Savikalpa and nirvikalpa pratyaksa

There are two kinds of direct knowledge, determinate, or conceptual perception, (savikalpaka pratyaksa) and indeterminate or, nonconceptual perception (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa). The former means the direct knowledge of an object that reveals the substance in terms of its attributes. For example, the knowledge ‘the pitcher is red’ reveals both the substance – the pitcher – and the attribute – its red colour. It also discloses their relationship with regard to identity. However, in the latter, the experience does not reveal the differentiated nature of the object, for instance, pitcher and its attribute, redness. In other words, nirvikalpa pratyaksa presents the object to the cogniser as an integral whole (akhajdartha) without any reference to its substance and attributes. In the Upanisadic sentence ‘tat tvam asi’, (you are it), Advaita-vedanta claims, each of the words ‘tat’, (it) and ‘tvam’, (you) and the verb to be (asi), produces nirvikalpa pratyaksa and presents an akhajdartha, while the whole sentence also generates nirvikalpa pratyaksa knowledge of pure Brahman without any reference to the attributes of either ‘it’ or, ‘you’ or to any relationship between them; or any reference to the time, or space of their existence. This is a very important notion because this and three other Upanisadic statements designated as maha vakya (great sentence) are to produce the gnosis of the unqualified and undifferentiated Brahman by removing the error of all differentiated cognitions.

As previously stated, vrtti in general dispels the veil of ignorance embracing an object. As the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality, is concealed from jiva, a vrtti should legitimately be drawn upon to discard this veil of ignorance. According to the Advaita-vedanta, such a vrtti embraces the identity between jiva and Brahman. This identity is called akhajdartha, the integral monolithic meaning. It may be noted here that the vrtti we are concerned with is an aparoksa (direct) vrtti, insofar as it is intended to discard jiva’s ignorance regarding Brahman, so that Brahman is revealed to him. Since the veiling ignorance of a person regarding Brahman is direct, the vrtti has to be direct as well, because only the direct vrtti dispels the veiling nescience. For example, in the case of an error regarding direction (dig-bhranti), it is only dispelled by direct knowledge about the direction.

Such a direct vrtti is recognised by the Advaita-vedanta to emerge, as referred to before, from great Upanisadic statements such as ‘tat tvam asi’ and ‘aham Brahmasmi’(I am Brahman). In other words, even though such modal cognition is a type of direct knowledge that dispels primordial avidya, it is still a form of verbal cognition. Therefore an objection may be raised as to how a verbal statement can produce direct knowledge. The answer put forward by Madhusudana is that word (fabda) can indeed produce direct knowledge, ²²⁰ although it generally generates indirect knowledge. Just as sometimes mind produces indirect knowledge and at other times direct knowledge, so also fabda sometimes produces direct knowledge, while at other times it produces indirect knowledge. In connection with sound producing direct knowledge, the following situation deserves consideration. Ten people cross a river. When they reach the other side, each one counts the number of heads to check that they have all safely crossed the river. But each one commits the same error of omitting himself from the count. Another person comes along and requests one of the original ten to count again. The man counts, and repeats the same mistake. The other person then says to the counter, ‘you are the tenth person’ and removes his mistake. All ten people committed the same error of direct illusion (aparoksa bhrama). Such a mistake can be rectified by contradictory knowledge, which is equally direct. Just as the person counting is disillusioned by the criticism of that eleventh person, he has to admit that the statement ‘you are the tenth person’ has yielded direct knowledge (aparoksa jñ ana), which has discarded his direct error. This demonstrates that even though fabda usually produces indirect knowledge, when a statement is applied to establish identity between one meaning of a constituent word and another presented by the word ‘tvam’, such a statement produces direct knowledge. Seen in this light, sentences like ‘you are the tenth’ (dafama-s-tvama asi); ‘you are the king’ (raja tvam asi), making somebody realise his hitherto unknown royal identity, and ‘tat tvam asi’ revealing the individual’s true identity, will all yield direct knowledge. On the other hand, a statement like ‘the blue jug’(nilo ghatah) will produce indirect knowledge. Though this statement produces an identity between the blue colour and the pitcher, neither ‘blue’ nor ‘the pitcher’ conveys the meaning of total identity like the sentences shown above.

