Object or content of avidya

Pure consciousness is not only the locus (afraya), but also the object (visaya) of avidya. In other words, pure consciousness is somehow connected with avidya so that one has the usage ‘Brahman does not exist nor is it revealed’. Even though Brahman as the self-revealed reality may always be revealed as pure existence it is not revealed as pure bliss, due to the operation of avidya,. At least, such usage as ‘Brahman is revealed to me as pure bliss’ is found wanting, and lack of this usage is due to the operation of avidya. This brings about the false relationship (adhyasika tadatmya) between avidya and Brahman. Such a relationship persists until the dawning of true knowledge. As this contact of avidya with Brahman is beginningless, such questions as ‘when did the contact first take place? ’, ‘when was the contact first known? ’or, ‘when did it first exist? ’, do not arise.¹³⁷ Though undifferentiated consciousness cannot be partially revealed by itself, that is as the substratum only and not in its fullest glory, yet due to the special power of avidya, absolute Brahman is indicated as non-existent, not revealed. It can also be experienced as just real (sat), the locus of the world illusion.

Ajñ ana thus conceals Brahman from jiva. The problem with this is that just as a pitcher covers a lamp, thereby barring the lamp’s contact with another object (non-luminous), similarly avidya, by covering consciousness, should prevent its contact with another object. But how can avidya conceal consciousness from another consciousness, namely jiva? Madhusudana replies that jiva, being limited by mind (antahkaraja), is illusorily distinguished from pure consciousness, and avidya conceals pure consciousness from such illusorily distinguished jiva, which is thus reduced to the status of another object. As both the distinction between Brahman and jiva and the concealment of Brahman from jiva are beginningless, they involve no interdependency.¹³⁸

Again, one may ask how can self-luminous consciousness be the object (visaya) of ajñ ana? In other words, how can ajñ ana be related to consciousness? Like darkness and light, they cannot have a mutual relationship of any kind.¹³⁹

Madhusudana answers that pure consciousness, or saksin, is not opposed to ajñ ana. In fact, avidya, being the illusory creation of consciousness, can easily stay in consciousness like any other created object. For example, an analysis of the experience ‘I am ignorant of the object you are referring to’, yields the following results: when a person has general knowledge about an object (say, the pitcher) doubt may arise in the mind as to whether it is a pitcher or not. It follows that though the doubt is based on the general knowledge of the pitcher, this doubt itself embraces the pitcher in its specific form (ghatatva). Similarly, in the given experience, the pitcher (the object referred to by the first person) is taken specifically, though such knowledge on the part of the second person is based on the general knowledge of the object referred to by the first person. This knowledge, therefore, is a revelation of the object (i.e. the pitcher) referred to by the first person. Such revelation is nothing but the revelation of consciousness as conditioned by the pitcher (ghatavachinna caitanya prakafa). But this very revelation reveals ajñ ana, as testified by the above experience. This shows that revelation of consciousness (caitanya prakafa though in the present case such consciousness is limited by the pitcher) is not opposed to ajñ ana. In other words, consciousness that reveals its own self also reveals the ajñ ana at the same time. In this sense, therefore, ajñ ana may be related to knowledge (jñ ana), even though both Jñ ana and ajñ ana may be concerned with the same object in the same form. On the other hand, knowledge of an object is found to destroy ajñ ana regarding the same object. How is it possible to reconcile these two apparently contradictory facts? ¹⁴⁰ Madhusudana says that knowledge is not opposed to ajñ ana when it is intuitive knowledge (saksi-jñ ana). That is, intuitive knowledge being the substratum of ajñ ana is not opposed to it. When, on the other hand, such knowledge is a cognitive knowledge (vrtti-jñ ana), it discards ajñ ana at once. Such an explanation therefore, presupposes a saksi-jñ ana different from ordinary knowledge (vrtti-jñ ana). Saksi-jñ ana is nothing but saksin or consciousness, which not being opposed to ajñ ana, can have a mutual relationship. In this sense, caitanya may very well be the object of ajñ ana.

Avidya is anirvacaniya

The nature of avidya cannot be specifically determined. Therefore, avidya is known as ‘anirvacaniya’ (indescribable). Reality may be divided into three categories: absolutely real (sat, like Brahman), absolutely unreal (asat, like the horns of a hare) or a compromise between the two. However, avidya does not belong to any of these categories. If it is real like Brahman, it can never be destroyed. If it is absolutely unreal like the horns of a hare, it cannot be cognised at all. Since a compromise between the two is absurd, avidya cannot fall within this category either. Defying all categories, avidya is thus said to be indefinable (anirvacaniya) or false (mithya). Opponents raise the objection that the negation of the real world means the assertion of unreal and vice versa; therefore, how can there be an entity that is both real and unreal? Madhusudana answers that the concept of contradiction between absence and its positive counterpart is based on the presumption of reality of both. But in view of the fact that everything other than Brahman is false, such a presumption is unwarranted. Hence, a false thing, that is avidya, comes under a fourth category, being other than the three mentioned above, namely, the real, the unreal and a combination of both. Avidya is indescribable in this sense.

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