, along with the corresponding sphere of consumption and management culture. Regarding the development of cooperation in the SES, such clusters can be created in most areas, based on available scientific, technology and production reserves. Expanding and improving the quality of cooperation, based on an understanding of the structural component of global economic changes, would enable the EEU member states to develop a clear concept of joint development based on the competitive advantages of each and everyone. Such an approach fully complies with the theoretical and practical groundwork of experts, who single out about 10-12 economy sectors capable of leading the alliance forward[269]. The generation of such a list of interrelated competitive production facilities is critically important not only in the context of making the EEU attractive for new members, but also in connection with the likely recarving of economic influence zones throughout the Northern Hemisphere that determines global economic development. Such reformatting of Eurasia is connected with implementation of the plans for the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) and the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade Partnership. After establishment of these free trade areas, it is likely that a new configuration of the global economic space will emerge, which in the coming years will account for most of the international exchange. We might well assume that after the creation of these intercontinental trade groupings, in the vast majority of world markets the exporters of the EEU member states will be in a less favorable situation compared to suppliers of the superbloc members[270]. With regard to the products of the EEU, the most-favored-nation tariffs (enshrined in the obligations of the WTO member states) will operate within the groupings, while the products of the member countries of the groupings will either not be subject to import duties, or will be subject to preferential (reduced) duty rates. Obviously, this situation will entail a decrease in the price competitiveness of Russian products[271]. Leaving other negative points aside, it is safe to say that the establishment of the FTA between the U.S. and the EU will be a serious obstacle to implementing the concept of a free trade area between Russia and the EU declared by the Russian leader. Reduced probability of creating such an area could become an additional negative factor hampering the expansion of integration in the post-Soviet space, and contributing to a certain isolation of the EEU. The U.S. plans to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership, another transcontinental zone of preferential trade and economic regime without the participation of Russia and China, also contradict Russian interests. This attempt does not dovetail with the foundations of the modern world economic order created by the U.S. itself, which is another sign of its decline. In any event, the strengthening of Russian position in the world economy and international trade will depend not so much on changes in the design of the global economic space, as on the successful solution of the integration tasks within the post-Soviet space and the socio-economic tasks of implementing a new industrialization based on the new technological paradigm. The U.S. strategy is to block Russia's ability to solve these problems – its aggression in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova aims against the first, while economic sanctions, including embargo on the supply of high-tech equipment and transfer of new technology, aim against the second one. Despite the obvious compliance of the process of Eurasian economic integration with the generally accepted global standards for creating regional economic associations, including the WTO rules, a party to which is not Russia alone, but the entire unified customs territory of the Customs Union as well (according to the relevant international treaty), this does not prevent the countries that still apply Cold War concepts from regular hitting out at the emerging Eurasian Union, trying to represent this regional economic association (which is quite conventional under the international law) as the restoration of the USSR[272]. The heads of the EEU member states repeatedly stressed the purely economic nature of Eurasian integration. This feature determines the boundaries of delegating national sovereignty to a supranational level. The policy pursued by the presidents of " the three" allows currently to feel well the boundaries of integration expediency, determined by centuries of historical experience and modern realities. This also concerns seeing the fine line beyond which integration ceases to be organic and becomes conflictual[273]. Or, for that matter, when the synergy of unification for the common good is undermined by the infringement of the interests of some for the benefit of others. In other words, when integration turns into colonization. Eurasian integration is being established in keeping with the best domestic traditions, when the strong help the weak, while voluntariness and mutual respect for spiritual values and cultural identity of the unifying nations are strictly observed. The Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union, were the only examples of the colonization of a large space in the interests of the acceding nations rather than the core. At the cost of the vital forces, material and human resources of the Russian people and the economic center of the country, the outlying districts were being upgraded, and the level of their development was harmonized with the metropolitan standards. This became evident with the collapse of the USSR, when the standard of living in all former Soviet republics has dropped dramatically, and still remains significantly lower than in Russia and many times lower than in Moscow. Russia is the natural and chief donor of the integration process. Yet not through one-sided donations to national elites, but with a view to creating a common synergetic effect, when all the participants in the association benefit by expanding opportunities and combining national competitive advantages. This determines the consistent adherence of the Russian leadership to the philosophy of voluntariness, not wanting to incur surplus costs to overcome the resistance of separatists, and following the well-known proverbial wisdom that love cannot be forced[274]. After all, if we compare the Eurasian integration processes with the empires of the past, it is the European, and not the Eurasian Union that has imperial features, being a product of the imperialist world economic order. The EU is a modern bureaucratic empire, in which the incredibly expanded Eurocracy (about 50 thousand European officials), evincing the interests of large European capital and serving the European TNCs, dictates its will to the peoples and national governments of European countries. This was particularly evident in the imposition of an association with the EU on Ukraine as a colony through blackmail and bribery of the Ukrainian elites, followed by resort to brute force and illegal methods of coercion right up to the coup d'é tat, mass repression and civil war. The same methods were applied by European politicians and officials against Moldova and Georgia, forcing them to enter into an unequal association. Unlike the EU and the U.S. empire reducing other countries to submission by force of arms and the world currency, Eurasian integration has the nature of a voluntary commonwealth of the peoples that have been living together for centuries, each of which retains its national sovereignty and has equal rights in the adoption of supranational resolutions[275]. In this lies the great potential of Eurasian integration, which is more in line with the requirements of the third millennium than the integration of NATO countries based on force, money and deception. The principles of Eurasian integration are comfortable for all countries wishing to cooperate on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and justice. Due to its historical experience, spiritual traditions and geopolitical significance, Russia is the natural center of such integration, which can actually cover the territory from Lisbon to Chukotka in latitude and from Novaya Zemlya to Sri Lanka in longitude. This is the potential of the Eurasian project, which can become the prototype of the new world economic paradigm that combines freedom of trade with state regulation of the economy for development of all states that unite in a single economic space. The process of Eurasian integration can lead to an association of countries and peoples interested in preserving their national traditions, spiritual values and cultural features while striving to master advanced technologies for economic well-being. However, implementation of this project will be possible only when Russia becomes attractive, being an example of a just, effective and humane state system. This is impossible without a drastic change in Russia's economic policy and formulation of an attractive model for the development and expansion of the EEU. In other words, in order to actualize the Eurasian integration potential, it is necessary to recover the historical meanings of Russia and conduct technological modernization of the economy, implementing a strategy of outstripping development based on the new technological paradigm[276]. By Way of Conclusion THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE
After the above analysis of the objective laws and subjective factors of the new world war being unleashed by the U.S. oligarchy against Russia, it is appropriate to return to the issue of Ukraine again. U.S. geopoliticians chose it as the main direction of the attack against Russia and achieved strategic success, in effect occupying its main part through the successful coup d'é tat and bringing their puppets to power. Under the guidance of U.S. specialists, the construction of the Ukrainian nation on a Russophobic basis is proceeding at a rapid pace, while the essence of Ukrainianness has been crystallized as anti-Russian. For the first time in our history, a very significant part of the Russian World not simply has been torn from it, but has been turned into a hostile and extremely aggressive formation. The further evolution of the Ukrainian state directed by the U.S. secret services poses an extreme danger for Russia. Firstly, the transformation of tens of millions of people into Russophobic Nazis means huge and irreparable losses for the Russian World and the relevant weakening of Russia. Secondly, the transformation of Ukraine into an anti-Russian fascist state under U.S. administration significantly enhances the ability of the latter to destabilize the socio-political situation in Russia. Kiev has already become a center of consolidation of anti-Russian forces with an influential network of supporters in Moscow. Their reinforcement by militants from Ukrainian Nazi organizations indistinguishable from Russian citizens creates a serious threat of riots and acts of terrorism in the capital and frontier cities of the Russian Federation. Thirdly, Ukraine's separation from Russia sharply weakens the potential of Eurasian integration. Without it, the EEU remains unfinished, as many technological chains for the production of high-value-added products, especially in machine building, chemical and metallurgical industry, include Ukrainian enterprises, scientific and design organizations. Fourthly, the destruction of the still significant cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian enterprises, design centers and scientific institutes in the high-tech industry inflicts huge damage on the Russian defense industry complex. Fifthly, the militarization of Ukraine and strengthening of the Ukrainian armed forces under NATO leadership represent a direct military threat to Russia, comparable to the importance of the occupation of Ukraine by fascist Germany for the defense capability of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Sixthly, the militant anti-Russian rhetoric of the Nazi junta leaders in Kiev, the ceaseless shelling of the Donbass cities and military provocations despite the Minsk agreements, leave no doubt that the main geopolitical goal of their U.S. curators is to draw Russia and the European NATO countries into a full-fledged war. Seventhly, the U.S. playing their Ukrainian puppets on stage of the European political theater excludes the restoration of normal relations and cooperation of Russia and the EEU with the EU countries, which weakens Russia economically, technologically and politically, making it extremely difficult to develop Eurasian integration. In other words, the Nazi criminal regime that occupied Ukraine, led by the U.S. secret services, is incompatible with both the interests of the people of Novorossiya, Malorossiya and Carpatho-Russia, and with the vital interests of Russia. Without liberating Ukraine from the pro-American Nazi junta, neither Russia's national security, nor a decent life of the Ukrainian population, nor the well-being of the Russian World can be ensured. This liberation can hardly be complete. Soviet power had to spend almost a decade after the liberation of Ukraine from the German Nazi occupation to finish off the Hitlerite minions hiding in the Carpathian Mountains. Today, the number of nationalists associating themselves with them increased thousandfold. Successful can only be the liberation of those regions of Ukraine, where the majority residents continue to consider themselves a part of the Russian World. There are the following legal, economic and ideological prerequisites to this. From the legal point of view, as was shown above, the current Ukrainian regime is illegitimate, and worse yet, criminal. This is evidenced by a legal analysis of the circumstances of its emergence and functioning after usurpation of power. From the economic point of view, the current Ukrainian government has already led the country to a catastrophe and cannot escape it within the framework of its policy of confrontation with Russia. In fact, it implements a new edition of the old " shock therapy" policy (the first was in the early 1990s), due to adoption of another IMF program and signing the association agreement with the EU. However, the point of departure for this " bold action" is completely different than almost a quarter of a century ago, as at that time Ukraine was the most economically developed republic of the USSR with industry that surpassed in level and scope all Eastern and Southern European states, maybe with the exception of Italy. As of today, the Soviet legacy has been completely guzzled away, as depreciation of fixed assets has exceeded 75-85% in the basic sectors. This process entailed a redistribution of the national income in favor of a small number of offshore beneficiaries, who export not only the entire surplus social product, including natural rent, but also a part of the necessary product, plundering the depreciation and payroll funds. Ukraine approached EuroMaidan with one of the lowest living standards in Europe: in terms of GDP per capita, the country was in early 2014 at the level of Tunisia and Uzbekistan, 3-fold lower than Russia and 1.5-2-fold lower than Belarus and Kazakhstan. After the catastrophic 2014/15, GDP per capita dropped to the level of backward African countries. Continuing to follow the " European choice" course, Ukraine faces a choice between bad, very bad and catastrophic options: 1) a controlled crisis with elements of stagnation against the background of formal compliance with the IMF conditions, with an aggressive anti-Russian policy, but attempting to make Russia assume the role of an unselfish helper and culprit behind all Ukrainian misfortunes and failures; this scenario means a formal observance of certain provisions of Minsk-2, although the real federalization of Ukraine will be thwarted; 2) an uncontrolled crisis (economy collapse) in the event of the IMF's refusal to provide financial " support" under the pretext of not fulfilling certain mandatory conditions. This option is probable if the real goal of U.S. policy will be unleashing the open, possibly military confrontation between Russia and European countries in the territory of Ukraine with indirect U.S. participation; this half-disintegration scenario with possible conflict escalation outbreaks does not meet the interests of the EU and Russia, increasing the likelihood of their involvement into the conflict and the transfer of " managed chaos" to their territory; 3) socio-economic chaos (catastrophe), the main consequence of which will be cessation of the existence of Ukraine as an integral state, resulting in tectonic shifts in the European and global security system and geo-economic cooperation.
