Tentative biography: date and works

Even though scholars have focused their attention on the date of Madhusudana Sarasvati, it still remains an open question. The main reason for this uncertainty lies in the fact that none of his books bears any positive evidence which can help us to arrive at a definite conclusion. Rajendra Ghose, in his elaborate preface to Advaita-siddhi, ¹³ has fixed the date of Madhusudana’s birth between AD 1525 and 1530. Though he sometimes mixes up historical evidence and legend, he still supplies us with much reliable material in support. Mm. Gopi Nath Kaviraj has also discussed the question, ¹⁴ and his conclusion, that Madhusudana lived in the sixteenth century, is in substantial agreement with Sri Ghose and Pt. Ramajñ a Farma Pajdeya.¹⁵ Sri P.C. Divanji also dealt with the subject very elaborately in his introduction to Siddhanta-bindu.¹⁶ In that article, he mentioned and criticised the views of other scholars, thereby furnishing us with a chronological survey of the attempts made to determine when Madhusudana lived. According to him, too, that was in sixteenth century. So all these scholars are unanimous on that point.

Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj¹⁷ has stated that there is a manuscript of

Madhusudana’s Siddhanta-bindu transcribed in Faka 1539 (Navagnivanendumite fakabde) or AD 1617, which means that it was actually written before that and places his birth still earlier. Further evidence is furnished by the date of Vifvanatha Nyaya Pañ canana who wrote Bheda-siddhi as a challenge to Advaitasiddhi. In his Goutama-sutra-vrttiVifvanatha himself states his age as Faka 1556, that is AD 1634.¹⁸ Decidedly, Madhusudana precedes this date. There was a disciple of Madhusudana, called Fesagovinda, the son of Fesapajdit. Fesapajdit may in turn be identified with Krsja Pajdit, ¹⁹ who is the preceptor of Bhattoji Diksita. So we can suggest the lower limit of Madhusudana’s date.

Now we should direct our attention to the other limit of it. It is accepted that Advaita-ratna-raksaja was a protest against FaÅ kara Mifra’s Bheda-ratna. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj, ²⁰ on the basis of a Ms (in full) of Bheda-ratna transcribed in AD 1462, locates FaÅ kara Mifra in the fifteenth century. Madhusudana must have flourished later than that time. He also quoted from Pañ cadafi of Madhavacarya, ²¹ and from the commentary of Sayanacarya on the Vedas.²²These two authors flourished in the fourteenth century. Varanasi, the accepted place of activity for Madhusudana, is far removed from Vijay Nagar, the native place of Madhavacarya and Sayanacarya, whom Madhusudana quotes as authorities. It is plausible to think that the fame of these two great scholars may have taken a long time to reach Varanasi. Hence one should have a convenient gap between the dates of Madhava and Sayana and that of Madhusudana. Therefore, the fifteenth century may in all probability be the upper limit of Madhusudana’s date.

Professor Dinesh Bhattacharya²³ has pointed out that there is a list of learned men of Akbar’s time in Abul Fazl’s Ain-I-Akbari (Ain. 30-book II). They are divided into several groups according to the different fields in which they show their competence. Among these, the first group, described by Abul Fazl, consists of the names of philosophers and ascetics. This list contains nine Hindu names, the first of which is Madhu Sarsati. Prof. Bhattacharya²⁴ shows that the name as spelt in the original Persian text is clearly Madhava Sarasvati. The name following immediately is Madhusudana. Prof. Bhattacharya²⁵ observes that this name indicates none other than the famous scholar, Madhusudana Sarasvati of Varanasi. The other relevant names found in that group are Narayajaframa, Ramatirtha, NrsiÅ haframa and Krsja Pajdit. All of them flourished in the sixteenth century.²⁶

The joint occurrence of the names of Madhava and Madhusudana can also be counted as evidence that the Madhusudana referred to here is indeed the famous Madhusudana Sarasvati, the disciple of Madhava Sarasvati. Abul Fazl wrote Ain-

I-Akbari in AD 1597. Prof. Bhattacharya notes²⁷ that most of the Mohammedan names of scholars listed in the book lived early in the reign of Akbar. So it can be conjectured that by the time of Ain-I-Akbari, Madhusudana too, was an elderly scholar. From this evidence, one may arrive at the conclusion that Madhusudana was alive at least in the middle of the sixteenth century.

At the beginning of his Advaita-siddhi, Madhusudana mentions Madhava

(Fri-Rama Vifvefvara-Madhavanam) as his preceptor and Brahmananda Sarasvati, in his commentary on the AdS, introduces Madhava as Madhusudana’s

Vidya-guru (teacher of the fastra). Ramajñ a Pajdeya refers to an article by

Haraprasad Sastri, published in the Indian Antiquary, ²⁸ where there is a statement that a son called Narayaja Bhatta was born to one Ramefvara Bhatta of Deccan, while he was going to Dvaraka in the year 1453 Faka or AD 1514. This Ramefvara Bhatta had a disciple named Madhava Sarasvati, a resident of Varanasi. Many years after the time of his journey to Dvaraka, Ramefvara went to Varanasi and presumably became Madhava’s teacher.²⁹ One may therefore, conclude that Madhava flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century. It is probable that he was identical with the preceptor of Madhusudana, whose ‘grand-teacher’ (paramaguru) also bore the name of Rama.

While delineating the doctrine of Eka-jiva-vada, ³⁰ Madhusudana mentions two views. One of these corresponds to the Eka-jiva-vada of Prakafananda Sarasvati, who lived in the fifteenth century.³¹ It may be said that Madhusudana was aware of Prakafananda’s view and that is why, while delineating his own view of Eka-jiva-vada, ³² he mentioned the view of Prakafananda as well.

Again, Madhusudana’s theory of bhakti³³ seems to be very close to the theology of the early teachers of the Bengal School of Vaisjavism. This also indicates that they must have been roughly contemporary. Rupa Gosvami’s date is 1554–5 and that of Jiva Gosvami is 1578–9.³⁴Though Madhusudana’s theory of bhakti resembles that of the Bengal School of Vaisjavism in many respects, Madhusudana’s treatment of bhakti is quite different from that of the Bengal school, since he places more emphasis on his non-dualist epistemological and metaphysical aspects.³⁵ One may, therefore, say that Rupa Gosvami and Madhusudana are almost contemporaries, and hence there was no chance for either one of them to be influenced by the other. That is why, in spite of their apparent resemblance, Madhusudana’s theory sometimes, in various outstanding points, differs fundamentally from that of the Bengal School of Vaisjavism, as found in the writings of Rupa or Jiva Gosvami.³⁶

A tradition current among the Indian orthodox scholars holds that

Madhusudana in his old age visited Gadadhara, the great sixteenth to seventeenth

Century CE logician of Navadvipa.³⁷ Again, there is a tradition that Madhusudana was a friend of the poet Tulsidasa and wrote a verse in appreciation of Tulsidasa’s poetic abilities. The date of Tulsidasa’s death is AD 1623 and that of his composition, Rama-carita-manasa, AD 1574.³⁸ Moreover, there is another tradition that Madhusudana visited the court of Emperor Akbar and was a friend of King Todarmal.³⁹ These also confirm the view that Madhusudana flourished in the sixteenth century.

