Refutation of scriptural evidence on difference

Even the sacred scriptures on bheda have to be construed otherwise. The fruti ‘dva suparja’ is stated by the Paikgi-rahasya Brahmaja as a description of buddhi (intelligence) and the jiva, ³²⁴ and not of jiva and God, as claimed by the dualists. Therefore, this fruti cannot be accepted as evidence of difference (bheda) between the jiva and Ifvara. What about the other frutis such as ‘Yah atmani tisthannatmanamantaro yamayati, ’³²⁵ ‘cetanafcetananam, ’³²⁶ and ‘ajo’nya’³²⁷, which seem to emphasise the relationship between the container and the contained, between jiva and Ifvara? To posit the specification of one out of many (nirdharaja) and to posit bheda can be justified by the assumption of an empirical bheda, which, nevertheless, need not be real. Moreover, reality of difference (bheda) would go against the frutis, which establish the identity between jiva and Brahman.³²⁸ Therefore the ‘bheda frutis’may be interpreted as expressing only empirical difference, (vyavaharika bheda). They are just ‘arthavada frutis’³²⁹ and thus they do not possess any independent validity apart from those giving injunction and prohibition. The ‘bheda frutis’ concern themselves with empirical intercourse only. In fact, according to the Advaitins, all the sacred texts depict directly or indirectly the sole existence of unlimited, unqualified and absolute Brahman. Madhusudana holds that the scripture and Smrtis describing bheda, the existence of enjoyment and the difference between Ifvara and jiva and so on, are meant for upasana of the qualified Brahman, which is an indirect means for attaining salvation. However, that does not mean that knowledge of bheda is necessary for salvation. Such frutis provide the preliminary steps for the purification of mind. Final and absolute salvation comes when complete identity between the jiva and Brahman is realised. Such realisation follows the cognition of the meaning of the scriptural statements such as ‘tat tvam asi’, ³³⁰ or ‘aham Brahmasmi’.³³¹

Vedic statements, such as ‘tat tvam asi’ or ‘aham Brahmasmi’ are called ‘great sentences’(mahavakya) because they distinctly establish perfect identity between jiva and Brahman, which is the purport of the Vedas. Madhusudana states³³² that these great sentences generate directly the correct knowledge of the aforementioned identity. In elucidating this statement of Madhusudana, Brahmananda, the commentator³³³ says that these sentences, namely ‘tat tvam asi’, etc., are the instrumental cause (karaja) for the generation of direct knowledge of identity between jiva and Brahman. Even though it is verbal knowledge, it is direct because the object of this knowledge is nothing but Brahman. According to Brahmananda, direct knowledge is that whose content is not generally covered by ajñ ana. In other words, in direct knowledge the essence of an object is so exposed that knowledge reveals it at once in all its bearings. Although insentient objects like the pitcher never directly become objects of ajñ ana, since ajñ ana operates only with reference to Brahman, nevertheless, the consciousness limited by the pitcher becomes the object of ajñ ana. Being the limitation of such consciousness the object, namely the pitcher, is falsely regarded as covered by ajñ ana. When a sensuous mode of mind (caksusadi vrtti) reaches the object, here a pitcher, the consciousness limited by the pitcher no longer remains covered. Thus the cover of ajñ ana having gone, the pitcher can be said to be an object of direct knowledge.³³⁴ Being the limitation of such consciousness, it may be stated that such objects have been embraced by ignorance, (ajñ ana).³³⁵ The mental mode arising from ‘great sentences’ (mahavakyas) embraces the identity of jiva and Brahman, and thereby dispels the knower’s ignorance regarding Brahman. In this way, the identification between jiva and Brahman is the content of the mental mode, this mode being called direct even though it is derived from a sentence. Thus the knowledge imparted by the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’ is direct. The sense conveyed by a sentence depends upon the knowledge of the sense conveyed by the words constituting that sentence. As the senses imparted by the words ‘tat’and ‘tvam’ are not obtainable from any other source, they are also furnished by the scripture. For example, the senses of Vedic words like ‘yupa’ (sacred post) and ‘ahavaniya’ (the ritual fire) can only be known from the scriptures. These two expressions are found in Vedic statements such as ‘the sacrificial animal is to be tied to the post’ (yupe pafum badhnati) and ‘sacrifice is made in the ritual fire’ (ahavaniye juhoti). The meaning of ‘yupa’ is sacrificial post made of bamboo, which has been cut and properly shaped. This meaning is found in Vedic statements such as ‘yupa taksati’³³⁶ and ‘yupamastasrikaroti’. Likewise, ahavaniya refers to a domestic fire that has been duly sanctified by offerings made during the daytime. This meaning is given by the fruti as ‘vasante brahmano’gninadadhita, naktam garhapatyamadadhati divahavaniyam’.³³⁷