In terms of depth and consequences, these scenarios can be designated as " crisis, " " collapse" and " catastrophe": the conditional quantitative gradation between them lies in a drop in GDP from 10-15% (crisis) through 20-30% (collapse) to 35-50% (catastrophe). These gradations represent qualitative differences and consequences for the EU and Russia: the crisis can be stopped (frozen) by the usual tricks of the IMF-EU (by the type of Bulgaria and the Baltic states); the collapse will affect the economies of neighboring countries; the catastrophe will entail transfer of destruction to other countries, and not only to Russia, as the initiators of the Maidan are hoping. The scenario of crisis stabilization is politically possible only if punitive operations are stopped in the south-eastern regions of the country. At the same time, the question arises: at whose expense can the financial system of Ukraine be rehabilitated. First of all, we are talking about assets accumulated in Ukraine (mainly in the form of foreign currency). To these foreign assets of Ukraine should be added the household savings in cash foreign currency (dollars and euros), which are estimated at $ 50-80 billion and exceed 3-5-fold the available money supply in Ukraine in hryvnas. Rehabilitation of the financial system of Ukraine has three potential sources: - the funds of Russia in Ukraine (about $ 60 billion in various forms); - household funds ($ 50-80 billion); - oligarchic funds ($ 70-100 billion). The total volume of these " reserve funds" exceeds the GDP of Ukraine and is a tempting " booty" for the " rehabilitator" countries. In the event of further economic paralysis in Ukraine, the reserve household funds will be used for survival purposes (allowing to hold out for several months), although it might possible to somewhat improve the situation in the banking sector at their expense by freezing foreign currency deposits. So, on September 1, 2014, the NBU already issued an instruction prohibiting the withdrawal of foreign currency funds inside Ukraine and prescribing their conversion into the hryvna. The reserve funds of oligarchs are located mainly in offshore zones such as Cyprus, Belize, Seychelles, Marshall Islands, etc., these funds are also burdened with comparable obligations (loans to Ukrainian enterprises for $ 77 billion at the end of 2013), that is, they cannot be mobilized for the purpose of rehabilitating the Ukrainian economy. Thus, the " easy prey" to the Kiev authorities and their sponsors seem to be Russia's investments in Ukraine, which under sanctions could be " pardoned" Russia. The legal basis for this has been created, and the law " On Sanctions" has been adopted, which allows the NSDC and the government of Ukraine to do almost anything with Russian assets in Ukraine under the pretext of punishing the " aggressor country." However, this would be a direct act of economic war, to which Russia will be forced to respond. So the medium-term price of such a rehabilitation of Ukraine could be a much more extensive destabilization of EU-Russia relations. The impossibility to balance the energy and payment balance of Ukraine within the " freezing the civil war" scenario in a stable way, to pass a normal budget, to attract capital inflows and attain a growth in gold and foreign currency reserves leads to the extreme fragility of this option of the future, which corresponds to the proverb " better a lean peace than a fat war, " but in the economy reproduces the social explosion conditions, and in politics creates the ground for radicals who will call for a " second attempt" to resolve the eastern issue. These are the circumstances when the prerequisites for the emergence of Scenario 2 can arise, if the IMF and other creditors refuse to provide further financial assistance to Ukraine in the form of loans, entailing even more dire consequences, the analysis of which is presented below. The gold and foreign currency reserves of Ukraine almost cease to exist in this scenario, the hryvna is propelled to free fall (by another 2-3-fold, compared to the current levels for six to twelve months). If this scenario activates, the main sectors forming the country's GDP will be semi-halted due to a lack of funding (a decrease in energy sector by 15-20%, in metallurgy by 20-30%, in coal industry by 40-60%). The banking system will be on the brink of bankruptcy. With the termination of the allocation of credit facilities, most Ukrainian banks will become unprofitable and go into bankruptcy, or will be nationalized. In a situation of total impoverishment, the cost of gas and other utilities will increase with difficult-to-forecast values, because the nominal increase in rates will be offset by the non-payment gap. Ukraine will face a multiple increase in unemployment in the conditions of business stoppage, a reduction in real wages, a decrease in the purchasing power of the population, and depletion of savings. With a high probability, the deterioration will not stop here, and Ukraine will enter a state of socio-economic chaos with a high risk of the country's disintegration into 2-3-4 parts. This catastrophic scenario currently seems the most likely one, since Ukraine is under external control, and the choice of the further development path is determined neither in Kiev nor in Ukraine's national interests. At the same time, if the goal of Ukraine's external governance is to inflict economic and geopolitical damage on the Russian Federation, then the fate of Ukraine itself becomes an " acceptable cost" in the planned " final resolution of the Russian issue." This is manifested in many illogical decisions taken by the leaders of Ukraine and aimed not at stabilizing and leveling the crisis phenomena, but only at confrontation with Russia, without attention to the emerging signs of an upcoming economic and territorial collapse. External governance does not imply Ukraine's withdrawal from the crisis. At best, the plans are to stabilize the crisis phenomena at such a level as to ensure Ukraine's economic dependence on the U.S. and prevent restoration of its sovereignty. The policy of repeated shock therapy leads to a permanent degradation of the situation. Meanwhile, the American puppets appointed to manage Ukraine show a pronounced motivation of timeservers, trying to use their unexpectedly obtained power to enrich themselves. This is evidenced by numerous scandals regarding large-scale fraud with the embezzlement of budget funds and misappropriation of public property, that electrify the Kiev media space. After squandering away the economy and social fabric, there is a temptation to consume what is left – the population and the territory. The territory of Ukraine is already being eaten away by preparing contracts for exporting chernozem to Sweden, accelerated extraction of shale gas, cultivation of genetically modified products on chernozems. The population is disposed of through cognitive technologies of " fascistizating" the population against the " cursed enemy." Extremely advanced technologies for disposing of excess population and predatory exploitation of nature are typical of the modern hybrid war, " successfully" implemented by the U.S. in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Outright destruction of industrial and residential infrastructure is also an extreme form of " scrapping" the population and territory. This scenario is destructive for the people of Ukraine, but quite acceptable for the oligarchs and their foreign partners. In the construction of the fourth, so far hypothetical positive scenario, we will proceed from the premise that all conflict participants are interested in its early resolution with minimal damage to their economies and civilization as a whole. For this, tradeoff options should be chosen that suit all parties. First of all, it is necessary to assess the scope of the disaster resulting from the European " choice" of Ukraine. In the case of granting Ukraine the full amount of promised loans, the growth of the public gross external debt of Ukraine will be about 8-10% of GDP per year. At the same time, the public debt/GDP ratio will be brought to 98.3% by the end of 2015, and by the end of 2017 gross external debt will exceed GDP by 6.2%. However, this may not be enough to stabilize the financial situation.
Fig. 21. Balance of payments of Ukraine, balancing items. (Source: the National Bank of Ukraine)
In view of the ban on military-technical cooperation imposed by the U.S. on Ukraine, the latter will dramatically reduce its exports to Russia. In 2014, its share in Ukrainian exports dropped to 18% compared to 25% in 2012. In absolute terms, this exceeds $ 20 billion a year. In contrast, the EU facilitates access of Ukrainian goods to its markets (unilateral free trade regime for some commodity items), as a result of which Ukraine's exports to the west will increase by $ 0.5 billion per year. For the sake of this negligible amount Ukraine has to reject many billions in foreign currency proceeds[277]. The downgrade of Ukraine's ratings to the pre-default level significantly increases the cost of borrowing and servicing the external debt, which will lead to a worsening of the investment income movement balance. (Table 12)
Table 12. Forecast of the Ukrainian investment income movement balance in 2017-2017 ($ billion)
Labor income movement balance and cash transfers of individuals was until 2014 the only stably positive balance item with a balance accounting for only 5% of GDP. We are talking about the income of Ukrainian labor migrants abroad, transferred to their homeland. At the same time, transfers to the balance of Ukraine from labor migrants in Russia amounted to about 70% of the total, that is, up to 3.5% of GDP. The anti-Russian policy of the Kiev authorities reduced this source 2-3-fold, further increasing the payment balance deficit. With the continuation of this policy, this source threatens to dry up. The outflow of currency from the country in the form of interest on loans, credits, borrowings, as well as in dividends, royalties and other types of income from foreign investment will inevitably increase. In 2014, the balance for this item was already about minus $ 8 billion[278]. Let us analyze the ability of the Ukrainian state to service its sovereign debt in foreign currency. The public debt was $ 54.1 billion already at the beginning of 2015 (together with government guarantees, $ 65 billion)[279]. Only $ 32.8 billion represent the external debt, but it must be understood that part of the domestic debt is also denominated in foreign currency. In total, about 60% of the public debt (about $ 36 billion) was nominated in foreign currency. However, the external public debt is just the first layer of the onion. The total amount of Ukraine's foreign debt at the beginning of 2015 was $ 126.3 billion[280]. To service such a debt, based on an interest rate of about 8%[281], an amount of $ 12 billion per year is required, ultimately giving $ 13 billion with an addition of $ 1 billion necessary for servicing government loans taken out in 2014. The IMF guarantees financing of $ 17.5 billion over 2 years, building into its program that the required amount of financing is $ 50 billion. The state's ability to attract other external resources is extremely limited after 2014, as the public debt has already exceeded this year the 100% GDP mark. Table 13 presents the forecast of the main Ukrainian payment balance items for 2015-2017. Its deficit for these years is estimated at $ 217.2 billion.
Table 13. Forecast of the main Ukrainian payment balance items for 2017-17 ($ billion)
To assess Ukraine's need for external assistance, the balance of payments deficit for current operations should be supplemented with the investments necessary to ensure at least a simple reproduction of capital. Starting in 2005, the volume of investments has provided only half of the required capital level, and the accumulated " underinvestment" of the economy is estimated at $ 300 billion. Indirectly, this is evidenced by the dynamics of depreciation of fixed assets, which has grown over 12 years from 44% to 78%. Thus, the necessary volume of foreign borrowings to adjust the Ukrainian balance of payments for 2014-2018 without taking into account the " underinvestment" in the previous period is $ 190 billion. To overcome the disproportions in the economy development accumulated over the past 2 decades, at least $ 300 billion will be needed. The package of financial assistance announced through the IMF by Western creditors is obviously insufficient to stabilize the macroeconomic situation. The only possible positive alternative to the three negative scenarios is the option of a tripartite joint resolution of the EU, EEU and Ukraine on both the format for trilateral trade and economic cooperation, and general investment programs for the restoration and development of the Ukrainian economy. This option is hypothetical because it is incompatible with the effect of the Association Agreement with the EU imposed on Ukraine, not to mention the unacceptability of the current criminal illegitimate Ukrainian regime for Russia. This Agreement establishes a free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU, created in stages over a period of 10 years. At the same time, at the time of entry of the Agreement into force, the import duty for the EU goods is zeroized for 7666 commodity items out of 10, 530 specified in the TNVED (foreign trade classification of goods). Within three years, the duty should be zeroized for 89% of items, bringing this figure to 98.5% in 10 years. It is envisaged to bring the Ukrainian legislation, regulations and standards into full compliance with the EU standards in such fields as technical regulation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs legislation, financial, telecommunications, postal, courier services, international maritime transport services, public procurement, intellectual property protection and competition law. The Agreement establishes a unilateral dependence of Ukraine on the EU, the directives of which automatically become mandatory for Ukraine. However, the latter is not given the opportunity to participate in the elaboration of these directives. Nominally, the Agreement does not prevent Ukraine from participating in other preferential agreements, if they do not contradict the agreements already reached. In other words, possible international agreements of Ukraine with the CU or with individual participants of the CU will have to fit into the legal framework of the Association Agreement, which acquires legal supremacy over other international agreements of Ukraine. This circumstance will limit the development of legal agreements, without which the development of economic relations between Ukraine and the CU is impossible. The Agreement does not contain any reservations or legal provisions protecting or guaranteeing the preservation of the legal basis for economic relations between Ukraine and the CU member states. Meanwhile, the mandatory standards of the Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in the field of trade, customs, technical regulation, sanitary and veterinary measures, as well as in other areas of economic regulation, collide with Ukraine's obligations under the Agreement with the EU, not allowing it to be a party to both agreements at the same time. The simultaneous participation of Ukraine in the CU/SES and in the FTA with the EU is possible only if the member states of the Customs Union agree to assume the obligations of Ukraine under the Agreement on supranational competence issues, which seems improbable. The Russian foreign policy tradition precludes signing of unequal agreements that stipulate unilateral transfer of sovereign powers to the other side, as well as unilateral concessions in the field of trade and economic relations. This concerns not only Ukraine's obligations to implement the EU directives on a wide range of issues related to the regulation of trade and economic relations, but also the free trade regime with the EU, which provides for preservation of restrictions on the import of Ukrainian goods. After the establishment of the FTA with the EU, Ukraine receives a negative total economic effect, the magnitude of which is determined by the response of the Single Economic Space countries to this move[282]. This eliminates the possibility of Ukraine's participation in the CU and SES with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which could have given a significant positive effect[283]. In particular, joining the SES makes it possible to increase the price competitiveness of Ukrainian goods due to lower energy carrier prices. In this case, the competitiveness of Ukrainian goods would increase both in the EEU market and in the EU. Preliminary calculations show that the positive effect on exports to EU countries from the reduction of energy tariffs in this case will exceed the effect of the abolition of customs tariffs within the FTA with the EU. It should be noted that the difference accrued (by 2030) between the scenario of creation of the FTA with the EU and Ukraine's accession to the SES is estimated at about 7.5% of total GDP. The Agreement enshrines application of the EU standards on regulation of the energy market and transit in Ukraine. This makes the participation of Russia side in the development of the Ukrainian gas transportation system meaningless and encourages expansion of alternative routes for the transit of Russian energy resources to the West. Thus, creation of the FTA of Ukraine and the EU entails significant risks for mutual trade in high-tech products. Taking into account the fact that the production capacities of Ukrainian machine-building enterprises are excessive for the domestic market, and their products are uncompetitive on the European market, one should speak of a high risk of further reducing the production potential of the Ukrainian machine-building complex. Participation of Ukraine in the Eurasian integration process, according to the calculations of the Academies of Sciences of Russia and Ukraine, significantly increases its economic efficiency. According to the calculations of an integrated model of the interindustry balance of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, a 15% increase in economic activity could be achieved due to establishment of the CU and SES in over 10 years, which is equivalent to an additional GDP of $ 400 to 700 billion, of which Ukraine would account for about 1/3 (Table 14). This is not surprising, considering that the aircraft, rocket and space, shipbuilding industry, nuclear engineering and many other high-tech industry branches have been created and are still being reproduced in Russia and Ukraine as a single whole[284]. Expansion of sales markets for Ukrainian producers (due to the increased competitiveness of Ukrainian goods and services on the markets of SES member countries) will be practically manifested in expanded production of Ukrainian exporting enterprises, as well as in the emergence of new exporters. The multiplier effect of increase in production at Ukrainian exporting enterprises will ensure creation of new jobs and additional income for the Ukrainian budget. At the same time, an analysis of the significance of sectoral relations between the SES countries and Ukraine should consider not only direct, but also indirect effects that reflect the involvement of related economy sectors in the production process. It is also necessary to study the distribution of effects at various stages in the formation of output of final products. The existing system of sectoral and intersectoral relations between the economies of the SES countries and Ukraine makes it possible to state that cooperation is non-alternative within a number of industries, but it may be sensitive to a sharp deterioration in trade and economic relations between countries, which creates additional risks, especially in the production of defense and dual-use products[285]. For the foregoing reasons, the necessary condition for the restoration and sustainable development of the Ukrainian economy is preservation and expansion of industrial and technological cooperation and trade with Russia and the EEU. To achieve this, however, Ukraine must have sovereignty in trade and economic issues which it has delegated to the EU institutions under the Association Agreement. Consequently, the necessary condition for the implementation of this scenario is denunciation of the said Agreement and start of the new, specifically tripartite format of negotiations between the EEU, the EU and Ukraine. And only if the EU prefers free trade area " from Lisbon to Vladivostok" to the
" Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership" (TTIP) promoted by the U.S., this scenario gets a chance to be implemented. Given the currently insignificant probability of such a drastic change in the EU's position, the worst scenario is quite likely, apparently entailing further disintegration of Ukraine along the split line between the regions where Ukrainian Nazism triumphed, and where the majority of residents continue to consider themselves a part of the Russian World. All the more so, as there is a corresponding ideological background for this. Ideologically, the Ukrainian idea currently pushed over the edge turned out to be nothing but denial of everything Russian with antagonistic opposition of the Ukrainian. In the light of the above historical facts about its genesis, the widely spread myths about relations of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples rooted in Soviet ideology must be stripped away. Therefore, the contradiction between the Russian origin of Ukrainians and their current Russophobia, brought to antagonism, can only be resolved by eliminating one of its components. And this process has already begun with the formation of the idea of Novorossiya as a Russian state consisting of the southern and eastern regions of present-day Ukraine, historically domesticated by Russian people. Currently, Novorossiya exists as an idea popular among Russian patriots, which could become implemented politically only if Russia acknowledges the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics wishing to exit the structure of Nazi Ukraine. The key problems related to their state building should also be resolved.
