Jiva is not a part of Brahman

Ramanuja and his school of Vaisjavas hold that the jiva is a part of the self of Brahman, another part being the universe. The doctrine purports that Brahman is the whole, having the universe and jiva as integral parts; this is known as ‘Vifistadvaita vada’. The idea is confirmed by several texts from the fruti and other religious texts of authority. For instance one may cite Vedic statements like: ‘one quarter of him (Brahman’s) comprises of the universe and the selves...’ (‘pado’sya sarva bhutani’)³⁶³; ‘In this world my own part has become the eternal jiva’ (mamaivaÅ fo jiva-loke jivabhutahsanatanah), ³⁶⁴ and so on. In order to refute this theory, Madhusudana proves that these scriptural quotations in fact depict identity. The jivas cannot be component parts of Brahman. As Brahman is beginningless, limited jiva cannot be regarded as the fragments that construct its whole being; nor can they be the dividing parts, because Brahman is indivisible. The conception of the part and the whole invariably refers to a form. Brahman, having no form, cannot be conceived in terms of the part and the whole. As Brahman is devoid of any parts, its parts, if any, have to be imagined. It is ignorance that produces the concept of false limitation. For example, though space is unlimited, one falsely imagines it to be limited by objects that sometimes enclose the space. The space inside a water jug is not really a part of the unlimited space; because, when the jug is full of water the space inside it becomes just the great space. Therefore, when the sacred scripture states that jiva is part of Brahman, the word ‘part’ is not to be understood in its literal sense. To avoid this apparent contradiction in the scripture (fruti), the secondary sense of this word, that is, illusory part, should be accepted to be the real meaning.³⁶⁵ Even in the sutra ‘aÅ fo nana vyapadefat’³⁶⁶ the difference implied by the word ‘part’, aÅ fa, is taken in its secondary sense in order to be congruous with the scriptures on identity (abheda frutis).

The dualist may ask whether the Advaitins consider the jiva to be part of pure Brahman or as part of the Lord, Isvara. The first option does not correspondent with the meaning contained in the fruti and smrti (sacred literature elaborating scriptures) mentioned earlier, because the scripture and the smrti statements quoted here clearly refer to Ifvara. If the second option is accepted, the conclusion becomes irrelevant for the present discussion, because Ifvara is not pure Brahman. In addition, the second option also goes against the Advaita view, since according to the Advaitins, Ifvara, being limited consciousness, stands almost on the same footing with the jiva. That is to say, both Ifvara and jiva, being distinct from pure Brahman, are illusory entities; so jiva cannot be regarded as being part of Ifvara. In reply to this, Madhusudana states that the pronoun used in the aforementioned quotation, that is, tat, indicates pure Brahman only.³⁶⁷

Now Madhusudana starts to defend the theory of identity between the individual and Brahman. Jiva is reflection of Brahman on the individual’s internal organ (antahkaraja), which is inherently transparent due to the predominance of sattva guna.³⁶⁸ The reflection (pratibimba) and its prototype (bimba) are always identical. Even though they may appear to be different, close scrutiny reveals their identification with each other. When an object is reflected on a clear mirror, the reflection exhibits almost complete identification with the reflected object. The appearance of difference between the two is brought about by the attributes of the mirror falsely imposed on the reflection. The reflection should not be taken as the shadow of the reflected object. Shadow means contradiction or absence of light, but a reflection is not opposed to light. Therefore reflection and shadow are different. When the mirror is blurred the reflection appears quite different from the object reflected. This analogy shows that the defects of the inner organ of every person affects the person by imposing false affectations, but that does not in reality affect the individual, jiva. Hence one must admit that jiva, being a reflection of Brahman, is identical with Brahman.

Identity between the reflection and the object reflected can also be established by formal inference.³⁶⁹ The reflection is identical with its prototype for one of three reasons:

1 Because it possesses the attributes peculiar to its prototype.

2 Because it does not possess any attributes contradictory to its prototype.

3 Or, because it is not produced by any cause which has not produced its prototype.

This last reason (middle term/hetu) is put forward in accordance with the view of the Pratyagatman, who held that bimba-consciousness is Ifvara, while jiva is His reflection. The second reason may be open to criticism on the grounds that jiva possesses several virtues that are diametrically opposite to the essence of pure Brahman. It may be said in answer to this criticism, however, that these contradictory virtues do not really belong to jiva, but are superimposed on it by its limiting inner organ, a product of avidya. Hence they are false, so none of them are natural to jiva.³⁷⁰ It may further be objected that if bimba is regarded as identical with its pratibimba, how can one of them be subjected to the cycle of birth and death while the other is free? In answer, it has been said that as the specks of dirt on the mirror spoil the beauty of the reflected face, so also the attributes of the limitations enwrap the pratibimba with false attributes, although the blemishes of the mirror do not affect the bimba.³⁷¹

So jiva is in substance identical with Brahman. Anything that can be called real in jiva is its consciousness, which is nothing but Brahman. Every other aspect and attribute of the individual, jiva – its mind or body, its birth or death, its instincts and impressions – are nothing but creations of avidya. Thus the existence of jiva, being extremely relative, conditional as well as limited, cannot be regarded as real. Hence real, absolute existence belongs solely to Brahman. Brahman manifests itself through avidya in two aspects: the enjoyer, that is jiva, and the object of enjoyment, that is the universe. But the perception and the enjoyment, being the creation of avidya, are as false as avidya itself. Thus, the reality that subsists free from these objects, names and forms, is Brahman – the absolute existence, the absolute consciousness and the absolute bliss.³⁷²

Likewise, from an ultimate point of view, this universe does not exist at all. This is because Brahman is the only existing reality and it possesses no difference or duality (bheda) whatsoever. Furthermore, as the universe is identical with Brahman, there is no place for any duality. Madhusudana wrote a separate treatise, the Advaita-ratna-raksaja to refute the views of the dualist Naiyayikas. By his own confession Madhusudana followed Fri Harsa, the author of the polemical work Khajdanakhajda-khadya.³⁷³ It is argued there that duality does not exist because it cannot be cognised.

Madhusudana critically analyses the Naiyayika view of determinate knowledge arising from direct experience, which according to the logicians, is said to yield duality.³⁷⁴ He shows how their arguments are full of fallacy, and therefore this view is not logical. It then follows that duality is never perceived. The appearance of bheda is merely illusion and moreover, bheda is practically identical with the locus (adhikaraja). The idea that the pitcher is not cloth in fact denotes that the pitcher is the negation of cloth. Therefore, distinction cannot be determined and determinate knowledge cannot manifest it either. Likewise, difference is also never grasped by indeterminate knowledge, since it only concerns itself with the essence (svarupa) of an object. Therefore, such knowledge cannot be employed to prove either difference or non-difference, and as this knowledge comprehends only the unqualified essence of the object, it should be regarded as evidence of non-difference, abheda.³⁷⁵ In this way, difference cannot be confirmed by any kind of evidence. Hence the theory of identity advocated by the scripture remains unchallenged.

Therefore, difference is non-existing as neither determinate nor indeterminate knowledge can prove its existence. The advocates of the concept of difference cannot establish it as the reciprocal negation of identity (anyonyabhava) or, as the essence (svarupa) of objects. Since the concept of difference cannot even be determined, little remains to speak of the existence of differentiated objects. This universe is non-different from Brahman. In fact, there exists the complete negation of the universe in Brahman. The Vedanta never contradicts the pragmatic existence of differences, nor does it negate the pragmatic existence of the universe. As in the case of the rope-snake illusion, the snake exists so long as it appears and ceases to exist when the rope, that is, its locus (adhisthana), is cognised as such. Likewise, the universe remains so long as the avidya remains and ceases to exist when the integral and undifferentiated cognitive mode (akhajdakara-citta-vrtti)³⁷⁶ reveals Brahman, the locus of the universe. Hence, like the illusory snake, the universe is also identical with its substratum, Brahman.

