Function of the mental mode (antahkaraja-vrtti)

The revealer of an object is the consciousness that is its locus.²⁰⁰ As the substratum of avidya, Brahman is the material cause of every object. An object is wrongly superimposed on Brahman and the relationship between the superimposed object and its locus, Brahman, is that of illusory identification (adhyasika tadatmya).²⁰¹ Such identification regulates the revelation of the object by consciousness in which the object is falsely related in terms of identity, as stated earlier. The consciousness in fact, as the locus (adhisthana caitanya) reveals itself and thereby the object superimposed on it. In this way, objects are always revealed to their substratum consciousness.

One may object that if the substratum consciousness is the revealer of objects how can the knower (pramata), that is, the individual knows objects? In other words, how can the knower, distinct from locus-consciousness, reveal the object? The answer is that an object may be revealed to the cognising person when this cognising consciousness merges its identity into the substratum consciousness (adhisthana caitanya). This in fact reveals the object. This identity with the revealed substratum consciousness follows, in all cases, the removal of ignorance from the cognising person with regard to the object. This removal of ignorance is brought about by the mental mode. Therefore, in the individual’s perception, there has to be a modal form of the mind. However, the experience ‘ghatah prakafate’ (‘the pitcher is being revealed’) as distinct from the experience ‘ghatam aham janami’ (‘I know the pitcher’) shows that the revealing consciousness, the locus, of the pitcher is different from a mental mode which operates in an individual’s perception of an object. The nature of the functions of vrtti depend upon the conception of jiva, the knower, and its relationship with the substratum consciousness, the revealer of the objects. I have been using the phrase ‘substratum consciousness’ which actually means saksi-caitanya or just saksi. Gauda Brahmananda, Madhusudana’s commentator explains: ‘the word means witness to whom every object is always revealed’.²⁰²

Very broadly speaking, the individual, jiva, is conceived by the Advaita philosophers in two ways.²⁰³ In one view, he is limited by the inner sense organ (antahkaraja). The saksi of the objects is then Brahman. In the other, jiva is all-pervasive. The latter view is further divided into two branches: one holds that jiva is all-pervasive, yet it is not the saksi of the objects; the other, that jiva is all-pervasive and the material cause of the objects, hence is their substratum as well. The authors of the Vivaraja, Vartika and SaÅ ksepa-fariraka consider jiva to be all-pervasive and not covered by avidya.²⁰⁴ Although all-pervasive, jiva is by nature unrelated to any objects (asakga), so while the objects are revealed to saksin, their material cause, jiva, (though not covered by avidya) does not experience them. According to Vacaspati Mifra, however, jiva is limited by avidya and is the material cause of its universe. Jiva, being the locus (afraya) of avidya, is considered by him to be the material cause. In this case, jiva, being the material cause, is the cosmic substratum consciousness, the revealer of the objects. However, some contents of experiences like happiness and sorrow are always revealed to jiva, while others, such as a pitcher, are only occasionally revealed to it. This position must be accepted. If it is not accepted, objects (like a the pitcher) would always, like emotions, appear to the jiva.²⁰⁵ Some followers of Vacaspati Mifra consider jiva to be limited by the inner sense organ. Being limited, jiva is in this case, distinct from the substratum consciousness of objects which is the all-pervasive consciousness saksi. According to this view, jiva is not the material cause of the universe either.

