Definition of Anandabodha

The fifth definition of mithya is derived from Anandabodhacarya: ‘a mithya is other than real (sat), yet it appears to be real’. ‘Real’ is that entity which is established by a proper means of knowledge, (pramaja). Pramaja is defined as the instrumental cause (karaka) of knowledge, which is not accompanied by dosa

(fault). In other words, ‘real’ is that which is the object of a valid knowledge.¹⁵⁹ Knowledge is said to be valid when its content is never contradicted. According to the Naiyayikas the difference between the shell-silver illusion (bhrama-jñ ana) and valid knowledge (prama-jñ ana) of a pitcher lies in the fact that although in both the experiences, the instrumental cause (karaka, for example the senseorgans) is the same, in the case of illusion such an instrumental cause is accompanied by some fault. According to Advaita-vedanta, both shell-silver illusion and the knowledge of the pitcher are illusory knowledge, inasmuch as the objects of such knowledge are contradicted (vadhita). Accepting the Naiyayika’s principle of discrimination between an error (bhrama) and valid knowledge, the monists recognise avidya as the dosa in both the earlier cases. Thus for the Advaitavedantin, only knowledge of Brahman is valid, as its content (namely, Brahman) is never contradicted. Though avidya is accepted as the material cause of all the three types of experiences, namely transcendental (Brahma-jñ ana), empirical (ghata-jñ ana) and false (brahma-jñ ana), to justify the illusory nature of the latter two cases, avidya is recognised there to be an agent (nimitta-karaja) as well.

In the case of transcendental experience, on the other hand, avidya does not play any role. Hence, experience of Brahman is not an illusion. In other words, the knowledge of Brahman is not accompanied by avidya-dosa, while both the illusory knowledge of shell-silver and the ordinary knowledge of a pitcher are. Therefore, while the content of the first knowledge is confirmed by a flawless pramana, the contents of the second and third experiences (i.e. shell-silver and the pitcher) are not so. So both shell-silver and the pitcher are false in that they are other than that (i.e. Brahman), which is confirmed by an instrument of knowledge unaccompanied by any flaw (dosa).

The major premise of Anandabodha’s syllogism (P. 26) is, ‘the world is false (mithya)’. Apropos to that, Madhusudana analyses and defends the defining nature of mithya as forwarded by most of the prominent teachers of Advaitavedanta. Although only one definition would have been enough, Madhusudana gives as many as five definitions. The reason for that is that he is answering Vyasatirtha who attacked and refuted all the prominent teachers of Advaitavedanta, preceding him, on their definitions of falsity. Thus the major term (sadhya) of the syllogism intended to establish the falsity of the universe is settled.

Madhusudana next proceeds to examine the three middle terms (hetu) for the same inference. In this connection he puts forward several explanations of the first hetu, drfyatva. Among these, the following deserves primary consideration: ¹⁶⁰ ‘a drfya is a phenomenon pervaded by a cognitive mode (vrtti)’. Opponents argue that Brahman is also pervaded by a certain vrtti known as akhajdakaracittavrtti.¹⁶¹ Madhusudana answers that pure consciousness (i.e. Brahman) is not the content of that vrtti, but the limited consciousness (upahita Brahman) is – and limited consciousness is mithya. It may be asked that if pure consciousness cannot be the content of any vrtti, how can the fruti present such consciousness? The answer is that pure consciousness, being selfrevealed and self-valid, does not depend on any external evidence for its establishment. When the fruti states that ‘consciousness is pure and self revealed’ it implies that impurity pervades all lack of self-revelation and as consciousness is not impure, it does not lack self-revelation. Opponents argue that pure consciousness may not be the content of a vrtti, but Madhusudana admits that the limited (upahita) consciousness can be the content of vrtti. If it is so, then he must admit the validity of the following argument, namely ‘as the limitation (vifesaja) becomes the content of a vrtti embracing the limited, so also the subject (vifesya) that is limited, becomes the content of the same vrtti. In the present case such a subject is pure consciousness. Hence, in this way, pure consciousness does become the content of vrtti’. Madhusudana answers that when pure consciousness becomes the subject (vifesya) it no longer remains pure.¹⁶² This is because the content then becomes consciousness, limited by a qualifying adjective.