Moreover, this interpretation of those frutis producing akhajdartha is not baseless. Scriptures such as ‘tad-dh-asya vijajñ au’, ‘tamasah param darfayati’ and ‘vedanta vijnnana sunifcitartha’, ²²¹ also confirm that sentences like ‘tat tvam asi’ produce direct knowledge of an individual’s identity with absolute Brahman. The first two scriptural quotations show that only scriptural teaching can generate direct knowledge of the absolute Brahman. In the third, the word ‘vijñ ana’ indicates that Vedantic teaching can produce knowledge of absolute

Brahman, while the word ‘sunifcitartha’denotes that such knowledge is direct.²²²

The question is, how can verbal knowledge, that generally embraces a substance in relation to certain attributes, comprehend ‘akhajdartha’, the integral monolithic meaning which apparently disallows all consideration of relationship? Because, every sentence by definition shows the relationship between the different parts of speech in order to produce a coherent sense.

To answer this question, Citsukha²²³ states that when a sentence having nonsynonymous words (aparyaya fabda) presents an integrated and monolithic meaning without any reference to their intra-relationship, such as that exists between the parts of speech in a sentence, that sentence is said to have an integral sense (akhajdartha). In other words, when the constituent words of a sentence denote the meaning of one substance which is looked upon as a mere stem (pratipadika), without any reference to the syntactical inflexions usual in a grammatical sentence, those words are taken to yield akhajdartha. Thus, for example, in the sentence prakrsta-prakafah candrah (moon, the marvellous light), the word ‘prakrstaprakafah’denotes only the object, the moon, as the stem chandra indicates that it is unrelated to anything. In this light, the words ‘tat’and ‘tvam’in the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’ present mere consciousness without any reference to any relationship. It may be noted here that such meaning is obtained only with reference to the words’ secondary meaning (laksaja).²²⁴

Madhusudana’s definition of akhajdartha largely follows that of Citsukha. According to Madhusudana, ‘when non-synonymous words constituting a sentence convey an integrated meaning in such a way that the sentence itself does not present any additional meaning of the relationships between the parts of speech as the content of a valid cognition, but only presents the unitary meaning recalled by the powers of the same constituent words, it is said to be a case of akhajdartha’²²⁵ (‘aparyaya fabdanam padavrttismaritatiriktagocara pramajanakatvam). Hence, his innovation lies in his mentioning that ‘the sentence itself does not present any additional meaning of the relationship as its content’ (padavrttismaritatiriktagocara). When a sentence produces verbal knowledge, (fabdabodha) such knowledge normally involves inter-relations between the meanings of the words constituting the sentence. Thus, for example, the sentence ‘nilo ghatah’presents the cognition that ‘blue colour and the pitcher are identical’. Here the relationship between the meanings of the words ‘nila’ and ‘ghatah’ regarding identity is embraced by the sentence ‘nilo ghatah’. As to the presentation of the interrelation in the verbal cognition, there are two prevailing theories in the MimaÅ sa school, known as ‘anvitabhidhanavada’and ‘abhihitanvayavada’, respectively held by the Prabhakara’s school of MimaÅ sakas and the Bhatta Kumarila’s school of MimaÅ sakas.

According to the former view, the denotative power (fakti) of the words constituting a sentence presents, in the verbal cognition, both the substantive meanings and their interrelations. The process may be described in the following way, using the sentence ‘nilo ghatah’ (the blue pitcher), as an example. The word ‘nila’, when heard, produces the knowldge that ‘nila’ denotes blue which is understood as the fakti, power of that word. This cognition of fakti, in turn, presents to the memory the colour blue. According to the MimaÅ sa school, memory not only embraces the colour blue, but this colour in relation to another object (which is in this case the pitcher, ‘ghatah’). This is also the case with the word ‘ghatah’. Thus the meanings of both ‘nila’and ‘ghatah’are revealed in the verbal cognition in terms of a special relationship of identity – the colour blue is identical with the pitcher. Furthermore, it is stated that every word in a sentence possesses two faktis, one revealing its direct meaning-content and the other its relationship with the meaning-contents of other words. A solitary word, completely independent of a sentence, does not convey any proper meaning. While the first fakti, being known, presents the substantive, the second fakti by itself, (i.e. without being known), presents the relationship. As distinguished from the first fakti, the second fakti is called ‘kubja fakti’(bent or restricted word-power), since this fakti itself remains outside the verbal cognition. Hence, according to this theory, even though the interrelationship is presented by the fakti of the words, this interrelationship is not recalled (smarita) by means of the cognition of faktis of the words.²²⁶