The scripture also confirms that the world has no separate existence from Brahman. It states that ‘there is no plurality in the universe’.³⁷⁷ The negation of Brahman’s pervasion prohibits any real contact of Brahman with the universe. Brahman is the absolute truth and consciousness itself, whereas the universe, being created by false avidya, is itself false and unconscious. Therefore, Brahman can never be influenced by the illusory qualities of this illusory world, just as a desert never bears the water that a mirage suggests is there.³⁷⁸ The negation of the universe is Brahman itself, as Brahman is the substratum of the false identity between the universe and Brahman. Thus, when every object of the universe becomes negated in Brahman, only Brahman remains as eternally and absolutely existent.³⁷⁹

It may be noted here that a non-dualist does not regard difference (bheda) to be absolutely non-existent. This is because, as Madhusudana explains, the concept is necessary for the daily intercourse of human life. The non-dualists accept three kinds of existence. Brahman is absolutely existent (paramarthika sat), the shell-silver is illusorily existent (pratibhasika sat) and the physical universe is pragmatically existent (vyavaharika sat). Thus the Advaita-vedanta school

accepts the empirical, vyavaharika existence of bheda.³⁸⁰

To answer Vyasaraja’s objection to the concept of three types of existence, Madhusu-dana answers that the quality of non-refutability (avadhyattva) is common in all three types of existence. Even the superimposed object, though subjected to contradiction at other times, is not contradicted at the time of its existence. The pratibhasika phenomenon too, should be recognised as being just as incapable of being contradicted as the vyavaharika, at least for the time being. Unless this is done, it is impossible to explain why a person, when he mistakenly sees a shell-silver, would react in exactly the same way, as he would do when confronted by empirical silver.³⁸¹

The distinction between vyavaharika reality and pratibhasika reality lies in the fact that while the former is contradicted only by akhajdakara-citta-vrtti, the latter is contradicted by ordinary empirical knowledge.

5

THE SENTIENT WORLD: IFVARA, JIVA

AND SAKSI

Having established that Brahman is the only immutable eternally real consciousness, Madhusudana turns his attention to other conscious entities mainly belonging to the empirical level of experience, namely the individual person, jiva, Ifvara, the Lord and Creator of the world of phenomena and Saksi, the revealer of all objects of perception. The Vedanta divides the pragmatic world of experience into two categories – perceiving consciousness and the perceived (drg-drfya). The pure Self, in accordance with the nature of its false relationship with the primordial avidya, is viewed as, Ifvara, Jiva and Saksi.³⁸² In reality, pure self is the essence of all three of them. On this point, there is unanimity amongst different teachers of the Advaita-vedanta school. However, there are sharp differences among these teachers when it comes to the nature of their relationship with avidya and the type of avidya. Broadly speaking, there are two views: those who regard jiva to be many (aneka jiva-vada) and those who hold that there is only one jiva (ekajiva-vada). The former is further sub-divided into abhasa-vada, or the theory of semblance; pratibimba-vada, or the theory of reflection; and avacceheda-vada, or the theory of delimitation.³⁸³

According to abhasa-vada, the self, when reflected on the primordial avidya, becomes identified with that avidya. It must be noted here that pure Self does not, in fact, become identified with the avidya, but only the reflection-self (pratibimba atma), limited by avidya, becomes identified with its limitation. This limited self is not the pure Self. However, due to this failure of apprehending this distinction between the two, the limited self is regarded to be the ever-abiding essential self (Antaryamin), the witnessing-self (Saksi) and the Creator-self (Ifvara) though they are all in fact pure Self. Likewise, the pure Self (atman) being reflected on the mind (buddhi) becomes limited by it. Thus, the limited, reflection-self becomes identified with mind, and due to the absence of the knowledge of difference between the pure Self and this limited self, the limited self is regarded as the person (jiva), the agent, the enjoyer and the knower. As the mind is different in each body, and there are innumerable bodies, the semblances of the self in the minds are also many. Since the self is undifferentiated from the semblances it too appears to be many. The avidya being one, however, means that the reflection of the pure conscious Self in it (cidabhasa), undifferentiated from avidya, always appears to be one.³⁸⁴ As the semblance is quite distinct from the pure Self, the semblance of Self is false.³⁸⁵ The identification between jiva, a false entity, and Brahman, occurs only when the jiva aspect of the Self is totally eliminated by true knowledge of the real nature of Self dispelling the primordial avidya.

Madhusudana provides another interpretation of this view, that is, abhasa-vada.³⁸⁶

He observes that the pure Self, reflected upon the primordial avidya, is Ifvara, a reflection of Self misunderstood through the primordial avidya as the creator-self. Likewise, this same Self, when reflected upon the mind, which is then falsely identified with the reflection-self, is the individual (jiva). Pure Self is real, while its qualifying adjuncts (upadhis), avidya, in the case of Ifvara, and mind in the case of jiva, are unreal. Thus, once the upadhis are removed through the removal of ignorance the identity between jiva and Brahman can be established without any further problem. The main conclusion is jiva as Pure consciousness, eternally exists.³⁸⁷

In the first interpretation of the abhasa-vada, pure Self as the prototype (bimba) of the two reflection selves, Ifvara and jiva, is the Saksi (witnessing-self), while the self that has no reference to either Ifvara or jiva, is the pure (fuddha) consciousness. In the second interpretation, Saksi cannot be separated from

Ifvara. Therefore, both the concepts of Saksi and Ifvara become merged in the

Ifvara concept. In considering the second interpretation, Madhusudana remarks that the author of the Vartika – the upholder of abhasa-vada – does not separate Saksi from Ifvara.³⁸⁸ It should be noted that Antaryami is never differentiated from Ifvara.

According to pratibimba-vada, followed by the Vivaraja school, Ifvara is the

Self limited (upahita) by the primordial avidya, the source of saÅ sara, transient life. As we shall shortly see, avidya with the aid of the five subtle cosmic elements, produces mind. At the time of deep sleep, the mind remains dormant in its cause (karajavastha), while during the states of waking or dreaming it remains manifest (karyavastha). The reflection of Ifvara on avidya conditioned by mind (dormant or manifest), is called jiva.³⁸⁹ Saksi here is the pure Self (fuddhatma) that pervades both Ifvara and jiva.

Sarvajñ atma Muni suggests some modifications in the theory of reflection. He holds that pure consciousness limited by avidya is the prototype (bimba). This bimba reflects itself on avidya and this reflection-self is Ifvara. On the other hand, when the same bimba is reflected on the mind that reflection-self is jiva. As there are countless minds, jivas are similarly countless. In this view, the bimba-consciousness is Saksi. Thus, according to both the Vivaraja and SaÅ ksepa-fariraka schools, the bimba-consciousness is the Saksi.³⁹⁰

The pratibimba-vada differs from the abhasa-vada in that while in the latter view the reflections are absolutely false, according to the former they are not so, since in pratibimba-vada, the prototype and its reflection are one and the same. The reflection-consciousness is non-different in substance from the prototypeconsciousness. This being so, the reflection is as real as its prototype. The difference between the views of the Vivaraja and the SaÅ ksepa-fariraka mainly lies in the fact that while the former regards Ifvara as the prototype-self which is limited by the primordial avidya, the latter considers even Ifvara a mere reflectionconsciousness, just like jivas. The prototype limited by the primordial avidya and common to both jiva and Ifvara is the witness-consciousness, Saksi.

According to the Avaccheda-vada held by the Bhamati-school, Ifvara, or pure consciousness, is the object (visaya) of avidya, while jiva is the locus (afraya) thereof. Jiva is regarded as the locus of avidya because its empirical understanding and behaviour are based on that understanding namely, ‘Brahman does not exist, ’ based on ignorance (avidya). As both such false understanding and behaviour (vyavahara) exist in jiva, avidya which causes such false understanding and behaviour also rests in jiva for both cause and effect should exist in the same locus. According to this view, jivas are many because empirical avidyas (tula) are also many. Jiva as delimited (avacchinna) by avidya is the material cause of the universe. As there are many jivas, each jiva is therefore the creator of a separate universe. Thus the jiva, as delimited by avidya, is the creator of a personal universe and as the locus of avidya, such creator-jiva is deluded (bhranta). Even though these universes are strictly personal, each jiva seems to perceive the same universe due to the extreme similarity of the universes. The fact that jivas ascribe to Ifvara the act of creation is because basically Ifvara is the locus of the cosmic avidya along with jivas and their worlds.³⁹¹

The aforementioned theories are founded on certain fundamental presumptions. The first of these is that although Brahman has to be recognised as the ultimate and single immutable Reality, the cosmic process of diversity, looming large in our everyday experience, has to be accounted for. Avidya is an explanation of that diversity.

Philosophers of the Advaita school tried to visualise Brahman empirically in terms of avidya; though, there being nothing real besides Brahman, no real connection can be recognised between the two. Still a working relationship (vyavaharika sambandha) has to be allowed to exist between the two. The difference of nature in the relationship has been responsible for the emergence of four types of consciousness: Brahman, kutastha, (i.e. Saksi), Ifvara and jiva (respectively, Pure consciousness, immutable consciousness, the creator consciousness and the individual consciousness). However, the number of these concepts varies due to other considerations.

