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Validity of knowledge in the comprehension



The same knowledge that reveals the first knowledge reveals the validity of this knowledge.251 Thus, when a knower has an experience such as ‘I know the pitcher’, at the same time he also knows that that knowledge he possesses about the pitcher is valid. This is known as the self-validity of knowledge at the point of its revelation. This conclusion may appear inconsistent, as knowledge sometimes grasps even an error. The answer is that knowledge whose validity is under consideration is intended here as a cognition involving a mental mode. On the other hand, error is a mode of avidya. Thus, from this standpoint, error is not knowledge at all. Hence, the question of its validity does not arise. That, knowledge in this context refers to the cognition generated only by a valid mental mode, is borne out by the fact that such knowledge is taken here to be contradictory to ignorance.252 Knowledge, which is contradictory to error, cannot be error itself.

An objection may be raised that if an error is not knowledge, then how can such an undeniable experience as ‘I have an illusory knowledge’ be justified? Such an experience unmistakably shows that error is also a form of knowledge. Madhusudana meets the question in the following way: In the case of the error, ‘this is silver’ (‘idam rajatam’) there are two vrttis, one is the mental mode embracing ‘this’ (idam) and the other, avidya-vrtti, embracing ‘silver’ (rajatam). The avidya-vrtti embracing ‘silver’becomes falsely identified with the mental-vrtti embracing ‘this’. The character of knowledge (jñ anatva) that exists in mentalvrtti is falsely ascribed to avidya-vrtti. Thus avidya-vrtti is not knowledge by itself, merely a semblance of knowledge (jñ anabhasa).253

As stated previously, the question of self-validity of knowledge is a real one when knowledge is taken to mean mental-vrtti. The same question might be taken to be relevant when knowledge is recognised to be consciousness and not merely a mental-vrtti. The answer is that knowledge as consciousness (caitanya) is neither produced nor known, so the question of the self-validity of that knowledge, both in its origin (utpatti) and its comprehension (jñ apti), does not arise. For such a question to be allowed at all, the answer should be formulated in terms of vrtti, which serves as a condition of consciousness and which entertains the question of validity in the light stated earlier. The self-validity of such vrttiknowledge in its comprehension is revealed in the knowledge of saksi, in the sense that every object, consciously or unconsciously, is revealed to the saksi (sarvam vastu jñ atataya ajñ atataya va saksi-bhasyam). But the knowledge of saksi does not make its object known to the cognising jiva. Thus, even though the validity of knowledge is revealed to the saksi, along with that knowledge itself, the true identity of knowledge remains unknown to the cognising jiva. In this way, such knowledge remains valid, inasmuch as it presents an unknown object to the jiva.


4

BRAHMAN

The chapter on knowledge and epistemology introduces the binary division of the world of experience; these are drk, perceiver and drfya, perceived. Brahman as the pure consciousness comes within the first category and so do other forms of consciousness empirically conceived to explain the world and its experience. These are God (Ifvara), the creator and the saviour; Saksi, totally passive but omniscient consciousness who reveals every phenomenon; and finally, the individual person who is the subject of every perception. The second category is the phenomenal world that forms the content of an individual’s perceptions.

At the top of the first category is Brahman, the totally transcendent, unqualified and unchangeable consciousness – for Advaita-vedanta the unique reality. For these reasons other forms of consciousness had to be devised. Behind the variegated world stands Brahman, the Absolute Being. Philosophy is the relentless pursuit of truth, and truth, according to the Advaita-vedanta, is Brahman. Thus knowledge of Brahman is the main subject taught in Advaita-vedanta. The truth or reality is absolute and one, infinite and indeterminate. That which ‘is’ must always be. Existence is absolutely unlimited by any condition. Therefore, Brahman as truth is completely free from any limitation (pariccheda) imposed by time (kala), space (defa) or matter (vastu). As any kind of limit spoils the absoluteness of reality, the universe, full of limitations, is held to be unreal. This is also the case with individual selves. As avidya’s creation, they become subjected to the limitation of time, space and matter. Being themselves created by Brahman these phases cannot limit Brahman. Absolute Brahman is the root cause of the entire creation and the ground upon which the structure of the universe stands. Brahman is the creator, the sustainer and the re-absorber of the multitudinous universe in so far as Brahman is the locus of avidya, which causes these activities. When avidya is active, pure Brahman is designated God (Ifvara).

