KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

In Advaita-vedanta, knowledge or consciousness (caitanya) is the only existing reality, which is the essence (svarupa) of Brahman and the only spontaneously revealed entity.¹⁸⁶ Objects are by nature non-conscious (jada) and hence not automatically revealed. They are revealed only when they come into contact with knowledge, through a relationship created by avidya. The transcendental knowledge is absolute and has no real relation with empirical objects, for there can be no relationship between knowledge and the known, insofar as the former is absolute truth, while the latter, being the creation of avidya, is false. However, to explain the physical universe that has forced itself upon our knowledge, some sort of relationship has to be recognised between knowledge and the known, since if knowledge is totally unrelated to objects of knowledge, then it cannot possibly reveal the object. Thus knowledge, though itself transcendental, somehow becomes connected with the objects which it reveals. ‘Knowledge’ is used in Advaita-vedanta to mean both absolute knowledge, when left by itself, and pragmatic (cognitive) knowledge, when wrongly related to false objects. Epistemology concerns itself with the latter kind of knowledge as distinct from absolute knowledge, which is a metaphysical entity; although in substance both types of knowledge are one and the same.

Philosophers have tried to comprehend ultimate knowledge/reality through empirical knowledge. Although ultimate truth, per se, transcends empirical comprehension, empirical knowledge is useful insofar as it repels ignorance (ajñ ana) about ultimate reality (absolute knowledge). It must be noted here that absolute knowledge per se is not antagonistic to ignorance. Since absolute knowledge is the locus (afraya) of ignorance, it is also the locus of all products of ignorance. However, the same knowledge removes ignorance only when it is conditioned by a cognitive mode (vrtti), just as the rays of the sun that usually sustain grass, burn it when those same rays are refracted through a magnifying glass.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, an object is exposed to knowledge only through the operation of vrtti. Cognition of an object, being empirical knowledge, should therefore involve vrtti. That is why it is called vrtti-jñ ana, and is described as consciousness reflected on a cognitive mental mode (vrtti).

It is common knowledge that some external objects exist, which are not always known to the knower (pramata). That means the cognisant has ignorance about those objects. Knowledge is the revelation of an object to the cognisant, consequent upon the removal of his ignorance regarding that object. Although the knower is identical with Brahman in substance, still everything is revealed to Brahman, the substratum of creation. Whereas, an object is revealed to the knower, pramata only when it is covered by a vrtti, which, as will be shown later, is either a mode of the inner sense organ of the knower or a mode of avidya. Thus it must be acknowledged that for the manifestation of objects, cognitive knowledge has to depend on a vrtti. The subject consciousness limited by its inner sense organ (mind) is pramata, the knower. The manifestation of a hitherto concealed object to the knower through a mental mode (vrtti) is known as prama-jñ ana (valid knowledge). I use the word mental to indicate the inner sense organ that covers the entire field of mind categorised in the Sanskrit terms of buddhi, manas and citta as well as the ego.¹⁸⁸ The mental mode that leads to the cognition of an object is called pramaja, or instrument of valid knowledge. Though objects are manifested to the knower by the vrtti-jñ ana, their existence does not depend on that vrtti-jñ ana. That is to say, an object can exist even without being perceived by a person.

However, there is another type of empirical knowledge, the object of which does not exist beyond the duration of that knowledge. In this case, as long as those objects exist they are revealed all the time; for instance, a mistaken cognition of silver in place of a shell. In order to distinguish this special type of cognition from ordinary valid knowledge (prama-jñ ana), the Advaita-vedantin differentiates between the respective modes (vrtti) involved in each case. The revelation of these kinds of objects is a kind of cognition, and therefore one must admit the function of a mode (vrtti) involved in the process of cognition, so that knowledge can take place at all. At the same time, such a vrtti should be recognised as distinct from valid knowledge (pramaja-vrtti). For instance, while an external object stays longer than the moment of its cognition, the object (i.e. shell-silver, the object of illusory knowledge) of this second type of vrtti does not usually stay beyond the duration of this vrtti. Moreover, the existence of illusory shell-silver is different in nature from that of an ordinary pitcher, so the vrtti producing the knowledge of shell-silver should be different from the vrtti that produces the empirical knowledge of a pitcher. The direct cause of shell-silver is avidya, so the vrtti producing the knowledge of shellsilver is also regarded as arising from the same avidya. It is important to remember that the process of any type of cognition, even if it is an error, must involve a modal activity either of the avidya of the knower or, of his/her mind so that a contact is established between the knower and the cosmic revealer saksin.

Similar to the knowledge of shell-silver, the knowledge of feelings like happiness etc. is also contemporaneous with the existence of the knowledge of such feelings. On the basis of this similarity, in the case of knowledge of happiness, the vrtti producing such knowledge is regarded as a mode of avidya. However, it may be noted here that although knowledge of shell-silver and the knowledge of happiness are both brought about by avidya-vrtti, the former is an error while the latter is valid knowledge. In fact, the validity of knowledge depends on the non-contradiction of its content. This is a vital point in the Advaita-vedanta soteriology.