In the Catalogus Catalogorum, ⁴⁰ Mr Aufrecht has listed as many as twenty-two books under the name of Madhusudana Sarasvati. These are: Advaita-brahma (? ) siddhi, ⁴¹ Advaita-ratna-raksaja, Atmabodha-tika, Ananda-mandakini, & gvedajatadyasta-Vikrti-vivaraja, Krsja-kutuhala-nataka, Prasthana-bheda, Bhaktisamanya-nirupaja, Bhagavadgita-gudhartha-dipika, Bhagavadbhaktirasayana, Bhagavata-puraja-prathamafloka-vyakhya, Mahimjah-stotra-tika, Rajñ ampratibodha, Vedastuti-tika, Vedanta-kalpa-latika, Fajdilya-sutra-tika,

Fastra-siddhanta-lesa-tika, SaÅ ksepa-fariraka-sara-saÅ graha, Sarvavidyasiddhanta-varjana, (? ), Siddhanta-tattva-bindu, Harilila-vyakhya and Bhagavatapurajadyaflokatraya-vyakhya.

It is difficult to ascribe to Madhusudana the authorship of all the abovementioned books, although some of them possess internal evidence that suggest that they came out of a single pen. Realising this difficulty, Swami Prajnananda⁴² mentions the names of only those works whose authorship can definitely be ascribed to Madhusudana.

The Advaita-siddhi is the most outstanding work of Madhusudana Sarasvati. It has made the name of Madhusudana immortal and has given him his revered position among the highest teachers of the FaÅ kara School of Vedanta. From this book we can gather copious particulars regarding Madhusudana: for example, that he was a member of the sannyasin order, ⁴³ and that his preceptors were Rama, Vifvefvara Sarasvati and Madhava.⁴⁴ Madhusudana is traditionally referred to as the author of the Advaita-siddhi. Therefore it is sensible to take this book as the starting point. Besides the Advaita-siddhi, the following books came from the same hand: (1) Vedanta-kalpa-latika, (2) Advaita-ratna-raksaja,

(3) Siddhanta-bindu, (4) SaÅ ksepa-faritaka-sara-saÅ graha, (5) Gudhartha-dipika, (6) Bhakti-rasayana, (7) Bhagavata-puraja-prathama-floka-vyakhya and (8) Mahimah-stotra-tika.

In the Vedanta-kalpa-latika, ⁴⁵ the author mentions the name of Vifvefvara in the introductory lines. This is the name of Madhusudana’s preceptor. Then again the author of the Advaita-siddhi⁴⁶ mentions the name of Vedanta-kalpa-latika and states distinctly that as he had elaborately expatiated upon some topics therein, he need not discuss them here any further. Moreover, the colophon of the Vedanta-kalpa-latika runs thus: ⁴⁷ ‘Here ends the stavaka...composed by FrimatparamahaÅ sa-parivrajakacarya Madhusudana Sarasvati.’ This almost exactly corresponds with the colophon of the first chapter of the Advaita-siddhi. Hence it is clear that both the works are by the same author.

The Advaita-ratna-raksaja is a dialectical work against the empiricist and dualist school of the Nyaya philosophy. Its authorship can also be safely ascribed to Madhusudana, because the author of this book frequently refers to the Advaitasiddhi as his own work.⁴⁸ Reference to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika⁴⁹ as another work by the same author is also found here. Thus, undoubtedly this is also a work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi.

The Siddhanta-bindu is a commentary on FaÅ kara’s Dafafloki. At the beginning of the treatise, the author pays tribute to Vifvefvara, whom his commentator Purusottama⁵⁰ – reputed to be Madhusudana’s direct disciple – describes as the preceptor of the author. The colophon⁵¹ of this book resembles almost exactly that of the Advaita-ratna-raksaja, ⁵² and in the Vedanta-kalpa-latika, ⁵³ the author mentions the Siddhanta-bindu as a treatise written by himself. Moreover, even in the Advaita-siddhi Madhusudana mentions this work, stating that in that work he has discussed the subject in question more elaborately.⁵⁴ So all the evidence points to the fact that the author of Advaita-siddhi also wrote this work.

The SaÅ ksepa-faritaka-sara-saÅ graha is a commentary on the SaÅ ksepafariraka of Sarvajñ atma Muni. Though it is not mentioned in any of Madhusudana’s other works, nor does it mention them, it still bears evidence that strongly suggests that this book is written by the same Madhusudana Sarasvati who composed the Advaita-siddhi. First of all, in the second benedictory verse of this commentary, ⁵⁵ the author mentions the name of his preceptors, which exactly corresponds to the first portion of the second benedictory verse of the Advaita-siddhi.⁵⁶ In addition, the colophon of the first chapter⁵⁷ is very similar to that of the Advaitaratna-raksaja, ⁵⁸ and the colophons⁵⁹ of the other three chapters have only the words ‘Fripadafisya’after ‘Fri Vifvefvara Sarasvati’, instead of ‘pujyapadafisya’. However, the two words are almost synonymous.

His largest work on religious philosophy is his commentary on the Bhagavad-gita. It is very extensive and Madhusudana here gives expression to his own opinions on various points where he deferred from FaÅ kara’s views on the subject. The colophons⁶⁰ of the chapter herein almost exactly correspond to those of the chapters of the SaÅ ksepa-fariraka-sara-saÅ graha⁶¹ and Advaita-ratna-raksaja.⁶² The next point, which provides convincing evidence that the author of this work is identical with the author of the Advaita-siddhi, is that the first line of the last verse of this book⁶³ is similar to the second introductory verse of the Advaitasiddhi.⁶⁴ Moreover, the author here mentions the name of Advaita-siddhi⁶⁵ as another of his works. In the Advaita-siddhi⁶⁶ the author often mentions that he has dealt with some topics in the Gudhartha-dipika.

Bhakti-rasayana is Madhusudana’s most important work on religious philosophy, in which he clearly depicts his views on various topics of emotion and devotion in religion. As this work mentions the names of Siddhanta-bindu⁶⁷ and Vedantakalpa-latika⁶⁸ as the author’s own work, and as Gudhartha-dipika⁶⁹ states that the topic at hand is further developed by the author in his Bhakti-rasayana, it is definitely a work of Madhusudana, the author of the Advaita-siddhi.

Bhagavata-puraja-prathama-floka-vyakhya is another theological work accredited to Madhusudana Sarasvati. As the work mentions the name of Bhaktirasayana⁷⁰ as the author’s own work, it is doubtless a work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi. Moreover the treatment of the metaphysical topics therein is typical of this author.⁷¹

The Hari-lila-vyakhya is a commentary on Bopadeva’s Hari-lilamrtam, a synopsis of the Bhagavata-puraja. The colophon under each of the chapters reads⁷²: ‘This is the account of the chapter of Hari-lila composed by the illustrious Bopadeva, written by Madhusudana Sarasvati.’The last verse of the work also gives the same name for the author. The editors of this book, and Prof. Modi, ⁷³ declare it to be the work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi without putting forward any evidence whatsoever to confirm their statement. Abhyankara Sastri asserts that a different Madhusudana wrote this and several other works.⁷⁴ But his conclusion is similarly only based on conjecture. This is a simple work. But there are several internal evidences pointing to the fact that our author must have written this commentary. The author mentions in this commentary his own commentary on the first verse of the Bhagavata Puraja. Moreover, his commentary definitely presupposes his treatment of bhakti and bhakti-rasa in his Bhakti-rasayana. For instance, his explanation of the words hari and lila in the title of the text bears the hallmark of his style of argumentation. Vopadeva explained that Hari is the bliss (ananda) and his lila (sports) is also bliss. Madhusudana in his typically erudite way explains that the word-combination harilila is to be analysed as the blissful sports (lila) of Hari the bliss. This does not indicate any duality between lila (also bliss) and Hari the bliss because the two words are written in the same parts of speech, that is, they have the same semantic value. He as a non-dualist does not accept any real difference between the quality and the qualified. Therefore, for him Hari and his lila are in fact a single entity, the bliss. This is so typical of Madhusudana’s argumentation that I accept this work to be written by him.