Brahman, as God (Ifvara), the designer, the origin and the controller of this universe, is conceived of as transcendental as well as immanent. Underlying this phenomenal world, Brahman exists as the very essence of its existence. It provides the illusion of existence to the non-existent universe; but that does not mean that Brahman is exhausted in the universe. While enduring through the universe, Brahman transcends it at the same time. The very name ‘Brahman’ suggests its pervasiveness, its immense reach, whereas the universe is small and inadequate. The essence of Brahman is its oneness and its nature of Absolute Existence, Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Bliss.

At the time of Madhusudana Sarasvati, Brahman’s nature as existence and knowledge was already established. The only questions were whether this existence was unique and absolute and whether Brahman could also be regarded as Bliss. This concerned mainly the dualist followers of bhakti theology. Vyasaraja, the great scholar of Madhva school of Vaisjavas, attacked the Advaita concept of the unqualified Brahman with particular vehemence. With great polemical skill he refuted this view of identity of Brahman with the world of conscious and unconscious beings and established the real difference (bheda) between Brahman and the individuals, on one hand, and with other worldly phenomena, on the other. Madhusudana answered each point made by Vyasaraja and refuted this with formal style of argumentation.255 As both Vyasaraja and Madhusudana followed the contemporary neo-logicians’ style, I have presented here these arguments in somewhat detailed form. Madhusudana, therefore, starts with the proposition that Brahman is the reality without a second and is the culmination of Bliss.256 The pressing demand of the Vaisjavas at that time was the establishment of the reality of the individual selves and of the outer world. They also stressed the blissfulness of the divine communion between God/Brahman and the individual self as God’s devotee. To refute this dualistic theory of devotion cherished by the Vaisjavas and the qualified nature of Brahman, which they held as the highest truth, required great polemical skill and deep knowledge in religious and philosophical fastras.

Madhusudana argues that the true nature of Brahman can be known from the scriptures alone because the limited knowledge of the individual fails to comprehend the unlimited and unqualified nature of Brahman, the Absolute.257 The scripture describes Brahman as the omniscient consciousness, unique and unqualified (saksi ceta kevalo nirgujafca).258 All but one of these features show the real nature of Brahman, with omniscience (Saksi) held to be only an incidental quality (tatastha laksaja). Thus the idea of the qualified Brahman is negated.

The contention of the Vaisjavas, with their faith in the qualified Brahman as the highest truth, is that because scripture promotes worship of the self – (atmetyevopasita)259, any texts260 depicting the self to be unqualified and so forth has only a subordinate significance (arthavada). Therefore, these latter scriptural texts aim only to praise the self and have nothing to teach. On the other hand, there are several scriptural texts that establish the qualified nature of Brahman. For example, the scripture asserts that Brahman possesses great attributes – ‘brhanto-’sya dharmah’. Vedic passages describing Brahman as attributeless are then ancillary to the passages confirming Brahman’s qualified nature. It is therefore inadmissible that the texts depicting qualified Brahman should be discarded in favour of those describing Brahman as unqualified and without attributes. Passages such as ‘ya atma’pahatapapma...satyakamah satyasaÅ kalpa so’nves tavyah ca vijijñ asitavya261 clearly show that Brahman does possess real attributes. The scripture states that these qualities are eternal virtues of Brahman. Vedic texts, stating that ‘the knowledge of Supreme self is eternal, the activity is eternal and its strength is also eternal (jñ anam nityam kriya nitya balam nityam paratmanah)’, clearly establish the eternity of Brahman’s qualities. The scripture emphasises that such qualities cannot be conditional (aupadhika) because knowledge, activity and strength are natural to Brahman.262 Passages depicting Brahman as one or identical with the individual self263 or positing that the universe is false264 should be taken as just hypothesis offered only to be refuted. So that the assertion that Brahman is ‘not without attribute’ etc. become understandable in the light of these passages. Statements contained in Vedic literature, such as ‘in the beginning it was indeed nonexistent’, ‘asad va idamagra asit’ and ‘the two birds...’, ‘dva suparja265 establish the following:

1 The reality of the universe.

2 The negation of absolute Brahman by denying its reality.

3 The difference between Brahman and the individual self by negating their identity.

Therefore, in order to introduce the positive counterparts of these negations, the fruti must describe them. Thus, by the statement ‘neha nanasti kiñ cana266 the fruti first lays down the falsity of the universe, then negates it by stating – ‘Vifvam satyam’. Likewise, the fruti first describes absolute Brahman – ‘satyam jñ anamanantam Brahma’– only to negate it by the statement, ‘asadevedam’. The relationship between jiva and Brahman is posited in the fruti as ‘tat tvam asi’ in order to negate it in ‘dva suparja’. Therefore, passages such as ‘neha nanasti, ‘tat tvamasi’ or ‘satyam jñ anam’, should not be taken at face value. In fact, the fruti always stresses meditation, upasana, even of the unqualified.267 Vacaspati also maintains that the Supreme self is suitable for dhyana, that is meditation and that is, upasana.268

Thus the fruti has chosen the qualified Brahman as real and eternal. Indeed, unless Brahman is regarded as qualified there cannot be any enquiry about it, as an enquiry presupposes a subject matter describable in terms of attributes (idamittham). Thus even in the face of the conception of unqualified Brahman as depicted in some Vedic texts, the qualified Brahman is the purport of the scripture. Here ends the opponent’s objections.

The non-dualist’s answers to these arguments are as follows: The Vedic passages such as ‘brhanto’sya dharmah’, when referring to the qualified Brahman, are for the purpose of upasana only, as it is seen conducive to arrive at the self-realisation that is mukti. Vacaspati also meant that, as his commentator, the author of the Kalpataru explains, ‘people who are slow to realize the supreme Brahman, first prepare their minds by the upasana of the qualified Brahman. Thus when their minds become purified, therein is revealed the real self of absolute Brahman, devoid of all limitations’.269 Evidently the qualified Brahman, as described by the fruti, must be regarded as possessing conditional reality, while absolute Brahman is unconditional and absolute. However, this is not apparent in the following passages taken from two particular fruti: ‘sadeva saumya idamagra asit270 and ‘asad va idamagra asit’.271 In each case the word idam refers to the universe, meaning that before creation the universe was identical to the ultimate and unmanifest reality; thus although manifested after the creation, the universe is unreal. Therefore, the frutis cannot mean that both qualified Brahman and unqualified Brahman are ultimately real. To avoid mutual contradiction within the frutis272 Madhusudana concludes that qualified Brahman possesses empirical reality whereas unqualified and unlimited Brahman has absolute reality. Therefore, frutis such as ‘brhanto’sya dharmah’and ‘kevalo nirgujafca’cannot be condemned as communicating contradictory theories. As for the fruti establishing the eternality of Brahman’s knowledge, strength and activity (as in ‘jñ anam nityam’, for example), the knowledge of Brahman forms the very core of Brahman, thus it is identical with Brahman. The eternality of Brahman’s strength and activity is stated only figuratively because these attributes are not ultimately real. They are said to be eternal inasmuch as they persist until the dawning of ultimate realisation of the true self. Hence, empirically they are eternal, because so long as the concept of time exists, they also exist.

The opponents of this theory contend that:

1 The fruti, ‘neha nanasti kiñ cana, ’ do not establish the falsity of the universe, but merely supply the positive counterpart (abhava pratiyogin) of the negation of falsity of the universe purported by the fruti ‘vifvam satyam’.

2 The fruti tat tvam asi’ instead of testifying the identity between jiva and Brahman merely provides the positive counterpart, which is negated in the fruti, ‘dva suparja’.