To justify these concepts, the philosophers have further introduced the ideas of the limiting adjunct, (upadhi), agent of delimitation, (avacchedaka) and secondary, remote and modified sense of a word, (upalaksaja). While upadhi and upalaksaja circumscribe the nature of consciousness without being really related to it, the avacchedaka affects the nature of consciousness.³⁹²Thus avidya is the avacchedaka of jiva, which thereby becomes involved in empiricism, while it is the upadhi of Saksi which leaves the latter unaffected by empiricism. Upalaksaja differs from upadhi inasmuch as it has only a casual reference to its referent (upalaksita). For example, the crows, which were once temporarily perched on a house, may serve as the upalaksaja of the house. Upadhi, however, continues as long as the qualified object (upahita) exists. For instance, a red object reflected on a piece of glass makes latter look red. Distinguished from both upalaksaja and upadhi, avacchedaka is the adjective and so co-exists with the object it qualifies (avacchinna) and is included in the nature of it for instance, a red flower. That is why in the theory of avaccheda the state of consciousness as jiva is co-existent with avidya.

The theory of reflection (pratibimba) has also contributed to the formation of some of these other theories. However, the mutual differences among philosophers who believe in the theory of reflection are based on the question as to whether reflection and its prototype are identical with each other or whether they are mutually different. In the case of identity, the reflection is recognised to be as real as the prototype, while in the case of their mutual difference the reflection is held to be false.

Avidya, the reflection of consciousness thereon, avidya as the avacchedaka, upalaksaja or upadhi, the falsity or reality of reflection – all these concepts in various combinations have formulated the different theories stated above.

Eka-jiva-vada

In the theory of a single individual self (eka-jiva-vada) of Madhusudana, the three concepts of upadhi, avacchedaka and reflection work simultaneously. Unlike the other three theories mentioned earlier, the eka-jiva-vada (as the name suggests) holds that jiva is one and not many, because the upadhi of jiva is the collective (samasti) ignorance (avidya) and not the individual effects (karya) of avidya such as, antahkaraja, etc. The upholders of this view are divided into two branches.³⁹³ One holds that self, limited by (upahita) avidya, is Ifvara. Thus, Ifvara as the prototype is reflected on avidya while the reflection-consciousness is jiva. The second branch, on the other hand, holds that Ifvara is the pure consciousness (fuddha caitanya), which is not limited by avidya, while jiva is the consciousness, limited by avidya.

It is evident that in the latter view, Ifvara is totally removed from the relationship of avidya as well as its creation, and is identified with pure consciousness. The jiva, independent of Ifvara, creates the universe through its avidya.³⁹⁴ Prakafananda, in his Vedanta-siddhanta-muktavali, expounds this view. Appaya Diksita also gives a survey of both these views in the Siddhanta-lefa-saÅ graha.³⁹⁵

Madhusudana accepts the first view, ³⁹⁶ that Ifvara is the consciousness whose qualifying adjunct is avidya and is the prototype, while jiva is the reflection of Ifvara on avidya. Thus jiva, covered by avidya, becomes the material cause of the universe, both subtle and gross.³⁹⁷

Only the unmanifest creation (avyakrta), ³⁹⁸ being beginningless, is omitted from the domain of jiva’s creative acts. Jiva is the agent of the universe because it is the substratum, (adhisthana) and as such possesses knowledge favourable for creation (srstyanukulajñ anavattva).³⁹⁹This jiva is the chief one, as it is the collective jiva (mukhya samastyabhimani jiva). The individual jivas are in fact semblances (jivabhasa) of this chief jiva and they are delimited by different minds, existing in countless gross bodies. The chief jiva, being falsely identified with different minds, due to false superimposition (adhyasa), is known as ‘aham’ (‘I’) in each body.⁴⁰⁰ When any individual jivabhasa enters the state of deep sleep, the other jivabhasas may remain in a waking state, for the collective, or cosmic, jiva itself remains in a waking state along with other jivabhasas. Superimposed by these, and with the help of the avidya, the cosmic jiva continues to imagine the external world and the jivabhasas. The state of deep sleep of the cosmic jiva is known as the dissolution in the source matter (prakrta-pralaya). At that time, due to the absence of minds, the universe and jivabhasas and their minds remain dormant in primordial avidya. During his deep sleep, the cosmic jiva remains covered with the primordial avidya.⁴⁰¹

The concept of the above-mentioned cosmic jiva corresponds to the common concept of Ifvara, as Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent. The cosmic jiva possesses Omniscience and the agency of all activities⁴⁰² and, as the substratum, pervades each worldly object as well as the semblance-jivas.

Drsti-srsti-vada

In order to appreciate the neo-vedantic drsti-srsti-vada, that is, the view that holds the world just existing as long as there is a person, (jiva) experiencing it, the conventional view of creation, which accepts the existence of the created world before the individual selves experience it, (i.e. srsti-drsti-vada), deserves first consideration. According to this latter view, Ifvara creates the world, common to all the percipient jivas. As creation is the result of God’s voluntary effort, God observed, (thought), (tadaiksata)⁴⁰³ before He created. This ‘being conscious of’ the imminent creation, is His innate virtue, so that God observes that is, is aware of the creation even before His act of creation. Such consciousness therefore is not ordinary knowledge dependant on an object, but belongs to the very nature of God (svarupabhutajñ ana).

Besides God’s cosmic creation, the traditional non-dualist view recognises jiva’s creation as well. This is jiva’s world of errors – the individual illusion that takes place frequently in its pragmatic life. The conventional view has analysed such illusion on the part of jiva. Jiva is possessed by avidya, which, sometimes conceals from the jiva an object such as a rope. Consequent upon such concealment its avidya creates an illusory snake there for that deluded jiva. Simultaneous with this creation of the snake, avidya creates a mental mode comprehending that illusory snake. This mode helps in the revelation of the snake to that jiva and continues to exist so long as the illusory snake is not contradicted by valid knowledge disclosing the true nature of the rope. The result is that the illusory snake is perpetually revealed to the jiva as long as it exists. From this standpoint, jiva possesses constant knowledge of its own creation, parallel to the knowledge of God with regard to God’s creation.

The ekajiva-vada has substituted jiva for God, the creator, so that God’s srsti-drsti-vada is replaced by jiva’s drsti-srsti-vada. In other words, the conventional theory of illusion has been exploited in such a way that God’s

creation has lost its identity in the creation of jiva.⁴⁰⁴ The results of such exploitation are twofold:

1 The conventional difference between the pragmatic existence (vyavaharikasatta) of God’s world and the illusory existence (pratibhasika-satta) of jiva’s world, has been effaced. All creation – whether it is that of the mountain, the pitcher or the illusory snake – is stated to be illusory (pratibhasika). The practical difference between the pitcher and the illusory snake is then a matter of the durability of the object of illusion. The knowledge of rope, although illusory in this view, may very well contradict the equally illusory snake, ⁴⁰⁵ as a dream object is discarded in dream by another dream object.

2 As God’s knowledge has been replaced by jiva’s cognition based on a mode of ignorance regarding its ‘illusory’creation, jiva, by means of this cognitive act, continues to know its own creation, as long as the creation lasts. This means until jiva’s avidya is not dispelled by the knowledge of ultimate reality, jiva enjoys omniscience in its own sphere of creation.⁴⁰⁶

Madhusudana has thus tried to explain drst-srsti-vada in terms of his eka-jiva-vada. But he has also assigned an important place to the theory of reflection in this context. For him, the principal individual (mukhya-jiva), whose creation is the universe, is a reflection of Ifvara on avidya. Distinguished from the abhasa-vada, Madhusudana’s theory of reflection considers both the reflection and its prototype to be identical and equally true. Thus jiva is at the same time both identical with, and a reflection of, God.

Madhusudana’s theory of reflection, along with his drsti-srsti-vada, leads to the conclusion that he omitted from the fold of drsti-srsti-vada several Vedantic realities namely, the six conventional categories that are recognised as beginningless.⁴⁰⁷ Thus, while the drsti-srsti-vada of Madhusudana has exploited the conventional theory of illusion, even as an explanation for the cosmic creation, it has significantly left God untouched.

It is interesting to note in this context, that Prakafananda, who preceded

Madhusudana, took drsti-srsti-vada to its furthest extreme. He proposed that not only the cosmic creation, but also God, jiva and avidya – in fact, all five beginningless entities except the Pure consciousness – are the creation of jiva’s imagination (drsti). The other extreme is referred to above by the conventional theory of illusion.