Mahimjah-stotra-tika is a commentary on Puspadanta’s Mahimjah-stotra. The commentator explains the hymn in two different ways, showing that both the gods Hara and Hari can be the object of the original verses. In the beginning of the commentary the author pays homage to his preceptor, ⁷⁵ Vifvefvara, and in the colophon he also mentions himself as a bee on the lotus feet of the illustrious Vifvefvara.⁷⁶ Moreover, Vedanta-kalpa-latika is here referred to as the author’s own work, ⁷⁷ confirming that this work can be added to the list of works ascribed to Madhusudana.

It would not be correct to consider the Prasthana-bheda as a separate work, since it is a part of his commentary on the Mahimjah-stotra.

The above-mentioned books are those works whose authorship can be confidently ascribed to Madhusudana and are thus, the principal sources of his philosophy. We may then turn to the remaining works that go under the name of Madhusudana. The list submitted by Mr Aufrecht can by no means be regarded as accurate in this respect. For example, although Bhaktisamanyanirupaja is listed as a separate work, it is merely a name given to the first chapter of the Bhakti-rasayana. The rest of the list is not from our author’s pen. T. Ganapati Sastri, Prof. Modi and Sri P.C. Divanji mention the Hari-lila-vyakhya and the Í fvara-pratipatti-prakafa as works of Madhusudana Sarasvati.

The Í fvara-pratipatti-prakafa is strongly advocated by both Prof. Modi⁷⁸ and P.C. Divanji⁷⁹ as a work of Madhusudana Sarasvati. They draw this conclusion from the fact that there are some topics dealt with in this tiny work, which correspond to those covered in Madhusudana’s larger works. Prof. Modi shows that these topics⁸⁰ – the nature of God, the three conditions of the soul and the formation of the mystic word ‘Prajava’ – are covered in works such as Siddhanta-bindu, as well as in this work. But it may be said that similar topics with the same conclusions may be discussed in different books by different authors sharing the same views. Not infrequently, Madhusudana himself adopts the conclusions and mode of treatment of some particular topics explored by his predecessors. The style of this work does not betray any similarity to the style adopted by Madhusudana in his other works. Therefore, we cannot cast our votes either negatively or positively. Mm. T. Ganapati Sastri, in his brief preface, throws no light on this subject.

The Ananda-mandakini is a eulogy of Lord Krsja. It is a metrical work, of which the last verse⁸¹ and the colophon⁸² bear the name of Madhusudana as its composer. However, the author does not mention the name of his preceptor, which was then customary among the ascetic authors, nor does the work provide any glimpse of the author’s scholarship in Vedantic philosophy. The verses only describe the exquisite beauty of Lord Krsja and his various heroic deeds; there is no sign of the mastermind of Madhusudana Sarasvati, the author of the Advaitasiddhi. The language of the book lacks any charm and its treatment is lacking in style, while repetition of ideas is often found. So one might discard this from the list of Madhusudana’s works.

As to the chronology of Madhusudana’s works, it appears from the nature and style of the composition that the author’s first work is the SaÅ ksepa-farirakasara-saÅ graha. Here, Madhusudana confines himself strictly to the position of a commentator and seldom expresses his own views. He explains the verses of the SaÅ ksepa-fariraka clearly and minutely, but the personality of the commentator is always kept in the background and never overpowers the views of Sarvajñ atma Muni. Again, this work bears no reference to any of the other compositions of

Madhusudana and possesses none of the author’s particular views. It is also never mentioned in any of his other works.

The Vedanta-kalpa-latika and the Siddhanta-bindu come after the SaÅ ksepafariraka-sara-saÅ graha, and the Advaita-siddhi comes after these works: both Advaita-ratna-raksaja and Gudhartha Dipika mention it, which suggest they came later than the Advaita-siddhi.

Among Madhusudana’s devotional works, with the exception of the

Mahimjah-stotra-tika, the Bhakti-rasayana comes first in chronological order, since both Gudhartha Dipika and the commentary on the first verse of the Bhagavata mention the Bhakti-rasayana. But the position of the Mahimah-stotra-tika is somewhat puzzling. Except for the Vedanta-kalpa-latika, it does not mention any other works of Madhusudana, and the nature of the treatment of different topics reveals the author as a vigorous follower of FaÅ kara rather than a devotee. Throughout the work the author is preoccupied with the notion of establishing that Hara and Hari are one and the same and should therefore be regarded as the bimba or Í fvara, who is identical with the absolute.⁸³ As the ideas, and often the language, ⁸⁴ used here resemble that of the Advaita-siddhi, its date of composition may be placed somewhere near the time of the Advaita-siddhi, and probably preceding the Bhakti-rasayana.

Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we come to the conclusion that the works of Madhusudana may be arranged chronologically in the following way:

1 SaÅ ksepa-fariraka-sara-saÅ graha (SSSS).

2 Vedanta-kalpa-latika (VKL).

3 Siddhanta-bindu (SB).

4 Advaita-siddhi (AdS).

5 Advaita-ratna-raksaja (ARR).

The devotional works are arranged thus:

1 Mahimnah-stotra-tika (MST).

2 Bhakti-rasayana (BhR).

3 Gita-gudhartha-dipika (GGD).

4 Commentary on the first verse of the Bhagavata Puraja. 5 Harilila-vyakhya.

I must hasten to add that these chronological lists are very tentative and open to emendation. Moreover, the last two works on bhakti may have been written any time in his career.

I have mentioned that the Advaita-siddhi was a work written to refute

Vyasatirtha’s the Nyayamrta. Vyasatirtha flourished in the period of the last part of the fifteenth and the first part of the sixteenth century CE, in Vijayanagara and was the preceptor of the royalty there. His Nyayamrta vigorously attacked FaÅ kara’s non-dualism and argued successfully against all the important nondualists of the FaÅ kara school. Being a follower of the Madhva school of realists, Vyasatirtha focused his attack on the notions of avidya and the unreality/illusoriness of the world.⁸⁵ The Nyayamrta is a detailed work in four chapters in which Vyasatirtha quotes almost all early Advaita classics to refute their arguments against realists position. He presents each of the issues clearly, producing arguments for and against the position of the opponents, and then proceeds to show the logical drawbacks or fallacies in the opponents’ arguments. He was a great logician and effectively followed the Nyaya tactics of polemics.⁸⁶ It became imperative for the non-dualists to address this new group of opponents – the Vedantic Vaisjava realists.

Madhusudana wrote the Advaita-siddhi mainly to answer the Nyayamrta. Right from the start he made that clear. His opening benedictory verse asserts that the empirically experienced phenomenal world is false (mithya), which was a clear response to Vyasatirtha’s second benedictory verse in the Nyayamrta referring Hari to be the creator of a real world. To emphasise his purpose of writing the Advaita-siddhi the author introduces his thesis that in order to establish non-duality he must first of all refute the reality of duality.⁸⁷ Moreover, he meticulously followed Vyasatirtha’s arrangement of the content of the Nyayamrta and refuted each and every argument of the latter. Vyasatirtha challenged the Advaita position by putting it in a syllogistic formula. ‘The world is illusory’ (probandum or the major term); ‘because it has the qualities of being perceptible, being unconscious and being limited’ (reason or the middle term); ‘like the (illusory) shell-silver’ that is, a piece of shell mistakenly seen as a piece of silver (example). Vyasatirtha then devoted the first chapter of his work to refute every part of this syllogism. Therefore, Madhusudana’s first chapter consists of elaborate refutation of every single point of Vyasatirtha’s attack.