His opponents argue that it is a fallacious argument. Because when akhajdakara-cittavrtti is intended to embrace limited consciousness, such limitation, in the absence of anything else, is the akhajdakara vrtti itself. Therefore, the vrtti that embraces the limited, embraces the limitation as well. Thus the vrtti inevitably becomes its own content. Madhusudana cannot accept this position, for the aforesaid vrtti is, after all, a verbal cognition and as such, it cannot concern anything which relevant words (such as, tat tvam asi, ) have not presented. Moreover, as this akhajdakara vrtti concerns a vrtti (a product of avidya) it cannot discard avidya altogether, as claimed by the Advaita-vedanta. Only such knowledge, which does not concern either avidya or its effect, can discard them.

Madhusudana, following the author of Kalpataru, ¹⁶³ answers that while akhajdakara vrtti embraces consciousness, the same vrtti, without being its own content, conditions the consciousness. For instance, in the case of saksin, which is consciousness limited by ajñ ana (i.e. ajñ ana vrtti), ajñ ana is the content of saksi-knowledge, yet being unconscious it cannot be saksin. Likewise, consciousness limited by vrtti is the content of vrtti, yet the limitation remains outside this vrtti’s own purview. Therefore, opponents cannot raise any objection regarding the vrtti being its own content. From the earlier discussion, Madhusudana concludes that as the object of the primal ajñ ana is Brahman, limited by that ajñ ana, and the content of akhajdakara vrtti is the same limited Brahman, only this time limited by a vrtti, so both ajñ ana and its contradictory knowledge occupy the same content, that is, Brahman. In both cases, the content is limited but it is not the agent of limitation as well.¹⁶⁴ So far, Madhusudana has established the view that pure Brahman is not at all the content of any cognitive vrtti.

In that case, he further elaborates, the term ‘being pervaded by vrtti’, (vrttivyapyatva), with reference to an empirical object, would mean that it is the object of a cognitive vrtti arising from anything other than only verbal evidence. Thus, Brahman is the content of a cognitive vrtti which is verbal (i.e. the fruti, tat tvam asi), and the non-existing ‘horn of a hare’, which is also the content of a verbal cognitive vrtti namely, ‘the hare’s horn is unreal’are equally excluded from the category of drfya, that is empirical phenomena.¹⁶⁵

Madhusudana gives a third explanation of the term ‘to be pervaded by a cognitive vrtti (vrttivyapyatva)’, in that a drfya is the object of determinate knowledge (savikalpa-jñ ana). Determination is an attribute, which is cognised as existing in the object which is the content of the experience. Thus Brahman, being unqualified, cannot be the object of any determinate knowledge. Likewise, the so-called attribute (e.g. gagana-kusumatva, the attribute of being a sky-flower) of a non-existing sky-flower, (gagana-kusuma), never appears to be really existing. Therefore, none of them can be regarded as drfya. Even abhava (negation) is

grasped as qualified by the existing quality, abhavatva.¹⁶⁶

Drfya may also mean being the object of consciousness, (caitanya). To be the object of consciousness means to be related to the latter by any type of relationship. Brahman, being itself consciousness, cannot be related to its own self. Likewise, a hare’s horn, being non-existent, can never be related to consciousness. Therefore, neither Brahman nor the non-existing hare’s horn can be regarded as drfya.¹⁶⁷

A drfya may also be described as an entity which, for its own usage (vyavahara) is invariably dependent upon knowledge which is not its own self (svatirikta).¹⁶⁸ The word ‘usage’includes both the revelation of the entity and the use of it by means of words (fabda-vyavahara). This means a drfya is never selfrevealed. In other words, it is always revealed by knowledge of itself, which knowledge is other than its own self. On the other hand, consciousness is selfrevealed in that without being the content of any knowledge, it can be revealed and be used as existing. The universe does not possess such self-revelation, which is thus a drfya.