The abhihitanvayavada explains the cognition of relationship in verbal knowledge in the following way: Starting with the same statement ‘nilo ghatah’, they expound that the word ‘nila’ presents the colour blue to the memory of the cogniser (but not any relationships). Likewise, the word ‘ghatah’ presents to the cogniser in a second memory the form of the pitcher (but not its relationship with the other). It may be noted here that even though the first and second memory comprehend the colour blue and the pitcher respectively, the subsequent verbal cognition embraces not only the blue colour and the pitcher, but their relationship of identity as well. The question is how does the relationship of identity appear in the verbal cognition? If verbal knowledge is confined to the meanings presented by the verbal vrtti, then a vrtti has to be accounted for, which gives rise to the aforementioned relationship of identity. The Bhatta-school maintains that while fakti presents the primary meaning of a noun, that is – the colour blue – while its secondary meaning, (laksaja) presents the relationship of identity. According to this school, such a laksaja is itself a relationship (fakyasambandha) between, on the one hand, the primary meaning presented by fakti and, on the other, the relationship of identity revealed in the verbal cognition.²²⁷ Seen in this light – every verbal cognition involves a secondary meaning insofar as it comprehends the relationship that cannot be presented by fakti. Fakti ceases to operate immediately after it has presented the substantive meaning of the word. The secondary meaning, however, like the second fakti of the Anvitabhidhanavadins, presents by itself, without any reference to the intended relationship in the verbal cognition. The extent of the function of this secondary meaning is regulated by the expectancy (akaÅ ksa) existing in the words. Such expectancy determines in the verbal cognition the precise contents, including their mutual relationship.²²⁸

Both these views agree that interrelationship (saÅ sarga) between wordsconstituents of a sentence which a verbal cognition reveals, is not recalled (smarita) by the power of denotation of the constituent words of a sentence. At the same time, however, both views maintain that revelation of relationship in a verbal cognition is brought about by the cognising mental mode, primary meaning (abhidha) in one view and secondary meaning (laksaja ) in the other.

The Advaita-vedanta holds that an interrelated meaning is not necessarily conveyed in each and every sentence. There may be some cases of sentences that present a monolithic meaning without any scope of such relationship. In most cases, verbal cognition does involve relationship, but other cases are conceivable where verbal cognition may not involve any relationship at all, but may be strictly confined to the knowledge of a single substantive. The secular statement ‘prakrstaprakafafcandra’, and the Vedic statement ‘tat tvam asi’, are both illustrations of the latter kind of knowledge. Using the conclusions of both the MimaÅ sa schools, ²²⁹ Madhusudana states that while ordinary verbal knowledge comprehends an entity (relationship) which is not recalled to memory by means of ‘padavrtti’, that is, verbal cognition, the similar knowledge emerging from sentences like ‘tat tvam asi’ does not comprehend an additional entity, namely, relationship, apart from the meanings of the pure substantive of constituent words. A sentence that does not allow any interrelationship between the meanings of its constituent parts, is said to present an integral meaning, (akhajdartha). Hence any shadow of duality emerging from its verbal cognition is ruled out.

Madhusudana adopts Citsukha’s definition of akhajdartha as an alternative one without making any substantial change. The commentator, Brahmananda, while elucidating on the concept of Madhusudana on this definition, states that sometimes words, by their secondary connotative meaning alone, produce a verbal cognition of just a single substantive (pratipadikartha).²³⁰ It should be noted that the words constituting a sentence that yield such akhajdartha must be nonsynonymous. For example, the words ‘satyam’, ‘jñ anam’ and ‘anantam’ in the Vedic statement ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’, through their laksaja-fakti, refer to one substantive, namely pure Brahman, although by their primary meaning they denote different entities. Thus, satyam means reality as marked by the absence of falsity, jñ anam means the same reality marked by the absence of ignorance and anantam means the reality as marked by the absence of any limitation.