Madhusudana steers clear of these two extremes. He enlarges the scope of the conventional theory of illusion to comprehend the cosmic creation of God. But he stops at that, and thus leaves out the conventional Vedantic postulates such as God and avidya. Perhaps the theism of Madhusudana leaves God to His sovereignty, without reducing Him to a figment of jiva’s imagination. While describing different forms of the Lord, Madhusudana recounts the conventional holy triad, Brahma, Visju and Rudra. He further expressed his opinion with regard to divine incarnations (avataras) who are, according to him, directly descending from Ifvara, who out of His boundless compassion for His devotees manifests them, for their liberation.⁴⁰⁸ However, Brahmananda, the commentator of Madhusudana, has shown his approval for Prakafaananda’s point of view.⁴⁰⁹

Critics of the ekajiva-vada argue that if it is accepted, then the sacred scriptures, as well as the preceptor’s knowledge of the absolute truth, become reduced to fiction. Moreover, in these circumstances, jiva will never seek liberation from an individual body. If the scriptures are imaginary, then jiva imagines them without knowing the absolute truth. The knowledge of absolute truth puts an end to all imagination. If the scriptures are intended to impart such knowledge, then they cannot be the creation of jiva’s imagination. Again, when jiva imagines the existence of a preceptor who can impart true knowledge, then he must also imagine the true knowledge belonging to the preceptor. It means that jiva, at that time, possesses the knowledge of truth for the purpose of his imagination. As jiva is already wise, the necessity for a preceptor becomes superfluous. Again, if one jiva is encased in all the bodies, then release from a particular body does not ensure a better lot for the jiva, for other, innumerable bodies remain intact and perpetuate the suffering of jiva as before. So jiva’s endeavour to rid itself of a particular body is useless.

Madhusudana, however, answers all these objections.⁴¹⁰ First of all, he states that the validity of the fastras does not require that they should be based on valid knowledge. The fastras impart knowledge inasmuch as the content of that knowledge is never contradicted (avadhita visayatva). The fastras are valid because they supply us with the knowledge of Brahman, and as Brahman is the only existing truth, this is never contradicted.⁴¹¹ His answers to the second objection are that jiva is able to imagine its preceptor by a general knowledge that the preceptor possesses knowledge of absolute truth; that jiva can possess the knowledge of truth unknown to itself; or, that jiva may possess previous indirect knowledge of Brahman so that the preceptor can say ‘tat tavam asi’ (that are you). This explanation should be accepted, he claims, even by the dualists, otherwise the charges would revert against them since, according to them, a disciple must somehow be convinced that his preceptor possesses true knowledge, which means that the disciple must know what true knowledge is before he meets the preceptor. But what benefit will he derive from meeting the preceptor, when he already possesses the knowledge of truth? ⁴¹² Madhusudana’s answer to the third objection is that even though one jiva is common to all the physical bodies, it is subjected to ego, which is peculiar to each body. Such individual ego gives rise to the notion, ‘I am in bondage.’The endeavour for liberation from a particular body is useful in the sense that that knowledge eradicates that particular ego, and the consequent notion with reference to a particular body.⁴¹³ In fact, Pure consciousness is unaffected by worldly diversity, but being covered by avidya, which possesses two powers of concealment and projection (avaraja and viksepa), it appears to be subjected to birth and death, to be the author of world imagination, and to be aspiring for liberation.⁴¹⁴

The theory of a single person (ekajiva), as propounded by Madhusudana, throws light on the five different aspects of consciousness: Ifvara, Saksi, Brahman, jiva and jivabhasas. Of these, the first four are held to be real while jivabhasas are said to be illusory. Jiva means here, the cosmic person, which, with the aid of avidya, creates the physical universe. Jiva is the reflection of consciousness on avidya; Ifvara is the consciousness that is reflected on avidya; Saksi is the consciousness that endures through both Ifvara and jiva; Brahman is absolute consciousness, free from all reference to jiva, Ifvara or even Saksi. As consciousness is one and absolute, there exists no real difference among these four aspects of consciousness. Jivabhasas, as depicted by drsti-srsti-vada, are different from the above-mentioned four conscious realities, being the false appearance of cosmic jiva, delimited (avacchinna) by individual inner sense organ or mind. This brief summary makes it clear that Madhusudana combined the avaccheda-vada with abhasa-vada in his concept of pseudo persons (jivabhasas). Therefore, these being conditioned by mind and also being just appearances (abhasa), are not real. In this way, in the drsti-srsti-vada of Madhusudana, we have a combination of pratibimba-vada, abhasa-vada and avaccheda-vada.

The concept of Saksi comes from the fruti ‘saksi ceta kevalo nirgujafca’, ⁴¹⁵ which describes pure and absolute consciousness to be the witness of every object as distinguished from, say, the individual person, who has limited perception. One must remember that Saksi is the immutable consciousness with an emphasis to its distinctive revealing nature (prakafa). Saksi is therefore consciousness that always reveals everything. In other words, Pure Conscious Self is designated

‘witness’ with reference to the empirical phenomena. Vidyarajya, author of the Pañ cadafi takes Saksi to reveal every empirical object including its knower and the cognitive knowledge of it.⁴¹⁶ Citsukha explained that Pure consciousness, Saksi and jiva, are essentially one and the same. Both Saksi and jiva are part of the empirical process of cognition. However, their distinction, being based on the conditioning of avidya, is a false one.⁴¹⁷ As these two conditions are mere qualifying adjuncts (upadhis), Saksi and jiva can still be one and the same. Therefore, the basic identity between the Pure consciousness, Saksi and jiva remains undisturbed.

It may be noted in this context, that following Sarvajñ atma Muni, Citsukha too holds the view that Brahman indeed is both the locus and object of avidya.⁴¹⁸ A cognitive mode can focus only on such an object which is pervaded by avidya, so all cognitive modes whether producing ordinary experience or, ultimate knowledge of Brahman, have to concern themselves with Brahman only, as the sole revealing entity. Thus, when Brahman becomes pervaded by a cognitive mode (ordinary or otherwise), it is called Saksi. It may also be noted here that the treatment of Saksi in light of the above, indicates that Citsukha has recognised Saksi as an epistemological reality. That is to say, Brahman is called Saksi when it becomes related to a cognitive mode (vrtti). Such a neutral concept of Saksi seems to run counter to the concept of the essential Controller (Antaryami) as found in the ‘antaryami Brahmaja’, since the Upanisadic Antaryami, as the name indicates, seems to be vitally concerned with the act of controlling jiva. Citsukha anticipates this objection and takes Upanisadic Antaryami to mean Saksi, which pervades all. In other words, Saksi is Antaryami insofar as Saksi is the only all-pervasive existence. Thus the so-called existence of jiva has no separate existence apart from that of Saksi. This concept of Saksi removes all distinction between the Lord (Ifvara) and Saksi.

Madhusudana’s concept of Saksi reveals two apparently distinct realities. In the first, Saksi is presented as a metaphysical reality, while in the other it represents an epistemological truth. Metaphysically speaking, Saksi is consciousness that endures through both Ifvara and jiva.⁴¹⁹ Saksi is not Ifvara (the prototype), jiva (the reflection) or Brahman (the Pure consciousness); it is consciousness limited (upahita) by a cognitive mode of avidya and thus free from either being a prototype or, a reflection. In trying to visualise Saksi from the perspective of his ekajiva-vada, Madhusudana draws upon the metaphysics of the Vivaraja school, which he prefers above the others.

On the other hand, when elucidating Saksi as an epistemological concept,

Madhusudana states that Saksi is the consciousness limited by either just avidya or a mode (vrtti) of avidya.⁴²⁰

The first definition, that Saksi is consciousness limited by avidya, is apparently the reaffirmation of the metaphysical definition of Saksi as given in the Siddhanta-bindu and referred to above. For practical purposes Madhusudana, in his epistemological context, confined himself to the second definition, that Saksi is consciousness limited by avidya vrtti.

In order to appreciate Madhusudana’s concept of Saksi as an epistemological reality, it is necessary to compare Saksi-knowledge with ordinary knowledge. The points of similarity in both are as follows:

1 a vrtti is required for the revelation of an object;

2 consciousness limited by such a vrtti is taken to be a form of cognitive knowledge;

3 the vrtti has a double function to discharge; first, it takes away the veil of ignorance covering an object and second, it establishes a kind of relationship between the object on the one hand and the cognising consciousness on the other.⁴²¹

Though consciousness, as the all-pervading reality, is always related to the object, such a relationship is not enough for the revelation of that object to a person. Had it been so, jiva, as consciousness, would be Omniscient. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that vrtti forges a special type of contact between the object and the conscious individual, so that consciousness immediately reveals that specific object to the cognising self.