The second middle term is insensateness (jadatva).¹⁶⁹That which is not sensate is jada and hence it is other than knowledge; is other than self (atman) or, is not self-revealed. Opponents say that if jada is stated to be that which is not knowledge, then consciousness will become jada, for knowledge means consciousness connected with a cognitive vrtti. So consciousness by itself is not knowledge, just as vrtti by itself is not knowledge. Madhusuudana answers that knowledge means the revealing consciousness as marked by an object (arthopalaksita prakafa). Such knowledge is consciousness itself. As the object is only a temporary marker (upalaksaja), at the time of liberation, when no object remains, knowledge essentially can and does exist apart from any object. But a material object (jada) cannot exist at that time.

The third middle term is paricchinnatva, which means that which is limited. Limitation can be of three kinds: the limitation of time, the limitation of space and the limitation of object. That which is the counterpart of destruction is known as limited by time; that which is the positive counterpart of absolute negation is known as limited by space and that which is the positive counterpart of mutual difference is known as limited by object. Brahman is not limited by time, by space or by object. Hence, it is not paricchinna like the universe.

The aforementioned discussion about the three middle terms of the syllogism establishes the validity of the inferential evidence for the falsity of the universe. Although the words of this inference make it clear that it refers to the world as a whole, by the same inference, one may determine the falsity of every pragmatic object, for example, ‘the sky is false, because it is a drfya like the shell-silver’.

Chitsukha puts forward a separate inference to establish the falsity of an individual pragmatic object: ‘This specific cloth is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation (atyantabhava) existing in this particular thread (that produces the cloth), because it (the cloth) is constituted of several parts (aÅ fitvat) like other such objects (itaraÅ fivat).’¹⁷⁰

After explaining the inference proving the falsity of the universe, Madhusudana now states how shell-silver, the example of that syllogism, possesses major term (sadhya), namely falsity (mithyatva).¹⁷¹ It has been stated before that a false object appears as existent in a locus, where its absolute nonexistence invariably exists. This experience of existence of such a false object is discarded by direct knowledge that contradicts this. The locus of the false or illusory universe is Brahman and as this universe has illusory contact of identity with Brahman, it appears to exist (sat). In the case of shell-silver, it must also be acknowledged that since shell-silver has a locus where it appears, it has an existence. As only direct knowledge can discard shell-silver illusion, it must have been directly experienced in illusion. It has been stated before that an illusory object is invariably absent where it is present (vide the definition of Citsukha). Moreover, when the Vivaraja maintains that an illusory object is discarded by direct knowledge (vide the second definition of falsity given by Prakafatma Yati), it means that the cognition of a false object is also direct knowledge. A direct illusion is discarded by direct valid knowledge only. A direct illusion requires the presence of the object of illusion because direct knowledge is confined only to the object that is present at the time of the direct knowledge. All this shows that even an illusory object has to exist albeit temporarily.

The question might be raised as to how the pitcher, as well as the shell-silver, can be recognised as existing in the same sense, because while the pitcher continues to exist until the dawning of ultimate knowledge, the shell-silver is falsified within a few moments after its knowledge.¹⁷² Madhusudana answers that the word ‘rajata’ (silver) is equally applicable to illusory as well as to the real (pragmatically existent) rajata, by virtue of the fact that in the case of the real silver, the generic quality of the silver (rajatatva), which has a pragmatic utility, does in fact exist therein, while it is ascribed to the illusory silver. Likewise, existence (satta), which really belongs to Brahman alone, is ascribed to the pitcher as well as to the shell-silver. In that sense, both the pitcher and the shell-silver are said to exist. Though in real sense existence is the special privilege of Brahman and is an imposition on the pitcher as well as on the shell-silver, the imposed existence is nevertheless recognised by Madhusudana as an existence.¹⁷³ The practical difference between the pitcher and the shell-silver is explained by the assumption that in the case of the pitcher, such imposed existence is pragmatic (i.e. remains uncontradicted until the dawning of ultimate knowledge), whereas in the case of shell-silver it is illusory (i.e. is discarded within a few moments from the knowledge of shell-silver). In this way, Madhusudana has recognised the experience of shell-silver’s temporary existence, even if it is illusory, as is the existence of empirically experienced universe. Hence, shell-silver can serve as a good example in the inference proving the illusoriness of the universe (prapañ ca). Madhusudana has drawn upon FaÅ kara’s theory of the experience of the inexplicable (anirvacaniya khyati) to justify such existence of shell-silver, which maintains that the illusory knowledge of shell-silver concerns the illusorily existing silver and not the empirical silver.