The functions of vrtti vary according to these concepts of nature of the cognising jiva. When jiva is consciousness limited by its inner sense organ, (the second view of the Vacaspati school), the substratum consciousness of the object, as stated earlier, is distinct from the cognising jiva. So in order to know an object jiva, has to make himself identified with saksi, to whom all objects are always revealed. The function of the mental mode in this instance is to forge that identification.²⁰⁶ Although avidya-vrtti can forge identification between the conscious knower and the consciousness underlying the object, until the knower’s ignorance with regard to the object is removed, it cannot be revealed to him. The complication arises because, from a metaphysical standpoint, even though the consciousness underlying each object is Brahman itself, and the cognising jiva, though limited by his inner sense organ, is still fundamentally identical with Brahman. Therefore, if mere identification between the consciousness underlying the object and the conscious knower is enough for the revelation of the objects to jiva, then the objects should have always been revealed to him. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that a mental vrtti, apart from forging an identity between object consciousness and the subject consciousness, removes the veil of ignorance from jiva with regard to the object it reveals by vrtti. According to the view propounded by the authors of Vivaraja, Vartika and SaÅ ksepa-fariraka, the cognising jiva, being all-pervasive, is basically identical with the saksi of objects. Jiva need not, therefore, be identified afresh with it. Identity with the substratum consciousness of objects connects jiva with the physical objects in a very general way. But being ‘asakga’ (i.e. not connected with objects other than avidya, its modifications, the inner sense organ, etc.), jiva lacks special contact with the objects necessary for their revelation to its self. The reason is that, in this view, jiva is not the material cause of the universe. The physical objects are therefore not superimposed on jiva.

The function of vrtti here is to remove from jiva the ignorance with regard to a particular object that is its content. The other function of vrtti may be summed up as follows: Vrtti qualifies the otherwise asakga jiva with a capacity to reveal the objects. In this context, Madhusudana draws upon an analogy from the old school of Naiyayikas. According to this school, all objects have a general relationship with universals such as cow-hood (gotva), but only the object marked by its dewlap, (i.e. the cow), reveals gotva. Likewise, asakga-jiva reveals an object only when it is marked by vrtti. In this way vrtti provides for a special aptitude in jiva, conducive to the revelation of the object.²⁰⁷ Thus the object becomes revealed to the jiva.

According to the other view (i.e. the theory of delimitation of jiva, avacchedavada of Vacaspati), jiva, being the material cause of its own universe, possesses the special contact with the object conducive to its revelation. However, as stated earlier, jiva is also covered by ignorance which prevents the object being revealed to it. Hence the mental mode (antahkaraja vrtti ) operates only to remove that ignorance from jiva.²⁰⁸

Madhusudana’s opponents raise the following objections: If ignorance (ajñ ana) is regarded as a single phenomenon, and if the mental mode removes this ignorance from jiva, then a vrtti should bring about jiva’s liberation, for liberation means the annihilation of jiva’s ignorance. Moreover, if consciousness, as marked by for instance, a pitcher is said to be concealed by ignorance, and if the pitcher is not covered by anything, ²⁰⁹ then concealment of the consciousness as marked by the pitcher (vifista) would virtually mean the concealment of pure consciousness. In such a case, the vrtti should reveal this pure consciousness. This will tantamount to instant liberation of the jiva, since, as a rule, revelation and concealment occupy the same place.²¹⁰

Madhusudana proposes several answers to the first objection. In the Siddhantabindu, he explains the function of vrtti in the following way: Just as in the analogy purported by the MimaÅ sa school, that the burning power of fire (dahakata fakti) is suppressed by the presence of a candrakanta gem (supposed to be capable of counteracting burning) and again becomes active when such a gem is removed, likewise vrtti does not destroy ignorance completely, but merely suppresses its power of concealing just one object, which is then revealed to the knower. When such vrtti ceases, the concealing power once again envelopes the object, so there is no question of liberation on the part of the knower by a particular cognition achieved by a mental mode.²¹¹ Madhusudana also draws upon the view of Vacaspati Mifra to answer the same question. Vacaspati classifies avidya/ajñ ana into primordial (mulavidya) and its offshoots (tulavidya). While the former is one and its destruction brings liberation, the latter are many and are different from the former, because they are innumerable and occupy only a single object.²¹² Finally, Madhusudana mentions a view, which states that vrtti destroys only individual ignorance (avasthajñ ana). According to Madhusudana, these, though identical with mulavidya, are innumerable. Thus a vrtti destroys one particular case of ignorance, while the other such individual cases of ignorance remain intact.²¹³

Madhusudana also suggests some other views to explain the function of vrtti.