This led him to discuss all the possible questions about the metaphysics of the Advaita-Vedanta school and he discussed these both extensively and intensively. He measured every concept from all possible sides and synthesised the different opinions existing among the teachers of the Advaita school themselves, which had been pointed out by their opponents. This predisposition towards synthesis or harmony is obvious in all his works; especially those concerned with metaphysics. Seen in this light, it is easy to understand why Madhusudana goes to such pains to explain and justify all the prevailing opinions regarding one issue.⁸⁸ To that extent, he can be regarded as an eclectic author. But that is only one side of his genius. In order to give a correct and logical interpretation of a question, Madhusudana often makes a compromise from the views of different authors of his school and sometimes reinterprets or slightly twists the statements of renowned authors to fit in with his own views.⁸⁹ Madhusudana always manages to explain each opinion of his predecessors in such a way as to quieten all opposition. That is why the Advaita-siddhi is regarded as a monumental work, for it succeeds in winning a complete victory over the fighting dualists like the logicians and the followers of Madhva. It should be noted, however, that in his anxiety to refute dualism, Madhusudana sometimes puts forward weak arguments, or even shows contradictions in his arguments. By his own admission, he intended mainly to produce a work of disputation (vada).⁹⁰ But the overall effect is stupendous and fully serves its purpose (fn. pp. 108 and 86 infra).

I discuss avidya first because his handling of that subject secured him his eminence. Although, Madhusudana’s arguments in favour of an indescribable avidya are what I introduce now, I shall constantly refer to his Advaita epistemology. Hence I shall discuss his views on the non-dualist epistemology next. Advaita-Vedanta accepts besides Brahman, the pure consciousness, three other conscious categories – God (Í fvara), the cosmic and intuitive consciousness (Saksi) and the individual consciousness (jiva). Only transcendental Brahman is pure, unlimited and eternally existent. The other three are relevant only on the empirical level and thus are limited in some ways. Their existence is relative to the unconscious phenomena they experience and interact with. Both these conscious and unconscious entities thus belong to the world of experience. I shall discuss these worldly categories next. Finally comes the question of the significance of all these discussions of fastra of the non-dualists. The significance is to attain liberation (mukti/moksa) from worldly suffering and dissatisfaction. Therefore, mukti is the goal of understanding the teachings of fastra and its discussion always comes at the end of the fastric discussions. But for a bhakti theologian that is a penultimate goal. My last chapter deals with Madhusudana’s bhakti theology. His is a mysticism of non-dualism and divine love. A philosopher, theologian and fearsome polemist, Madhusudana stands as a great representative of his time. I have tried to show his views and his methods of argumentation as evinced from all his masterful works. I also have, as far as possible, mentioned his use of the views of his predecessors in the FaÅ kara School, and occasionally I have used his commentators to explain his expositions. It should be noted that I have rarely translated Madhusudana literally. Whenever I quoted him, in order to make it clear, I often paraphrased it in English. Further, almost all quotations from Upanisads are from Patrick Ollivelle’s translations.

2

AVIDYA

The Vedas (fruti) tell us that Brahman created the universe.⁹¹ But if the act of creation is attributed to Brahman, it can no longer remain non-different and devoid of all attributes, as the followers of the school of Advaita-vedanta hold Brahman to be.⁹² The concept of avidya provides an answer to this criticism. Avidya is directly responsible for creation. Brahman is said to be the creator of this universe through the instrumentality of avidya.⁹³ In other words, the universe is an illusory projection (viksepa) of avidya and Brahman, being related to avidya as its locus (adhisthana), is said by ascription, to be the cause of the universe. The concept of avidya is not made very clear in the Upanisads, although several texts suggest this concept when they deal with the term maya (delusion) or ajñ ana (ignorance). FaÅ kara realised this, and used these examples freely to support his views of avidya, which he exploits to establish his theory of absolute monism. Madhusudana also followed FaÅ kara’s example and used these three terms, namely, avidya, maya and ajñ ana more or less synonymously. Hence, to follow Madhusudana’s complicated style of argumentation, I shall use the terms avidya and ajñ ana interchangeably.

According to the school of the Advaita-vedanta, avidya is the material cause of all created objects. Madhusudana, ⁹⁴ following Citsukha, defines avidya as a beginningless, positive entity, which is destructible by knowledge. Avidya is beginningless, thus the definition does not cover a knowledge that is refuted by a subsequent knowledge. Such knowledge is positive, and is refutable by the next knowledge. But as it is not beginningless, this definition does not cover it. The adjective ‘positive’ is given to prevent the inclusion of the absence of a particular knowledge just before its cognition.⁹⁵ Thus the definition of avidya does not cover such absence of knowledge. Because even though such non-existence of knowledge is beginningless and it is also refutable by the particular knowledge, nevertheless, it is not positive.

It is incorrect for the opponent to claim that all beginningless positive objects are irrefutable like the Self (Atman), because according to the Naiyayikas, atoms are beginningless, positive and irrefutable. Thus, the black earth atoms of a black earthen pot should be everlasting. But when the pot is burnt the black earth atoms are destroyed, and we see red earth atoms in their stead. The word ‘positive’ is taken here in the sense of that which is other than negative (bhavatvaÅ catrabhava-vilaksajatvamatraÅ vivaksitam). Thus, avidya is merely different from negativity and not contradictory to it. It is interpreted in this way in order to justify that avidya is the material cause of both positive and negative objects of the universe. A material cause cannot be contradictory to its effect. At the same time, it cannot be similar to the effect in all respects. A cow cannot be the material cause of a horse, nor can a pitcher be the material cause of another pitcher. Considering the material causality of avidya, it is defined as different from both positive and negative objects.

The dualists refute this definition in the following way: avidya cannot always be beginningless because there are exceptions. For example, the ignorance (avidya) about the true nature of the shell, in the shell-silver illusion, has a beginning. Again, avidya, being the material cause of the negation (abhavopadanajñ ana) as well, cannot be exclusively positive since by nature, the cause has to be homogenous to the effect.

Madhusudana answers these objections as follows⁹⁶: avidya conditioned by the shell is beginningless per se but it is said to have a beginning insofar as its condition namely, the shell has a beginning. Again, avidya is positive, in the sense that it is not a negative concept (abhava vilaksaja). Thus, ‘positive’ here means that which is neither positive nor negative but a third category which is indefinable (anirvacaniya). So the question of lack of homogeneity between negation (abhava) and avidya (its material cause), does not arise. Moreover, two completely identical entities cannot be mutually causally related. Similarly, two utterly different objects cannot be related as a cause and effect relationship. Therefore, the question of homogeneity is not relevant.

The opponents raised an objection in connection with the definition of avidya:

How, they asked, can ignorance (avidya) regarding Brahman be destroyed by a corresponding knowledge, as the definition of avidya presupposes? For avidya regarding Brahman can be discarded only by the cognition (vrtti-jñ ana) of the same reality namely Brahman? But Brahman can never be the content of cognition because in that case, it (Brahman) becomes illusory like the pitcher, which can be the content of its cognition (vrtti-vyapya).⁹⁷

The answer to the objection is this⁹⁸: Brahman is said to be the content of a vrtti in the sense that vrtti here serves as a distinguishing adjunct (upadhi), to Brahman. That is to say, though pure Brahman cannot be the object of either a cognition (vrtti-jñ ana) or avidya, Brahman conditioned by an upadhi (and therefore to some extent, impure) can still very easily become the object of both avidya and an experience (vrtti-jñ ana). Thus, Brahman is an object of avidya when avidya itself serves as Brahman’s conditioning adjunct (upadhi). Brahman can also be an object of an experience (vrtti) when the same vrtti acts as its upadhi. Thus, in both cases, the conditioned Brahman is the object (visaya) and not the pure one. An upadhi is distinguished from an adjective in that while an adjective (vifesaja) becomes integrated into what it qualifies, an upadhi conditions an object without being inherent in it. This means that an upadhi without itself being the object of either avidya or cognition (i.e. svarupa-sat) still conditions an entity and thus provides for its objectivity (visayata) of either an experience or avidya Such a condition, however, will pursue the conditioned entity for a long time, and thus is distinguished from an upalaksaja, (a temporary unessential mark), which is just a casual feature of the entity it qualifies.⁹⁹ Interpreted in terms of upadhi, the same entity, namely Brahman, can very well be the object of both avidya and cognitive (vrtti) knowledge. When, therefore, Brahman becomes the object of knowledge, ignorance (avidya) regarding Brahman is destroyed at once. The definition of avidya thus stands unchallenged.