3 The fruti, ‘satyam jñ anam’ does not evince the validity of the absolute Brahman. It only supplies the positive counterpart that which is negated in the fruti asadeva idamagra asit’.273

Madhusudana answers these criticisms by stating that the frutis such as ‘all these are just Brahman’ (Brahmaivedam sarvam)274 and ‘neha nanasti kiñ cana’ establish the falsity of the universe, demonstrating that the frutis are inclined towards the view that the world is not real. Moreover, ‘vifvam satyam’ is not a negative statement therefore it is unnecessary to put forward a positive counterpart to it.

The same can be said for ‘dva suparja’, where again the frutis, for example ‘tat tvam asi’, 275 and ‘aham Brahmasmi’, 276 establish the idea that jiva and Brahman are identical. Therefore, the meaning of ‘dva suparja’ cannot be the duality of jiva and Brahman. Moreover, Madhusudana mentions that the ‘PaiÅ gi-rahasya-Brahmaja277 explains the fruti dva suparja’ as positing the difference between the mind (buddhi) and jiva.

The third point made by his opponents is that the theory of the non-existent Brahman does not stand up to scrutiny, as no fruti has ever established this fact.

For example, ‘sarvam khalvidam Brahma278 states that Brahman is the locus of the universe. An unreal thing cannot be the locus of any object. It should therefore be acknowledged that frutis such as ‘asadevedam agra asit’ do not convey the idea of Brahman’s non-existence. These frutis merely inform that before its origination the universe was implicit in Brahman. It is therefore incorrect to consider that the fruti kevalo nirgujafca’, 279 which establish Brahman’s unqualified nature, is not authoritative.

The attributes described by frutis such as ‘brhanto’sya dharmah’ or ‘parasya faktirvividhaiva fruyate’in the context of Brahman, are merely pragmatic and the frutis describe them only for the purposes of negating them against Brahman. When the fruti describes a false object as false it cannot be unauthentic for saying so. When the fruti states that Brahman’s knowledge, activity and strength are ‘natural’to it (svabhavikijñ anabala kriya ca) it does not mean that these qualities are innate within it. The fruti conveys only the idea that while knowledge of jiva is accidental, it is a permanent feature within Brahman so long as ajñ ana exists. For the knowledge of Brahman is its omniscience which, being a modification of ajñ ana, is co-existent with the latter. It cannot be said that through association with false omniscience, Brahman also becomes false. Although Brahman is associated with false omniscience, still it may be real. Two realities of differing degrees can remain side by side without affecting each other by their respective peculiarities. Brahman and its omniscience mutually differ in that while omniscience is liable to negation, Brahman is not. Moreover, it must be noted that the fruti yah sarvajñ ah280 refers only to the quality of omniscience, and does not establish its reality as well.281 The nirguja fruti, ‘kebalo nirgujafca’, claims supremacy over the saguja fruti, namely, ‘brhanto’sya dharmah’ inasmuch as it conveys the absolute truth and is the only means for the attainment of the ultimate knowledge of Brahman.

Nevertheless, the sagjna frutis should not be regarded as valueless. As I have stated elsewhere, they are meant for upasana or meditative worship, which requires a qualified object. The unqualified is beyond the reach of upasana. Upasana of the unqualified Brahman282 is but knowledge in the form of deep meditation. Referring to Kalpataru’s remark quoted above, 283 the object of upasana is Brahman as symbolised in , consisting of three syllables, a, u and m. Therefore, the statement in Bhamati does not go against the contention of the Advaitins, namely that only the nirguja Brahman is the purport of the entire

Vedanta literature. The knowledge of the nirguja Brahman brings absolute bliss, the salvation from and the cessation of worldly bondage and sorrow. The upasana of the saguja Brahman cannot bring ultimate salvation, which comes only when Brahman is revealed as the absolute, unconditional and unqualified reality, that is, when complete identity is established between jiva and Brahman. The salvation that can be attained by the upasana of the qualified Brahman is only relative (avantara).284 Upasana makes the mind of the worshipper fit for receiving the final knowledge derived from the great Vedic statements such as ‘tat tvam asi’ and ‘aham Brahmasmi’. However, the unqualified nature of Brahman does not make it unsuitable as an object of discussion, for that purpose can be served by assuming false qualities in Brahman.285 Likewise, absolute Brahman is completely formless.