The MimaÅ sa-school raises the question as to why one should recognise the existence of shell-silver at all. According to them, the experience of shell-silver (‘this is silver’) is not a single knowledge. One directly perceives only ‘this’. The perception of ‘silver’, as its qualification is in fact a case of memory of empirical silver. One is said to undergo the experience ‘this is silver’, only so far as one fails to grasp the difference between the two forms of experience – perception in the case of ‘this’, and memory in the case of silver – and also fails to grasp the difference between the two objects of this knowledge, namely ‘this’ and ‘silver’. So it is not a unitary knowledge and one need not accept the existence of shell-silver to justify such knowledge. Such a lack of discrimination between the two forms of mental activities, namely, perception of an object and the memory of its supposed quality of ‘silverness’ generate reactions in the beholder in the form of his/her rushing towards it. This theory is known as a form of experience that only partially reveals its content (Akhyativada).

Madhusudana criticises this theory and argues that mere non-comprehension of distinction between the objects (‘this’and ‘silver’) and between perception and memory, cannot produce any activity regarding the object (silver). The fact is that the comprehension of shell-silver induces one to go to pick it up. So one has to accept such comprehension to be a positivistic knowledge.

The Vijñ anavadin Buddhists, who maintain that the shell-silver experience is a case of a lack of experience of a real object (asat-khyativada) may, of course, say that if one has to accept the experience of shell-silver, even then one need not accept its real existence. Knowledge itself may give the illusion of a form (akara) of an object, but such an object does not correspond to reality. The process is that the knowledge projects the form of silver on the ‘object at the vicinity’ (‘this’). This ‘object at the vicinity is real’, according to Vaibhasika and Sautrantika schools of Bauddhists while according to Vijñ anavadins, it is illusorily, imagined by the beginningless flow of mental impressions (vasana) existing in the individuals. But in any case, the silver is a mere projection of knowledge and has no reality (asat eva rajatam abhat).

Madhusudana answers that if the object is thus reduced to a mere projection of knowledge then it cannot be perceived. Because, in order to perceive an object, a contact between the sense organ and the object is necessary. But this is not possible in the case of the non-existing silver.

To this, the followers of the Nyaya-school reply that for perception one need not recognise the creation of the anirvacaniya silver on ‘this’. The Naiyayikas contend that the knowledge – ‘this is silver’ – is a case of perception. So far as ‘this’ is concerned such perception is ordinary because the conjunction between the sense-organ and the object at the vicinity – the requisite sense-object contact – is available without any difficulty. Difficulty arises as to the requisite sense-object contact in the case of silver perception: contact between the eyes, on the one hand, and the silver –the object of that very, (mistaken), experience – on the other. The Naiyayikas maintain that the silver revealed in the said experience is not shellsilver, but an actual piece of silver which the cogniser had actually witnessed at the market. Such previous cognition of real silver seen at the market has left the impression of real silver on his mind. At the sign of brightness in the object at the vicinity (i.e. the shell), the impression of real silver, lying dormant in the mind so far, is awakened, giving rise to the memory of real silver experienced before. Such a memory of real silver is what the Naiyayikas call ‘extraordinary perception of a connection’ (jñ analaksaja sannikarsa) mistakenly attributed to an object of perception. Through the operation of this memory, the sense organ, namely the eyes, are said to perceive the real silver of the market. As such perception is a little out of the way, they recognise it as extraordinary (alaukika).