Objections may be raised that the state of a person who achieved liberation in this life, (jivanmukta), is a challenge to the above-mentioned concept held by the followers of FaÅ kara. Since if a liberated person still retains his/her physical existence, a product of avidya, clearly this person’s self-realisation did bring him/her enlightenment but did not remove all effects of avidya. The non-dualist answers that in the case of a jivanmukta, the ‘prarabdha karman’, that is, the accumulated karman which has borne fruit in the shape of the present body and its inevitable experience of pleasure and pain, forms the obstacle. The actions done by the jiva must be atoned for. True knowledge destroys all karman except for those actions, which have borne fruit. These karmans must be exhausted only by enjoyment (bhoga). For that purpose the jivanmukta retains his body until the prarabdha karmans are exhausted.¹⁰⁰

Madhusudana puts forward another definition of avidya, namely that which is the material cause of illusion (bhramopadanatvam). But this definition is only acceptable to those who regard avidya as the material cause of the creation and Brahman as the substratum of such avidya. To those who contend that Brahman, or Brahman aided by avidya, is the material cause of the creation, it cannot be acceptable.

This indefinable avidya is revealed by the intuitive knowledge of saksin. In fact, saksin is nothing other than pure consciousness reflected on the mode or vrtti of avidya (avidya-vrtti-pratibimbacaitanyam). Thus saksi is the intuitive knowledge of self and avidya, being connected to it, is always revealed to it. In other words like Rahu, avidya is revealed by the consciousness that it covers (rahubat svavrta-caitanya-prakafyavidya).¹⁰¹ As avidya is thus always revealed to intuitive knowledge, so also are the effects of avidya. Whenever there is cognition of any object, it arises after discarding the particular avidya that so long kept the object covered from the cogniser. Thus the cogniser observes the object as revealed. But avidya cannot be cognised as such. It is revealed only to the intuitive knowledge, and the cognising self realises its existence only because this self is identical with the intuitive knowledge. Therefore no proof can be put forward to determine the existence of avidya, as the scope of all such proof is limited to cognitive knowledge only. Avidya, on the other hand, is not cognisable. Doubt regarding the existence of avidya is also impossible for the same reason. Therefore doubt may arise regarding the nature of avidya, such as its being anirvacaniya, endless, etc.; and four kinds of pramajas (means to valid knowledge), are posited to determine its nature. These are direct knowledge, inference, scripture and implication. Avidya exists because it can actually be perceived. Such undeniable experience¹⁰² as, ‘I am ignorant, I do not know myself or anyone else’, or ‘I do not know the object which you are referring to’, bear testimony to avidya. The first cognition cognises avidya in general while the second posits particular avidya, that is, avidya concerning a particular object (e.g. a jar). Likewise, ‘I slept peacefully and did not experience anything’¹⁰³ – a memory at the waking state after the break of dreamless sleep – proves the direct experience of avidya at the state of dreamless sleep.

The opponents¹⁰⁴ argue that the first experience mentioned above reveals only a negative object, such as the absence of knowledge, and not avidya as a positive entity, because according to the monists, positive avidya cannot exist in anything except absolute consciousness (citireva kevala). In the cognition, ‘I am ignorant’ avidya is presented as existing in the ego (ahamartha), which is not absolute consciousness. Therefore it should be recognised that in the above experience the object of cognition cannot be positive avidya. Hence the absence of knowledge should be accepted as the object of such experience. The same applies in the case of the cognition of ignorance regarding a particular object, for example ‘I do not know what you are referring to’(the jar, for instance). The same argument, which establishes the first cognition revealing absence of knowledge, also establishes that the second cognition, too, reveals the absence of knowledge. They further argue that so far as the objects are concerned, there is no difference between the two forms of knowledge, namely ‘I am ignorant’ and ‘There is no knowledge in me’. So the object of the cognition, ‘I am ignorant’ is nothing but the absence of knowledge in general.

The summary of Madhusudana’s answer to this is as follows: according to the monists, pure consciousness is the substratum of avidya. On this consciousness mind (antahkaraja) is superimposed as identical with the consciousness mentioned above. Therefore, though avidya is really revealed by saksin, it is erroneously attributed to consciousness limited by antahkaraja.¹⁰⁵ The error arises because both avidya and antahkaraja subsist in the same substratum, namely (individual) consciousness. This justifies the cognition of avidya as an attribute of ego (antahkaraja)¹⁰⁶ as presented in the experience, ‘I am ignorant’. It is true that both the experiences refer to the same object. But that object cannot be the absence of knowledge, because the knowledge of a negative object cannot arise without the previous knowledge of its positive counterpart (protiyogin).

The opponent may then ask what is the object of this particular cognition, namely ‘I am ignorant’ or ‘I do not know’? Is it the totality of absence of all the knowledge taken individually, or the absence of knowledge in general? In both cases, the admission of a previous knowledge of the positive counterpart of the negation contradicts the negation itself, since if there is a single knowledge, it immediately discards the totality of negation or the general negation of knowledge. On the other hand, the recognition of positive avidya in these cases is free from this criticism. In this case avidya, being a positive entity (i.e. not negative), does not anticipate knowledge of the positive counterpart. But how can knowledge refer to avidya, which is diametrically opposed to knowledge in nature? The answer is that avidya is revealed by saksi-jñ ana, which, unlike the vrtti-jñ ana, is not opposed to avidya/ajñ ana.¹⁰⁷

Even when one argues that saksi-jñ ana reveals avidya, one is still open to criticism. In the knowledge, ‘the blue pitcher’ the knowledge of blue, the adjective of the pitcher, is a prerequisite. Likewise, the knowledge of the object of ajñ ana is necessary before the knowledge of ajñ ana becomes possible. This is because ajñ ana is never known in the abstract, but is always known in relation to a particular object. The object thus qualifies ajñ ana and the knowledge of the qualification is the prerequisite of the knowledge of the qualified. Thus it must be recognised that the knowledge of the pitcher exists before the ajñ ana about the pitcher is revealed. The knowledge of the pitcher has to be vrtti-jñ ana, which has the claim to be prama-jñ ana (valid knowledge) at the same time. So the question is, how can ajñ ana about the pitcher arise at all in the face of valid knowledge of the same pitcher? And if ajñ ana does not exist in this case, then the question of its being known does not arise. So saksi knowledge cannot grasp ajñ ana that thus had already become non-existent.