In the case of ‘tat’ and tvam’, their sense is expressed in several Vedic statements. Thus, the word ‘tat’directly means the omniscient God, who is the creator. This meaning is derived from the frutis; for example, ‘that from which all created beings are born, by whose efforts the created beings continue to live’ (‘yato va imani bhutani jayante, yena jatani jivanti’)³³⁸ and ‘that which is omniscient and is aware of all’ (yah sarvajñ ah sarvavit.)³³⁹ However, the secondary meaning of the word is pure Brahman as described in the fruti ‘satyamjñ anamanantam’.³⁴⁰ The primary sense of the word ‘tvam’ is stated in frutis such as ‘like a great fish that swims along both banks (of a river) alternately’(tadyatha maha matsya ubhe kule anusanncarati)’³⁴¹ and means limited jiva. The secondary sense of ‘tvam’is, however, the pure consciousness (or self) as expressed in frutis such as ‘it is this person – the one that consists of perception among the vital functions, the one that is the inner light within the heart’ (yo’yam vijñ anamayah prajesu hrdantarjyotih purusah)³⁴² and ‘you can’t see the seer who does the seeing’ (na drsterdrastaram pafyeh).³⁴³

If the primary meanings of ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ are adopted, then the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’becomes incongruous, because the jiva, being of limited consciousness, can never be identified with God, the Omniscient Creator. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ must be taken in their secondary meanings.³⁴⁴ Madhusudana explains this process as follows. First, the primary sense of the words ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’, as stated above, are apprehended; then the disagreement between the two primary senses is felt, since the limited jiva can never be identified with unlimited God. This disagreement gives rise to the recollection of the secondary meanings of ‘tvam’ and ‘tat’ – pure self and Brahman. This is recollection rather than direct knowledge, the knowledge of pure self and Brahman having already been acquired through Vedic statements such as ‘satyam’etc. Thus although jiva, because it is limited, cannot prima facie be the same as the Omniscient, Omnipotent Creator, as pure self and Brahman they can be identical. The relationship between the pure self and Brahman is experienced in deep sleep (susupti), thus giving credence to the purport of ‘tat tvam asi’.

Here both ‘tat’and ‘tvam’are taken in their secondary senses (laksyartha). The lakfaja herein is known as jahadajahatsvartha (that which has partly abandoned its primary sense and partly retained it). Although both words denote qualified consciousness, and the difference in meaning between them lies in the difference of the limitation (upadhi) of consciousness, by their secondary power (laksaja) they just indicate Brahman, which is devoid of all attributes. Thus both words abandon the adjective (vifesaja) parts of their senses and retain the nominal (vifesya) portion.³⁴⁵ In this way, by establishing complete identity between the jiva and Brahman, the sentence imparts the integral sense in relation to Brahman, which is the true nature of the self (atmatattva).³⁴⁶Although both ‘tat’and ‘tvam’, by indication, mean one integral object – pure self – there is no question of repetition, ³⁴⁷ since their primary senses are different. It cannot be said that acceptance of the secondary sense (laksaja) in both the words, constituting the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’, is courting defeat. As the purport of the sentence is identity, it is logical to admit more than one laksaja to support this. It should also be borne in mind that the power of the constituent words in a sentence are guided by the purport.³⁴⁸ Therefore, the Vedic statement ‘tat tvam asi’establishes complete identity between the jiva and Brahman.³⁴⁹

The dualists³⁵⁰ claim that at the beginning and the end of the Mujdaka

Upanisad, which is included in the Atharva Veda, ³⁵¹ by the repeated mention of the difference existing between an individual person and the Lord, ³⁵² and further, by the description of the fruit of the knowledge of difference, it is evident that the Mujdaka has established the validity of the knowledge of palpable difference between the jiva and Ifa.