Even though the fruti sometimes describes Brahman as having thousands of limbs and other characteristics peculiar to the body, 286 they are used only figuratively, either to express Brahman’s all-pervasiveness or to indicate its self-luminous nature. The fruti seeks to establish the reality of Brahman so their emphasis is on Brahman alone, while all other things are described insofar as they corroborate that idea. When the scripture287 observes that Brahman must be visualised, stress is laid on the revelation of Brahman and not on the reality of the form of Brahman. The notion of any form of Brahman is against the doctrine of the

Vedanta as held by the FaÅ kara’s school, since the very idea places a limitation on Brahman and accordingly its absolute nature is nullified. The idea of a particular form is necessary only for the purposes of upasana and the utility of upasana lies in the purification of the worshipper’s mind.

However, the necessity for a qualified Brahman does not end here. Illogical as Brahman the Absolute is, it naturally violates all ideas that come under the umbrella of logic. It is the logical mind that prompts human beings to seek an explanation of this creation and its cause. Where does the universe come from? What is its material cause? On whom are we to bestow its efficient causality? If Brahman is to be regarded as the substratum of everything and the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, 288 then how can it remain unqualified? Whenever Brahman is described in relation to the universe, it becomes qualified by that relationship. Thus the qualified Brahman is to be looked upon as both the material and efficient cause of the universe. According to Madhusudana, Brahman is the material cause of the universe, being the substratum of the ignorance that transforms into the universe. In fact, according to Madhusudana, Brahman is the material cause of the universe insofar as, being the locus of avidya, it is responsible for the world illusion.289 As the object of avidya, Brahman no longer remains unqualified, but serves as the material cause by becoming the reservoir in which the universe is created.290 Hence, the qualified Brahman can be regarded as the material cause. The text ‘He who is omniscient’ (yah sarvajñ ah)291 may be considered in this connection, wherein it is also indicated that the omniscient God is the creator of the universe. This omniscient God is no other than Brahman itself in its qualified condition. Likewise, Brahman may be regarded as the efficient cause insofar as Brahman created the universe with a desire to create it. Brahmananda defines efficient cause as that possessing the knowledge conducive to the generation of the effect.292 That is why the scriptural text mentioned above states that Brahman, as omniscient, created the universe.293 Thus the concept of the qualified Brahman is not regarded as completely worthless. This qualified Brahman is, however, none other than the Absolute viewed as such as long as the creation persists. When the universe is no more, the Absolute Brahman is revealed as unqualified. Just as maya or avidya is beginningless, so is the qualified Brahman. So long as avidya exists, the qualified Brahman, as the locus294 of avidya, must also exist. When this avidya ceases to exist, the unqualified Brahman shines in its pristine glory as Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Bliss and unique, divorced from all kinds of duality. This is salvation.


Brahman as knowledge

Unlike the Naiyayikas, the FaÅ kara’s school contends that knowledge is not a special attribute of Brahman, since that conception leaves room for duality. At the same time, however, the reality of knowledge cannot be denied, because the ultimate goal of humans is to achieve a state of consciousness of absolute, unceasing blissfulness or anandatva.295 Therefore, at the time of self-realisation, when an individual completely identifies himself with Brahman, consciousness and bliss must be recognised as existing. That is why the scripture describes them as constituting the very nature of Brahman.296 So what sort of knowledge includes self-realisation? Madhusudana explains knowledge as that which reveals objects.297 However, Vyasaraja contends that at the time of salvation, when all objects have vanished, knowledge, if any, has to remain without an object, thus negating Madhusudana’s definition. Brahman by itself cannot be regarded as serving as the object of knowledge, for knowledge, according to the Advaita school, is the essence of Brahman and so Brahman cannot become its own object. Madhusudana replies that knowledge reveals an object in the sense that such knowledge leads to the practical usage of that object; for example, the use of a pitcher is based on the revelation of the object in the mind of the speaker. Thus, knowledge is characterised by this revelation. Revelation is consciousness reflected on a mental mode (citta vrtti), which dispels the ignorance of the cogniser regarding the existence of that object. Knowledge, therefore, is consciousness, limited by a mental mode. In other words, knowledge is nothing but Brahman conditioned by a vrtti. Such a mental mode may embrace an object or it may embrace pure Brahman. In this way, knowledge of Brahman is possible. It then follows that knowledge in order to maintain its character, need not always be associated with an object. It is sufficient to say that it occasionally reveals an object but certainly not always. Therefore, in the state of salvation, knowledge may exist without an object as its content.298