Firstly, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics currently control only about a quarter of the declared territory of the republics. At the same time, the idea of Novorossiya contemplates inclusion of at least 8 regions of the South and East of Ukraine (Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa) in its structure. Secondly, Novorossiya is being created in the course of the civil war (and may be finally constituted only based on its results) that broke out in Ukraine after the coup of February 21-23, 2014, which deprived the country of legitimate power and interrupted the constitutional continuity. Thirdly, it is extremely difficult to predetermine the course and outcome of the international negotiation process on the rearrangement of territories of the former Ukraine. In addition to the creation of several independent states, one of which may be Novorossiya, an option of the reorganization of the Ukrainian state on a federative basis is possible. Taking advantage of the fact that the ruling Nazi junta does not consider itself to be the legal successor of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics could declare themselves legitimate heirs of Soviet Ukraine, launching the process of a new assembly of the Ukrainian state. It is also possible that different territories of the former Ukraine will be included in the neighboring countries. At the same time, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics have already announced the establishment of the Union of People's Republics in the form of a confederation, thereby partially predetermining the state structure. Since the future of this state formation is not defined, its borders are not outlined, and it is likely that these issues will be resolved by a consensus of external players at an international conference where Novorossiya may be represented as a full participant, more likely as an observer, or may be not represented at all, the legal system and the Constitution of Novorossiya should have a high degree of adaptability to various decisions concerning its (Novorossiya's) future status, including the most unexpected ones. Considering a possibility of re-establishment of the Ukrainian state, the Constitution should be drawn up in such a way as to serve as the assemblage point of this hypothetical new state formation, without changing the internal structure of the Novorossiya itself as one of the possible co-founders of the new Ukraine. These contradictions seem difficult to solve at first sight. However, in Europe alone we have three different examples of solving similar problems: 1. The Swiss Confederation (1291-1798) that emerged as the union of the three original cantons in the struggle against Austrians, Burgundians and Savoyards (actually, these were civil wars within the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation). 2. Montenegro under the rule of the prince-bishop (1516-1852) was constituted during resistance against aggression of the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian Republic. 3. The Republic of the Seven United Provinces, the present Netherlands (1581-1795), appeared in the course of the religious war with Spain. Characteristically, in all these cases, initially the insurgents were coming out for broad autonomy (in essence, the same federalization as in Donetsk and Lugansk), and only in the course of the civil war unleashed by the official authorities that refused to satisfy initially moderate demands, they were going over to assertion of complete independence. Similarly, at the first stage, power was exercised by authoritative military leaders, and only with the lapse of time did effective civil structures emerge. The only problem is that all three examples are faulty in that these states did not have a written Constitution, their system was not completely ordered and had an archaic nature. Nevertheless, we also have an example that almost completely correlates with the situation in Novorossiya, which in the course of being developed by the Russian Empire was often called Russian America. We are talking about the United States of America. The independence of the U.S. was proclaimed in 1776, recognized by Great Britain under the Paris Peace Treaty in 1883, and the wording of the American Constitution was approved only in 1888. Great Britain's colonies that proclaimed independence initially also advocated only the extension of civil rights – their main requirement was representation in the British parliament. The union of individual colonies (states), established for the war with Britain, was at first a loose confederation united only by the military command of George Washington. At first, the U.S. central authorities had very little power (since the confederative system was preserved). The power of the president and congress gained strength rather slowly, and the U.S. finally became a federation after the Civil War of 1861-1865, when the right of states to secession was abolished. So, how do we see the solution of the problems connected with the constitutional arrangement of Novorossiya? Firstly, the absolutely correct form of state structure – confederation – has already been found (in an intuitive or compelled way). It should be noted that almost all the states listed above and formed during civil wars of several provinces with the central power, were originally established exactly as a confederation (regardless of whether it was legally formalized or took place by way of accomplished fact). Such arrangement minimizes the contradictions between regional elites, as in absence or low importance of central administration offices they have nothing to compete for. Moreover, the confederative arrangement facilitates the accession of new provinces, as beyond preserving their internal structure, they acquire an additional degree of freedom (in comparison with the one that had existed in the framework of the previous state system). There was good reason that none of the cantons associated with the three original ones expressed the desire to withdraw from the Union (given that the cantons were not only German, but also French and Italian, and joined as a result of brutal wars). The civil war in the U.S., caused by the contradiction between the industrial capitalist North and the agrarian slave-holding South, was an episode. Both before the crisis (when the contradiction was offset by the development of new territories) and after it, when it was removed by the reconstruction of the South, the U.S. was an internally integral state. Even during the war, the opposing Union and Confederation, each separately, were internally united. Secondly, the confederative form of Novorossiya's arrangement gives it an additional advantage in terms of further international legal formalization of the rearrangement of the former Ukrainian territories. In the event that preservation of the Ukrainian state (even in a re-established form) would appear impossible, and preservation of the new statehood would be undesirable, the regions-republics could be included in the neighboring state formations in a personal capacity (which will facilitate their integration in comparison with Novorossiya, huge both in territory and population). If, however, the decision will be taken to recreate the Ukrainian state, then given the inter-regional contradictions that have just resulted in the civil war, it is the confederative principle of the organization of Novorossiya (which minimizes contacts between Ukraine's regions hostile towards each other) that should be the basis of the new Ukrainian statehood. Thirdly, any confederation is built on the principle of power concentration at the bottom of the pyramid. The supreme confederation bodies have only very limited delegated powers and rigidly established budgets. They may not impose taxes and adopt binding resolutions (without ratification by local authorities). Such a shift in the balance of power in favor of regions ensures a more effective and differentiated policy that complies with the specific needs of the local population, which is quite important given the need to restore many of the regions of Novorossiya affected by the civil war. Thus, the promising scheme of power arrangement in Novorossiya has the form of plenipotentiary regional governments that rest upon strong local self-administration and delegate limited powers to a few common confederative structures with restricted rights. The competence of regional authorities should fully include issues of cultural, social, economic development, law and order protection, tax policy. As for the central general confederation bodies, today it seems sufficient to assign to them responsibility for the defense and implementation of the common foreign policy of Novorossiya, as well as implementation of the general macroeconomic policy and the general economy regulation system. To do this, the following is necessary: · creation of the fiscal and banking system based on the establishment of the State Bank of Novorossiya, combining the functions of money circulation arrangement, banking services, treasury and fisc; · establishment of customs and border protection, veterinary, phytosanitary and sanitary services; · establishment of the chamber of commerce and industry issuing certificates of origin for goods; · establishment of a system for registration of enterprises and property rights; · nationalization of the former Ukrainian state property and property of criminals involved in conduct and support of the punitive operation; · creation of the system of courts and law enforcement bodies. This system of state regulation could be created as uniform for the two republics and be based on common legislation, which should be as close as possible to the Russian one. In addition to these issues, the legal system and the Constitution of Novorossiya could define the principles of religious relations. It may happen that Novorossiya will decide to enshrine in its Constitution not the traditional formula on the separation of church and state, but clear identification of itself as the canonical territory of the ROC. Then, in case the Nazi junta liquidates the UOC (MP) and accepts the autocephalistic doctrine, Novorossiya will become a center of not only political but also religious resistance. When establishing the future state system of Ukraine, the precedent of the Republika Srpska as part of Bosnia and Herzegovina can also be used. " Republika Srpska" is not a state in the strict sense, but one of the semi-state " entities" with rather broad rights within the internationally recognized state " Bosnia and Herzegovina" [286]. This was achieved through international recognition of the fact of the ethnocide of Serbs in the region. There is an International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide[287]. The regulations of the Convention stipulate that if a particular nation is through a certain fault of the state subject to conditions threatening its existence (such as apartheid, genocide, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian tragedy), entailing a situation threatening world peace and international security, then the international community (for example, through the UN Security Council) can provide support to such nation, up to recognition of its right to secession[288]. According to this provision, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics have the full right to secession either together, as part of the Union of People's Republics, or individually. After all, such phenomena as genocide, ethnic cleansing of Russophone citizens and the humanitarian tragedy provoked by the 18-month war of the Kiev Nazi junta against Russophone and Orthodox people, are evident. Terrifying media materials of public tortures of people fighting for their natural right to self-determination, shelling of the Donbass cities, towns and villages, killing of children and old people, and destroyed infrastructure have circled the globe. The authenticity of these materials, as well as the facts of mass repressions on language, religious and political grounds registered in the White Book[289] since November 2013, as well as numerous personal testimonies of the OSCE mission members in the Donbass, are not questioned. However, the fratricidal bloodshed started by the Washington hawks and blessed by NATO, waging a purposeful hybrid war against Russia, continues still. Apparently, it will go on as long as the decision-making centers in Brussels and overseas continue their aggression against Russia. Hence, it follows that the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics may have ahead of them a long period of existence in the status of war as a rebel territory. There are objective prerequisites for this. Enterprises of the Donbass accounted for a significant share of Ukraine's GDP, providing the necessary quantum of exports. In recent years, the direct contribution of Donetsk and Lugansk regions to the Ukraine's GDP was about 17%, while their share in the total industrial production and commodity exports exceeded 25%. At the same time, during 1995-2013 there was a steady trend towards a widening gap in the household income level of the Donbass and Kiev. While in 1995 the household income in the Donetsk region and Kiev exceeded the average Ukrainian level roughly the same, by 2013 the situation had changed significantly. The gap in the level of average wages between Donetsk and Lugansk regions and the average indicators for Ukraine has practically disappeared. This became possible not least due to the policy of withdrawing rental income outside