In reply, Madhusudana admits that ajñ ana always appears concerned with an object. He further admits that the previous knowledge of that object is necessary for the revelation of the ajñ ana concerning it. But the knowledge of the object – and here he differs from his opponents – is not a normal cognition (vrtti-jñ ana) at all and hence is not a valid knowledge which is opposed to the ajñ ana. In fact, like ajñ ana, the object too, is revealed by saksi-jñ ana. Whether a cogniser knows the pitcher or not, saksi-jñ ana reveals the object. Thus, the same saksi-jñ ana reveals both the pitcher and its ignorance. In this way, though ignorance about a pitcher requires previous knowledge of the pitcher, previous knowledge of the pitcher, being a saksi-jñ ana, is compatible with ajñ ana and its knowledge. It is the nature of saksi-jñ ana that unlike ordinary valid knowledge, it reveals unknown objects as both unknown and known, that is unknown to the individual cogniser and known to saksin. Whether it comes within the parameters of the valid cognition and the cognising individual, or not, every object is revealed to the saksin.¹⁰⁸

The contention of Madhusudana’s opponents is that the content of the knowledge, ‘I am ignorant’, is the absence of knowledge and not the indescribable avidya. Since it is merely an absence of knowledge, the question may be asked as to what kind of absence (abhava) this absence of knowledge (jñ anabhava) can possibly be? Is it the totality of absence of all knowledge taken individually? Is it the absence of knowledge in general? Or is it the pragabhava (pre-existing absence) of a particular knowledge? ¹⁰⁹ Madhusudana has already refuted the first two alternatives, so his opponents propose the third. In this case the inconvenience of the first two alternatives is removed, as the knowledge concerns a particular pragabhava of a particular knowledge rather than of all knowledge. In the absence of all knowledge, the existence of the awareness of that absence contradicts the idea of the absence of all knowledge, as the existence of any one knowledge goes against the contention of the absence of all knowledge. But in this case, this pragabhava of a particular knowledge allows scope for the existence of any other knowledge except for that particular individual whose pragabhava is being experienced. Hence the knowledge of such pragabhava does not make the conception wrong. However, there may be another danger in admitting this view, since the knowledge of the positive entity that is being negated (pratiyogin), is held to be the prerequisite to the knowledge of its absence. Accordingly, before one experiences an absence of a particular knowledge, the very knowledge of that particular knowledge, that is, the pratiyogin, is necessary. To avoid this criticism of circular argumentation, his opponents state that the requisite knowledge of the pratiyogin comprehends the latter in its generic form. That is, the knowledge of the particular pratiyogin which serves as the cause of the knowledge of its pragabhava, presents the pratiyogin in its generic form and not individually. The result is that, in such a case, the pratiyogin is not required to be present for the attainment of its knowledge, since, according to the Naiyayikas, the knowledge of generality (samanyalaksajapratyasatti), in present case jñ anatva, can grasp even past and future knowledge. This obviously cannot be present at the time of such knowledge. Therefore, the object of the knowledge – ‘I am ignorant’ – is the pragabhava of a particular knowledge.¹¹⁰

Madhusudana answers that: if the object of the above-mentioned experience is the pragabhava of a particular knowledge, then it is undeniable that very experience comprehends that particular knowledge, the pratiyogin of the pragabhava, in its specific form. Hence, as the prerequisite of the knowledge of the pragabhava of a particular jñ ana, the knowledge of the pratiyogin must have to grasp it (pratiyogin) in its specific form. Therefore it cannot be accepted that the requisite knowledge of the pratiyogin comprehends it in generic form.

In fact, Madhusudana does not at all accept the concept of pragabhava.

He explains that the expression ‘the pitcher will come into existence’, does not imply the pragabhava of the pitcher, but refers only to its future existence (bhavisyatta). The verb ‘will become’ (bhavisyati) denotes the association of the pitcher with a time which neither contains the pitcher nor its destruction. Likewise, samanyabhava is a false notion.¹¹¹ For example, in the case of, say, the samanyabhava of a pitcher, the knowledge of such samanyabhava requires the knowledge of its positive counterpart (pratiyogin) namely the pitcher. But the pitcher may be comprehended only when it exists. In that case, the knowledge of the general absence of the pitcher cannot occur in the face of the existing pitcher. Moreover, the concept of pragabhava as presented by opponents of this theory renders the concept of samanyabhava untenable, since they state that even the absence (abhava) of a particular object concerns a pratiyogin qualified by a generic attribute (samanyabhava vacchinnapratiyogitaka). Hence the concept of samanyabhava cannot be distinguished from the concept of pragabhava as both the abhavas concern identical objects as they are delimited by (pratiyogitavacchedaka) the same generic attribute. If the concept of samanyabhava is accepted as distinct from the concept of pragabhava, then the concept of pragabhava remains to be reinterpreted. Thus, both the acceptance and non-acceptance of the notion of pragabhava produce the same effect – the dismissal of the concept of samanyabhava. By such means, Madhusudana discards both the concepts of pragabhava and samanyabhava in order to refute the claims of opponents that ‘I am ignorant’is an experience of the absence of knowledge. Madhusudana continues to defend the indescribable nature of avidya. I have just given a few examples to show his method.¹¹²

Having thus analysed the ordinary experience of the waking state,

Madhusudana proceeds to examine the cognition of deep sleep (susupti) in support of ajñ ana as a non-negative entity. The retrospective knowledge of the waking state (jagratparamarfa) – ‘I slept happily, I did not know anything’ – is additional evidence as to the existence of ajñ ana at the time of deep sleep. In response to this, his opponents ask whether this retrospective knowledge (paramarfa) is an inference, or a case of memory? If it is an inference, then the same inference proves the existence of absence of knowledge and not indescribable ajñ ana at the time of deep sleep. The logic of the inference runs thus: ‘before’and ‘after’have an intermediate time, so between the waking state and the reversion to the same, there is an intermediate time called the susupti, that is, the state of dreamless sleep. At that time, ‘I had no knowledge’ because (1) I was in a special state, (2) all conditions of knowledge were then absent and (3) the individual self (atman) was invariably not remembered as having knowledge at the time. This retrospective knowledge cannot be a case of memory for want of relevant impression (saÅ skara), one of the conditions of memory. The reason for this is that previous knowledge produces memory in due course only through the intermediate operation of saÅ skara. While previous knowledge dies out it leaves the saÅ skara about its content, which being instigated (udbuddha) by a stimulus, produces memory about the same content. This means that saÅ skara presupposes for its existence the destruction of previous knowledge, since, unless the knowledge dies, it must be said to continue and will then produce by itself the succeeding knowledge, which in that case cannot be a memory for lack of saÅ skara. But the knowledge of ajñ ana at the time of susupti is a saksi-jñ ana. As such, it cannot be destroyed at the waking state, for saksi-jñ ana is consciousness limited by ajñ ana. But neither consciousness nor ajñ ana is destroyed at the waking state. Hence, saksi-jñ ana, being indestructible, does not produce any saÅ skara and consequently no memory is possible about the content of that knowledge. Therefore, opponents conclude, the retrospective knowledge under consideration cannot be a case of memory. And if it is an inference, such inference will establish absence of knowledge (and not ajñ ana) at the time of deep sleep.¹¹³

