Arguments in favour of difference, bheda

This is a concept the bhakti-theologians especially the Vaisjavas, cannot accept. Dualists such as Madhva and his followers challenge the above view. Among the five distinctions recognised by them to be absolute, ³¹² one is that of jiva from Brahman, that is, God. This distinction is proved by perceptional evidence.

Ordinary knowledge of jiva fails to recognise Ifvara as distinct from jiva, because

Ifvara is not the object of ordinary knowledge. However, jiva always feels its distinction from God as evident from such experiences as: ‘I am not omniscient like God’, ‘I am subjected to sorrow’, etc. Furthermore, if jiva were identical with God, it would possess omniscience, which again should be experienced. As there is no such experience, jiva does not possess omniscience. Moreover, unless the cognition of distinction (bheda) is accepted, the Advaitins cannot negate it as such negation requires a pre-affirmation of the negated subject (prasaktapratisedha). The statement of God in the Bhagavadgita, ‘I know all my previous births but oh,

Arjuna, you do not know them’, ³¹³ implies that God, (Ifvara) always perceives

His distinction from the jiva. Therefore, the distinction of Ifvara (i.e. Brahman) from the jiva is established by the infallible perception of God.

Distinction (bheda) can also be established by following three inferences:

1 Jiva and Ifvara are mutually different; because they are substrata of mutually conflicting qualities; the qualities of the jiva are in total conflict with those of Ifvara, just as fire and snow are opposed to each other.

2 Brahman, being omniscient is, in fact, different from the jiva, as that which is not omniscient is none other than jiva; for example, the jiva itself.

3 Ifvara is the locus of the difference, the positive counterpart (pratiyogin) of which is the jiva; because Ifvara is omniscient, omnipotent, the agent of all activities and independent; the negative example (vyatireki-drstanta) is the jiva.

The scripture also proves this fact. Thus the frutis, such as ‘dva suparja, ’³¹⁴ ‘ye atmani tisthan, ’³¹⁵ and ‘Ajo hyeko jusamajo’nufete jahatyenaÅ bhuktabhogamajo’nyah, ³¹⁶ confirm the difference between the jiva and Brahman. Moreover, in order to establish identity the Advaitins must at first choose one of three options:

1 accept the existence of the jiva as known by direct knowledge and then establish its identity with Brahman;

2 accept the existence of Brahman, known from the scripture, as distinct from jiva and then establish its individualness ( jivatva);

3 accept the existence of both of them separately and then establish their identity.

In all of these cases, however, before the Advaitins establish the identity between the jiva and Brahman, they are forced to accept their distinct existence. Therefore, the realisation of identity depends upon the realisation of the distinctiveness of Brahman and jiva. As the latter is the fundamental meaning of the scriptures, it possesses greater strength than the former; thus, the theory of identity, which is based on such a foundation, does not stand up to logic.

The validity of the scriptural statement confirming duality is further emphasised by the fact that from the introduction of the Mujdaka Upanisad and the concluding portion thereof, it is evident that the main thesis of this scripture is to establish duality. For example, it begins with ‘the two birds’ (dva suparja)³¹⁷ and ends in ‘attains great harmony’ (paramaÅ samyamupaiti).³¹⁸ Moreover, the same view is repeated over and over again in the same scripture in order to make the conclusion free from all doubts.³¹⁹ Further, as the fruti has to present a novel idea (apurva), which in this case is difference (bheda), its validity is unquestionable. The knowledge that establishes the distinction of Ifvara from the jiva presupposes knowledge of Ifvara, the positive counterpart of such distinction. Only the fruti present both these forms of knowledge. Again, knowledge of duality is not fruitless inasmuch as it helps to discriminate between merit and demerit. Therefore, the validity of distinction between the jiva and Brahman goes uncontested whereas the view of their identity, being contradictory to that of the former, cannot be accepted.³²⁰

Refutation of the experience of difference (bheda)

Madhusudana critically examines all the arguments of the dualists and nullifies them by following counter-arguments: Realisations such as ‘I am not omniscient’ or ‘I am not devoid of sorrow’do not establish jiva as being distinct from absolute Brahman. However, they do indicate the difference between consciousness limited by a person’s internal faculties (antahkaraja) and consciousness unlimited by this. Scriptures emphasising the difference between Ifvara and the jiva, present only the difference between the individual and the Lord (Ifvara) both of whom have limited consciousness. However, it does not establish the difference between the jiva and Brahman, the unlimited consciousness. The scriptures establishing their identity (abheda fruti) may indeed establish the absolute identity between the jiva and Brahman on the mere presumption of distinction (bheda),

but bheda as an absolute fact is not the prerequisite for such fruti.³²¹

It is not possible to assert that the difference between Brahman and the jiva is proved by perception. Madhusudana explains that pure Brahman, as such, is beyond the reach of ordinary perception. Any conscious entity (jiva or Ifvara) is Brahman itself, since Brahman is the consciousness and allows no division. The apparent difference between the jiva and Ifvara lies in the nature of limitation (upadhi). Limitation is the creation of avidya, and as avidya is false, the difference created by it is also false.

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