On the other hand, these two forms of knowledge (i.e., saksi-knowledge and ordinary knowledge) differ from each other in the following ways. Ordinary knowledge is consciousness conditioned (upahita) by a cognitive mode (vrtti) comprehending an external object. Such vrtti, however, is a mode of the inner sense organ (see Chapter 3). In this view, the cognising subject (pramata) is consciousness reflected on the inner sense organ and hence is circumscribed by the physical body.⁴²² In the eka-jiva-vada under consideration, the cogniser is a mere appearance (jivabhasa) of the primary jiva (mukhya-jiva), which is the reflection of Ifvara on avidya.

In saksi- knowledge, however, the requisite vrtti is not a mode of the inner sense organ, but a mode of avidya. This explains the memory in the waking state namely, ‘I slept happily’ (sukhamahamasvapsam), based on what one feels about one’s experience in deep sleep (susupti). In deep sleep, when the inner sense organ loses its identity, only avidya remains. If this avidya is recognised at that stage as having a vrtti embracing the happiness that arises in deep sleep, then one is able to recall that experience of happiness in the waking state. Likewise, in the experience of happiness during the waking state, the same avidya vrtti, for the sake of economy of concept (laghavat), is also able to grasp that pleasure. Thus in both these types of experience (one in deep sleep, the other in the waking state) a mode of avidya, (and not a mode of mind/inner sense organ), may be said to operate in such a way that pleasure is exposed to consciousness which then, on the basis of a special contact between the object (pleasure) and itself, reveals that object.

It would follow from this analysis that the epistemological Saksi that is, the saksi-knowledge of Madhusudana is consciousness conditioned by a mode of avidya, as distinguished from ordinary empirical knowledge, which is consciousness conditioned by a mode of mind. Even though in the eka-jiva-vada, as shown earlier, the cognising person is a mere appearance, from the metaphysical point of view such a condition is basically identical with Saksi. Therefore, the experience of pleasure that really belongs to Saksi is ascribed to the experiencing person, and he feels happy.

Although saksi-knowledge is thus identical with Saksi itself and is therefore prima facie eternal, according to Madhusudana, consciousness (caitanya) becomes Saksi, that is, revealer (drasta) only when it is conditioned by avidya-vrtti. The result is that, although by itself consciousness is eternal, its power of revealing an object (drastrtva) is contemporaneous with the avidya-vrtti.⁴²³ Hence, with the disappearance of the avidya-vrtti, consciousness’ power of revelation of an object is kept in abeyance. The destruction of avidya-vrtti is thus called, from a broad point of view, the destruction of Saksi. In other words, in this way saksi-knowledge, though identical with Saksi, may be said to be liable of destruction. In this way, even the saksi-knowledge can produce a mental impression (saÅ skara) most conducive to subsequent memory as in the case of the experience of happiness and lack of knowledge during deep sleep remembered in the waking state.⁴²⁴

Although the metaphysical concept of Saksi as the all-pervasive reality, conditioned by avidya and free from the bimba-pratibimba condition, and the epistemological concept of Saksi, as consciousness limited by avidya-vrtti, seem mutually different, Madhusudana accepted both the concepts to be equally plausible. For him the apparent difference may be merged in the following way. Avidya-vrtti is, after all, a special form of avidya itself. Thus if the metaphysical

Saksi is taken to be consciousness limited by avidya in general, then such a concept certainly includes the epistemological Saksi, which is but consciousness limited by a special type of avidya; in other words, avidya in the state of having a vrtti, a special mode. Indeed, according to Madhusudana, all experiences, whether cognitive knowledge of jiva, the knowledge of Saksi or, bhakti, must be considered in terms of vrtti, since knowledge is consciousness reflected on the vrtti of avidya. This vrtti may be primordial, in the case of Saksi, or conditional, in the case of ordinary cognition or bhakti.

Advaita-vedanta establishes absolute identity between all types of conscious entities and Brahman. However the importance of the jiva, the percipient person and enjoyer of the universe, is undeniable. Brahman is the only existent and absolute reality, yet in the empirical world the individual person is the pivot around which the universe revolves. Moreover, the teachings of the Vedanta are meant for the jiva, in order to bring about his liberation. So Madhusudana ascribes primary importance to the individual and clarifies his notion of the ‘person’and its relation to the creator God.⁴²⁵ It is equally important to understand the notion of Saksi, because without it, the non-dual epistemology is impossible to understand.

It is not easy to discover the real nature (svarupa) of jiva, the support (alambana) of ‘I’consciousness (aham-pratyaya). Scrutiny of the nature of jiva raises serious controversies amongst philosophers. Thus gross materialists like the Carvakas take the body or the senses for the jiva. The Buddhists regard the jiva as the momentary conscious entity. In fact, the philosophers give different expositions of the jiva’s nature according to the views peculiar to the individual systems to which they belong. According to the Advaita-vedanta, jiva, being ultimately identical with Brahman, is devoid of all limitations, eternal, and essentially identified with consciousness and bliss.

The existence of jiva, or the individual person, can be proved by the experience of deep sleep (susupti). When the body and the mind are called into inactivity, the individual still exists and enjoys the pleasure of deep sleep. The individual self, being identical with the ultimate Self, is always existent. Which means, it is not limited by time, space or matter (kala-defa-vastu- pariccheda-fujya). That the jiva is not limited by time is proved by the absence of its previous non-existence (pragabhava) and destruction (dhvaÅ fa). Since the individual is the self (atman) of the experiencing person, he cannot witness its non-existence.⁴²⁶ Likewise, as existence itself, the self persists everywhere, so it cannot be limited by space.⁴²⁷ The pattern of argumentation runs in the following manner: As the self is identical with Brahman, it alone exists; that which is not self is non-existent. Anything that is not self is the creation of avidya and therefore illusory, like avidya itself. These non-existing objects appear to be existent due to their superimposition (adhyasa) on the self. Superimposition establishes a false identity between the self and objects, although the self, being consciousness, cannot be bound down to a single non-conscious object. These arguments also prove the validity of the view that jiva is in essence kutastha (unchangeable, immutable) consciousness.

The witnessing self (Saksi), however, continues to be the same, even though the knower, the instrument of knowledge, the act of knowledge and the objects of knowledge may vary, (matr-mana-miti-meyajam vyabhicaritve’pi avyavhicarat).⁴²⁸ It may be argued that the knower, who is the locus of valid knowledge (pramafraya), is the agent (karta) and the enjoyer (bhokta), and this knower (pramata) reveals other objects as well as its own self, just like a lamp. Therefore, it is unnecessary to imagine a separate witnessing-self as the revealer to the knower.

The answer to this criticism is that all these attributes of the knower, the agent or the enjoyer, are modifications of avidya. Jiva, being a combination (granthi or, knot) of consciousness and these attributes, cannot by itself be the ever-revealed witness. This would mean that not only consciousness but also the aforementioned attributes, which are undoubtedly objects of cognition (drfya), would attain the status of being recognised as witness-consciousness. This would mean that they would be taken to be like consciousness itself. Hence consciousness divested of the capacity of becoming an object of knowledge (drfyatva), that is, the immutable self, (kutastha atma) is the witness of every object. The scriptures also confirm this view by statements such as ‘tameva bhantamanubhati sarvam tasya bhasa sarvamidam vibhati, ’ (Him alone, as he shines, do all things reflect; this whole world radiates with his light); ‘Na drsterdrastaram pafyeh’ (You cannot see the seer who does the seeing), and ‘adrsto drasta,...nanya’to’sti drasta.’ (Unseen He sees,...there is no one besides him who sees).⁴²⁹ The qualities of knowing, agency and enjoying belong to the mind, which is not the self. The mind, being transparent due to the predominance of sattva guja, ⁴³⁰ is capable of receiving the reflection of cosmic consciousness (cit). At that time the mind, being superimposed on the individual consciousness, becomes falsely identified with it. By mutual superimposition between the consciousness and mind, each is then influenced by the characteristics of the other, which enables the mind to receive valid knowledge (pramajñ ana).⁴³¹ The formlessness of the cosmic consciousness, or Self, is not opposed to its reflection on the mind. Even in ordinary experience, the space, (akafa) which is unperceivable and formless, is seen to be reflected on water. The reflection of akafa on water explains the appearance of depth in shallow water.⁴³² Scriptures such as ‘rupam rupam pratirupo babhuva’ (Of every form of every being, the likeness he has assumed), ‘ekadha bahudha caiva drfyate jalacandravat’ (like the reflection of the moon on the water, he, though single, appears manyfold), ⁴³³ also confirm the reflection of the formless Brahman. Moreover, unless this view of reflection is accepted, such Scriptures as ‘sa esa iha pravistah’(He it is who has penetrated this body), and ‘tat srstva tadevanupravifat’ (After emitting it, he entered that very world), ⁴³⁴ become meaningless because Self being totally devoid of any action the verb to penetrate/enter cannot mean any positive action and must be explained as just being reflected.