As stated before, akhajdartha is the intended meaning of sentences like ‘tat tvam asi’. The realisation of such meaning is the goal of the Vedanta teachings insofar as it dispels the primordial ignorance of the knower regarding the true nature of Brahman. However, an analysis of the process of the verbal cognition which comprehends the integral meaning, will disclose that such verbal cognition is dependant upon the cognition of the meaning of ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’, the constituent words of ‘tat tvam asi’. In other words, the knower must first be sure about the meaning (fakti) of the words ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’, before he realises the integral meaning in the verbal cognition arising from the sentence. The determination of the meaning of ‘tat’and ‘tvam’, which is thus a prerequisite of verbal knowledge, is recognised by the Advaita-vedanta school to be another form of verbal knowledge. Thus a Vedic statement like ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’²³¹ is said to present the knowledge of ‘tat’, which is undoubtedly a verbal knowledge, and is also stated to comprehend an akhajdartha, namely pure Brahman. This akhajdartha refers to the meaning of a single part of speech in a sentence, in view of the fact that it is the meaning of the word ‘tat’ of the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’, though it also denotes the meaning of a whole sentence, being the meaning of the sentence ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’.²³² It may be noted here that a Vedic sentence like ‘satyamjñ ananmanantam Brahma’ yields an akhajdartha which serves the purpose of understanding the meaning of ‘tat tvam asi’, which presents a second akhajdartha emerging from that sentence. In this way, the first sentence sub-serves the purpose of the second and therefore is subordinate to it. Akhajdartha is therefore of two types, the first called ‘padartha’, that is, the verbal cognition of a word in a sentence, and the second known as ‘vakyartha’, that is, the verbal cognition of a sentence.²³³

As the sentence ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and eternity’,

(Satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma), is a definition of Brahman and is given in answer to the question on the nature of pure Brahman, so this statement has to denote absolute Brahman, which is the meaning of the word ‘that’, (tat) in the sentence ‘that you are’ (tat tvam asi). This is the akhajdartha belonging to the word ‘tat’. Similarly, the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’ presents an akhajdartha, whose meaning does not itself involve any distinction between the constituent words, ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’, as related to one another by, for example, cause and effect, but embraces an identical substantive connoted by the two words, namely, the one and the same Brahman. Hence the meaning of this sentence does not involve any kind of relationship.²³⁴

Madhusudana examines two objections against the conclusion that a Vedic statement like ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’ presents akhajdartha through laksaja. The first objection is that if the constituent words of a sentence do not present a relationship in the verbal cognition, they cannot constitute a sentence. The words of a sentence must possess akaÅ ksa (expectancy), yogyata (congruity) and asatti or sannidhi (proximity), all of which involve relationship.²³⁵ The second objection is that if the words in the sentence ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’ do not involve any relationship, then there can be no secondary meaning, laksaja. According to some scholars, laksaja is the presentation of an object which is revealed in the verbal cognition in relation to another object and which is not the denotative meaning of a word. The root cause of such a presentation is the apparent incongruity of relationship between the denotative meanings of the words.²³⁶ Thus laksaja always involves a relationship. Both these objections are based on the description of verbal knowledge held by the Naiyayikas.

In answer to the first objection, Madhusudana states that all three conditions of a sentence, namely akaÅ ksa, yogyata and asatti, exist in the words ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’, yet they present the akhajdartha, that is, absolute Brahman, in the verbal cognition. AkaÅ ksa is that condition without which the words cannot present the intended meaning (tatparyartha) of the sentence. Seen in this light, akaÅ ksa does not involve any contact (anvaya). This intended meaning may sometimes include relationship (saÅ srsta) for example, ‘the blue pitcher’, and sometimes akhajdartha for example, ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’. Such akaÅ ksa exists in the four words of the sentence ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’, which then present an integral meaning in the verbal cognition, and thus constitute a sentence.²³⁷ Likewise, by proximity, Madhusudana means the presentation of words in a favourable juxtaposition to the verbal cognition.²³⁸ Therefore, proximity does not necessarily involve any relationship and can exist in the words belonging to ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’ without this aspect. On the other hand, congruity (yogyata), means non-contradictoriness in the subject of import (tatparyartha), hence it may remain even in a case of akhajdartha, which does not involve any relationship. Therefore, Madhusudana concludes that even though the words belonging to the sentence ‘satyamjñ anamanantam Brahma’present an akhajdartha in the verbal cognition, they may still possess all three qualities of akaÅ ksa, yogyata and asatti, which enable them to present intended meaning.