It should be noted here that Brahman is not affected by the result of knowledge

(phalavyapyatva). The meaning of phalavyapyatva is the nature of being pervaded by the result (phala) of vrtti-jñ ana. Such a result is the revelation of the object of vrtti-jñ ana.299 Unconscious objects await such a result for their revelation. Brahman, being self-revealed, does not need the help of such a result to reveal itself. However, vrtti-jñ ana is essential for the removal of ajñ ana, which covers the real nature of Brahman from jiva. Hence, vrtti-jñ ana may embrace Brahman, but the result of such vrtti-jñ ana cannot.

Brahman as bliss

Bliss is also Brahman’s essence. This means that Brahman is the object of unconditional desire.300 According to Brahmananda, 301 this means that bliss is sought for its own sake. Even though, from the ultimate viewpoint, both knowledge and bliss are identical, both words are used in the frutis302 on the presupposition of two apparently different characteristics, blissfulness, (anandatva) and being of the nature of knowledge, (jñ anatva). In order to avoid attaching any positive attribute to Brahman the non-dualist explains these two essential characteristics of Brahman in a negative way. They are explained to be contradictions of the very lack of blissfulness and not being essentially ignorant, niranandatva and ajñ anatva, respectively. Brahman is knowledge and bliss and so it is distinct from the world that consists of ignorance and suffering. Thus it becomes clear that the two words are semantically different, although the object indicated by them is one and the same – Brahman. Hence, when both words are used in the context of Brahman, they are not mere repetitions. Being only indicatory marks (upalaksaja), however, they do not make Brahman qualified.303 Brahman therefore is bliss insofar as it is the state of unconditional desirability. That essence of Brahman is indicated by the word ‘desirability’(paramapremaspadatvam), 304 and as this essence is experienced at the time of liberation, liberation is also bliss.305

Brahman, as existence, knowledge and bliss, is regarded as being absolute and eternal. It is one, devoid of all kinds of duality. The fruti na tu taddvitiyamasti306 states that Brahman is without a second. This means that Brahman is marked (upalaksita) by the absence of a second. It may be contended that if this absence of a second is regarded as real, then this very absence becomes a second to Brahman. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as unreal then Brahman cannot claim to be without a second because of the presence of the universe.307 Madhusudana avoids this dilemma by accepting the view of the Prabhakara school of MimaÅ sa, that the absence of a thing is the same as the substratum of that absence. For instance, the absence of a pot on the earth is nothing other than the earth itself; so also the absence of a second in Brahman is real because such an absence amounts to Brahman, the substratum of the absence. However, Madhusudana also justifies the absence of a second in Brahman even when the absence of a second is regarded as different from Brahman, its substratum. He observes that the reality of the absence of a second does not enforce reality on its positive counterpart as well. The counterpart can be the object of real negation just as a dream object is negated when the dream gives way to waking states.308 The main purpose of the scripture is to establish the reality of Brahman, as indicated by the absence of a second, ‘dvitiyabhava’. In order to establish this reality the empirical reality of all worldly objects is accepted for the purpose of negation. Empirical objects may indicate the absolute, and for this purpose they need not possess the same degree of reality as possessed by Brahman indicated by them.


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