Madhusudana replies that: the inference by which his opponents try to prove the existence of the absence of knowledge at the time of susupti, is open to objection, since it is fallacious. The reasons that is, the middle terms on which this inference is based are faulty and the adjective to the minor term (paksa) is unknown. In the first reason, the special state of atman is nothing but its lack of knowledge (jñ anabhavavatva), although this has not yet been established by valid knowledge. In the second reason, the absence of all conditions of knowledge is determined by the absence of knowledge, which is the major term (sadhya) of the syllogism under consideration. Thus, in this case, the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) become interdependent. The third reason may be interpreted in two ways: either, atman is never recognised as having knowledge, or, when limited by the time of susupti, atman is not recognised as having knowledge. The first interpretation is impossible, as it is contrary to common experience. In the second case, mere recognition cannot justify the absence of such knowledge. There are some experiences which the cogniser does not care to remember (upeksajiyajñ anabhava). Only the things that are fit to be remembered are remembered. The knowledge for which the cogniser does not care may arise, but such knowledge is never remembered. So this case, at least, is not covered by the middle term (i.e. the third reason) of the syllogism under consideration. In fact, the absence of knowledge is never proved by the reason of not having been remembered. The absence of knowledge of anything is determined by anupalabdhi pramana.¹¹⁴ The retrospective knowledge in question refers to the memory of ajñ ana experienced at the time of susupti. For saÅ skara, the condition of memory, is possible because saksi-jñ ana is not the consciousness limited by ajñ ana (as supposed by opponents) but is consciousness reflected on a mode of ajñ ana.¹¹⁵ At the time of susupti, ajñ ana is comprehended by such saksi-jñ ana. With the disappearance of susupti the operative mode of ajñ ana (which in the view of Vivaraja is sufupti itself)¹¹⁶ is destroyed, and so the corresponding saksi-jñ ana may be said to disappear. In this sense, the previous knowledge, namely saksijñ ana, is capable of producing saÅ skara, necessary for subsequent memory.

Opponents argue that if ajñ ana is regarded as being revealed only when its particular mode (vrtti) exists, then at the time of the absence of this specific mode, doubt may arise about ajñ ana, since, in the case of an ordinary pitcher, doubt arises about the existence of the pitcher when any cognitive mental mode is absent concerning that pitcher. But according to the Advaita-vedanta, doubt cannot arise about ajñ ana, because the existence of ajñ ana is never doubted, as it is revealed by saksin. Madhusudana answers that the existence of ajñ ana covering an object is the root cause of doubt about that object.¹¹⁷ Hence, when any cognitive mental mode embracing the pitcher is absent, the pitcher remains covered by ajñ ana. In this situation, doubt may arise as to whether the pitcher exists or not. But it is absurd to think ajñ ana can cover itself. Therefore, doubt as to whether ‘ajñ ana exists or not’ is impossible. However, it may be said that one doubts the indescribable nature of ajñ ana. This may lead one to doubt ‘is ajñ ana indescribable or not? ’ prompting an investigation into the nature of ajñ ana.

Recognising that retrospective knowledge such as ‘I did not know anything’ is a case of ajñ ana experienced at the time of deep sleep, opponents now ask how is it possible that this experience of ajñ ana is recollected as opposed to knowledge as it actually occurs in retrospective knowledge, while at the time of deep sleep, it was not experienced as opposed to knowledge. Madhusudana replies that like the agent ‘I’ (aham) revealed in retrospective knowledge, ajñ ana’s attribute of being opposed to knowledge is also revealed only at the time of retrospective knowledge. Thus memory concerns itself with ajñ ana alone and not other components of that retrospective experience. In fact, the retrospective knowledge under consideration is a consolidated experience (that is, perception-cummemory), where part of this experience, namely, ego (ahamartha), that is, the subject of the experience and ajñ ana’s attribute of being opposed to knowledge, are presented by perception, whereas ajñ ana is presented by memory.

Again, opponents object that as Madhusudana holds that ajñ ana is revealed by consciousness reflected on a mode of ajñ ana existing in saksin, such a mode may be presumed to continue along with ajñ ana, which does continue at the waking state, since ajñ ana is always the same. Madhusudana admits the problem and answers by identifying this mode of ajñ ana with the deep sleep condition. Thus when the deep sleep condition is broken at the time of awakening that particular ajñ ana-mode is also removed. Thus, at the waking state saksin continues to reveal ajñ ana, but not through its mode of deep sleep. Therefore, even though ajñ ana is one and it continuously exists through the states of deep sleep and wakefulness, due to the difference of limiting mode of ajñ ana, it is experienced differently. In this way, the experience of ajñ ana at the time of deep sleep is destroyed at the waking state, leaving behind an impression, which inspires memory of ajñ ana cognised at deep sleep.¹¹⁸ As the opponents are quick to indicate, the two early authors of Advaita-vedanta held somewhat contradictory views on this point. The author of Vivaraja (Prakafatma Yati)¹¹⁹ states that the retrospective knowledge of ajñ ana is a case of memory and Madhusudana ‘s explanation follows his view.¹²⁰ But the author of Vartika (Surefvara) states¹²¹that the experience of ajñ ana in deep sleep is not a case of recollection. These apparently conflicting statements are reconciled by Madhusudana in the following way: while the author of Vivaraja takes the retrospective knowledge of ajñ ana to be a case of memory, he is referring to it as limited by the mode of deep sleep on the authority of the Yogasutra of Patañ jali (1. 10.). On the other hand, the author of Vartika takes the experience of deep sleep to be the experience of ajñ ana and not a special mode of it because he was explaining the nature of the unmanifest creation while talking about the process of creation. In another context (BrAU Bhasya-vartika 3.4.103) the author of the Vartika accepted the view which was same as the view of Madhusudana.

Inferential evidence

After adducing perceptional evidence as to the existence of ajñ ana, Madhusudana proceeds to prove it by means of inference. In this connection he quotes¹²² the inference put forward by the author of Vivaraja which runs thus: ‘like the first flame of a lamp in darkness, valid knowledge presupposes an entity, because it reveals an object which was so far subject to the usage “the thing is not revealed”; such an entity is, however, (1) other than the antecedent absence (pragabhava) of the valid knowledge, (2) opposed to the usage “the object exists and is revealed, ”

(3) liable to dismissal by the said valid knowledge and (4) it exists in the same locus where the valid knowledge is produced. In the case of the first flame, for example, such an entity is darkness (which according to the Vedanta theory is an entity and not just a lack of light), and in the case of the main object to be proved by the inference is nothing but the valid knowledge of ajñ ana’. The adjectives of the object to be proved are inserted for the following reason. The pragabhava of valid knowledge is opposed to this knowledge, destroyed by the knowledge and exists in the same locus where knowledge is subsequently produced. But a pragabhava is not other than pragabhava. Likewise, the particular adrsta which produces valid knowledge, is other than the pragabhava of that knowledge, is exhausted when the same knowledge, its product, is produced and has existed in the same locus where the knowledge is subsequently produced. But such adrsta is not opposed to valid knowledge. Similarly, a specific adrsta, which is opposed to the valid knowledge, is other than the pragabhava of the knowledge and existed in the same locus where the knowledge is subsequently produced. But such adrsta is not discarded by the knowledge in question. Unless the knowledge is produced, there can be no question of it discarding the hostile adrsta. In the same way, the absolute absence of the valid knowledge (jñ anatyantabhava) is other than pragabhava of that knowledge, is opposed to that knowledge, and is discarded by the presence of that knowledge, but such absolute absence is not located where the said knowledge is subsequently produced. Therefore, all the four adjectives stated above in connection with the inferable entity (sadhya), that is ajñ ana, are necessary so that the inference may not be diverted. It does not apply to pragabhava, or to a favourable or unfavourable adrsta, or to the absolute absence of valid knowledge. The words ‘valid knowledge’ (the minor term in the above inference) include the valid knowledge of absolute Brahman as an epistemic adjective. Brahman, which has so far been subjected to the usage ‘Brahman is not revealed to me’, becomes revealed by that cognitive experience. Though Brahman is self-revealed, one still can experience, for instance, ‘Brahman is not revealed to me’. Just as the initial light of a lamp instantly removes one’s incomprehension of an object concealed by darkness, so also the valid knowledge reveals an object, having removed the ignorance covering that object. In both cases the process of revelation contradicts the usage namely, ‘the thing is not revealed to me’. Therefore, this conclusion does not make Brahman an object of an empirical cognition. This inference proves the general existence of ajñ ana.