So analysis of that experience, ‘this is silver’, yields the following results: (1) this experience is purely a case of perception; (2) in the case of ‘this’ such perception is ordinary, while in the case of ‘silver’ it is extraordinary; (3) as real silver justifies such experience, there is no reason to recognise the creation of another kind

of silver (i.e. the shell-silver) apart from the real silver.¹⁷⁴

Madhusudana refutes this view¹⁷⁵ by stating that ‘jñ analaksaja-sannikarsa’ is not acceptable to the Advaita-vedantins, since in all cases of perception (irrespective of valid knowledge and error) the sense-object contact (visayendriya-sannikrsa) is a prerequisite. Therefore, in the case of the perception ‘this is silver’, there is no need to accept any other kind of contact except the same conjunction of sense and the object. Moreover, in the case of shell-silver error, so far as ‘this’is concerned, the sense-object contact is available. Therefore, for the sake of economy of conception, one should accept that same contact in the case of silver, as well. Therefore, it is necessary to accept the existence of shell-silver for its perception to occur. As real silver cannot exist in shell, it is necessary to accept the creation of an apparent silver – a new kind of silver (pratibhasika rajata), created by avidya covering the shell.

The question is therefore: is it necessary to accept illusory silver as separate from the pragmatic silver and if such illusory silver is said to be revealed in error, then what is the positive counterpart of the contradicting knowledge? If the illusory silver, taken in that form, is regarded to be the positive counterpart of the contradictory knowledge, then the form of the negative experience should have been ‘the silver was produced and is destroyed’, and not ‘the silver was never present in the shell’, which is the purport of the contradictory knowledge.¹⁷⁶

Madhusudana challenges his opponents with a counter question: when do they believe that particular experience occurs? ¹⁷⁷ Does it occur at the time of the revelation of shell-silver or at its contradiction (vadha)? Such experience cannot occur at the time of the revelation of shell-silver, since at that time shell-silver appears as identified with the shell. Thus it seems to have a continued existence without the question of being created or destroyed. Moreover, before the advent of contradictory knowledge, the beholder has never experienced any real silver to be totally destroyed. At the time of contradiction, on the other hand, the experience of the absolute negation of the silver prevents the existence of the experience, such as the shell-silver is produced and is destroyed. The existence of the experience of the absolute negation of silver prevents the advent of the experience of its being destroyed. Though the experience of the absolute negation is contradictory to the experience of its production, for all practical purposes, such experience has to be accepted for the sake of the nature of experience. This explanation is based on the assumption that the contradictory knowledge negates illusory shell- silver just as such. As an alternative view, it may be said that the content of negation is the illusory silver presented as real (paramarthika).¹⁷⁸ Such reality, existing in the illusory silver at the time of its appearance, is equally illusory. Hence, in the experience of illusory silver’s contradiction, the attribute of silver, namely its absoluteness, does not really belong to the illusory silver but to something else. Thus the negation that comprises of an object possessing an attribute, which does not really belong to that object, does not invariably require the existence of the experience of its counterpart. In the given experience of the negation of illusory silver, its absoluteness is grasped through the function of memory. Indeed, Madhusudana does not accept the notion that the content of a negative experience must be presented by that experience. Even the memory of such content is sufficient for the negative experience. In order to justify the actions generated in the beholder, such as trying to go near it etc., one must accept the attribute of some sort of pragmatic reality in the shell-silver. Such an attribute is common to both shell-silver and ordinary silver. Thus he seems to hold a view close to the Naiyayika view. The third most radical explanation given by Madhusudana is that the real silver is the content of negation.¹⁷⁹

It should be remembered that these various explanations are given only to justify the observations of such previous scholars of his school as Prakafatma Yati; because he wanted to totally refute Vyasatirtha’s argument attacking the Monistic Vedanta view. But, as previously mentioned, the personal view of Madhusudana is that the illusory silver is revealed in error as identified with real silver, and the same silver (i.e. illusory silver as identified with pragmatic silver) is negated in the contradictory knowledge. The comprehension of shell-silver (in the form ‘this is silver’) consists of two parts. In ‘this’ (i.e. the locus) portion, it is ordinary perception, that is, a mental cognitive mode and in the ‘silver’ (i.e. the imposed) portion it is saksi-knowledge, that is, a mode of avidya.

The question is if silver is not perceived, that is, if it does not fall within the purview of ordinary cognitive mode, then can one say ‘I perceive the silver’ (rupyam pafyami)? Madhusudana answers that: before the false knowledge of shell-silver is produced, we have the real knowledge of ‘this’ (idam). That is to say, we have a real cognitive awareness the content of which is ‘this’. The content of the avidya-vrtti revealing false silver, on the other hand, has no connection with any sense organ and therefore should not be cognised as a perception. However, it can be explained as follows: since this false silver is produced by the avidya that exists in the same cognitive consciousness as possessed by the cogniser the latter thinks it to be also perceived. So the perceptibility, which really belongs to the mental cognitive mode, is ascribed to avidya-vrtti.¹⁸⁰ That is why we say ‘I see silver’.