Therefore, it is evident that avidya-vrtti can produce valid knowledge without the help of any vrtti of mind. Such is the privilege of avidya-vrtti that it can produce knowledge, even valid knowledge, independent of the operation of the mental vrtti. This avidya-vrtti can, therefore, be employed to explain knowledge at the time of deep sleep when, with the dissolution of all sense organs, the mental mode cannot possibly operate. That knowledge remains present even in deep sleep and is borne out by the composite knowledge such as, ‘I slept happily and did not know anything’. This knowledge is a combination of first, memory of happiness which a person experienced during his/her deep sleep – a vrtti of avidya that always exists in saksin, inherent in the cognising person; and second, a cognitive mental vrtti referring to the ego of the same person, which comes back when he/she is awake. But memory presupposes experience. Therefore, the person’s experience of entities such as happiness and ignorance (avidya) must have taken place at the time of his/her deep sleep. One must thus accept this explanation of the simultaneous experience of happiness and a total ignorance during the deep sleep as a case of saksi-jñ ana wherein the sleeper’s pragmatic ego-consciousness remains dormant.

Besides avidya-vrtti and the vrtti of the mind which generates valid knowledge (prama-jñ ana), there are several other mental modes that are not considered capable of generating any form of cognition. For example, when a person meditates on a name of a deity, taking it for supreme Brahman, his meditation consists of a mental exercise. This is not a valid knowledge as such a name is neither Brahman nor an illusory object. It is just a divine attribute ascribed on Brahman. The person knows this fact hence it is not an illusion, for he possesses the contradictory knowledge (vadhaka-jñ ana) of this illusion. His meditation is therefore a mere mental exercise that operates on the will of mind. The person operates his mind by the Vedic injunction ‘nama Brahmeti upasita’ (meditate on Brahma as a proper name), and for that reason also this mental mode is not regarded as knowledge, since injunctions can never be made on knowledge.¹⁸⁹ Likewise, ‘tarka’ (logical argumentation) is also not a form of cognitive knowledge, but a mere mental process, since argument is always based on mental hypothesis and is regulated by the will of the mind. Hence, it is neither valid nor illusory knowledge. An example of this is given in the argument that follows the proposition, ‘the hill is on fire; because there is smoke’ (parvato vanhiman dhumat). This hypothesis is based on the argument that ‘if there is no fire then there should be no smoke; because smoke is invariably concomitant with fire; in the present proposition, smoke is sighted on the hill, hence one may safely conclude that there is fire on that hill’. In order to prove the presence of fire on the hill, for argument’s sake, the absence of fire, which is proved by the absence of smoke, is hypothetically ascribed to the hill by means of the assumption of a hypothetical middle term, namely the absence of smoke. It is not knowledge generated by a mental mode, but a hypothetical judgment brought about independently by the mental mode.

In Advaita-vedanta the means to attain liberation is through the removal of a person’s avidya, which projects the world on the locus of Brahman. Only the realisation of Brahman, the locus, can remove this cosmic avidya. The true nature of Brahman, the only reality, is instructed by the Upanisads, which is transmitted orally by the enlightened teachers to the pupils. The famous statement of Yajñ avalkya to his wife Maitreyi revealing the method of acquiring this gnosis of truth by means of realising one’s own true self, atman which is identical with Brahman, the Truth, runs as follows: ‘You see, Maitreyi – it is one’s self (atman) which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one’s self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one’s self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world.’¹⁹⁰

This statement is split into two. The first part, that is, ‘seeing’, refers to the Brahma-gnosis which is a direct experience. The second part, hearing etc., shows the method of acquiring this gnosis. This method is threefold – hearing the Upanisadic teaching from an enlightened preceptor, (fravaja), reflecting on that teaching (manana) and finally deeply meditating on that (nididhyasana). Moreover, the second part, indeed a yogic process, leads to the gnosis of Brahman and thereby brings about mukti. Madhusudana takes this entire Vedic statement to mean Vedantic discourse (vicara) – which is nothing but a form of deliberation (tarka).¹⁹¹ This is why a Vedic injunction (vidhi) is accepted in modes such as fravaja. Had it been a case of cognition, vidhi would have been impossible.

It may be noted here that while elucidating the word ‘cittavrtti’, as it occurs in the Patañ jala-yoga-sutra I. 2, ‘Yogafcittavrtti-nirodhah’, ¹⁹² Madhusudana states that there are five kinds of such vrtti:

1 Valid cognition Pramaja-vrtti, itself sub-divided into six types, according to the type of pramaja leading to it.¹⁹³ Direct knowledge, (pratyaksa), inferential, (anumana), scriptural knowledge (fastra), analogy, (upamana), presumption, (arthapatti) and negation, (abhava).

2 Viparyaya-vrtti, or false knowledge, sub-divided into avidya, asmita, raga, dvesa and abhinivesash which are explained in the Patañ jala-yoga-sutra II.3 as sources of transience of individuals.

3 Vikalpa-vrtti, by which non-existent objects like the sky-flower, are used in language. This is not knowledge like perception but merely a mental exercise.

4 Nidra-vrtti which is just the state of sleep and is considered the seat of tamoguja. Hence in this state the individual knows the lack of all the other four vrttis.

5 Smrti-vrtti, which is recollection of previous experience; that is, the knowledge of the impressions left by the store of previously acquired experienced. As smrti embraces the impressions left by the other four vrttis, Madhusudana leaves it until last.

It may be noted here that except for vikalpa-vrtti and pramaja-vrtti, all the other are, in fact, avidya-vrttis. This is why Madhusudana describes them elsewhere as belonging to saksi-jñ ana.¹⁹⁴ Vikalpa-vrtti, on the other hand, is not knowledge at all, but merely a mental operation when mind, by its independent will, uses a word to express a non-existing object such as a sky-flower or a hare’s horn. Pramaja-vrtti is, of course, a mental mode, citta-vrtti. In other words it is a modification of mind. Thus, not all five vrttis mentioned above can be taken to be mental-vrttis.¹⁹⁵

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