First definition of Vivaraja

The second definition of falsity is taken from the Vivaraja: ¹⁴² mithya is an entity that appears in a place where it did not exist, does not exist, nor will exist in the future. Thus Mithya is not absolutely non-existent like a hare’s horn, for unlike it, mithya appears to exist somewhere. It is not absolutely real either, as its existence is contradicted (vadhya). (Pratipannopadhau traikalikanisedha-pratiyogitvam va mithyatvam.)¹⁴³

The question is, therefore, whether the absolute negation of the universe is real

(tattvika) or unreal (atattvika). Opponents argue that if such negation is real then a second reality other than Brahman must be acknowledged. However, such an admission will put an end to the monist theory. If, on the other hand, such negation is held to be pratibhasika (illusory), then the opponents agree with this because they also hold such negation to be illusory. In that case, Madhusudana does not put forward any new ideas. If such negation is said to possess pragmatic (vyavaharika) reality, then that being contradicted (vadhita) would make the universe, the positive counterpart of the negation, real, since a negation, if opposed, re-establishes its positive counterpart. Again, in this case, the fruti ‘neha nanasti kiñ cana’¹⁴⁴ has to be regarded as yielding a false proposition, ¹⁴⁵ thus making the universe a reality.

Madhusudana answers that in the case of the negation being ultimately real, it is regarded as being identical with Brahman, the locus (adhisthana) of such negation. So the reality of negation does not involve dualism. Furthermore, the positive counterpart of a real negation does not need to be real, for the real negation of illusory shell-silver does not make it real. On the other hand, such negation may be taken as unreal, that is, the negation is vyavaharika. Though a vyavaharika entity is liable to contradiction (vadhya), such negation does not make the universe, its counterpart, real, since in dream, the illusory negation of an equally illusory object does not result in the confirmation of its counterpart (i.e. the illusory object). So if the negation is contradicted, it does not mean that such negation will confirm the reality of its positive counterpart. Only when the negation possesses a lesser degree of existence (nyunasattaka) than its positive counterpart, does it fail to oppose the reality of its positive counterpart. In the present case, both the universe and its negation possess the same degree of existence (tulyasattaka) namely, vyayaharika sattva. Such negation need not imply absolute (paramarthika) existence of the universe, for both the negation and its positive counterpart stand on the same footing, in that both are equally liable to contradiction. This is the case in the destruction of an object, which negates the existence of both the object and its antecedent absence. Both the universe and its contradiction are equally liable to contradiction, because both have a common feature, namely drfyatva. As the fruti ‘neha nanasti kiñ cana’ asserts the unreality of the unreal object, it cannot be regarded as invalid (apramaja).

Opponents argue that the negation of the shell-silver and that of the universe cannot be on par in terms of their specific attributes (svarupa), ¹⁴⁶ since in the case of the negation of silver, the form of the contradictory knowledge is ‘here (i.e. in the shell) silver did not exist’. If this knowledge is analysed it reveals that, in this case, the positive counterpart of negation is the real silver. (It should be noted here that ‘real’ means vyavaharika). It may be said, of course, that the content of the shell-silver illusion was the illusory silver, and thus itself, according to the rule that the content of illusion should be identical with the content of the contradictory knowledge of that illusion, the counterpart of the negation of shell-silver is illusory silver taken in terms of reality (paramarthikatva). So the second explanation means ‘the illusory silver did not really exist’. But equally this cannot be regarded as the negation of illusory silver per se. If, on the other hand, the contradictory knowledge is taken to negate real silver in terms of illusion, then similarly such real silver is not negated as it really is. Therefore, the negation of shell-silver cannot be taken as an example of the negation of an entity just as it is (svarupatah).¹⁴⁷

Moreover, even the author of Vivaraja, whose view is followed by Madhusudana in the present case, states that the positive counterpart of the negation of silver is the ordinary real (laukika paramarthika) silver taken as it is, and not the illusory silver. The Vivaraja also states as an alternative view, that the illusory silver taken as real is negated in the contradictory knowledge, but not at its face value. In such a case, the Vivaraja cannot confirm that in the example of the shell-silver contradiction, the positive counterpart is the unqualified illusory silver. So how can the shell-silver contradiction serve as an example for the contradiction of the universe?

The third objection is that if the universe is negated as it is then, like the sky-flower, the universe also becomes absolutely non-existent. In that case, how can the fruti confirm the creation of the universe, because an absolutely non-existent object cannot be created?

Madhusudana answers that in the first case of contradictory knowledge, the positive counterpart is indeed the illusory silver. In the shell-silver illusion, the illusory silver had appeared as identified with real silver.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the knowledge that contradicts it has the illusory silver as its positive counterpart, which appears as identified with the real silver. In other words, the illusory silver ‘appearing as identical with real silver’ is negated in the experience of contradiction, where such illusory silver is taken just at its face value. In such a case, the same silver that appeared in the illusion becomes contradicted by the opposing knowledge.

In the second case stated earlier, the content of the aforementioned experience of contradiction, namely, ‘here existed no silver’, is not merely the illusory silver but the illusory silver ‘appearing identical with the real silver’. The statement in the Vivaraja should thus be interpreted in the following way: the illusory silver appearing as identical with real silver, as qualified by its special attributes, is negated in the experience of contradiction. Though, as an alternative, the same statement may refer to the negation of illusory silver taken as real. From the form of the sentence used, Madhusudana adds, it appears that the Vivaraja only casually puts forward this alternative form. In fact, the aforementioned Vivaraja passage can be formulated as follows: it means that illusory silver taken as identified with real silver is negated in terms of shell-silver’s specific attributes (svarupa) or (and this ‘or’ shows the dislike of the Vivaraja for the second view) in terms of reality.

In the third case, the inference: ‘the universe is not as unreal as a sky flower, since a sky flower never appears to exist, while the universe does appear to exist until the dawning of true knowledge.

Such a universe, which can be cognised, may possess its creation, function, a material cause and destruction, and yet can still be the positive counterpart of its absolute negation.

Thus it is just like the shell-silver, which possesses creation etc. and yet can be absolutely negated. In this inference, the analogy lies between the negation of the illusory silver taken per se, and the universe, also confirmed to be negated as per se.¹⁴⁹

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