Second definition of Vivaraja

The third definition of mithyatva is also based on the Vivaraja: ¹⁵⁰ ‘mithya means that which is liable to termination (nivartya) by knowledge ( jñ ananivartyatvam va mithyatvam)’. Opponents argue that as the first knowledge is destroyed by the second knowledge, such first knowledge should be regarded as mithya according to the definition stated earlier.¹⁵¹ Moreover, when a pitcher is smashed it is destroyed, but such destruction is not brought about by knowledge, though the pitcher is a mithya object. Madhusudana replies that mithya is to be understood as an entity whose existence in general is liable to contradiction by knowledge. In the case of a smashed pitcher, though such a pitcher is destroyed in its gross form (karyarupa), it continues to exist as latent in its material cause.¹⁵² Such destruction then does not mean the negation of its existence in general. By the same logic, the second knowledge cannot destroy the existence in general of the first knowledge. The existence of the illusory shell-silver should be acknowledged at the time of its appearance, but the contradicting knowledge negates the existence in general of the shell-silver. Thus, the contradicting knowledge destroys not only the shell-silver but also its material cause, that is, the particular ajñ ana creating it. Thus the shell-silver is robbed of its existence in general by the contradicting knowledge.¹⁵³

Mithya may also be that which has narrower scope than jñ anatva’, that is, the generic quality of knowledge. Therefore, it is liable to destruction by knowledge characterised by the same generic quality.¹⁵⁴ His opponents raise the objection that memory is also characterised by the generic quality ‘smrtitva’, which is narrower than jñ anatva.¹⁵⁵ When a memory takes place, it destroys the mental impression

(saÅ skara) that produces it. Then the definition of mithyatva misses its mark (arthantara) insofar saÅ skara is concerned. Madhusudana answers that the advent of memory does not, in fact, destroy the saÅ skara producing such memory. However, it does produce another saÅ skara regarding the same object and thus the number of saÅ skaras is multiplied.¹⁵⁶

Alternatively, the definition might be explained as that which is liable to be contradicted by direct knowledge. This interpretation is much simpler than the second interpretation of jñ ana-nivartyatva. Hence, the author of the Vartika states that, ‘when the direct knowledge is generated by the fruti “tattvamasi, ” the avidya, along with its effect, completely ceases to exist’.

Definition of Citsukha

The fourth definition of mithya is taken from Citsukha’s

‘Svafrayanisthatyantabhava pratiyogitva’ ‘mithya is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation co-existing in the same locus (afraya) as the object under review’. This is interpreted in the following way: a mithya is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation that is invariably present where the same object appears to ‘be’.¹⁵⁷ In other words, an object that is invariably absent where it seems to be present is called mithya. His opponents argue that when a pitcher is produced from its halves (kapala), its material cause, it remains inherent (samaveta) in the kapala, so how can it be absolutely absent? Madhusudana answers that both the pitcher and its absolute negation may co-exist at the same time, for example, the pitcher exists in the kapala at the same time as its absence remains on the floor. Likewise, why are the pitcher and its non-existence unable to co-exist at the same place? ¹⁵⁸ Though the pitcher becomes absent in its material cause in the way stated earlier, the law of causality is not violated thereby. The antecedent negation (pragabhava) of a particular pitcher, resting with a particular kapala, regulates the production of that particular pitcher from that specific kapala. As in time, so also at the same place (as, for example, in the kapala in the present case) the antecedent negation as well as the absolute negation of the same object (i.e. the pitcher in the present case) can co-exist. Though such co-existence may not be apparent to us, the authority of the fruti (neha nanasti kiñ cana) establishes such co-existence. Moreover, while the pitcher is a pragmatic reality, its absence is absolute. Therefore, for us, the pitcher and its absence can co-exist (in the kapalas) because each of them has a different grade of reality. The law of contradiction operates only where the absence and its positive counterpart possess the same degree of reality. Obviously for Madhusudana, this is a more reasonable and direct explanation than the former one, which is somewhat involved. Thus, just as illusory shell-silver and its pragmatically real absence can easily co-exist on the shell, likewise the pitcher and its absence can both be present on the kapala without any fear of contradiction. Though in this way the universe becomes absolutely absent, it should not be confused with the non-existence of the ‘horns of a hare’(asat). They are different because, while the latter never appears to exist at any locus, the former evidently appears to exist in Brahman. So the definition of mithya boils down to this: an illusory object is, in fact, absolutely and invariably absent whenever and wherever it appears to exist.

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