The author of Tattvapradipika adduces another inference, also quoted by Madhusudana, ¹²³ which proves the existence of specific occurrence of ajñ ana. The inference is thus: a valid knowledge, of Caitra (a particular individual) discards a beginningless entity, which is other than that very valid knowledge, or its antecedent absence; because it is valid knowledge. Like the valid knowledge of Maitra, which does the same thing, namely it discards a beginningless entity (i.e. the antecedent absence) of the valid knowledge of Maitra, which is other than that very valid knowledge or its antecedent absence existing in Caitra. It should be understood that in the case of the valid knowledge of Maitra, such a beginningless entity is pragabhava of that knowledge, while in the case of the valid knowledge of Caitra, such an entity cannot be anything other than ajñ ana. This inference, therefore, results in the recognition of a specific ajñ ana, discarded by the valid knowledge of Caitra. Hence, the existence of that specific ajñ ana is proved by the inference.

Madhusudana has taken cognisance of the later writers (Navyah), ¹²⁴ who have suggested further improvements on the inference propounded by the Tattvapradipika. Their inference runs thus: valid knowledge under consideration destroys a beginningless entity which is other than the absence in general (samanyabhava) of the said valid knowledge, because this valid knowledge is a product (karya) like a pitcher. A pitcher is a product which also discards a beginningless entity, namely its absence immediately prior to its creation, which is other than the absence in general of the valid knowledge under consideration. In relation to the valid knowledge under consideration, such a beginningless entity, other than the absence in general of the valid knowledge under consideration, is ajñ ana. Ajñ ana, therefore, is established by such inference.

Evidence of fruti

In the eighth chapter of the Chandogyopanisad, it is stated that: ‘as a person, who does not know that there is gold buried under a place unconsciously treads the same ground time and again, so this individual always comes in contact with Brahman, yet being covered by anrta, they do not comprehend Brahman.’

Madhusudana¹²⁵ takes the word ‘anrta’to mean ajñ ana and therefore, he adduces this fruti as evidence of the existence of ajñ ana. His opponents argue that ‘anrta’ should not be taken to mean ajñ ana, since the word ‘rta’is generally used to mean good deeds, as in, for example, the fruti ‘rtam pibantau sukrtasya loke’.¹²⁶ The word ‘anrta’ should therefore mean bad deeds (i.e. sin). Madhusudana answers that the first fruti quoted above goes further, and says that atman is devoid of bad deeds (apahatapapma). If anrta is taken to mean ‘bad deeds’, as these opponents claim, then it should be acknowledged that the first fruti refers to the souls blinded by bad deeds (anrtena-pratyudha); at the same time, however, this fruti also takes atman to be devoid of all sins, which is an apparent contradiction. If, on the other hand, anrta is taken as ajñ ana, the fruti should mean that the soul is generally blinded by ajñ ana. Therefore, even though it is really devoid of any sins, a soul does not realise it and mistakes itself to be a sinner. Thus the word ‘anrta’ occurring in the first fruti, should, in addition, mean ajñ ana, and not merely bad deeds, because the analogy holds out the ignorance of an ordinary person about the location of treasures beneath his feet. Likewise, an individual soul does not know its true nature, because it is possessed by ajñ ana. Moreover, it must be recognised that from time immemorial, people have been labouring under an obstacle to self-realisation. Therefore, such an obstacle must be recognised as being removed with the dawning of knowledge. In ordinary experience, knowledge discards ignorance. Therefore, in the world of metaphysics, ignorance should be accepted as the beginningless obstacle, which is liable to dismissal by the knowledge of reality. That such an obstacle is dispelled by knowledge is also borne out by the fruti, which says that ultimately (when the knowledge arises) the cosmic illusion ceases to exist.¹²⁷

The evidence of arthapatti (inference from circumstances)¹²⁸

It should be noted here that Madhusudana tries to give a more practical reason for accepting ajñ ana as an object of metaphysical consideration. The evidence of implication also proves the existence of ajñ ana as a positive entity. It is a fact that all-bliss Brahman is self-revealed, yet it is equally true that such Brahman is not revealed to an ordinary person. How should such an apparent contradiction be explained? The explanation is found in the recognition of ajñ ana, which should then be taken as concealing the nature of Brahman from an ordinary individual. Another argument is that as the material cause of illusion cannot otherwise be explained, the existence of ajñ ana must be accepted as serving as the material cause of illusion. Neither mind (antahkaraja) nor Brahman can be taken as the material cause, for mind has to depend on the sense organs to produce a cognition. But the illusory knowledge of the shell-silver is produced independent of sense-object contact. So mind (antahkaraja) is helpless in producing that knowledge. Brahman being immutable, it cannot be the material cause of anything.¹²⁹ However, Brahman is taken to be the material cause of the universe only insofar as it is the substratum of ajñ ana, which is the material cause of all illusion.

Thus, all these four kinds of evidence prove the existence of ajñ ana as a beginningless, positive entity, capable of being eradicated by knowledge alone. Ajñ ana cannot be accepted as revealed by absolute consciousness, that is reality. If it is, the content of absolute revelation, it becomes as real as Brahman itself, and therefore should be taken to exist even at the time of liberation. If, on the other hand, ajñ ana is taken as revealed by saksin, that is the consciousness reflected in a mode of it (avidya-vrtti), ¹³⁰ then from an absolute standpoint such saksin is as false as its revelation. Ajñ ana, being the content of such revelation, naturally becomes false; just as ‘Rahu’ is revealed by the sun or the moon encapsulated by ‘Rahu’, so also ajñ ana is revealed by a stance of consciousness, (saksi), which is covered by ajñ ana. Ajñ ana, as such, cannot be manifest in a cognitive knowledge (vrtti-jñ ana). But, as previously demonstrated, vrtti-jñ ana can prove the existence of ajñ ana as something distinct from the object of illusion. Similarly, it is as liable to destruction as it is beginningless.

Substratum of avidya

Following Samksepa-fariraka, ¹³¹ Madhusudana takes pure consciousness to be the substratum of ajñ ana. Ajñ ana exercises its power (such as duhkhitva, etc.) on the jiva but it does not exist therein. The jiva is, according to Madhusudana (who possibly believed in the existence of a single individual self), ¹³² the reflection of consciousness on a special mode (vrtti) of avidya. Just as the blemishes on a mirror affect the reflection on it, but not the object reflected, so the operation of ajñ ana influences the jiva, but does not influence pure consciousness. Consciousness per se is not opposed to ajñ ana, but it is so when reflected on a mode. The sun sustains everything by its rays, but when these rays shine through the lens of a magnifying glass, they burn the grass etc. on which they fall. Likewise, ajñ ana remains safe in pure consciousness, but when the same consciousness becomes reflected on a special mode of ajñ ana, it destroys ajñ ana and its products.¹³³ When the jiva is called ‘ajñ a’, it only means that

avidya and its effects operates just on the individual soul.¹³⁴

Madhusudana’s opponents argue that although it is undeniable that illusion arises in the cogniser, such illusion is destroyed by valid knowledge arising in the same cogniser. Hence the cogniser, being the substratum of both error and valid knowledge, should be taken to be the locus of ajñ ana, which is nothing but nonrevelation of an object. Madhusudana answers that the cogniser is none other than saksin identified with the individual consciousness as well with pure Brahman, which is the substratum of ajñ ana. Thus, where there is identity between the cogniser, saksin and pure consciousness, ajñ ana can very well be said to exist in the cogniser.

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