Vrtti is said to take away a part (ekadefa) of the mulavidya that covered the object; or like a coward warrior, avidya just glides away at the presence of its opponent, the vrtti; or just as a rolled-up mat exposes the object beneath it, so vrtti helps to roll up the avidya a bit at a time revealing a part of the entire phenomenal world while the rest remains concealed. It is apparent that these views draw upon physical analogies that should not apply to an extraordinary entity like avidya.²¹⁴ However, all the above views come to a common conclusion that cognition generated by the function of mental mode does not destroy mulavidya and therefore, the question of the knower’s liberation does not arise.

The answer to the second objection, that an ordinary vrtti should reveal pure consciousness, is that the vrtti of the inner sense-organ taking the shape of an object, can remove the ignorance regarding the substratum consciousness as appearing identified with that very object insofar as that object is concerned; however, it does not remove the individual’s ignorance regarding pure Brahman.

Madhusudana describes the modus operandi of vrtti as follows: If such vrtti operates through one of the sense organs of the knower then, on the one hand, it has contact with the knower and on the other, the content of his cognition. By its contact with the knower it dispels his ignorance regarding the very existence of the object (asattv-apadak-avaraja). While embracing the object of knowledge (prameya), it discards the cover of ignorance that caused the non-revelation of that very object (abhan-apadaka-avaraja) so that the object is revealed to the cogniser as a real thing.²¹⁵

The fact that at any one time an individual knower knows one particular object to the exclusion of others is borne out by the presence of a specific vrtti of a specific knower regarding a specific object.²¹⁶ Such a specific vrtti establishes a specific identification between the specific individual knower and the objectconsciousness that reveals the object. As the specific vrtti arises at a specific moment, the knower of the knowledge, the object of knowledge and the time of knowing the object, all become specific.

When vrtti does not operate through a sense organ, that is, when knowledge of an object is indirect (paroksa), as in the case of inferential knowledge, the mental vrtti does not leave the body of the cogniser and so cannot take the shape of the object of knowledge (prameya). In this case, the vrtti resides in the body of the cogniser.²¹⁷ As the vrtti does not come into direct contact with the object, it cannot remove the concealment of the revelation of that object (abhan-apadakaavaraja). However, as it is generated in the mind of the investigating person, the vrtti can remove the covering of that investigating person which conceals the existence of the object (asattv-apadaka-avaraja). Thus, as distinguished from aparoksa (direct) vrtti, which produces knowledge such as ‘the pitcher exists and it reveals itself to me’, paroksa (indirect) vrtti ensures only the knowledge of the pitcher’s existence.

It may be objected that, if from the standpoint of the opinion that vrtti is necessary for the connection of the cognising consciousness with the objectconsciousness, then merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) and Brahman should also be always revealed to the cogniser as these are directly connected with his mind/inner sense-organ. Because the latter is their locus (afraya), so no vrtti is necessary for the direct perception of dharma, adharma and Brahman. Madhusudana answers that, in this view, only those objects that are both transparent and uncovered are revealed to the cogniser and vrtti fosters those two qualities to its object. Brahman, though transparent, is covered to the cogniser by its ignorance and thus it waits for vrtti to remove that cover and reveal Brahman. In the case of an ordinary pitcher, vrtti removes its covering and also makes it transparent by pervading it. In the case of the non-transparent dharma and adharma, they are by their very nature covered so vrtti is able to remove only the cogniser’s ignorance covering their existence, thus generating only indirect knowledge of them.²¹⁸ In the case of false shell-silver, the silver is not covered but it is non-transparent. Hence vrtti is necessary to make it transparent.

Even though, in the light of what has been said above, vrtti operates differently at different places, generally speaking it establishes contact (uparaga) between the cogniser and the object of cognition so that the cognitional vrtti, receives the reflection of both the cognising consciousness and the object-consciousness.²¹⁹

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