Thus, jiva is essentially unlimited Self but is superimposed by the mind and becomes limited as the knower, the agent and the enjoyer. The argument in favour of this superimposition can be summarised as follows: The commonplace personal experience such as ‘I am a man, the agent and the enjoyer’ shows the individual self to be attributed with manhood, agency and enjoyment. This experience can neither be regarded as recollection nor valid knowledge (pramajñ ana). It is not a recollection because it is direct knowledge.⁴³⁵ It cannot be valid knowledge because scriptures contradict it in such statements as ‘yo’yam vijñ anamayah prajesu hrdyantarjyotih purusah’ (It is this person – the one that consists of perception among the vital functions, praja, the one that is the inner light within the heart); ‘ayamatma Brahma’, (Brahman is this self, atman); and ‘yo’fanayapipase fokam moham jaram mrtyumatyeti’ (He is the one who is beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death).⁴³⁶ Moreover, the experience ‘I am a man’ means that the self is a body; but the self cannot be a body, since a body is subject to changes (vikara) and is a limited object. Changes and limitations are characteristics of objects that are not self. Furthermore, the body cannot be the self, for the self is the subject of knowledge that has the body as its object. Again, the body, being the object of knowledge, cannot be related to the self, which is knowledge itself. Thus, it is evident that the body cannot be regarded as being identical with the self. Likewise, the agency of the self cannot be taken as real, as in that case agency would persist even at the time of salvation. As agency is the cause of all worldly bondage, cessation from it would never be possible. Since the self is self-revealing, it can reveal other objects; otherwise, the worldly objects would never have been revealed. The self is the object of great love⁴³⁷ because it is bliss in nature. Therefore, the self is by nature attributeless, eternally existent, self-revealing bliss.⁴³⁸ The knowledge, ‘I am the man, the agent and the enjoyer’ is false and, as already discussed, is caused by avidya. Due to the beginningless avidya, the non-self is superimposed on the self. Failing to distinguish between the self and non-self, man experiences such illusions as ‘I am the man, the agent and the enjoyer.’⁴³⁹

Following the conventional concept, Madhusudana describes the triad forms of jiva, namely, vifva, taijasa and prajñ a, representing jiva’s three states of existence: waking ( jagrat), dreaming (svapna) and the deep sleep (susupti). The waking state of jiva takes place when, through the individual body and its senses, jiva enjoys the gross material objects of the universe. Thus this state presupposes the existence of the gross bodies, and also contact between the jiva and the gross bodies.⁴⁴⁰ As it is based on superimposition (adhyasa), this contact is illusory. The contact of the self with the gross body occurs in the following way. At the outset, avidya is superimposed on the consciousness as ignorance. This ignorance then produces ego (ahaÅ kara) and the inner sense organ etc. and these, along with their qualities are also superimposed on the consciousness producing the individual jiva sensing such uncharacteristic personal experience as ‘I am ignorant’. Due to the false identification between jiva and ego etc. the attributes of antahkaraja such as agency (kartrtva), power to enjoy (bhokrtva) and cognisance (pramatrtva) are superimposed on this limited consciousness. Lastly, the gross body is superimposed on consciousness, where the qualities of the senses are already attributed. It may be noted here that in this series of superimpositions, in each case the superimposition of qualities (dharmadhyasa) is preceded by the superimposition of the subject qualified (dharmi-adhyasa), except in the case of the attribution of the qualities of senses. In this case, the senses are not previously superimposed.⁴⁴¹

In this way, jiva becomes connected with the gross body and through it makes contact with the gross external objects. At that time, jiva becomes limited by the gross body and the gross external world and goes by the name of ‘Vifva’(the world).

In the state of dreaming, jiva becomes possessed by a special vrtti of avidya known as sleep, (nidra)⁴⁴² where tamas guja dominates. In that state, the gross physical body merges into the subtle body. Due to the absence of a physical body, the gross senses become inactive. At that time avidya, with the aid of vasana, that is, impressions left in the mind by past actions and thoughts, produces objects called dream-objects. Just like the illusory objects of the waking state, these dream-objects also become known through the vrtti of avidya that produces them. The difference between the ordinary cognition and dream-cognition lies in the fact that in ordinary cognition, mind flows through the sense organs into the external objects and assumes the shape thereof (vrtti). In dream-cognition, however, the sense organs cease to function. The vrtti revealing dream-objects are, therefore, taken to belong to avidya. Thus knowledge of dream-objects also belongs to Saksi. Even though avidya creates the dream-objects, they are strictly personal because the special vasana of the individual mind is included among the causes of dream-objects. Jiva in this state is called ‘Taijasa’ (dynamic).

From this state of dream, jiva enters the state of deep sleep. In this state its mind, along with the vasana imprinted on it, lies dormant in its cause, the avidya. Madhusudana quotes the author of Vivaraja, ⁴⁴³ who maintains that at the time of deep sleep there exists only one vrtti and that also of avidya, manifesting the witnessing consciousness (Saksi), happiness and this special avidya also contains the individual’s mind and its vasanas both of the waking state and the dreaming state, albeit in a latent condition (saÅ skaratapannam). It also embraces the beginningless objects.⁴⁴⁴ But there is another conventional theory adopted by Madhusudana in Siddhanta-bindu, which holds that in susupti there exist three vrttis of avidya, namely, the vrtti of the particular avidya mentioned earlier, the vrtti of happiness and the vrtti of saksi-knowledge. According to the traditional point of view, these vrttis cannot be reduced to one. The vrttis in deep sleep embrace the aforementioned three objects without any reference to their particular characteristics. Therefore in the state of deep sleep, the comprehension of the three objects are indeterminate, as distinguished from the perception of objects in the waking state and in dream, which is always determinate. Thus if one vrtti is substituted for the aforementioned vrttis, and if the objects thereof become interrelated under one vrtti, then the resulting knowledge cannot be indeterminate. Moreover, as ego (ahaÅ kara ) is absent in susupti, there can be no determinate knowledge at that stage. This is because in all cases of determinate knowledge, ahaÅ kara is a prerequisite condition. Therefore, these vrttis cannot be replaced by one vrtti, co-ordinating the happiness and the particular mode of avidya present as deep sleep.⁴⁴⁵

It may be noted here that the reduction of these vrttis to one, does not necessarily mean the existence of an interrelationship among the objects of knowledge, as presumed by the traditional view, as the named vrtti can embrace the three entities connected with one another (samuhalambanatmika jñ ana). If such a position is accepted, then there is no harm in accepting one vrtti instead of three.⁴⁴⁶ This is the view of the Vivaraja.⁴⁴⁷ The presence of vrtti distinguishes susupti from pralaya (total dissolution of creation), when avidya is left to itself without any vrtti.

Jiva in deep sleep (susupti) is known as prajñ a (wise). Madhusudana describes three states of jiva from the conventional point of view, which is evident from his method of treating them without any reference to drsti-srsti-vada. So, in susupti, only a part of the inner organ, where its cognitive power predominates, becomes dormant. The vital airs of the inner organ continue unaffected. This explains the existence of respiration etc. in the individual jiva at the time of deep sleep.⁴⁴⁸ Otherwise, from the drsti-srsti viewpoint, this explanation is unnecessary, since according to that view the experience of respiration in a person in deep sleep is only illusory.

Refutation of jiva’s ajutva (atomic nature)

As a part of Ifvara, the Pervading Creator, jiva is held by the dualist Vaisjavas to be of atomic dimension (aju parimaja). It goes totally against the view of Advaita-vedanta, which holds the jiva to be essentially identical with Brahman. As the abiding essence of the universe, Brahman is the all-pervasive reality and jiva, as identical with it, is also all-pervasive (vibhu). When the scripture⁴⁴⁹ describes jiva to be of a very small dimension, it is merely to emphasise the fact that the nature of jiva is very difficult to comprehend.

Objections may be raised against the conclusion that the scripture often describes the movement of jiva.⁴⁵⁰ Again, according to the scripture, ⁴⁵¹ jiva, after leaving the body, attains the Brahman. All these statements indicate that jiva possesses a limited dimension. Had jiva been all-pervasive, it could never move from one place to another, nor could it reach Brahman.