the Donbass. The contradictions between the Donbass and Kiev consisted not only in the fact that the elites of these regions have been fighting over the past years for political leadership. They were most notably aggravated during the discussion of the consequences of signing a treaty on a free trade area with the European Union. The economy of the South-East of Ukraine has traditionally been aligned towards close trade and economic ties with Russia. Majority of the remaining enterprises that are not engaged in raw materials exports either directly depend on the supply of products to the Russian market, or are linked by close scientific and technical ties with the leading Russian producers, institutions, etc. Of course, the deterioration of trade and economic ties with Russia put them in harm's way. At least equal problems were expected by the commodities-based industries. The increase in costs could clearly jeopardize supplies to the markets of Turkey and the Middle East, not to mention the Russian market. The key risks for the economy of the Donbass after signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU can be defined as follows: a) increasing gas and electricity prices with the gradual elimination of cross-subsidization in pricing for the population and industrial enterprises; b) price changes due to alteration in the market shares between Ukrainian and imported goods, exchange rate fluctuations for stabilizing the balance of payments; c) an increase in prices for intermediate products due to the gradual abolition of export duties on metallurgical and chemical products, agricultural raw materials; d) cumulative price growth in the economy as a result of the factors described above. The actualization of these risks poses an obvious threat to the preservation of price competitiveness both in the domestic market of Ukraine and in the market of the SES countries. It should be taken into account that the production facilities of the Donbass enterprises have been scarcely modernized over the last 23 years. This means that they still have the basic efficiency parameters characteristic of Soviet industry, that is, high energy and labor intensity. An abrupt change in the level of prices for intermediate products may become an insurmountable obstacle to the modernization of production facilities, bringing the economy of Donbass to the long period of production stagnation. Preservation of the development model that was in effect in the South-East of Ukraine in recent decades is no longer possible. Substantial financial investments are already required to support key enterprises in the region. These transfusions are impossible without a redistribution of the system of financial flows within the Ukrainian economy. This means an impossibility to maintain the current system of inter-budgetary relations no matter what. It can be said with a high degree of probability that, given the changing economic development priorities and the political elite, the Donetsk region may face decisions in the field of economic policy that would significantly worsen its situation. The threat of this progression of events urges to search for possible development alternatives. The main of them are associated with ensuring greater economic independence of the region. Donetsk region should have the status allowing it to preserve and develop relations both with Russia and with other Ukrainian regions. It is in this status that the development of the Donbass economy could receive a significant additional impetus. Yet to achieve this, the region status should be settled in the context of the agreement between Ukraine and the EU, as well as within the CIS free trade area. Under these conditions, it is theoretically possible that the enterprises of Donbass could be granted a discount on the purchase of energy resources in the EEU markets, use its infrastructure, and, in addition, have easy access to the markets of the SES countries. In fact, we are talking about creation of a free trade area with a high level of independence in all fields of economic life. The military activities have inflicted significant damage on the region, the number of refugees is estimated at hundreds of thousands. These factors significantly complicate assessment of the prospects for economic development of the Donbass. It is already clear that Ukraine does not have the resources necessary to restore normal economic life in the region within an acceptable time frame. Not to mention the hatred that arose between the residents of the South-East and the central government. It is quite clear that a return to the development model that existed before the events of February 2014 is no longer possible. The Donbass needs to develop a purposeful economic policy aimed at restoring a peaceful life and creating conditions for a gradual increase in the economic activity level. The addressing of this task requires participation of the largest economies of the European continent, that is, Russia and the European Union. Besides, the recovery of life in the Donetsk region requires Kiev to understand that residents of Novorossiya have the right to their own opinion regarding the Ukraine's development prospects, its economic and foreign policy course. CONTENTS
PREFACE.................................................................... 5 BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION The Last Geopolitical Game: the U.S. to Move and Lose.......................................... 9 SECTION 1 Why Would the U.S. Need the War? ........................ 43 The naturally determined character of the U.S. aggression in Ukraine....................... 47 The change of long cycles of socio-economic development as an objective basis for the escalation of global military and political tension............................................ 62 The U.S. strategy of maintaining global dominance....................... 82 The U.S. tactics of conducting a modern world war..................... 89
SECTION 2 Why Ukraine?........................................................... 101 The goals of U.S. aggression in Ukraine.......... 104 Eurofascism in Ukraine.................................... 116
Ukrainian Nazism as a weapon of the West against Russia................................ 130 The criminal activities of the U.S. secret services for nurturing of anti-Russian Nazi organizations in Ukraine........................... 172 Conflictology of the Ukrainian crisis................ 201 SECTION 3 The Futility of U.S. Aggression................................. 215 From the American to the Asian world economic paradigm 216 Forecast of the cyclical aggravation of the military threat.......................................... 239 Start of the war and lessons drawn from the first defeat 250
SECTION 4 How can the war be prevented?............................... 264 The anti-war international coalition................... 265 Transition to the new scientific paradigm for managing economic development 282 The concept of socially conservative synthesis as the basis of a new world order ideology 296 The course of action to neutralize the U.S. aggression 314 Liberation of Ukraine........................................ 324 SECTION 5 Strengthening of Russia............................................ 337 Threats to the economic development of Russia........................................................... 339 Socio-economic status of Russia................................................. 344 Financial war against Russia............................. 372 Defeat of the Russian economy by external manipulation of its regulators 390 Springs of the mechanism of external influence on the Russian economy................... 402 Transition to a modern management system as a condition for the survival of Russia........... 416 Transition to a sovereign monetary policy................................................ 422 Promotion of Russia's foreign economic security................................ 430 Deployment of the strategic planning system.... 441 Eurasian economic integration as the basis of the anti-war coalition and harmonization of international relations..... 449 BY WAY OF CONCLUSION The Future of Ukraine.............................................. 471
The Izborsk Club of experts was established in September 2012 in the town of Izborsk, Pskov region. The Club was initiated by well-known politicians, theorists and public figures of state-patriotic orientation. A.A. Prokhanov was elected chairman of the Club, with V.V. Averyanov and A.A. Upland as executive secretaries. The ideological trend of the Izborsk Club can be determined as social conservatism, a synthesis of different views of Russian state-minded thinkers (from socialists and Soviet patriots to monarchists and Orthodox conservatives) into a single ideological platform. The Izborsk Club is often regarded as an alternative to numerous liberal clubs and sites that have been laying claim for a long time to the expression and intellectual servicing of the Russian official policy. At the same time, it is necessary to see that the Izborsk Club reflects not a newly emerging, but a mature and long-established political and ideological pole that for a good while could not be institutionalized due to various subjective factors and purposeful regulation of the expert field by the authorities supervising domestic policy. The activities, works and biographies of the main Izborsk Club participants testify to the maturity and rootedness of this trend in the Russian soil.
WWW.DYNACON.RU club@izborsk-club.ru redaction@izborsk-club.ru
Sergei GLAZYEV
THE LAST WORLD WAR THE U.S. TO MOVE AND LOSE
subject to the Federal Law dated 29.12.2010 No. 436-FZ
Format 84х108 1/32. Offset printing. Offset paper. 16 printer's sheets.
ZAO Knizhny Mir Phone: (495) 720-62-02 www.kmbook.ru [1] Dostoyevsky F.M. A Writer’s Diary. 1873-1881. [2] Fukuyama F. The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, 1992. 400 pp. (Russ. ed.: Konets istorii i posledniy chelovek (M.B. Levin, trans.) Moscow, AST Publ., 2007. 588 pp.) [3] Heartland is the " middle" or " core" land currently occupied by Russia, a part of Eurasia which, according to the theory of the English geographer Halford Mackinder, is the " geographical axis of history." [4] For example, Mackinder, the author of the " Heartland" concept, wrote: " Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India and on China replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppe-men. In the world at large she occupies the central strategical position held by Germany in Europe. She can strike on all sides..." And the British Prime Minister M. Thatcher (no matter how later they tried to interpret these words) said "...by estimates of the world community, accommodation in the territory of Russia of 15 million people is economically expedient..." The first female U.S. Secretary of State, M. Albright dropped a remark, the essence of which was that sole possession of Siberia by Russia is " unfair" and Siberia should be placed under international control. Siberia is too large a territory to belong to one state.
[5] Ogorodnikov A. Brestskiy mir. Predystoriya [Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Prehistory]. Zavtra, October 29, 2013. (In Russian) [6] Vandam A.E. Velichayshee iz iskusstv. Obzor sovremennogo mezhdunarodnogo polozheniya pri svete vysshey strategii [The greatest of the arts. A review of the current international situation in the light of the highest strategy] (1913) – St. Petersburg, Nauka Publ., 2009. (In Russian) [7] Marchetti Cesare. A postmortem technology assessment of the spinning wheel: the last 1000 years. Technological forecasting and social change, 1978 [8] Charles Higham. Trading With The Enemy: An Expose of The Nazi-American Money Plot 1933-1949. New York, 1983. [9] Ibid. [10] http: //infoglaz.ru/? p=22965
[11] Schweitzer P. Pobeda. Rol taynoy strategii administratsii SShA v raspade Sovetskogo Soyuza i sotsialisticheskogo lagerya [Victory. The role of the secret strategy of the U.S. administration in disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Socialist block]. Minsk, 1995. (In Russian)
[12] Bogomolov O. T. Teoriya i metodologiya mezhdunarodnogo sotsialisticheskogo razdeleniya truda [Theory and methodology of the international socialist division of labor]. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1967. (In Russian) [13] Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. Secretary of State, told at a press conference in Dublin on December 6, 2012: " There is a move to re-Sovietise the region. It’s not going to be called that. It’s going to be called a customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that. But let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it." [14] Glazyev S. Sanktsii SShA i politika Banka Rossii: dvoynoy udar po natsionalnoy ekonomike [Sanctions of the USA and the Policy of Bank of Russia: Double Blow to the National Economy]. Voprosy Economiki, 2014, No. 9. (In Russian) [15] " In our times, not a single cannon in Europe could fire without our consent" –this phrase belongs to A. Bezborodko, the Russian Grand Chancellor and diplomat of the 18th century. [16] Glazyev S.Y. Strategiya operezhayushchego razvitiya Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa [The strategy of Russia’s outstripping development in the context of the global crisis]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2010. (In Russian) [17] Giovanni Arrighi. The long twentieth century. London, Verso, 1994 (Russ. ed.: Dolgiy dvadtsatyy vek. Moscow, Territoriya Budushchego Publ., 2006).