Not satisfied, his opponents raise the objection that if two different vrttis are recognised, how is it possible to maintain unity of the experience ‘this is silver’? Madhusudana gives three explanations for this: ¹⁸¹

1 Objects of the two vrttis (namely, ‘this’ and ‘silver’) become identified through ascription. Such identification makes for the ascribed identity of the correspondence knowledge.

2 False silver, being the effect of avidya existing in consciousness limited by ‘this’, appears as identical with the object ‘this’. Likewise, the avidya-vrtti presenting the false silver, being the effect of avidya existing in the same conscious self, whose mental mode, at the time of shell-silver appearance, has as its content the unspecified yet real object ‘this’, appears as identified with the above mentioned mode of avidya presenting the false shell-silver. In other words, in this procession of illusion, the individual consciousness, influenced by avidya fails to distinguish between different modes of avidya and their contents.¹⁸²

3 Though the vrttis are different, as both ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are revealed by the same consciousness limited by ‘this’, ¹⁸³ the results appear to be one. As a consequence the knowledge is also one.¹⁸⁴ Avidya-vrtti cannot discard avidya and hence cannot be regarded as cognitive knowledge. Only a mental vrtti (here in the form of ‘this’) can discard avidya, and therefore it is knowledge. This means that in the case of idam rajatam, one must accept that both the vrttis of the mind and avidya are so closely juxtaposed that the experiencing individual fails to distinguish it.

In the case of ‘this’– because the eyes have contacted with the object in front, (i.e.

‘this’) – the mind can go out of the visual sense organ and on reaching ‘this’, can assume the mode of the latter. But in the case of the silver, no such process is possible.¹⁸⁵

Ramanuja, in his Fri-bhasya on the Brahma-sutra severely criticised the notion of avidya as depicted by the Advaita-vedantins. Avidya, or Maya, is accepted by all dualistic Vedantins, as a divine power of Brahman. But they do not agree with the Advaita-vedantic notion of avidya as a false, beginningless indefinable entity existing in Brahman, the pure existence. In order to refute such avidya, Vyasaraja developed and used all these objections, along with those laid down by the teachers of other Vaisjava systems, in countering the Advaita-vedanta views. Madhusudana answered all the objections put forward by Vyasaraja. Yet here he chooses to refute the arguments of Ramanuja against the Advaita-vedanta’s notion of avidya. The reason for singling Ramanuja out, I shall argue, evinces Madhusudana special regard for Ramanuja’s Vaisjava theology, which to some extent, he even followed in his own bhakti exposition.

Ramanuja’s first objection concerns the nature of avidya as a veil covering consciousness. The question may be asked as to whether the avidya is real or false. If it is regarded as real, then the Advaitins are reverting to dualism. If, on the other hand, it is taken to be false, one has to discover another false entity in order to ascertain the cause of this falsity, thus leading it to endless regression. The answer to this objection is that avidya is indeed a power of Brahman which, being a false entity, is identical with it. The universe is an evolution of this avidya, which has threefold innate characteristics (gujas), namely sattva, rajas and tamas. Avidya subsists in pure Brahman and is evolved into the universe. As evolution is the nature of avidya, it does not need any other power to set it evolving except pure Brahman, its substratum.

The second objection of Ramanuja is raised against the view that Pure

Brahman is the substratum of avidya, and that jiva is its object. The inferential proofs given to contradict the first view are:

1 avidya does not subsist in Pure Brahman alone, because it exists in the knower;

2 Brahman is not the substratum of avidya because it is devoid of the quality of being the knower. Ramanuja explains objection to this view, because he regarded avidya as being the absence of knowledge. Moreover, avidya, being contradictory to knowledge, can never exist in it. Brahman, being absolute knowledge itself, cannot have the absence of knowledge as well. Madhusudana’s answers to such objections are based on the views of both

Prakafatma Yati and Vacaspati Mifra on that issue. With regard to the objection concerning avidya’s existence in knowledge, Madhusudana states that avidya is not contradictory to just every kind of knowledge, but only to that of cognitive knowledge, which is not the transcendental Brahman, the substratum of avidya. Madhusudana’s answer to Ramanuja’s objection concerning avidya’s existence in jiva has already been covered earlier in this chapter.