Madhusudana answers that jiva by itself has no movement, but the aforementioned scripture indicates the movement of jiva, as limited by its inner sense organ. Apart from this limitation jiva is, as described in the scripture, ⁴⁵² as well as in the Bhagavadgita, ⁴⁵³ eternal and all-pervasive self. As regards the scriptural statement denoting jiva’s approaching Brahman (sa enan Brahma gamayat) the meaning of the scripture, taken in its primary sense, is absurd. A limited object can approach another limited object, but unlimited Brahman being all-pervasive need not have any object to move towards It, nor can It, being the unique reality, find another existent entity. Therefore, how can this scriptural statement really mean to say that the individuals are lead to Brahman? Thus the underlying meaning of the scripture is that jiva, by removing the limitation (of avidya) that differentiated it from Brahman, becomes identified with Brahman. Moreover, if jiva is regarded as being of an atomic dimension, how can we feel it pervading the entire physical body? Hence, jiva must be regarded as all-pervasive, like Brahman itself. The opponent may argue that just as a lamp placed in a corner illuminates the entire space falling within its range, so the atomic jiva, abiding in a space within the body, may be said to pervade the whole body through its attribute of feeling (anubhuti). However, this solution is not tenable. As an attribute of jiva, feeling cannot exist apart from jiva. How, then, can feeling pervade the entire body while the jiva is left in a corner? An attribute must always remain with the subject. Moreover, from this standpoint, the light of a lamp cannot be regarded as an attribute of the lamp when the light wanders and the lamp is left behind. Thus the analogy of a lamp does not stand up to scrutiny.⁴⁵⁴ Hence, the jiva cannot be regarded as possessing an atomic dimension.

6

MATERIAL WORLD AND

COSMOGONY

Having dealt with the empirical world of the perceiving conscious entities (drk), Madhusudana next concerns himself with the contents of their experience (drfya). Madhusudana, in his Siddhanta-bindu, ⁴⁵⁵ has enumerated the views of the various Vaisjava sects and of the Pafupatas concerning the status of the empirical world.

This is interesting for our purpose of recounting how Madhusudana, a great devotee of Lord Krsja, refuted the theistic view of the reality of the created world.

First of all Madhusudana discusses the different theories of causation held by the various schools of Indian philosophy. Following Sarvajñ atma Muni, he states, that the cosmological theory of evolution (parijama ) of the SaÅ khya philosophy is acceptable as far as men of ordinary limited intelligence are concerned. It implies that in order to prepare their mind and intellect for initiation to the Advaita-vedanta theory of illusory transformation (vivarta), which is a difficult concept to realise, one has to, as a preliminary step, understand the theory of parijama. Moreover this theory is useful for contradicting other views, such as that held by the realist Naiyayikas, as well as those that are completely idealistic, such as the views of the Buddhists.⁴⁵⁶ The main difference between the Advaitavedanta and Naiyayika theories is that the former totally denies the cause and effect relationship, since from the monistic viewpoint the relationship presupposes a difference between the two which they do not accept. Hence no relationship can exist between a cause and its effect.

According to the Nyaya-school, before its creation, the effect is non-existent, that is, the cause produces a completely new object, which, begins (arambha) to exist only just at the moment of its creation. Prior to that moment, there exists that object’s antecedent absence (pragabhava) in its cause.

Madhusudana construes that this produced object can neither be existent nor non-existent before its production. In the first case, because the effect remains previous to its production, the causes become useless. In the second case, it is illogical because non-existent objects, like horns of a hare, cannot be brought into existence by any means.

It may be said that the latter objection is based on an incorrect analogy.⁴⁵⁷ The Naiyayikas state that the non-existence of a horn of a hare is an instance of absolute non-existence (atyantabhava), whereas the non-existence of a pitcher, which is produced by joining its constituent two halves (kapala), in either of those two halves in their separated states, is an instance of its antecedent non-existence (pragabhava). Hence there is no similarity between the two cases.

To that argument Madhusudana answers that according to the Vedantins, prior to the creation of an object, its non-existence cannot be specified as a case of pragabhava, because Advaita-vedanta does not recognise this notion. Naiyayikas may further argue that antecedent non-existence must be accepted as a really specified non-existence. Because, this particular non-existence of an object includes in its connotation the imminent creation of that object which is now non-existent, from its inherent material cause (samavayi karaja) where its antecedent non-existence is located.

Madhusudana⁴⁵⁸ contends that the concept of samavayi karaja, that is, the material cause that inheres in the effect is invalid, for the relation of inherence (samavaya sambandha), which the Naiyayikas accept to be existing between the constituent material cause and its effect, is not valid. Such a relationship cannot possibly exist between an existent (sat) cause and a non-existent (asat) effect. Moreover, knowledge cannot arise about a non-existent object for nothing can exist between the knowledge and the non-existing object that might be known.

Naiyayikas may argue that without the acceptance of pragabhava, one of the auxiliary causes, that produce an effect, the particular combination of other causes will go on producing an unceasing recurrence of effects. However, if the concept of pragabhava is accepted as a cause, this inconvenience cannot arise since with the production of the first effect, this cause no longer exists. Madhusudana replies that it is a nature or quality of any causal system that a particular set of causes should produce a single effect.⁴⁵⁹ Therefore, the abovementioned disadvantage of not accepting the pragabhava cannot hold good. For the sake of simplification it is better to imagine the existence of a quality than imagining a new phenomenon like pragabhava. Moreover, after the production of the effect, the particular adrsta⁴⁶⁰ which is a part of the auxiliary causes of it, is destroyed. Therefore, as no relationship can exist between the cause and the non-existent effect, neither one can be the regulator of the other. Hence, the whole Naiyayika notion of the cause and effect relationship is baseless and invalid.

The upholders of the theory of parijama hold that the effect exists even before its production (sat-karya), when it lies dormant in its material cause. Hence, the effect is sat or real, that is, it exists even when it is not manifest; but not eternal, that is, existing endlessly. Madhusudana refutes this theory by proving this conclusion as logically fallacious.⁴⁶¹ He asks whether, before the process of its creation, this dormant effect exists in its causes, partly or entirely? The former is impossible because no other part than the causal one can then exist. However, if this proposition is accepted, the fallacy of self-dependency (atmafraya) will arise. The latter theory is also unworkable because if the effect exists in each part of the cause, then each part should have the same utility as the whole effect. It may be contended that the idea of the theorists of sat-karya is that the effect exists in the cause as the cause, in which case the question of partial or entire existence does not arise at all. However, such contention is futile, because just as one may question as to whether ‘cow-ness’(gotva) exists in each particular part of the cow or in the entire cow, and endless argumentation cannot really prove anything either way. So also in this case nothing can be settled beyond any doubt. It is useless to argue that just as ‘cow-ness’ exists in each cow so the effect exists in each cause, since experience does not confirm this theory. Anything that is completely different from its effect cannot be its material cause.⁴⁶² Therefore, the theory of parijama is as illogical as the theory of arambha. The nihilistic theory of funyata also does not stand scrutiny. Thus, none of the above-mentioned theories of causation is rational enough to be acceptable.

On the other hand, the view that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe appears to be more logical. Brahman creates the universe through the medium of avidya. Thus, avidya, in this sense, is regarded as the instrumental cause of the universe. Just as a magician projects illusory objects by his magical power, so Brahman projects this universe by its avidya or maya power. Questions may arise as to how Brahman can be the material cause of the universe, because a cause must evolve into the effect. Since Brahman is unchangeable, it cannot be seen as the material cause, a view accepted by Madhusudana himself.⁴⁶³ Reiterating the view of Prakafananda, he states that Brahman is not the evolving cause of the universe (parijami karaja), rather it is the base or locus where false transformation (vivarta) is projected. Advaita-vedanta accepts avidya as the parijami karaja of the created universe; to be more exact, it is the material cause of the universe and Brahman, being the locus of avidya, is accepted as the indirect cause. The frutis – such as ‘yato va imani bhutani jayane...’⁴⁶⁴ – confirm the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Brahman is the material cause of the universe because it is the substratum of all appearance (vivarta). The world is produced in Brahman by avidya.⁴⁶⁵

If both Brahman and avidya are regarded as the material causes of the world appearance then, Vyasaraja observes, this can be in three ways:

1 If both are considered to be equally responsible for the creation of this universe then the scripture should not have portrayed Brahman as unchangeable. Moreover, just as a piece of cloth made of two different colours has the threads of both colours running through it, so should the universe made of Brahman and anirvacaniya avidya be both real and anirvacaniya.⁴⁶⁶ Madhusudana may argue that the relationship of Brahman with the universe, being illusory, does not make the universe real. By the same logic, the relationship of avidya with the universe may also be illusory. Hence, the universe should not be regarded as anirvacaniya. Brahman and avidya cannot be equally regarded as the material cause of this world appearance.⁴⁶⁷

2 If Brahman, with its maya power, is regarded as the material cause and the scripture depicting the changelessness of Brahman is likewise interpreted in that light, the monists still cannot escape criticism. If Brahman undergoes change in its contact with maya then it becomes as evolving as the clay producing the earthen pot. If Brahman is regarded as qualified by maya, then the scripture confirming unqualified monism becomes invalid. On the other hand, if Brahman is regarded as unqualified, the scripture cannot cite it as the cause of the universe. It cannot be said that as qualified, Brahman is regarded as the evolving cause whereas as pure, Brahman is regarded as the vivarta cause, because even in pure Brahman the imposition of changeability is necessary for the sake of appearance. If it is acknowledged that pure Brahman, being the object of avidya, serves as the material cause of appearance, then it should be also acknowledged that the change in the form of the destruction of that quality is also manifested in pure Brahman. Hence the scripture depicting Brahman as unchangeable becomes meaningless, ⁴⁶⁸ so this theory must also be rejected.