However, this conclusion is not tenable. In the first mujdaka, (chapter), ³⁵³ of that Upanisad, ‘Faunaka, a wealthy householder, once went up to Akgiras in the prescribed manner and asked: ‘What is it, my lord, by knowing which a man comes to know this whole world? ’This is what Akgiras told him: Two types of knowledge a man should learn – those who know Brahman tell us – the higher and the lower.

The lower of the two consists of the & gveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, the Atharvaveda, phonetics, the ritual-science, grammar, etymology, metrics and astronomy; whereas the higher is that by which one grasps the imperishable.³⁵⁴

‘What cannot be seen, what cannot be grasped, without colour, without sight or hearing, without hands or feet; what is eternal and all-pervading, extremely minute, present every where – that is the immutable, which the wise fully perceive’.³⁵⁵ This statement is the real answer to the question put by Faunaka.³⁵⁶ Therefore, it is evident that the identity of jiva and Brahman is the subject on which the Upanisad begins, otherwise the answer would become irrelevant. In the second Mujdaka, the same point is again dealt with in the statement ‘all this is simply that Person – rites, penance, prayer (Brahman), the highest immortal. One who knows this, my friend, hidden within the cave, cuts the knot of ignorance in this world’.³⁵⁷ At the end of the third Mujdaka, it is observed, ‘the knower, freed from name and appearance; reaches the heavenly Person, beyond the very highest. When a man comes to know that highest Brahman, he himself becomes that very brahman.’³⁵⁸ Thus scriptural extracts found in the three Mujdakas clearly establish the validity of identity (abheda). Therefore, all the places where seemingly the MuU is making a dualistic statement one should not mistake that for the scripture’s true purport. Moreover, the statement ‘he attains the highest identity’ (‘paramaÅ sammyamupaiti’)³⁵⁹ confirms that the scripture really teaches total identity between the individual and Brahman. Therefore, the Mujdaka Upanisad does not establish any difference.³⁶⁰

The opponent raises a query. This identity is the very essence of the self. Just as the self is revealed, so is identity. How then, can justification be given for the daily intercourse on the part of the self, when the root of intercourse – avidya – can never appear in the face of this everlasting sense of identity?

The answer is that this identity per se is not opposed to avidya, which then envelops the identity until it is dispelled by the undifferentiated and integral cognition (akhajdartha vrtti) embracing Brahman. Until that vrtti arises, the pragmatic intercourse, based on duality, is not considered to be void (funya). This is contrary to the view of the Buddhists who hold that the funya does not possess any essence, whereas the self does. Madhusudana observes that jiva is identical to Brahman, in the sense that Brahman has become the essence of jiva in such a way that no attribute that is irrelevant to Brahman can be relevant to jiva.³⁶¹

Neither can it be argued that the mere fact that the concept of identity depends (upajivya) on the presupposition of the concept of difference makes the latter of greater validity. Although knowledge of difference is a pre-requisite for the knowledge of the significance of the scriptures depicting non-difference (abheda fruti), the latter does not require the scriptures depicting difference (bheda fruti) to yield the knowledge of real difference in order to prove its validity.³⁶² The reality of bheda need not be taken as the basis for scriptures depicting non-difference (abheda fruti). When in the case of the cognition that contradicts the false experience of shell-silver, the non-dualists do not accept that the negative experience required the shell-silver negated here should be ultimately real (like Brahman).

Inference also proves that the individual is, in fact, non-different from Brahman. The syllogistic formula runs thus:

The jivas are not really different from the highest self (paramatman) by virtue of their being the self (i.e. it possesses self-hood).

As the highest self, being self (i.e. possessing self-hood) does not differ from the highest self, so also the individual, being self, is identical to the highest self.

It should be noted that even though the theory of uniqueness of self (atman) makes the idea of any class conception of self-hood (atmatva jati) impossible, yet the idea is used here by assuming its relative reality (vyavaharika satta).

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