Ramanuja’s third objection concerns the view that avidya covers Brahman or in other words, that Brahman is the object of avidya. Ramanuja explains that the absence of Brahman’s manifestation means either the lack of creation of such a manifestation or the destruction of it. But neither of these explanations is possible. Self-manifested, absolute Brahman can never be destroyed, nor is it created.

Madhusudana answers this objection by establishing that avidya falsely prevents the manifestation of self-luminous Brahman. Just as the sun, when covered by cloud, is considered as not manifest, likewise self-luminous Brahman, being covered by avidya, is regarded as being neither existent nor manifest. But just as the cloud covers only the sight of the beholder, so also avidya covers jiva, preventing him from realising the true nature of Brahman. Hence the beholder thinks Brahman is neither existent nor manifest.

The fourth objection is against the logical proofs put forward by the Advaitavedantins to establish the positive avidya. This point is very critically considered by Madhusudana and has been discussed elsewhere in this book.

The fifth objection is raised in connection with the indefinable (anirvacaniya) nature of avidya. In order to establish the nature of avidya, Madhusudana discusses the concept of indescribability (anirvacyatva). Anirvacyatva can be defined as:

1 quality of being different from existent, non-existent or both existent and non-existent at the same time;

2 quality of not being proven as either existent or non-existent or otherwise (satvasatvabhyam vicarasahatve sati sadasatvena vicarasahatva;

3 quality of being contradicted where it appears to be existent (pratipannopadhau vadhyatvam).

Here the words ‘existent’ and ‘non-existent’ are used in the normal sense. It cannot be objected that contradiction of one means the existence of the other, because all forms of contradiction are regarded as false in this system. For example, it cannot be claimed that false silver is contradictory to real shell. Therefore, whenever in the definition the term ‘contradiction’(nisedha) is used in connection with existence, non-existence and so on, it is done in order to establish the falsity of those objects. Those who consider the destruction of avidya as a fifth category, other than existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence and the contradiction of both, should add ‘the quality of not being existent at the time of liberation’ to the definition of anirvacyatva. When it is stated that all contradictions are false, this means that both existence and non-existence, as they are normally experienced, are false. Though in the case of real existence and non-existence, the absence of both cannot exist anywhere, but in the case of false existence and non-existence, the absence of both simultaneously is possible in a third object such as avidya. The conclusion is that although each existence and non-existence co-exists with the absence of the other, neither of these is identified with the absence of the other. This particular nature of avidya is established by several means of valid knowledge, such as perception, inference, fruti and arthapatti, and is perceived when one experiences the contradiction of the knowledge of false silver (nedam rajatam).

The inference supporting the anirvacyatva of avidya runs in the following way: ‘the disputed object is something other than existent and non-existent, while it is other than both existent and non-existent together; either, because it is subjected to negation or, its manifestation depends on some false object. That which is not subjected to negation or does not depend on some false object for its manifestation, is none other than existence, etc., such as Brahman’ (vimatam sattvarahitatve sati, asattva-rahitatve sati sattvasattvarahitam; vadhyatvat, dosaprayuktabhanatvad va; yannaivam tannaivam; yatha Brahma).

Madhusudana presents arthapatti pramaja in the following way: the object of controversy, such as shell-silver cannot be real or it would never be contradicted, nor can it be unreal, for in that case it would never appear to be existent. But the fact is, such silver is contradicted and does appear to be existent. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that such silver is neither real nor unreal, and hence it is anirvacya, or false.

Ramanuja’s final point of contention is that nothing can destroy beginningless and positive avidya. This is based on the assumption that pure, absolute, immutable and indeterminate Brahman is a false conception. For Ramanuja, Brahman is always qualified (saguja). However, Madhusudana has fully considered the issue, that and his conclusions are discussed in the next chapter.

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