[18] Malyavin V. 36 stratagem. Kitayskie sekrety uspekha [36 stratagems. The Chinese secrets for success]. Moscow, Belye Alvy Publ., 2000, 192 pp. (In Russian) [19] Glazyev S. Sotsialisticheskiy otvet liberalnoy globalizatsii [A socialist reply to liberal globalization]. APN, 2006. (In Russian) [20] Glazyev S. Uroki ocherednoy rossiyskoy revolyutsii: krakh liberalnoy utopii i shans na ekonomicheskoe chudo [Lessons of the next Russian revolution: the collapse of liberal utopia and the chance of an economic miracle]. Moscow, Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, 2011. (In Russian) [21] Glazyev S.Y. Strategiya operezhayushchego razvitiya Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa [The strategy of Russia’s outstripping development in the context of the global crisis]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2010. (In Russian); Glazyev S. Teoriya dolgosrochnogo tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya [The theory of long-term technical and economic development]. Moscow, VlaDar Publ., 1993. (In Russian) [22] Lvov D.S., Glazyev S.Y., Fetisov G.G. Evolyutsiya tekhniko-ekonomicheskikh sistem: vozmozhnosti i granitsy tsentralizovannogo regulirovaniya [Evolution of technical and economic systems: capabilities and boundaries of centralized regulation]. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1992. (In Russian)
[23] The Treaty of Bjö rkö was a secret Russo-German allied treaty signed at the meeting of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II with the German Emperor Wilhelm II on July 11 (24), 1905, on the Baltic island of Bjö rkö (near Vyborg) aboard the Imperial Yacht " Polar Star." The initiative of concluding the treaty belonged to the German diplomacy that sought to destroy the Russo-French alliance and prevent creation of the Entente. To this end, it was intended to turn the Russian-German alliance into a triple Russo-Germanic-French one stacked against the United Kingdom. [24] Giovanni Arrighi. The long twentieth century. London, Verso, 1994 (Russ. ed.: Dolgiy dvadtsatyy vek. Moscow, Territoriya Budushchego Publ., 2006. [25] Dugin A.G. Suverennaya tsivilizatsiya i preodolenie tsezarizma [Sovereign civilization and the overcoming of Caesarism]. Retrieved from http: //www.svpressa.ru/society/article/95167/ (in Russian) [26] Glazyev S.Y., Mikerin G. I. Dlinnye volny: NTP i sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie [Long waves: scientific-technological progress and socio-economic development]. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1989. (In Russian) [27] Glazyev S.Y. Ekonomicheskaya teoriya tekhnicheskogo razvitiya [The economic theory of technical development]. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1990. (In Russian) [28] Glazyev S. Strategiya operezhayushchego razvitiya Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa [The strategy of Russia’s outstripping development in the context of the global crisis]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2010. (In Russian) [29] Glazyev S., Kharitonov V. Nanotekhnologii kak klyuchevoy faktor novogo tekhnologicheskogo uklada v ekonomike [Nanotechnology as a key factor of the new technological paradigm in the economy]. Moscow, Trovant Publ., 2009. (In Russian) [30] Glazyev S. Teoriya dolgosrochnogo tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya [The theory of long-term technical and economic development]. Moscow, VlaDar Publ., 1993. (In Russian) [31] Glazyev S. O politike razvitiya rossiyskoy ekonomiki [On the policy of development of the Russian economy]. Report, 2013 (In Russian); Glazyev S. Politika ekonomicheskogo rosta v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa [The policy of economic growth in the context of the global crisis]. Report, 2012. (In Russian) [32] Glazyev S. Modernizatsiya rossiyskoy ekonomiki na osnove novogo tekhnologicheskogo uklada kak klyuchevoe napravlenie antikrizisnoy politiki [Modernization of the Russian economy based on the new technological paradigm as the key direction of the anti-crisis policy]. Analytical report on the program of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation (to project No. 09-02-95650). 2009. (In Russian) [33] http: //www.rypravlenie.ru/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/03-Glaziev.pdf [34] Glazyev S. Poslednyaya geopoliticheskaya partiya: SShA nachinayut i proigryvayut [The Last Geopolitical Game: the U.S. to Move and Lose]. International Affairs, 2015, No. 8. (In Russian) [35] Fukuyama F. The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, 1992. (Russ. ed.: Konets istorii i posledniy chelovek. Moscow, AST Publ., 2010) [36] Sadovnichy V.I, Yakovets Yu.V., Akayev A.A. (Eds.). Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. [37] According to data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Study for 2013. [38] Report by Director of RAS Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies S. Rogov " Russia in the Multipolar World, " 2012. [39] From the materials of the head of the department of the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations, V.I. Pantin to the report " The most probable forecast of the development of political and military conflicts in the period of 2014-2018" at a meeting of the working group of the President of the Russian Federation’s Economic Council in the subject area " Development of international economic integration, " June 2014. [40] Dudchak A., Manachinskiy A. " Demokraticheskaya" voyna kak mekhanizm nenasilstvennogo peredela mirovykh resursov [" Democratic" war as a mechanism for non-violent redistribution of global resources]. Kiev, Zolotye Vorota Publ., 2011. (In Russian) [41] Ibid. [42] Ref. to the article of G. Friedman " From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine." [43] From G. Friedman’s lecture at MGIMO, January 2015. [44] Krasnov P. Operatsiya " Nemyslimoe". Vystrel v spinu ot soyuznikov [Operation Unthinkable. A backstab from allies]; Rzheshevskiy O.A. Sekretnye voennye plany U. Cherchillya protiv SSSR v mae 1945 g [W. Churchill’s secret military plans against the USSR in May 1945]. Modern and Current History Journal, 1999, No. 3. (In Russian) [45] Terentyev A., Jr. Ukrainskiy krizis i povorot na Vostok [The Ukrainian crisis and the turn to the East]. Odnako, June-July 2014 (174). (In Russian) [46] Dudchak A., Manachinskiy A. " Demokraticheskaya" voyna kak mekhanizm nenasilstvennogo peredela mirovykh resursov [" Democratic" war as a mechanism for non-violent redistribution of global resources]. Kiev, Zolotye Vorota Publ., 2011. (In Russian) [47] Published in 2003, the book includes the following chapters: " Facing dictatorships realistically, " " The dangers of negotiations, " " Applying political defiance, " " Disintegrating the dictatorship." [48] www.antidrugfront.ru [49] Engdahl W.F. Seeds of Destruction. Global Research, 2007. (Russ. ed.: Semena razrusheniya. Moscow, Selado Publ., 2015). [50] A number of sources give the term as “controlled chaos.” [51] A detailed description of the condition of cooperation ties between enterprises of Ukraine and the Customs Union (of course, without taking into account the physical damage to enterprises, and in some cases, their complete incapacitation as a result of the devastating civil war) is contained in the thorough and most comprehensive study Economic and Technological Cooperation in View of Sectors of the SES and Ukraine, undertaken by the RAS Institute for National Economic Forecasts and the RASU Institute of Economics and Forecasting with the support of the Eurasian Development Bank in 2014. [52] Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements dated 12.02.2015 (signed by representatives of the Tripartite Contact Group); Declaration of the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted on February 12, 2015. [53] White Book on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Eds. 1-3), 2014. [54] From CNN interview with B. Obama on February 1, 2015: " And since Mr. Putin made this decision around Crimea and Ukraine, not because of some grand strategy, but essentially because he was caught off balance by the protests in the Maidan, and Yanukovych then fleeing after we’d brokered a deal to transition power in Ukraine." [55] “If you don’t do this deal, folks, we will have walked away from our allies–Britain, France, Germany. What happens when we walk into them and say, " Well, we got to tighten down on Russia because of Ukraine"? The complications that will grow out of that are enormous. You’ve seen Putin and you’ve seen China sort of working together and–in the wake of Ukraine, Putin’s been reaching out. You may have observed the BRICS summit that took place in Russia recently. Walking away from the deal... that is a recipe quickly, my friends, for our allies to walk away from Ukraine, where they are already very dicey and ready to say, " Well, we’ve done our bit." [56] Association Agreement between the EU and its member states, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part.–http: //eeas.europa.eu [57] CNN interview with Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, on April 22, 2014. [58] Dudchak A., Manachinskiy A. " Demokraticheskaya" voyna kak mekhanizm nenasilstvennogo peredela mirovykh resursov [" Democratic" war as a mechanism for non-violent redistribution of global resources]. Kiev, Zolotye Vorota Publ., 2011. (In Russian) [59] Economic and Technological Cooperation in View of Sectors of the SES and Ukraine. A study by the RAS Institute for National Economic Forecasts and the RASU Institute of Economics and Forecasting with the support of the Eurasian Development Bank, 2014. [60] http: //toplivo.rbc.ua/rus/news/ukraina-i-shell-podpisali-operatsionnoe- soglashenie-o-rabote-12092013163500 [61] http: //www.pravda-tv.ru/2014/03/19/43498 [62] http: //atnews.org/news/v_ssha_vyvezli_zolotoj_zapas_ukrainy/2014-03-11- 13425 [63] " If we manage to procure about 160 billion euros, then we will be able to reconstruct the economy of the country quickly enough in a historical context, meaning that the free trade zone with the EU will turn out to be a gain for us. Ukrainian producers will become competitive, and Ukraine will become a powerful state. It is necessary to understand and be fully aware of his, " Prime Minister Azarov said on November 9, 2013. [64] O vysokoy veroyatnosti i posledstviyakh defolta Ukrainy v 2014 g. Usloviya i tsena spaseniya [On the high probability and consequences of the default of Ukraine in 2014. The conditions and price of salvation]. Analytical report of the System Forecasting Center, 2013. (In Russian) [65] Medvedchuk V. Soglashenie ob assotsiatsii s YeS–soglashenie o kolonizatsii [The Agreement on Association with the EU–agreement on colonization]. Kommersant-Ukraina, December 9, 2013. (In Russian) [66] Instytut Wschodni w Warszawie [67] Dudchak A., Manachinskiy A. " Demokraticheskaya" voyna kak mekhanizm nenasilstvennogo peredela mirovykh resursov [" Democratic" war as a mechanism for non-violent redistribution of global resources]. Kiev, Zolotye Vorota Publ., 2011. (In Russian) [68] Ibid. [69] Falin V. Rol vneshnikh faktorov v formirovanii vneshney politiki SSSR [The role of external factors in shaping the foreign policy of the USSR]. 2007 (In Russian) [70] Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard. Basic Books, 1997. (Russ. ed.: Velikaya shakhmatnaya doska. Moscow, International Relations Publ., 1998) [71] Kuznetsov A. Pereosmyslenie kontseptsii Bolshoy Yevropy v svyazi s ukrainskim krizisom [Rethinking the concept of Greater Europe in connection with the Ukrainian crisis]. Moscow, International Affairs Publ., December 2014. (In Russian) [72] Brzezinski Z. Russia needs to be offered a ‘Finland option’ for Ukraine. The Financial Times, February 22, 2014. [73] Novorossiya was a relatively young part of the Russian Empire, the process of its formation being determined by a rapid colonization by the multinational population, as well as by the almost instantaneous industrialization and urbanization of the province. Pre-revolutionary scientists usually attributed to Novorossiya all the lands in the south of the empire, added since the reign of Catherine II. However, most often it meant the territory of the four governorates–Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida and Bessarabia. These are the current Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Kirovograd, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine, as well as the Crimea. [74] Frolov K. Sakralnye smysly Novorossii [Sacred meanings of Novorossiya]. Krasnoyarskoe Vremya, 2015. [75] Skorobogaty P. Vtoroe rozhdenie Novorossii [The second birth of Novorossiya]. Expert, No. 29, July 14, 2014. (In Russian) [76] Ibid. [77] Sabov A. Tretya ruina [The third ruin]. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 13, 2015 (No. 6574). (In Russian) [78] Historians did not invent the name “Ruin”, they overheard it from common people. By the definition of N. Kostomarov, “ruin” was the epoch in the history of Malorossiya characterized by disturbances that were shaking this region in the second half of the 17th century, mainly since the division of the Hetmanate into two hetmanships on two banks of the Dnieper...” A. Sabov defines as the " first ruin" the 30-year period after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, when Ukraine was being torn to pieces by Cossack elites who sought hetman’s warder with the support of Poland, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. The " second ruin" is the period of revolutions and wars from 1917 to 1922. The " third ruin" means the current historical segment. [79] The role of this oldest educational institution in the “democratic transformation” of Ukrainian society will be discussed below. [80] Skorobogaty P. Vtoroe rozhdenie Novorossii [The second birth of Novorossiya]. Expert, No. 29, July 14, 2014. (In Russian) [81] Sabov A. Tretya ruina [The third ruin]. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 13, 2015 (No. 6574). (In Russian) [82] Ibid. [83] In March of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the initiator of the transfer of the Crimean region to Ukrainian SSR “was Khrushchev in person.” According to the Russian president, only the motivation of Khrushchev remains a mystery: " a desire to enlist the support of the Ukrainian nomenklatura, or to make amends for the organization of mass repressions in Ukraine in the 1930s." Meanwhile, Sergei Khrushchev, the son of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, explained on March 19, 2014 with reference to his father’s words, that Khrushchev’s decision was connected with construction of the North Crimean Canal from Kakhovka reservoir on the Dnieper, and the desirability of conducting and financing large-scale hydrotechnical operations within the framework of a single Union republic. There are also arguments about a desire of the Soviet nomenklatura to make a gift to Ukrainian SSR in honor of the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Council. Meanwhile, the authority to present such a " gift" is highly questionable. According to Article 18 of the USSR Constitution in force in 1954, the territory of the republics could not be changed without their consent. Such consents were formalized by both republics in the form of resolutions adopted by the Presidiums of their Supreme Soviets. However, Article 33 of the Constitution of the RSFSR, which contained a list of powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, did not provide for the authority to change the boundaries of the RSFSR. [84] " The Ukrainianization of the Russian population in the 1920s and after the collapse of the Soviet Union has only an outward resemblance: introduction of the Ukrainian language into scientific treatises, official paperwork, schools, printing. However, the content of these processes is completely different, says Elena Borisenok, head of the department of Eastern Slavs at the RAS Institute of Slavic Studies.