3 The third probable explanation is that Brahman is the material cause of the world-appearance through maya, in the same way as fibre is considered to be the cause of a piece of cloth through the threads spun of it. That is to say, Brahman is the material cause of maya and maya is the material cause of the universe. However, this explanation is also unacceptable, because Brahman is not the material cause of maya. Therefore, it is evident that Brahman cannot be regarded as the material cause of this universe.

Madhusudana replies, that although both Brahman and avidya are equally considered to be the material causes of the universe, Brahman is the cause through appearance (vivarta) while avidya is the evolving cause (parijami karaja). Therefore, the vivarta cause Brahman remains unchangeable, whereas avidya as parijami karaja undergoes change. The reality of Brahman⁴⁶⁹ does not make the universe real because the rule that the effect must have the same degree of reality as possessed by its evolving cause, is not applicable here, inasmuch as Brahman is not the evolving cause of the universe. Hence the universe need not possess the same degree of reality as Brahman does. Thus Brahman, having a different category of reality, may remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the conception of avidya as the ancillary material cause is necessary, because in common experience the conception of an evolving material cause is inevitable. The earthen pot has its material cause, clay, which evolves into that very object.⁴⁷⁰

It may be argued that not all the appearances require an evolving cause. For example, the shell-silver appearance does not possess an evolving cause because the material cause, which evolves into an effect, always produces an empirically real object (satyarupapatti). In the case of shell-silver, however, the unreal effect means that satyarupapatti does not take place. Hence it may be presumed that shell-silver does not possess any evolving material cause. As the Advaita-vedantins regard the existence of the universe as an appearance only, the supposition of avidya as its evolving material cause is superfluous.⁴⁷¹

Madhusudana further argues that according to Advaita-vedanta, evolution does not mean changing into a real form (satyarupapatti), because in this system both the evolving cause and the effect are equally non-existent. Moreover, as a changing (vikari) cause, avidya must be regarded as the material cause of the universe. Brahman cannot be a material cause in this sense because, in that case, the destruction of the world-appearance by the knowledge of the truth would not be possible. The knowledge of absolute truth can destroy the ignorance covering the truth (Brahman) and all evolving effects of ignorance (ajñ ana-parijama) can be destroyed immediately.⁴⁷²

Vyasaraja objects that Brahman cannot be regarded as the creator of this false universe, just as no creator (or agent) is found to produce the false silver. But Madhusudana construes that such objection does not stand scrutiny because even false silver is a creation of Saksi.⁴⁷³

Vyasaraja further argues by raising the question ‘what is really meant by agency (kartrtva)? ’⁴⁷⁴ It cannot be the quality of the substratum, nor can it be the quality of being the observer of the illusion, that is, a person who takes an illusion to be real, because such a person cannot be the agent of illusion if he/she as the agent, sees it as illusion before creating it. It cannot even be the quality of creating illusion for others, like a magician, because, in this case, unless the creator is aware of the existence of the jivas who will be illusioned, there is no need for the creator to possess this quality. On the other hand, if the creator is seen as being conscious of the existence of the jivas, he also becomes merged into illusion. It cannot be said that this illusion is imposed on the creator, for that conclusion gives way to the fallacy of reciprocal dependency; that is, to justify illusion one has to presuppose illusion. Moreover, this notion goes against the scripture which states, ‘I shall change into name and form, ’⁴⁷⁵ because a magician, before projecting his illusion, resolves not to ‘make’ it but to ‘show’ it to the spectators.

Moreover, the three alternatives mentioned earlier cannot justify the omniscience of the creator.⁴⁷⁶A fourth alternative might be that the creator is he who possesses the volition which is favourable to the evolution of the material into the effect.⁴⁷⁷ However, this theory is also open to criticism because in the case of illusion, such evolution is impossible.

Madhusudana states that the fourth alternative is free from all criticism. Agency means the possession of knowledge favourable to creative activities.⁴⁷⁸ The omniscience of Brahman is justified because Brahman possesses the required knowledge as a vrtti of maya, which is the material cause of the universe. Thus Brahman, by the vrtti of maya, is directly connected with all physical objects and directly knows every object.⁴⁷⁹ Therefore, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

Scriptural evidence, such as ‘yato va imani bhutani jayante yena jatani jivanti yat prayantyabhisaÅ vifanti’, ⁴⁸⁰ establishes Brahman as the locus of the creation, existence and disappearance of the universe, thereby making it the material cause of the universe. The scripture also states, ‘I establish the distinctions of name and appearance’, ⁴⁸¹ conveying the idea that Brahman is the agent of this universe. Other scriptural evidences include ‘After emitting it, he entered that very world.

And after entering, he became [both] visible and invisible [phenomena]’.⁴⁸² He had this desire: ‘Let me multiply myself. Let me produce offspring.’⁴⁸³ ‘In the beginning this world was the non-existent, and from it arose the existent.’⁴⁸⁴

Vyasaraja further objects that tejas, etc. cannot be the creation of Brahman, ⁴⁸⁵ as they possess, like God, the power of observation and creation and as such, are conscious phenomena. Hence, Brahman cannot be their material cause, for Brahman cannot be the material cause of any conscious entity.

To this, Madhusudana’s reply is that as consciousness per se cannot be created, when the scripture describes the creation of the elements, it refers to the revelation of consciousness as limited by those elements. The frutis, such as ‘the heat thought to itself’(tattejo aiksata) and ‘it created water’(tadapo’srjata), ⁴⁸⁶ merely say that consciousness limited by the preceding element is responsible for the creation of the successive element. For example, consciousness limited by space (akafa) is the creator of wind (vayu), consciousness limited by vayu is the creator of fire (tejas), and so on. As consciousness is thus recreating itself in the sense stated earlier, fruti states ‘tadatmanam svayam akuruta’ (‘it created itself.’), ⁴⁸⁷ indicating that Brahman is the material cause of creation. The preceding sentence from this fruti, which states ‘tato vai sadajayata’⁴⁸⁸ (‘from that, all this manifested world comes into being’), indicates that Brahman is equally the efficient or agent cause. In this way, the fruti cannot be accused of repetition.⁴⁸⁹

In justification of his view Madhusudana quotes a syllogism suggested by the author of Vivaraja, which is based on the scriptures, and confirms the view mentioned earlier.⁴⁹⁰ Moreover, both Surefvara in his Vartika⁴⁹¹ and Sarvajñ atma Muni in his SaÅ ksepa-fariraka support the view of Brahman’s being the material cause of the universe through avidya.⁴⁹² Madhusudana’s interpretation of this theory closely resembles that of Prakafananda Sarasvati.⁴⁹³ Prakafananda states that the actual evolving material cause is avidya, as the material cause is that which evolves into effect. It is impossible to ascribe such causality to Brahman, in which no change is possible. For Brahman to be the material cause, it has to be indirect, as the Vartika states. Avidya, the direct material cause, has Brahman as its locus. Thus Brahman creates the universe by projecting the universe-illusion through the instrument (karaja) of avidya. Avidya may therefore be seen also as the instrumental cause, a view shared by Sarvajñ atma Muni. It may be conjectured, therefore, that the active evolving cause of this world-illusion is avidya. This avidya, by virtue of its twofold power, creates the world on the one hand and the percipient individual, jiva on the other. By its concealing power (avaraja fakti), avidya hides the real nature of Brahman as unlimited, infinite and unchangeable, and causes it to be seen as limited and finite, subjected to the worldly bondage of birth and death. Ignorance is the cause of jiva’s non-recognition of its own self-revealed, unlimited and transcendental nature. By its projecting power (viksepa fakti), avidya creates this universe on Brahman, just as a false snake is projected on a rope by human-error. Brahman is therefore necessary as the substratum of illusion and for imposing a false existence on these illusory objects, derived from their illusory identification with Brahman.

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