In answer to the second objection, Madhusudana states that the secondary meaning is not by itself presented through the intended meaning (laksyartha), but it is the verbal mode (vrtti) that persists in the relationship (fakyasambandha) between the literal meaning (vacyartha) and the secondary or intended meaning (laksyartha). As the Advaitins maintain that there is a false relationship subsisting between the vacyartha and the laksyartha of the said words, there is no harm in admitting laksaja here. Moreover, the root cause of admitting a laksaja is the incongruity in the intended meanings of the words (tatparyarthanupapatti). Thus a laksaja does not necessarily involve interrelated sentential meaning.²³⁹

Saksi-jñ ana

The discussion has thus far been focused on experiences where the knower is an individual and the experiences are related to the functions of his mind. But beyond the fold of this type of knowledge, remain some other kinds of experience which are regarded by the Advaitins as saksi-jñ ana.²⁴⁰ A pitcher may exist whether or not it is cognised. On the other hand, happiness cannot exist without being cognised at the same time. There is, therefore, a practical distinction between the cognition of a pitcher and the cognition of happiness. The question arises as to what is the difference between these two types of knowledge. The nature of the pitcher or that of happiness cannot be adduced as an explanation for this difference, since the nature itself varies from pitcher to pitcher, or from happiness to happiness. Likewise, the knowledge of the pitcher is as distinct from the knowledge of happiness as is the knowledge of cloth. Is it possible to state, therefore, that the nature of cloth explains the difference of knowledge? If so, then the nature of cloth is a second differential, apart from the nature of the pitcher. So it is clear that there is no one consistent (anugata) criterion that may be held out to distinguish the knowledge of the pitcher from the knowledge of happiness. Therefore, the differential must be found elsewhere. For example, it may be said that the difference between the two types of knowledge occurs because there is a difference between the two types of cognitive mode involved in such knowledge. Thus, while knowledge of the pitcher is brought about by a mental mode, the knowledge of happiness is said to result from a mode of avidya.

As is put forward earlier in this chapter, in ordinary cognition the knower’s inner sense organ functions in a way that the ignorance covering the object from the knower’s awareness is removed, thereby revealing the object to him. In this sense, the mode of the inner sense organ is called ‘valid cognitive mode’ (pramajavrtti), which is instrumental to his valid knowledge regarding a particular object. On the other hand, as happiness can never be concealed from the individual who experiences it, that which is experiencing such happiness has to be recognised as being a different entity from the knower of an ordinary object like the pitcher. The distinct reality that experiences happiness is called saksi.

However, saksi is not only distinct from an individual but also from pure Brahman. The reason for this is that saksi-knowledge, for instance, the experience of happiness, is as fleeting as the knowledge of the pitcher and not at all like Brahman-knowledge. The ordinary cognition of an object, say a pitcher depends upon the cognitive mode of the inner sense organ. Brahman-knowledge involves no modal function of any phenomenon; but saksi-knowledge requires to be conditioned (upahita) by the modal function of avidya, (avidya-vrtti). However, as it is not ever contradicted saksi-knowledge is accepted as valid. In fact validity or non-validity is generally associated with ordinary knowledge like the knowledge of a pitcher, saksi-knowledge is taken to be free from such consideration.

Saksi-knowledge has its parallel in the introspection (manasapratyaksa) and recognition (anuvyavasaya) of the Naiyayikas. It corresponds to the intuitive knowledge (pratibhakajñ ana) of the Faiva school of thought and the dhvani of the school of poetics, in which ‘rasa’ is cognised as long as it exists.

Knowledge is self-revealed (svaprakafa)

The function of vrtti is already established as the removal of the ignorance covering the object that it embraces. Besides this, some scholars posit that vrtti forges a contact between the object-consciousness and the knower, while others hold that it produces identity between the object-consciousness and the cognising consciousness. Whatever the function of vrtti may be, it is evident that it is not the revealer of the object. Objects are always revealed by consciousness, as conditioned by vrtti.²⁴¹ This is known as the knowledge of an object. So who is the revealer of this knowledge? It is stated that knowledge is self-revealed (svaprakafa). This is the distinction between consciousness and ordinary insensate objects. While insensate objects are revealed (drfya) by external consciousness, consciousness is not; it reveals its own self as well as the objects that come into contact with such consciousness. Hence self-luminosity (svaprakafatva) is the basic feature of knowledge. Whenever knowledge is produced, it becomes revealed, just like a lamp which, as well as its own self, reveals the objects that come into contact with it. Madhusudana defines self-luminosity of knowledge as follows:

While a pitcher requires knowledge for its revelation, knowledge does not require other knowledge for its own revelation. On the contrary, it is self-revealed. Technically speaking, while the pitcher is apt to be revealed by consciousness (phalavyapya), consciousness does not require this element, so it is called self-revealed.²⁴²

Madhusudana proposes another definition of the self-revelation of knowledge:

Knowledge does not, for its revelation, require another knowledge; because knowledge by itself provides for such usage as ‘knowledge is revealed’ (aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam).²⁴³ Knowledge is therefore self-luminous insofar as it yields to usage based on direct knowledge, even though it is not comprehended by other knowledge.