–the Bolsheviks never said that Russians were enemies. On the contrary, they talked about the fraternal peoples, about the strength of the proletariat, about a joint future, and that Ukrainians should not break away from Russians. Until the 1930s, even Bohdan Khmelnytsky was a negative character. This was, to the full extent, the formula of the policy " national in form, socialist in content." [85] The “thorny” ascent of Yushchenko’s future wife to the top of the political Olympus will be discussed below. [86] Sivkov V. Nedodelannyy reykh [Unfinished Reich]. Voenno-Promyshlennyj Kurjer, No. 9 (575), 2015. (In Russian) [87] Ibid. [88] Dudchak A., Manachinskiy A. " Demokraticheskaya" voyna kak mekhanizm nenasilstvennogo peredela mirovykh resursov [" Democratic" war as a mechanism for non-violent redistribution of global resources]. Kiev, Zolotye Vorota Publ., 2011. (In Russian) [89] Bandera S. Z moskalyami nema spіlnoi movy [There is no common language with Moskals]. 1952. (In Ukrainian) [90] The statement on posthumous exoneration of the OUN leader Stepan Bandera was delivered by President Yushchenko in 2010 at the solemn assembly in Kiev on the occasion of the Ukrainian Unity Day. " This was awaited by millions of Ukrainians for many years, " Yushchenko said, pointing out that he awarded Stepan Bandera the high title " for upholding the national idea and fighting for an independent Ukrainian state." In addition, Yushchenko decorated Bandera with the Order of State, which he handed over to his grandson Stephen (Stepan) Bandera, a journalist who works in Ukraine and has Canadian citizenship. In 2011, President Viktor Yanukovych annulled the decree of his predecessor. [91] " The Russian-Soviet side was trying at that time to pressure the Western allies to acknowledge Banderites and others as killers. Why did the Nuremberg trial not recognize this? Because the facts were falsified, because the position of the Soviet Union at that time was unfair, " said Y. Sergeev, Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the UN at a briefing on March 3, 2015 adding that " millions of Ukrainians in the West are normal European citizens." He also reckoned among " normal" members of the ultra-nationalist party " Svoboda." [92] LiveJournal of K. Frolov. [93] S. Drobyazko. Pod znamenami vraga. Antisovetskie formirovaniya v sostave germanskikh vooruzhennykh sil [Under the banner of the enemy. Anti-Soviet units as part of the German armed forces]. Moscow, Exmo Publ., 2005. (In Russian) [94] Aleksander Korman. Ludobó jstwo UPA na Ludnoś ć i Polskiej. Nortom, 2003. (In Polish) [95] Na Rubież y. No. 35, 1999 [96] Poliszczuk W. Bitter Truth: The Criminality of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA): The Testimony of a Ukrainian. Toronto, 1999. [97] Vavrik V. Razorenie gnezda. Kartina voennogo terrora na Galitskoy Rusi v 1914 g [Destruction of the nest. The picture of military terror in Galicia in 1914]. Lvov, Nauka Publ., June-July 1936. (In Russian) [98] Vavrik V. Terezin and Talergof. Philadelphia, 1966. [99] Galitskaya Golgofa [Galician Golgotha]. The U.S., published by P. Gardyi, 1964. (In Russian) [100] Ulyanov N. Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma [Origins of Ukrainian separatism]. Moscow, Vagrius Publ., 2006 (In Russian, reprint) [101] Mekhanik A. Yazyk, avtonomiya, nezavisimost [Language, autonomy, independence]. Expert, No. 11 (937), 2015. (In Russian) [102] From the book of O. Monchalovsky Literary and political Ukrainophilia (1898, in Russian): " The main collaborators of Peter I in the field of scientific, literary and partly state activity were Little Russians, the pupils of the Kiev [Mohyla] Academy; of course, they could not but bring their mite to the treasury of the all-Russian language, could not but influence it with the peculiarity of their South Russian nature, their South Russian spirit. And this participation of Little Russians in the all-Russian linguistic work continued after Peter...” [103] Mekhanik A. Yazyk, avtonomiya, nezavisimost [Language, autonomy, independence]. Expert, No. 11 (937), 2015. (In Russian) [104] The words of P. Skoropadsky, a general of the Imperial Army, and hetman of Ukraine in 1918: " The narrow-minded Ukrainism is the product brought to us exclusively from Galicia, a culture that does not make any sense for us to transplant completely, as there is no evidence of success and this is just a crime, because there is, in fact, no culture there. After all, Galicians live on leftovers from the German and Polish table. Their language alone clearly reflects this, where four out of five words are of Polish or German origin. (...) Great Russians and our Ukrainians have created by combined efforts Russian science, Russian literature, music and art, and to give up these high and mighty things in order to replace them with the squalor that Galicians so graciously offer to us Ukrainians, would be just ridiculous and unthinkable..." [105] Ibid. [106] Only nine are extant: " Naimychka" (The Servant Girl), " Varnak" (The Convict), " Kniaginia" (The Princess), " Muzykant" (The Musician), " Neschastnyi" (The Unfortunate Man), " Kapitansha" (The Captain’s Woman), " Bliznetsy" (The Twins), " Khudozhnik" (The Artist), " Progulka s udovol’stviiem i ne bez morali” (A Stroll with Pleasure and Not without a Moral). In addition, there’s a poem " Trizna" (Funeral Feast) and a drama " Nazar Stodolia" often staged by theaters. [107] In addition to the book From Dictatorship to Democracy mentioned above, Sharp wrote under the auspices of the Institute a number of “workbooks” on the processes of social transformation, including There Are Realistic Alternatives, The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle, The politics of nonviolent action (1994), Self-Reliant Defense Without Bankruptcy or War (1992), National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense (1985), Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal (1990). [108] www.freedomhouse.org.ua. Previously led by J. Woolsey, former director of the CIA. [109] TV and newspapers alleged that Ukraine was preparing to join the EU, and not just to sign the Association Agreement offensive to any state that values its economic sovereignty; when economic arguments ceased to have effect, the most primitive arguments were used about a " civilizational choice" of the European vector on part of Ukraine, and Ukrainians were equated with Europeans. [110] Munchaev S. Antirossiyskaya napravlennost i posledstviya zapadnykh planov i programm razvitiya Ukrainy [Anti-Russian orientation and consequences of Western plans and Ukraine development programs]. Moscow, 2014. (In Russian) [111] Non-resident grantors, as well as Ukrainian recipient structures, are listed in detail above. [112] In Ukrainian, " dignity." [113] The whole story of the captive: http: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=rohgV9JGyvQ [114] Vavrik V. Terezin and Talergof. Philadelphia, 1966. [115] Kunyaev S. Zhretsy i zhertvy Kholokosta. Istoriya voprosa [Priests and victims of the Holocaust. Case history]. Moscow, Algoritm Publ., 2012. (In Russian) [116] The list included the head of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Stanislav Redens, his deputies Carl Carlson and Khoma Leonyuk, the head of the statistical department of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Mikhail Bukshpan, and the head of the Kharkov regional division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Zinoviy Katsnelson. [117] Conquest R. The Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-famine. London, 1986. [118] Mykhalchyshin Yu. Vatra. Versiya 1.0 [Vatra. Version 1.0]. Evrosvit Publ., 2010 (In Ukrainian). (This 420-page edition was presented on the shelves of Ukrainian shops as a manual for students of higher educational institutions of humanitarian specialist fields, post-graduate students and lecturers, as well as party and public figures.) [119] More details here http: //www.eajc.org/page18/news15643.html [120] O. Kildiyushov. Ideological-political and lifestyle orientation of soccer fans in South-East Ukraine. National Strategy Issues, No. 6 (27), 2014. (In Russian) [121] According to the leader of the movement “Russian-speaking Ukraine” V. Kolesnichenko, over the last 20 years (as of 2011), more than 3 thousand schools were closed, where education was offered in the languages of national minorities... The number of pupils who studied in Russian has reduced 7-fold. For example, in Kiev alone out of 519 schools there were only 7 Russophone, that is, only 3% of schoolchildren could study in Russian, and there were no Russophone kindergartens at all. [122] Shtepa P. Moskovstvo: yogo pokhodzhennya, zmіst, formy i іstorichna tyaglіst [Muscovitism: its origin, content, forms and historical extension]. Drogobych, Vidrodzhennya Publ., 2003. (In Ukrainian) [123] This is largely promoted by the well-known educational programs of the Fulbright Foundation and the American Councils. The latter is funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. Annually, about 120 Ukrainian students are sent to the U.S. within the framework of this program at the expense of the Department of State. Upon returning to Ukraine, they are provided with job placement. [124] Ubiystvo demokratii: operatsii TsRU i pentagona v postsovetskiy period [Killing Democracy: CIA and Pentagon Operations in the Post-Soviet Period]. Collection of articles by the international team of authors. Moscow, ANO " Institute for Foreign Policy Studies and Initiatives, " 2014 (p. 151). (In Russian) [125] Munchaev S., Kozhaev Y. Zapadnye plany i programmy, ikh antirossiyskaya napravlennost i politicheskiy krizis na Ukraine [Western plans and programs, their anti-Russian orientation and political crisis in Ukraine]. Scientific School “Patriotic History”, Plekhanov Russian Institute of Economics. Moscow, 2014. (In Russian) [126] Newspaper Culture, No. 31, September 12-18, 2014. (In Russian) [127] Prokopenko I. Vsya pravda ob Ukraine [The whole truth about Ukraine]. Moscow, Exmo Publ., 2014. (In Russian) [128] White Book on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Eds. 1-3), 2014. [129] A study of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on the question " What path of integration should Ukraine choose: European Union, Customs Union" (2 weeks before the Vilnius summit), November 2013; sociological research [130] “The removal of a heavily armed gang of nonhuman beings out of Slavyansk has an immense symbolic meaning. This is the beginning of a reversal in the fight against militants for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, ” said P. Poroshenko in his televised address on July 6, 2014. [131] " They lost their lives because they defended men and women, children and the elderly who found themselves in a situation facing a threat to be killed by invaders and subhumans sponsored by them, " says the English text of the statement by A. Yatsenyuk, where the word “subhuman” was used, being in fact a calque of the term " Untermensch" used by the German Nazis. Published on June 16, 2014 (http: //vz.ru/news/2014/6/16/691357.html) [132] " These Russians shold be killed with an atomic weapon, " Y. Tymoshenko said in a telephone conversation with N. Shufrych, the recording of which became public in March 2014, and the authenticity of which the ex-prime minister of Ukraine did not deny (http: //ukrday.com/politika/novosti. php? id=121309) [133] The article by A. Rogers Nazi Blunders was published by the online portal Anna News on July 2, 2014. (In Russian) [134] Umberto Eco. Totalitarismo fuzzy e Ur-Fascismo. Report, La revista dei libri, 1995. (In Italian) [135] Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard. American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. Basic Books, 1997. [136] From the address of U.S. President Barack Obama delivered at West Point on May 28, 2014. [137] Kuchma L. D. Ukraina–ne Rossiya [Ukraine is not Russia]. Moscow, Vremya Publ., 2003. (In Russian) [138] Sadovnichy V.I, Yakovets Yu.V., Akayev A.A. (Eds.). Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. [139] China 2030: Striding Towards Common Prosperity. Beijing, Renmin University Press, 2011. [140] Sadovnichy V.I, Yakovets Yu.V., Akayev A.A. (Eds.). Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. [141] Ibid. [142] Ramo J. The Beijing Consensus. London, The Foreign Policy Centre. May, 2004. [143] V. Popov’s talk with P. Dutkevich from the book 22 idei o tom, kak ustroit mir (besedy s vydayushchimisya uchenymi) [22 ideas on how to put the world in order (conversations with eminent scientists)]. MSU Publ., 2014, pp. 470-471. (In Russian) [144] Giovanni Arrighi. The long twentieth century. London, Verso, 1994 (Russ. ed.: Dolgiy dvadtsatyy vek. Moscow, Territoriya Budushchego Publ., 2006). [145] Ayvazov A. Periodicheskaya sistema mirovogo kapitalisticheskogo razvitiya [Periodic law of world capitalist development]. Article, on author’s website. 2012. (In Russian) [146] Glazyev S. Genotsid [Genocide]. Moscow, Terra Publ., 1998. (In Russian) [147] The World Bank. Indicators, 2000-2013. [148] Sadovnichy V.I, Yakovets Yu.V., Akayev A.A. (Eds.). Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. [149] Ibid. [150] The directions of such a reform could cover the formation of a joint payment system of the BRICS countries, taking into account the plans for the creation of a national payment system; establishment of a joint multilateral agency for investment assurance; development of international standards for activities of rating agencies and determination of ratings; creation of an own global system of international payments; harmonization of rules of procedure of national monetary authorities. [151] See the Policy Concept on Russia’s participation in BRICS, approved by President Vladimir Putin on March 21, 2013. [152] Sadovnichy V.I, Yakovets Yu.V., Akayev A.A. (Eds.). Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. [153] S. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996. (This book is one of the most popular geopolitical treatises of the 1990s. Developed from an article in the journal Foreign Affairs, it describes in a new way the political reality and forecast of the global development of the entire civilization. The edition contains the famous article by F. Fukuyama, The End of History). [154] Ref. to A. Ayvazov’s essay Novorossiya is Our Stalingrad (2014) and other works by the author. [155] GDP figures are based on purchasing power parity (PPP) indicators; calculations for the years 1820-2000 were performed by A. Maddison; calculations for 2010-2030 were performed by Chinese scientists on the basis of A. Maddison’s calculations. [156] Goldman Sachs: naselenie stran BRIC budet stremitelno bogatet sleduyushchie 20 let [Goldman Sachs: the population of the BRIC countries will rapidly grow rich over the next 20 years]. Electronic publication: Slon.ru, November 24, 2011. (In Russian) [157] Conversation of Yang Jiemian with Li Xin from the book 22 idei o tom, kak ustroit mir (besedy s vydayushchimisya uchenymi) [22 ideas on how to put the world in order (conversations with eminent scientists)]. MSU Publ., 2014, p. 489. (In Russian) [158] Harvey D. The Winding Paths of Capital. A conversation between G. Arrighi and D. Harvey. (Along with the theory of " accumulation by dispossession, " D. Harvey also developed the interconnected theory of capitalist geographic expansion, the so called " spatial fix" theory. The latter proceeds from the premise that capitalism must create a geographical landscape commensurate with the conditions of accumulation in each particular era of growth. One of these conditions is investment in real estate, social infrastructure, industrial development, etc., and another lies in certain institutional mechanisms characteristic for the given period. When capital in its dynamics exhausts the possibilities of the epoch and reaches new investment areas, new production forms, new labor relations, etc., it explodes the old shell and creates a new landscape in accordance with new requirements). [159] Sadovnichy V.I, Yakovets Yu.V., Akayev A.A. (Eds.). Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. [160] The regions where the countries taking part in the negotiations for establishing the transcontinental superblocks are located account for the vast majority of world imports (about 85%). North America absorbs about 18% of world exports, Europe–almost 36%, Asia–32%. Russian exports are also largely oriented toward these regions. The EU absorbs 53% of national exports, and the APEC countries, more than 17%. [161] At the meeting of finance ministers and heads of central banks of the group of the most advanced countries (the U.S., Britain, Germany, France and Japan) in 1985, the U.S. persuaded other participants to take a number of concerted measures to regulate foreign exchange markets. Their goal was to reduce the dollar rate and increase the rates of other currencies. Each country consented to change its economic policy and intervene in the work of foreign exchange markets to the extent necessary to devalue the dollar. Japan agreed to raise interest rates and do everything necessary to ensure that the yen rate " fully reflected the positive dynamics of the Japanese economy." As a result, because of the sharp increase in the yen rate, the Japanese economy suffered severely, as Japanese exporting companies became less competitive in foreign markets. (It is believed that in the end it led to a 10-year economic recession in the country.) On the contrary, after signing the agreement the U.S. experienced a significant economic growth and a low level of inflation. [162] Sorokin P. The Basic Trends of Our Times. New Haven, 1964. (Russ. ed.: Glavnye tendentsii nashego vremeni. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1997.) [163] Toloraya G. BRICS and the New World Order (a chapter to the book Prospects and Strategic Priorities for the Rise of the BRICS. Sadovnichy V., Yakovets Yu., Akayev A. (Eds.). Moscow, MSU – Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute – INES – National Committee for BRICS Studies – RAS Latin American Institute, Polis, 2014 Prospects and Strategic for the Rise of the BRICS. Moscow, MSU–Pitirim Sorokin–Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute–INES–National Committee for BRICS Studies–RAS Latin American Institute, 2014. . [164] Akaev A., Sadovnichy V. O novoy metodologii dolgosrochnogo tsiklicheskogo prognozirovaniya dinamiki razvitiya mirovoy ekonomiki i Rossii [On a new methodology for long-term cyclical forecasting of the dynamics of development of the global economy and Russia]. Site http: //socmodel.com/ (In Russian) [165] Pantin V. I. Research note Naibolee veroyatnyy prognoz razvitiya politicheskikh i voennykh konfliktov v period 2014-2018 gg. [The most probable forecast for the development of political and military conflicts in the period 2014-2018]. (In Russian) [166] Akaev A., Sadovnichy V. O novoy metodologii dolgosrochnogo tsiklicheskogo prognozirovaniya dinamiki razvitiya mirovoy ekonomiki i Rossii [On a new methodology for long-term cyclical forecasting of the dynamics of development of the global economy and Russia]. Site http: //socmodel.com/ (In Russian) [167] Pantin V. I., Lapkin V.V. Volny politicheskoy modernizatsii v istorii Rossii [Waves of Political Modernization in Russia's History]. Polis, 1998, No. 2, p. 42. (In Russian) [168] Pantin V. I. Research note Naibolee veroyatnyy prognoz razvitiya politicheskikh i voennykh konfliktov v period 2014-2018 gg. [The most probable forecast for the development of political and military conflicts in the period 2014-2018]. June 2014. Published in newsdon.info on July 12, 2014. (In Russian) [169] Ibid. [170] Thus, an influential Iraqi electronic newspaper Alephia named three high-ranking Iraqi military officers, who in its opinion were bribed by the U.S. and ensured the fall of Baghdad and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. Among them was a relative of Hussein Abdurrahman al-Tikriti, who already before the war had begun to report to the U.S. the movements of the Baghdad regime leaders, including the president and his eldest son Uday Hussein, who commanded the Fedayeen Saddam; a Hussein's personal security officer, whose name was not reported, tipped the U.S. about the meeting of the leaders in the presidential complex on the night of March 19-20, as well as in the house in the Al-Mansur area on the night of April 7 (the U.S. inflicted massive strikes on both sites); a nephew of the former president, Lieutenant General Maher Sufyan at-Tikriti, who as commander of the 100, 000-strong Republican Guard that defended Baghdad made a deal with the U.S. that the Republican Guard would not participate in the fighting. [171] Engdahl W.F. Seeds of Destruction. Global Research, 2007. (Russ. ed.: Semena razrusheniya. Moscow, Selado Publ., 2015). [172] Frolov A. Chastnye voennye kompanii SShA [The U.S. private military companies]. War and Peace, October 9, 2008. (In Russian) [173] Chiesa G. Invece della catastrofe. Piemme Publ., 2013. (Russ. ed.: Chto vmesto katastrofy. Tribuna Publ., 2014). [174] Glazyev S. Uroki ocherednoy rossiyskoy revolyutsii: krakh liberalnoy utopii i shans na ekonomicheskoe chudo [Lessons of the next Russian revolution: the collapse of liberal utopia and the chance of an economic miracle]. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 2011. (In Russian) [175] Voprosy optimalnogo planirovaniya i upravleniya ekonomikoy [Issues of optimal planning and management of the economy]. A series of monographs. Moscow, the Central Economic Mathematical Institute, Nauka Publ., 1983-1986. (In Russian) [176] Glazyev S. Teoriya dolgosrochnogo tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya [The theory of long-term technical and economic development]. Moscow, VlaDar Publ., 1993. (In Russian) [177] Richard G. Nelson, Sidney G. Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard University Press, 2002. [178] Perez C. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital. Edward Elgar Publ., 2002. [179] Giovanni Arrighi. The long twentieth century. London, Verso, 1994 (Russ. ed.: Dolgiy dvadtsatyy vek. Moscow, Territoriya Budushchego Publ., 2006). [180] Tsekhanskaya K. Amerikanskiy messianizm–dukhovnaya sila globalizma [American Messianism–the spiritual force of globalism]. National Strategy Issues, No. 1 (28), 2015. (In Russian) [181] Kostyukov A. Odinochestvo mysli: beseda s doktorom filosofii Aleksandrom Zinovyevym [Loneliness of thought: a conversation with the doctor of philosophy Alexander Zinoviev]. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2002, No. 232. (In Russian) [182] Narochnitskaya N. Rossiya i russkie v mirovoy istorii [Russia and the Russians in world history]. Moscow, International Relations Publ., 2003, p. 518. (In Russian). [183] Ibid. [184] A. Utkin. Udar amerikanskikh bogov [The strike of the American gods]. Moscow, Algoritm Publ., 2006, p. 9. (In Russian) [185] Ibid. [186] Thus, the root of the word dispensatio is translated from Greek as " management, " from Latin, as " providence, " from English, as " epoch." Dispensationalism is a system of premillennialist views on the end of time that originated in England within the Plymouth Brotherhood movement in the 1930s. Its founder was the Anglican priest J.N. Darby. [187] The Bible commented by the Protestant theologian C. Scofield (first published in 1909) is the main apologetic source of dispensationalists. [188] https: //obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony [189] Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard. Basic Books, 1997. (Russ. ed.: Velikaya shakhmatnaya doska. Moscow, International Relations Publ., 1998). [190] Brzezinski Z. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. Basic Books, 2005. (Russ. ed.: Mirovoe gospodstvo ili globalnoe liderstvo. International Relations Publ., 2005). [191] Tsekhanskaya K. Amerikanskiy messianizm–dukhovnaya sila globalizma [American Messianism–the spiritual force of globalism]. National Strategy Issues, No. 1 (28), 2015. (In Russian) [192] A. Utkin. Udar amerikanskikh bogov [The strike of the American gods]. Moscow, Algoritm Publ., 2006. (In Russian) [193] Sergeitsev T. Padenie mirovoy sverkhvlasti: krymskiy rubezh [Downfall of the world superpower: the Crimean frontier]. Odnako, June-July 2014 (174). (In Russian) [194] Glazyev S. Sotsialisticheskiy otvet liberalnoy globalizatsii [A socialist reply to liberal globalization]. APN, 2006. (In Russian) [195] Glazyev S. O mezhdunarodnoy initsiative dlya G20 po razrabotke sistemy zashchity Zemli ot kosmicheskikh ugroz [On the international initiative for the G20 to develop a system to protect the Earth from space threats]. Research note, 2013. (In Russian) [196] Sergeitsev T. Padenie mirovoy sverkhvlasti: krymskiy rubezh [Downfall of the world superpower: the Crimean frontier]. Odnako, June-July 2014 (174). (In Russian). [197] Ibid. [198] Ibid. [199] Glazyev S. Ukraina v istoricheskoy rasshcheline [Ukraine in the crevice of history]. An interview to the media outlet News Front on May 19, 2015. (In Russian) [200] Moment istiny: Rossiya i sanktsii Zapada [Moment of truth: Russia and sanctions of the West]. A report of the Izborsk Club under academic supervision of S. Glazyev. Published on June 24, 2014. (In Russian) [201] Glazyev S., Lokosov V. Otsenka predelno kriticheskikh znacheniy pokazateley sostoyaniya rossiyskogo obshchestva i ikh ispolzovanie v upravlenii sotsialno-ekonomicheskim razvitiem [Assessment of the critical threshold values of the indicators of the state of Russian society and their use in the socio-economic development management]. Economic and social changes: facts, trends, forecast. No. 4, vol. 22, 2012. (In Russian); Glazyev S. Za kriticheskoy chertoy. (O kontseptsii makroekonomicheskoy politiki v svete obespecheniya ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti strany) [Beyond the red line. (On the concept of macroeconomic policy in the light of ensuring the economic security of the country)]. Moscow, Russian Economic Journal, 1996. (In Russian) [202] Rimashevskaya N.M. Radikalnoe izmenenie negativnogo trenda zdorovya v Rossii [A radical change in the negative health trend in Russia]. Narodonaselenie, 2010, No. 1 (47). (In Russian) [203] Glazyev S. Y. Za kriticheskoy chertoy. (O kontseptsii makroekonomicheskoy politiki v svete obespecheniya ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti strany) [Beyond the red line. (On the concept of macroeconomic policy in the light of ensuring the economic security of the country)]. Moscow, Russian Economic Journal, 1996. (In Russian) [204] Senchagov V.K. (Ed.). Ekonomicheskaya bezopasnost Rossii [Economic security of Russia]. General coursebook, 2nd edition, Moscow, Delo Publ., 2005. (In Russian) [205] Rutkevich A.M. K.G. Yung o sovremennosti [K.G. Jung on modern times]. Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences, 1989, No. 8. (In Russian) [206] Dogan M. Legitimnost rezhimov i krizis doveriya [Legitimacy of regimes and confidence crisis]. Sociological Studies, 1994, No. 6. (In Russian) [207] Academician Petrakov N. Y. (Ed.). Modernizatsiya i ekonomicheskaya bezopasnost Rossii [Modernization and economic security of Russia]. Vol. 1. Moscow, Finance and Credit Publ., 2009. (In Russian) [208] Simchera V.M. Uspekhi, kotorykh net [Achievements that do not exist]. Zavtra, 2011, No. 21 (914). (In Russian) [209] Simchera V.M. Obnarodovana shokiruyushchaya pravda ob istinnom polozhenii del v Rossii [A shocking truth about the true state of affairs in Russia]. KM.ru, 2011. (In Russian) [210] Glazyev S.Y., Kharitonov V.V. (Eds.). Glazyev S.Y., Dementev V.Y., Elkin S.V. Nanotekhnologii kak klyuchevoy faktor novogo tekhnologicheskogo uklada v ekonomike [Nanotechnology as a key factor of the new technological paradigm in the economy]. Moscow, Trovant Publ., 2009. (In Russian) [211] Glazyev S.Y. Strategiya operezhayushchego razvitiya Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa [The strategy of Russia's outstripping development in the context of the global crisis]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2010. (In Russian) [212] Glazyev S.Y., Ivanter V.V., Makarov V.L. O strategii razvitiya ekonomiki Rossii [On the strategy for the development of the Russian economy]. Economics of Contemporary Russia, 2011, No. 3 (54). (In Russian) [213] Petrov Y. K formirovaniyu novoy ekonomicheskoy modeli: restriktsiya byudzhetnykh raskhodov ili povyshenie sobiraemosti nalogov? [About shaping a new economic model: restriction of budget expenditures or better fiscal performance? ] Russian Economic Journal, 2013, No. 4. (In Russian) [214] The data of all-Russian sociological research, conducted under the supervision of Academician G.V. Osipov, Associate Member V.L. Schultz and Doctor of Sociology V.V. Lokosov in the years 2007-2011. [215] Gorshkov M.K., Krumm R., Tikhonova N.E. (Eds.). O chem mechtayut rossiyane. Ideal i realnost [What do Russians dream about. Ideality and reality]. Moscow, Ves Mir Publ., 2013, p. 203. (In Russian) [216] In 2008, according to the calculations of the New Economic School, the " golden million" (approximately 0.7% of the population) received 30% of all income of the population. It should be noted that these estimates were made without taking into account the income from the growth in the value of capital assets and other income not reflected in Russian statistics. [217] On the Bank of Russia Key Rate. Information notice of the Press Service of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, July 25, 2014. (www.cbr.ru) [218] Glazyev S. Obucheniye rynku [Learning the market]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2004. (In Russian) [219] On the Bank of Russia Key Rate. Information notice of the Press Service of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, April 25, 2014. (www.cbr.ru) [220] Glazyev S. O praktichnosti kolichestvennoy teorii deneg, ili Skolko stoit dogmatizm denezhnykh vlastey [On practical validity of quantity theory of money, or How much does the dogmatism of monetary authorities cost]. Voprosy Economiki, 2008, No. 7. (In Russian) [221] Ershov M. Krizis 2008 goda: " moment istiny" dlya globalnoy ekonomiki i novye vozmozhnosti dlya Rossii [The crisis of 2008: the " hour of reckoning" for the global economy and new opportunities for Russia]. Voprosy Economiki, 2008, No. 12. (In Russian) [222] Glazyev S. O praktichnosti kolichestvennoy teorii deneg, ili Skolko stoit dogmatizm denezhnykh vlastey [On practical validity of quantity theory of money, or How much does the dogmatism of monetary authorities cost]. Voprosy Economiki, 2008, No. 7. (In Russian) [223] Glazyev S. Kudryavaya ekonomika [Frizzly economy]. Politicheskiy zhurnal, 2006. (In Russian) [224] Glazyev S. Obucheniye rynku [Learning the market]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2004. (In Russian) [225] Perkins J. Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. Berrett-Koehler Publ., 2004. (Russ. ed.: Ispoved ekonomicheskogo ubiytsy. Moscow, Pretext Publ., 2005) [226] Glazyev S. Tsentralnyy bank protiv promyshlennosti Rossii [Central Bank against Russian Industry]. Voprosy Economiki, 1998, No. 1, pp. 16-32; No. 2, pp. 37-50. (In Russian) [227] Annual Report of the Bank of Russia for 2013. (https: //www.cbr.ru/eng/publ/God/ar_2013_e.pdf) [228] Otyrba A., Kobyakov A. Kak pobezhdat v finansovykh voynakh [How to Win Financial Wars]. Odnako, June-July 2014 (174). (In Russian) [229] Glazyev S. (Science ed.). Strategicheskie predposylki modernizatsii i innovatsionnogo razvitiya rossiyskoy ekonomiki [Strategic prerequisites of modernization and innovative development of the Russian economy]. Moscow, State University of Management, 2014. (In Russian) [230] Ershov M. Krizis 2008 goda: " moment istiny" dlya globalnoy ekonomiki i novye vozmozhnosti dlya Rossii [The crisis of 2008: the " hour of reckoning" for the global economy and new opportunities for Russia]. Voprosy Economiki, 2008, No. 12. (In Russian) [231] Annual Report of the Bank of Russia for 2013. (https: //www.cbr.ru/eng/publ/God/ar_2013_e.pdf) [232] Bukina I.S., Manevich V.Е. (Eds.). Makroekonomicheskaya situatsiya i denezhno-finansovaya politika v Rossii [Macroeconomic situation and monetary and fiscal policy in Russia] Research report. Moscow, RAS Institute of Economy, 2013. (In Russian) [233] Annual Report of the Bank of Russia for 2013. (https: //www.cbr.ru/eng/publ/God/ar_2013_e.pdf) [234] Glazyev S. Tsentralnyy bank protiv promyshlennosti Rossii [Central Bank against Russian Industry]. Voprosy Economiki, 1998, No. 1, pp. 16-32; No. 2, pp. 37-50. (In Russian) [235] Glazyev S. Dollaropoklonniki [Dollar worshippers]. An interview. Zavtra, January 22, 2015. (In Russian) [236] Ershov M. Ob obespechenii valyutnoy stabilnosti i o novykh finansovykh mekhanizmakh v usloviyakh sanktsionnogo rezhima [Concerning Provision of Currency Stability and New Financial Mechanisms under Sanctions]. Russian Economic Journal, 2014, No. 5. (In Russian) [237] https: //www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/52/mcs100114 [238] World economic outlook update, January 2015. [239] Nekipelov A., Ivanter V., Glazyev S. (Eds.). Rossiya na puti k dinamichnoy sovremennoy i effektivnoy ekonomike [Russia on the way to the modern dynamic and efficient economy]. Report, 2014; O strategii razvitiya ekonomiki Rossii [On a strategy for steady development of the Russian economy]. Report of the RAS Section of Economics, 2011. (In Russian) [240] Ibid. [241] Glazyev S. Sanktsii SShA i politika Banka Rossii: dvoynoy udar po natsionalnoy ekonomike [Sanctions of the USA and the Policy of Bank of Russia: Double Blow to the National Economy]. Voprosy Economiki, 2014, No. 9. (In Russian) [242] Dmitrieva O. Yeshche raz ob izmenennom byudzhete-2009 i pravitelstvennoy antikrizisnoy programme [Once again on the amended 2009 budget and the government anti-crisis program]. Russian Economic Journal, 2009, No. 5. (In Russian) [243] Glazyev S. O targetirovanii inflyatsii [On inflation targeting]. Voprosy Economiki, 2015, No. 9. (In Russian) [244] Galbraith J. The New Industrial State. Princeton University Press, 1967; Buckingham W. Theoretical Economic Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Ronald Press Co, 1958; Bogomolov O. Razmyshleniya o nasushchnom [Reflections on the vital]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2003. (In Russian) [245] Ershov M. Ob obespechenii valyutnoy stabilnosti i o novykh finansovykh mekhanizmakh v usloviyakh sanktsionnogo rezhima [Concerning Provision of Currency Stability and New Financial Mechanisms under Sanctions]. Russian Economic Journal, 2014, No. 5. (In Russian) [246] Glazyev S., Lokosov V. Otsenka predelno kriticheskikh znacheniy pokazateley sostoyaniya rossiyskogo obshchestva i ikh ispolzovanie v upravlenii sotsialno-ekonomicheskim razvitiem [Assessment of the critical threshold values of the indicators of the state of Russian society and their use in the socio-economic development management]. Economic and social changes: facts, trends, forecast. No. 4, Vol. 22, 2012. (In Russian) [247] Integration Barometer, Centre for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank. Moscow, 2013, 2014 [248] In Kazakhstan, the Russian direction is comparably significant [249] Eliseev M. Yevraziyskoe prostranstvo: geoekonomicheskiy aspekt razvitiya [Eurasian space: geo-economic aspect of development]. Eurasian integration: economics, law, politics, 2013, No. 14. (In Russian) [250] Gumilyov L. Istoriko-filosofskie trudy knyazya N.S. Trubetskogo (zametki poslednego evraziytsa) [Historical and philosophical works of Prince N.S. Trubetskoy (notes of the last Eurasian)]. (In Russian) [251] Trubetskoy N.S. Istoriya. Kultura. Yazyk [History. Culture. Language]. Foreword by N.I. Tolstoy and L.N. Gumilyov. Preparation, text processing an comments by V.M. Zhivov; Austrian Academy of Sciences. Moscow, Progress-Univers Publ., 1995. (In Russian) [252] Published in the monthly digest of social co-thinking Socium, 1992, No. 5. (In Russian) [253] Podberezkin A., Borishpolets K., Podberezkina O. Yevraziya i Rossiya [Eurasia and Russia]. Moscow, 2013. (In Russian) [254] Zapesotskiy A. Rossiya mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom: novyy kontekst staroy diskussii (k voprosu o sovremennoy teorii i praktike evraziystva) [Russia between East and West: the new context of the old discussion (the issue of modern theory and practice of Eurasianism)]. Saint-Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2013. (In Russian) [255] Ibid. [256] Speech by Vladimir Putin at the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on October 24, 2013, Minsk. Official website of the President of the Russian Federation [257] Nysanbaev A., Kurmanbaev E. Yevraziyskaya ideya Chokana Valikhanova [The Eurasian idea of Chokan Valikhanov]. Eurasian Community, 1999. (In Russian) [258] Vinokurov E., Libman A. Dve evraziyskie integratsii. [Two Integration Processes in Eurasia]. Voprosy Economiki, 2013, No. 2. (In Russian) [259] Eliseev M. Yevraziyskoe prostranstvo: geoekonomicheskiy aspekt razvitiya [Eurasian space: geo-economic aspect of development]. Eurasian integration: economics, law, politics, 2013, No. 14. (In Russian) [260] Putin V. The new integration project for Eurasia–a future that is born today. Izvestiya, October 3, 2011. [261] Zapesotskiy A. Rossiya mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom: novyy kontekst staroy diskussii (k voprosu o sovremennoy teorii i praktike evraziystva) [Russia between East and West: the new context of the old discussion (the issue of modern theory and practice of Eurasianism)]. Saint-Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2013. (In Russian) [262] Vladimir Putin said, " As a concrete idea, the EU leadership was invited to study the possibility of forming a free trade area between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union created by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In any case, this is worth sparing a thought..." [263] Podberezkin A., Borishpolets K., Podberezkina O. Yevraziya i Rossiya [Eurasia and Russia]. Moscow, 2013. (In Russian) [264] Putin's speech at the plenary session of the Valdai Club, September 21, 2013. [265] Glazyev S. Yevraziyskaya integratsiya kak klyuchevoe napravlenie sovremennoy politiki Rossii [Eurasian integration as a key direction of Russia's current policy]. The Izborsk Club Journal, 2014, No. 1. (In Russian) [266] Glazyev S., Klotsvog F. Perspektivy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya SNG pri integratsionnom i inertsionnom stsenariyakh vzaimodeystviya stran-uchastnits [Prospects for the economic development of the CIS under the integration and inertial scenarios of the interaction between its member countries]. Russian Economic Journal, 2008, No. 7-8. (In Russian) [267] Glazyev S.Y. Strategiya operezhayushchego razvitiya Rossii v usloviyakh globalnogo krizisa [The strategy of Russia's outstripping development in the context of the global crisis]. Moscow, Economika Publ., 2010. (In Russian) [268] Otsenka perspektiv i ekonomicheskogo effekta ot integratsionnogo sotrudnichestva v ramkakh Tamozhennogo soyuza (TS) YevrAzES i Yedinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva (YeEP) Rossii, Belorussii i Kazakhstana, v tom chisle s uchetom zarubezhnogo opyta v etoy sfere i vozmozhnogo prisoedineniya novykh gosudarstv uchastnikov k TS i YeEP [Assessment of prospects and economic benefits of integration cooperation within the framework of the Customs Union (CU), EurAsEC and the Single Economic Space (SES) of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, taking into account the foreign experience in this area and the possible accession of new member states to the CU and EEU]. Research project report under supervision of K. Borishpolets. MGIMO, 2011. (In Russian) [269] Technological cooperation and the improvement of competitiveness in the SES. Report of the Eurasian Development Bank’s Centre for Integration Studies No. 10, 2013. [270] Based on the sources of the RAS Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, MGIMO and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. [271] Ibid. [272] On December 6, 2012, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in Dublin, " There is a move to re-Sovietise the region. It’s not going to be called that. It’s going to be called a customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that. But let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it." [273] Glazyev S. Yevraziyskaya integratsiya kak klyuchevoe napravlenie sovremennoy politiki Rossii [Eurasian integration as a key direction of Russia's current policy]. The Izborsk Club Journal, 2014, No. 1. (In Russian) [274] Ibid. [275] The distribution of votes among members of the EU varies. The 28th member of the European Union was Croatia, which has one representative in the European Council (7 votes). At the same time, Germany and France have 29 votes each. Associated members do not have any representation in the supranational body. [276] S. Glazyev. Uroki ocherednoy rossiyskoy revolyutsii: krakh liberalnoy utopii i shans na ekonomicheskoe chudo [Lessons of the next Russian revolution: the collapse of liberal utopia and the chance of an economic miracle]. Moscow, Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, 2011. (In Russian) [277] Glazyev S.Y. Mif MVF o spasenii Ukrainy [Myth of the IMF about the rescue of Ukraine]. 03.06.2014. (In Russian) [278] According to the NBU as of 01.01.2015. [279] According to the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine as of 31.03.2015. [280] According to the NBU as of 01.01.2015. [281] Calculated based on the country's balance of payments. [282] This calculation does not consider the scenario of Ukraine's full-fledged accession to the EU by 2020. [283] An estimate of economic effects for the Ukrainian economy within various options of integration processes between Ukraine, the EU and SES (the increase in indicators to the base option that does not provide for changes in the current situation, %) [284] Glazyev S.Y. Mif MVF O Spasenii Ukrainy [Myth of the IMF about the rescue of Ukraine]. 03.06.2014. (In Russian) Official website of Glazyev S.Y.: https: //glazev.ru/articles/6-jekonomika/54461-mif-mvf-o-spasenii-ukrainy [285] Economic and Technological Cooperation in View of Sectors of the EEA and Ukraine. A study by the RAS Institute for National Economic Forecasts and the RASU Institute of Economics and Forecasting with the support of the Eurasian Development Bank, 2014. [286] Rumyantsev O. Pretsedent Respubliki Serbskoy (v sostave Bosnii i Gertsegoviny) i perspektivy ego ispolzovaniya [The precedent of Republika Srpska (as part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the prospects for its use]. July 2014. (In Russian) [287] The document adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, defines from the international legal point of view the phenomenon of genocide, the acts qualifying as genocide, and measures to prevent and punish genocide. [288] Secession (Latin secessio–leaving, secedo–I leave) means departure from the state (federal, as a rule) of any its part (usually a constituent entity of the federation). It is the result of separatism and antonym of annexation. The term in this sense appeared during the U.S. War of Independence. The right to secession can be recognized by the law of the state from which the departure occurs (for example, the USSR Constitution of 1924, 1936 and 1977, or not recognized (for example, the SFRY Constitution). In the second case, the attempts of secession entail a legal issue of whether the state territorial integrity principle or the people's right to self-determination should be applied (international law unconditionally gives priority to the right to self-determination in the case of colonies). In the UK and Canada, for the independence of historical parts, colonial and dependent territories, it is sufficient to hold a referendum and support the secession by a majority vote. Although the referendums that took place (1980, 1995, 2014) did not yield a positive result, Quebec and Scotland, where the number of secession supporters grows, have a close opportunity to gain independence. Similar rights can theoretically be used by other parts of Great Britain–England, Northern Ireland and Wales. The U.S. law does not stipulate (yet does not prohibit) secession of states. However, for the independence of the associated Puerto Rico and a number of Pacific islands, the relevant referendum result is sufficient, although their residents did not express such a will. [289] White Book on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Eds. 1-3), 2014. |
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Fig. 21 illustrates the flows of the Ukrainian balance of payments. The most significant is the imbalance of foreign trade in goods and services, which amount to 8.5% of GDP. In the medium term, it will deteriorate due to the curtailment of trade with Russia.
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