Thus, although the pitcher and consciousness seem to be on a par, in that both are liable to direct usage based on direct knowledge, yet, while the pitcher requires a valid vrtti for its revelation, consciousness does not. However, the same consciousness cannot be both the knower and the known, for such a relationship presupposes a distinction between the knower and the known, which is not true in the case of consciousness.²⁴⁴ Therefore, it is necessary to explain what a valid knowledge really is and how it functions.

Knowledge is, in fact, the reflection of consciousness on a vrtti. As reflection is identical with the object being reflected, so knowledge is not different from consciousness, that is, pure Brahman. Brahman is self-revealed in the sense that even when not directly known, unlike an ordinary object, it is still liable to be used, as is in the verbal knowledge, ‘I am Brahman’. Likewise, though not properly understood to the extent of its real nature, knowledge is still liable to be used as revealed in the form ‘I have knowledge of the pitcher’.²⁴⁵ To prove the self-luminosity of knowledge, Madhusudana proposes two inferences:

1 Knowledge is, by its essence, not the object of consciousness, that is, not pervaded by ‘phala’ (the result of a valid vrtti), because knowledge is consciousness.

2 Knowledge that is unknown, that is, unrevealed by the ‘phala’, is still capable of being used, because knowledge is consciousness (anubhuti).

The argument runs thus – ‘that which is pervaded by the result of a cognition, or in other words, that which is the content of a cognition, becomes liable to direct usage, yet is not consciousness, e.g., the pitcher’.²⁴⁶ This argument is a case of a syllogism where the middle premise is a negative (vyatireka²⁴⁷) one.

The main argument in favour of these inferences is that knowledge, being consciousness, cannot be the object of consciousness; that is, knowledge cannot be the object of its own self or of another knowledge. Opponents of this theory state that there are cases where an entity does become its own object. For example, the mental endeavour (krti) exerted on performing an action (kriya), is itself an action. Likewise, the knower himself becomes the known, as in the case of the experience ‘I know myself’. Such experience shows that the relationship between the object and the subject does not always require the duality of the knower and the known. Nor does this relationship require that the two entities must exist when knowledge takes place, since, in the case of knowledge of an object that is destroyed or that of a non-existing object such as a sky-flower, the objects do not exist yet their knowledge is still an undeniable fact. Thus there are some entities, such as those mentioned above, that become objects of their own selves.²⁴⁸ Consciousness is therefore on a par with them.

Madhusudana meets this problem in the following way: It is a fact that usage such as ‘this is a jug’, is based upon previous knowledge of the jug. An object must be known before a statement is made about it. In order to make this rule applicable to the usage – ‘this is consciousness’ – it has to be presumed that this knowledge, the content of this usage, has also been revealed by knowledge. The question then arises, is the knowledge that reveals the first knowledge – the content of the usage – identical with the first knowledge or, is it a separate reality? The admission of a separate reality would raise the same question with regard to the second knowledge as well, and so on, so there would be no settlement of the issue (anavastha). It should be accepted, therefore, that the so-called second knowledge that reveals the first knowledge is, in fact, not a second knowledge after all, but the self-revelation of the first knowledge. The acceptance of such a position amounts to the admission of a nature (svabhava) of knowledge, which enables it to reveal itself so that it may be liable to direct usage. Madhusudana therefore contends that the general rule – ‘usage of an object requires previous knowledge of it’– need not be applicable to knowledge itself. Therefore, for the sake of this rule, the revelation of knowledge by its own self need not be recognised. Unlike the pitcher, knowledge is self-revealed insofar as it conduces to a direct usage, namely ‘this is consciousness’, without knowledge being previously known.

Thus far, the self-luminosity of knowledge has been discussed on the basis of the presumption that knowledge is basically consciousness itself. However, parallel to this concept of knowledge, another notion exists in which knowledge means valid cognition obtained through the function of a valid mental mode. This raises the question if the validity of the valid knowledge requires some other valid cognition. To avoid this problem knowledge is taken to be self-valid. The selfvalidity of knowledge may be considered in two ways: First, validity of knowledge is produced by the same conditions that produce the knowledge itself. Second, the knowledge that reveals the first knowledge invariably reveals the validity of the second knowledge. Both issues are dealt with separately in the following.

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